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1. Introduction 
1.1. The contribution of the thesis 
What explains continuity and change in post-Cold War maritime security 
strategies? What lessons can we learn from the employment of such 
comprehensive grand strategies in maritime regions where traditional and 
non-traditional threats converge? While a range of scholars employ rationalist 
or reflectivist theories in studies aimed at explaining or understanding 
particular maritime security problems, such as piracy, this author joins the few 
who engage themselves in the study of the conceptual development of 
maritime security strategies in this thesis. 
This thesis suggests that structural realism provides convincing 
explanations to the continuity and the most important changes in the maritime 
security strategies of Finland, Sweden and the US over the past three decades. 
It thus contributes to filling a gap in the conceptual maritime security literature 
by employing an analytical framework derived from structural realism in an 
aggregated analysis of the findings presented in its empirical chapters. These 
comprise five articles examining the logic of the maritime security strategies 
employed by the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) member 
states Finland and Sweden as components of their respective grand strategies. 
It concludes that while their maritime security concept remains broad, the 
recent increase in security pressure involves a renewed priority of the military 
sector of security. Accordingly, navies are re-using the bi- and multinational 
measures implemented with naval support by a broad set of civil agencies and 
the shipping industry to improve maritime security, to support the level of 
maritime domain awareness required for establishing regional sea control and 
project power from the sea. 
The US use of military and political instruments of power to promote its 
national economic interests is no longer unequivocal. Instead, the US 
increasingly uses economic means to achieve its national military and political 
ends, while balance of power considerations induce weaker states to cluster 
around the rivalling great powers. For Finland and Sweden, converging 
security interests and a common external security threat have induced 
processes of security policy transformation, characterised by rapprochement 
with the US and NATO and by deepened bilateral defence cooperation. This 
development is spearheaded by their navies. 
  
1
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1.2. The aim of the thesis 
The aim of this thesis, that employs a structural realism framework in its 
analyses, is twofold. First, it aims to explain continuity and change in the post-
Cold War maritime security strategies employed in the Baltic Sea region, in 
which Russia has declined and then re-emerged as a regional power, with a 
focus on non-aligned Finland and Sweden whose security policies are in a state 
of transformation. Given that these small states lack the economic and military 
power required to pursue independent maritime security strategies, we must 
duly consider the role of wider security frameworks composed of the EU, NATO 
and the US. This thesis key assumption that the post-Cold War conceptual 
maritime security developments of the US – the Cold War victor and the world’s 
sole superpower – has influenced states worldwide leads us to its second aim. 
It involves explaining continuity and change in the US post-Cold War maritime 
security concept by examining its maritime security strategy development. 
To fulfil the second aim, we must also examine the influence of the maritime 
security developments in the dynamic region comprising the East and South 
China Seas. This is simply because China represents the rising regional power 
that has the potential to become “a true global peer” of the US in decades to 
come (Brooks and Wohlforth 2016). The two aims are mutually supportive. We 
will examine, draw conclusions on and compare the logic of the US employment 
of its maritime security strategy in two regions in which it confronts a 
challenger state. Thereto, we will expound on the lessons learned from the 
post-Cold War employment of maritime security strategies in two distinct 
regions where traditional and non-traditional maritime security threats 
converge. This will give us a more comprehensive understanding. 
Baldwin (1997: 24–25) defined “security as a policy objective 
distinguishable from others”. This thesis follows him by defining maritime 
security as a national security policy objective while leaving the “means most 
appropriate for its pursuit (…) open to empirical inquiry”. It defines conceptual 
continuity as the continued Cold War focus on military control of the maritime 
domain for the purpose of territorial defence, naval access, power projection 
and maritime trade. Conversely, change represents the incorporation of wider, 
multi-sectoral, definitions of security, focussed on fostering good order at sea 
to the benefit of many by employing civilian and military resources in coalition 
operations to counter crime and terrorism in the maritime domain. Somewhat 
surprisingly, maritime security remains an insufficiently researched issue-area 
of national security despite that much effort has been devoted to the study of 
particular maritime security problems. By examining the maritime security 2
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strategies pursued by the US, Finland and Sweden, this thesis contributes to 
“clarifying the meaning” (Baldwin 1997: 6) of the maritime security concept 
while explicating on the logic of their selection of means for its pursuit. 
In 1991, maritime security was a rarely used term. When used, it was 
integral of maritime1 strategies, referring to naval control of sea lanes for 
power projection and strategic supply – and the provision of national merchant 
shipping capacity for these ends. Between 2013–2015, maritime powers 
France (FR PM 2015), India (IN MoD 2015), Spain (ES PoG 2013), the UK (UK 
Gov 2014) and the US (US DoD 2015) published cross-sectoral national 
maritime security strategies; intrinsically linked to their national security and 
maritime strategies. In 2014, the EU Council (2014) published a maritime 
security strategy, the scope of which was global, and an action plan for its 
implementation. Although the definitions of maritime security vary in these 
documents (see section 1.3), they all outline comprehensive visions of 
managing threats, risks and opportunities, as well as protecting and advancing 
national interests such as trade and resource exploitation on regional or global 
scales. This adoption of broad maritime security strategies – complementary to 
national security and maritime strategies – is a conceptual change central to 
the research problem addressed in this thesis. However, the recent return of 
geopolitical rivalries to centre stage of international relations (Mead 2014) 
influence what national interests states’ give priority in the maritime domain. 
This suggests, after all, that continuity may be prevailing. 
Following Stolberg (2012: 41), this thesis defines policy as the formulation 
of “what to do about something” or “what is to be done”, i.e. stating the 
common “ends” of policy and strategy while “[t]he implementing strategy 
provides the how to do it” (italics in original). Accordingly, policy directs 
strategy while “there must be policy approval for each component of the 
supporting strategy” (italics in original), i.e. approval by leaders of the policy-
making actor on the “ways” and “means” outlined in the strategy. This thesis 
thus understands formulation of strategy by rational actors as “a constant 
process of adaptation [and response] to shifting conditions and circumstances” 
in a complex and uncertain world (Murray and Grimsley 1996[1994]: 1). 
Hence, it recognises that policy and higher (i.e. grand) strategy are interwoven. 
                                                          
1 Here, we make a distinction between the narrow term naval, a single-service 
approach that places emphasis on establishing/maintaining naval capabilities and 
employing force at sea, and the wider term maritime, which includes the full range of 
activities and interests in maritime domain and their interactions with other domains.  3
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Policy-implementing strategies constitute a hierarchy. Different levels of 
decision-making develop its strategy documents for distinct purposes and with 
varying degree of generalisation. National security strategies are grand 
strategies, i.e. strategies coordinated at the highest levels of the state that 
expand on the use of a full suite of hard and soft power available to a state or 
an alliance under states of peace, crises and war. In military strategy, these are 
often abstracted as the application of Diplomatic, Information, Military, and 
Economic (DIME) instruments of power to reach comprehensive political end-
states and manage the desired and undesired effects on the Political, Military, 
Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information (PMESII) dimensions of a 
complex “engagement space” (see NATO 2013: 1–8 – 1–11, 3–30 – 3–36). 
Figure 1 illustrates this thesis understanding of how maritime security and 
maritime strategies fit into this hierarchy. N.B. the actual outline of the 
hierarchy and the titles of the strategy documents adopted by individual nation 
states – as well as their scope and content – differ. 
 
Figure 1: This thesis generic understanding of how recent maritime security 
strategies and traditional maritime strategies fit into the hierarchy of national 
policy-implementing strategies. Source: Author. 
4
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Gray (1999: 17) provides an essentially military definition of strategy, i.e. 
“the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the end of policy” 
(italics in original). It serves us in establishing the necessary distinction 
between maritime strategy and maritime security strategy. Both types of 
strategies incorporate the full range of activities and interests in the maritime 
domain, their interactions with other domains and their geographical scope are 
regional or global. However, a maritime security strategy is a comprehensive 
grand strategy for the maritime domain outlining the “purposeful employment 
of all instruments of power available to a security community” (Gray 
2008[2007]: 283). A maritime strategy, for its part, represents a 
comprehensive military strategy focussing on the application of naval power.2 
It prescribes a variety of “considerations for navies” in: i) peacetime; ii) “naval 
operations short of open warfare”; iii) “the non-war functions of naval power 
that continue even during wartime”; and iv) their wartime functions in concert 
with other armed services (Hattendorf 2013: 8).3 This thesis will examine both 
types of strategies, relevant to gain a comprehensive understanding. 
In his study of the Byzantine Empire – a state actor lacking a formal written 
statement of national security and never used the word strategy – Luttwak 
(2009: 409) concluded that “[a]ll states have a grand strategy, whether they 
know it or not. That is inevitable because grand strategy is simply the level at 
which knowledge and persuasion, or in modern terms intelligence and 
diplomacy, interact with military strength to determine outcomes in a world of 
other states with their own ‘grand strategies’” (italics in original).4 His position 
is equally valid for maritime security strategies, since they constitute grand 
strategies for the maritime domain.  
This study follows Luttwak (2009: 415–418) by opting to identify 
“operational codes” in state actors’ maritime strategic policy behaviour. 
Accordingly, it highlights the logic of states’ maritime security strategies as 
components of their grand strategies. This is particularly relevant when 
studying small states, whose limited national capabilities may not justify the 
adoption of national maritime strategies. Given the linkages between national 
                                                          
2 Booth (2014[1977]: 15–16) specified three strategic roles for a navy: the policing; 
the diplomatic; and the military. 
3 N.B. national maritime strategies prepared by e.g. ministries of industry or fisheries 
often omit the military dimension and typically focus on blue growth and maritime 
management (see MoI Sweden 2015). 
4 Although Luttwak focusses on the military dimension of state interaction in his 
analysis, his statement is valid for the full range of instruments of power available to a 
state. 5
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security strategies, maritime security strategies and maritime strategies, we 
must study a wide range of strategy documents adopted by the actors 
examined. Since we will compare the logic of the maritime security strategies 
pursued by small and major powers – equally aimed at protecting and 
promoting national interests – the obvious asymmetries regarding the 
available empirical material are manageable. 
Concerning security strategies adopted by international bodies such as the 
EU, Tanner et al. (2009: 45) have noted that a “high degree of [interstate] 
consensus” on common aims is required, which must be “decoupled by the 
interests and priorities of individual states”. As a result, this necessitates “the 
use of a broader canvas”. Of relevance to this study, they concluded that 
although progress to these ends may be smooth in times of peace and stability, 
it “can easily be halted by unforeseen events that bring instability and fear back 
into the equation”. 
To fulfil the second aim of this thesis, we engage ourselves in a qualitative 
study of the US maritime strategy developments. Clearly, its maritime security 
strategy has not developed in a context of geopolitical isolation. Instead, we can 
expect that a variety of factors and actors on a global scale have influenced it. 
We must therefore examine the US maritime security strategy developments in 
geographically separated, influential, maritime contexts. 
Given that this thesis understands the post-Cold War concept of maritime 
security as being in continuous development, its aim is process oriented. To 
understand the nuances of this process, we must expound on the lessons that 
we can learn from the employment of maritime security strategies in regions 
where traditional and non-traditional maritime security threats converge.5 
Here, we can learn a lot from engaging in qualitative analyses at state, 
international sub-system and system levels. In the last decades, the East and 
South China Seas have become the scene of escalating territorial disputes, 
traditional military great power competition, but also a variety of non-
traditional maritime security threats such as piracy, terrorism and human 
smuggling. 
                                                          
5 In this thesis, traditional security issues refer to conventional interstate threats 
and/or the use of military force. Non-traditional security issues, for their part, are 
complex and often transnational “challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples 
and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources” such as natural disasters, 
irregular migration, people and drug smuggling, trafficking and transnational crime 
(RSIS 2007). 6
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More recently, the Baltic Sea region has transformed from a “sea of peace” 
(The Nordic Council 1992: 34) to an arena where national, regional and great 
power dynamics interact. Here, piracy and terrorism are rare problems while 
“smuggling of drugs and weapons and human trafficking” are being reported 
(Fransas et al. 2013: 20). As in the East and South China Seas, a regional power 
wields various instruments of power to promote its national interests in 
domains including the maritime. Thereto, the Baltic Sea is also one of the 
world’s busiest seas, which very slow exchange of water makes it sensitive to 
pollution caused by shipping accidents (HELCOM 2011). However, in contrast 
to the East and South China Seas, the maritime security of the Baltic Sea has to 
date received scant scholarly attention. This justifies the priority assigned to 
this region in this thesis.  
To fulfil the twofold aim of this thesis the following research questions are 
posed, of which the first and the third addresses the strategies adopted and 
employed by the state actors examined, while the second and the fourth 
addresses the consequences thereof – and the lessons to be learnt – in each of 
the two regions of study: 
1. What explains continuity and change in the post-Cold War maritime 
security strategy of the US? 
2. What lessons regarding continuity and change can we learn from the 
post-Cold War employment of maritime security strategies in the East 
and South China Seas?  
3. What explains continuity and change in the post-Cold War maritime 
security strategy of Sweden and Finland in light of the recent resurgence 
of regional military threats? 
4. What lessons regarding continuity and change can we learn from the 
post-Cold War employment of maritime security strategies in the Baltic 
Sea region? 
Answering the first and the second research questions contributes to 
fulfilling the second aim of this thesis, i.e. explaining continuity and change in 
the US post-Cold War maritime security concept by examining the development 
of its maritime security strategy. Answering the third and fourth research 
questions contributes to fulfilling the first aim of this thesis, i.e. explaining 
continuity and change in the post-Cold War maritime security strategies 
employed in the Baltic Sea region with a focus on non-aligned Finland and 
Sweden. Finally, answering all research questions will allow us to compare not 
only the logic of the US – the preponderant power, external to both regions – 
7
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interactions with coastal states in each of the regions, but also the resulting 
regional security dynamics with a focus on the maritime domain. 
1.3. The setting 
The 1991 break-up of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (the USSR) – 
more commonly referred to as the Soviet Union – marked the end to a policy of 
confrontation between two power-blocs and the entry into a new era in 
international relations. Arguably, it resulted from a host of interacting 
domestic and international factors, of which the failure of the weak Soviet 
economic system to respond to changes in a globalising economy was 
instrumental (Wallander 2003: 137; Kramer 2003: 183). At the time, Western 
states maritime security conceptions were shaped by Cold War requirements, 
referring to “the maritime component of international conflict” (Scott 2011:  
77). The continuous importance assigned by states to the maritime domain for 
satisfying their needs for transport, trade, power projection and defence (Till 
2009: 286) renders maritime security a relevant field of study in its own right. 
Arguably, the value of the maritime domain has increased in the post-Cold War 
period. 
There has been a gradual shift in focus towards the maritime domain not 
only by states, but also by non-state actors. Non-governmental organisations 
have frequently called for attention to the intrinsic values of the marine 
environment, while direct-action groups such as the Sea Shepard have been 
accused of pursuing maritime eco-extremism (Mills and Ernst 2012). Post-Cold 
War reductions in naval funding have coincided with the emergence of 
maritime private security actors, challenging the traditional role of states as 
maritime security providers (Carafano 2012). India, for example, has 
repeatedly opposed this challenge of their monopoly of force by setting 
crewmembers operating vessels of such state or non-state actors on trial for 
their actions, causing bilateral disputes with the need for international 
arbitration (PCA 2015; Shettar 2015). 
Maritime security management is often coalesced with issues of ocean 
governance (see Wirth 2012), mainly due to the fact that the sea is an ever 
increasing source of food and raw materials6 essential for national wealth and 
prosperity. Accordingly, the EU defines maritime security as: “a state of affairs 
of the global maritime domain, in which international law and national law are 
                                                          
6 I.e. oil, gas and minerals, including rare earth elements (see Ting and Seaman 2015: 
122–123). 8
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enforced, freedom of navigation is guaranteed and citizens, infrastructure, 
transport, the environment and marine resources are protected” (EU Council 
2014: 3). France defines it as “preventing and fighting all intentional activities 
which are hostile to our interests” (FR PM 2015: 2). For the UK, maritime 
security is the “advancement and protection of national interests, at home and 
abroad, through the active management of risks and opportunities in and from 
the maritime domain, in order to strengthen and extend the UK’s prosperity, 
security and resilience and to help shape a stable world” (UK Gov 2014: 15). To 
the US Sea Services, maritime security is about protecting its “sovereignty and 
maritime resources, support[ing] free and open seaborne commerce, and 
counter[ing] weapons proliferation, terrorism, transnational crime, piracy, 
illegal exploitation of the maritime environment, and unlawful seaborne 
immigration” (U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Coast Guard 2015: 26). 
Accordingly, the maritime strategies of Western states’ navies have widened in 
recent decades and now include a broad array of security issues (see Till 2013; 
Scott 2011; Rahman 2009c). Sea power, however, remains an integral part. 
The emphasis on promoting national interests in the maritime security 
strategies put forth by the UK and the US reverberates in the more generally 
phrased strategy of the EU. As Germond (2015: 191–193) suggests, economic 
reasons underlie the EU’s quest to secure the maritime domain and protect the 
rights and interests of its member states. After all, maritime security 
deficiencies limit the prospects for sustainable blue growth7 as they complicate 
marine exploitation and discourage investors. The comprehensive, inter-
sectoral, approach to the maritime domain of the EU gained momentum by its 
2007 launch of an Integrated Maritime Policy (EC 2007). 
A corresponding development is evident in South Africa, whose Defence 
Minister in 2011 declared maritime security “an increasingly pressing priority” 
and “a critical element of collective human security” linked to regional 
“development and economic prosperity” (Sisulu 2012). Accordingly, maritime 
security was included among South Africa’s top ten strategic priorities in 
2012.8 In contrast, earlier documents such as its 2006 maritime doctrine and 
1996 Defence White Paper emphasised traditional sea-power concepts and 
                                                          
7 The EU’s Blue Growth Strategy focus areas are: i) blue energy; ii) aquaculture; iii) 
maritime, coastal and cruise tourism; and iv) blue biotechnology (European 
Commission 2012: 7–13). 
8 Among the priorities were also to consolidate the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) Maritime Security Strategy (RSA DoD 2012: 2, 7, 12). 9
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assigned secondary roles to naval diplomacy and policing (RSA DoD 2006: 8, 
48–50; RSA DoD 1996, Ch. 5, para. 27–30). 
Much effort has been devoted to studying the developments of the issue 
areas embraced by today’s broad maritime security concept, i.e. maritime 
terrorism; maritime piracy; the smuggling of drugs and humans in the 
maritime domain; and the genesis of private security companies as providers 
of maritime security services.9 Scholars applying various approaches to their 
study of legal or policy problems in these issue areas have created a body of 
research.  
Accordingly, scholars have pointed out maritime security as an emerging 
sub-discipline within Security Studies, in turn a sub-field of International 
Relations (IR) theory (Bruns 2014). However, to Bueger (2015: 159, 163) the 
term is a “buzzword” of international relations with “no definite meaning,” 
increasingly used in “maritime policy, ocean governance and international 
security.” This is partly due to the limited amount of scholarly effort dedicated 
to date to explaining the resulting changes in states´ maritime security 
conceptions, i.e. why these changes have occurred.10 Few authors (see Bueger 
2015; Till 2013; Yetkin 2013; Scott 2011; Rahman 2009c) have engaged 
themselves in theory-driven analyses of the conceptual post-Cold War 
development of maritime security. This limitation in previous results – of 
relevance to explain contemporary policymaking – represents the research gap 
addressed by this thesis. 
1.4. Positioning the thesis in the academic literature 
The array of scholarly work on various issue-areas of maritime security that 
the following chapter will address indicates the nested character of Western 
states’ maritime security strategies. In fact, these strategies represent the 
aggregated result from states’ adoption of various sub-strategies in different 
sectors of security, each of which outlines a distinct approach to problem 
solving and promoting civil and military national interests pertaining to, or 
relating to, the maritime domain. This thesis draws on the fact that the priority 
of such sub-strategies to comprehensive maritime security strategies tends to 
change over time. Given the dominance of the military sector in states’ early 
                                                          
9 N.B. maritime security is an issue area in itself. Following Vertzberger (1990: 71), I 
break it down further into these categories based on their information content and the 
primary actors. 
10 Struett and Nance (2013: 8), as well as McGahan and Lee (2013: 162), arrive at a 
similar conclusion regarding the literature on maritime piracy. 10
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post-Cold War maritime security strategies, a residual effect of the Cold War, 
its priority in subsequent strategies would imply conceptual continuity while 
emphasis placed on issues in any other sector of security indicates change. 
By engaging in a theory-driven conceptual analysis, this thesis contributes 
to explain the continuity and change in the maritime security strategies of 
Finland, Sweden and the US over the past three decades. It duly considers the 
influence of the sole superpower on the maritime security strategies of the two 
former by its key assumption that the post-Cold War conceptual maritime 
security developments has influenced states worldwide. This is in consonance 
with the claim of structural realism that great powers “dominate and shape 
international politics”, while recognising the fact that realism and liberalism 
constitute the dominant competing paradigms of IR theory (Mearsheimer 
2001: 14–17; Ikenberry 2009: 203–206). The latter state of affairs is 
acknowledged also by critical theorists, who often point to the scholarly 
dominance of the social science discipline by US researchers, reminding us that 
even the idea of conceptualising international relations as a science with a 
dominant positivistic methodology is entirely American (see Crawford 2000: 
15–17, 88–90; Wæver 1998: 696–724).11 
Following Waltz (2004: 5), it must be noted that constructivism in the 
tradition of Wendt (1999) firmly entered the American discipline of IR since 
the millennium. As opposed to the “critical constructivism” firmly established 
in European Journals, this approach is complementary to realism and 
liberalism since it endorses “a scientific approach to social inquiry”, conceding 
“important points to materialist and individualist perspectives.” It challenges 
realism and liberalism by focussing on “the role of shared ideas and norms in 
shaping state behaviour” (Ikenberry 1999), arguing that the anarchic nature of 
the international system – which rules according to Wendt are socially 
constructed – may be overcome by states’ identity and interest formation 
(Wendt 1992). Notwithstanding, this thesis draws on the explanatory power of 
structural realism.  
Augmented by supporting analytical frameworks derived from Till (2013) 
and Knudsen (1988; 1996) in Article 2 and in the concluding chapter, the 
structural realism framework presented in Chapter 3 is the main lens through 
                                                          
11 See Hoffman (1977) and Ikenberry (2009) for rationalist accounts of IR as an 
American field. 1
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which the empirical material will be analysed.12 However, it may rightly be 
argued that Finland‘s and Sweden’s integration into the common foreign and 
security policy of the EU have influenced their choice of entering into a bilateral 
naval cooperation. To provide a more comprehensive understanding of their 
complex incentives, it employs a competing theoretical framework based on 
the neofunctionalism strand of liberalism in Article 3. N.B. this analytical siding 
contributes to enabling us to assess the explanatory power of structural 
realism, which we will discuss in Articles 2 and 3 as well as in the concluding 
chapter. 
Examining the change in the US post-Cold War maritime security strategy 
through a structural realism lens is worthwhile in two respects. First, it has 
empirical merit by clarifying the influence on its maritime security conception 
of: i) maritime terrorism; ii) maritime piracy and criminality; and iii) the 
territorialisation of the sea by coastal states the following interlinked issues 
areas. However, we must not study the influence of these issue-areas in 
isolation. Instead, the post-Cold War context must be taken into due 
consideration. This context centres on a shift in superpower competition from 
the political-ideological to the economic sphere and involves a complex nexus 
of geoeconomic and geopolitical concerns (Dent 2010: 243; Raphael and Stokes 
2010: 391).13 Second, this thesis has theoretical merits by assessing strengths 
and weaknesses of structural realism in explaining the naval cooperation of 
Finland and Sweden, involving regional and global security dynamics. In 
addition, its reflections on the conditions enabling small states to influence the 
conditions for cooperating with a great power have theoretical relevance. 
We can more thoroughly assess the explanations provided by structural 
realism by contrasting and challenging them. Here, various strands of 
liberalism have offered competing perspectives to those of the realism 
tradition since the end of the First World War. While neoliberalism represents 
the main competitor of structural realism, neofunctionalism – a thread of the 
sociological liberalism strand – is a theoretical framework designed to explain 
European integration. Finland and Sweden are small Nordic states deeply 
                                                          
12 See Figure 6 for a flowchart outlining the logic of how this thesis understands the 
responses of state actors to threats to typical referent objects in key maritime security 
sectors. 
13 In a forward-looking article, Buzan (1991b: 432–433) characterised the Cold War 
security agenda as dominated by political/military concerns due to the real danger of 
war stemming from intense US/USSR rivalry, transmitted into regions that were more 
peripheral by their arms transfers. Inversely, he expected a rise in ranks of economic, 
societal and environmental issues on the international security agenda.  12
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embedded in the common foreign and security policy of the EU. The ever 
stronger perception among its member states of “common security and defence 
challenges”, requiring resources beyond what they individually possess, have 
made them agree upon “the vision of a stronger Europe” and a global strategy 
outlining strengthened “EU cooperation on external security and defence” (EU 
2016; EC 2016c). Their coordinated efforts to develop strategic defence 
capabilities for this common end, justify the use of neofunctionalism as a 
competing theoretical framework – i.e. we expound on the force of spillover 
effects – in Article 3. Here, we employ a slightly modified version of 
neofunctionalism to contrast and challenge structural realism’s explanations 
on the bilateral naval cooperation of Finland and Sweden. This approach is 
novel but not unique. Ojanen (2006), Parrein (2011), Sauer (2015) and 
Westberg (2015) have employed neofunctionalism to explain the process 
leading up to the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), 
international defence cooperation within the EU as well as within the Nordic 
Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO). 
The rise of authoritarian regional powers Russia and China, accompanied by 
expectations on the international community to accept their perceived need for 
expanded spheres of influence14 and their ambition “to become more 
formidable powers on the international stage” (Kagan 2015), must be duly 
considered. Given their challenge of the US hegemony in the last decade – or, 
as regards China the last decades – we can expect them to influence the 
character of the maritime security concerns of the coastal states in two distinct 
regions. Such friction is prominent in the East and South China Seas as well as 
in the Baltic Sea. Since the rise of China has preceded that of Russia, we use the 
influence of the developments in the region of the East and South China Seas to 
draw out the implications for the US conceptual maritime security 
developments, which we use as a reference when we examine the maritime 
security developments of the Baltic Sea region. 
To understand the regional implications of the maritime security 
developments, we must study also the foreign policies of less powerful states 
in key regions and their interaction with the US. Examining their foreign 
policies will contrast the traditional focus on great powers in the structural 
realist literature, adhering to the traditional wisdom that the role of small 
states in the construction and maintenance of international security orders has 
                                                          
14 Such a sphere involves “the [political] claim by a state to exclusive or predominant 
control over a foreign area or territory (…) which other nations may or may not 
recognize as a matter of fact” (Dudney 2016).  13
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always been marginal (Wivel et al. 2014: 3). Thereby, this thesis will be linked 
to the growing body of IR-literature on how small states may act strategically 
to promote their own security by influencing larger and more powerful states 
(see Steinmetz and Wivel 2010: 3–11; Mosser 2001: 64–65). 
Notably, there is no agreed definition of what constitutes a small state. 
Rather, smallness – regardless of its definition as an absolute or a relative term 
– draws on the concept of power.15 A small state is thus a weak state relative to 
more powerful ones. The issue at hand making the small states literature differ 
from structural realist studies is its questioning of whether a certain degree of 
power – measured in absolute and relative terms – equivalents influence. In 
plain words, this thesis will reflect on whether certain small states can punch 
above their weight and if so, how they go about and under what conditions they 
can do so? 
Before we engage more deeply with the theoretical frameworks employed 
in this thesis, we will review and structure the research previously undertaken 
in the field of maritime security. 
  
                                                          
15 For an elaborate discussion on the concepts of power and influence, see Zimmerling 
(2005: 15–31). 14
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2. Previous research on maritime security 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a more detailed account of the 
current research status of maritime security and its issue-areas. Accordingly, it 
identifies limitations of existing research and the theoretical approaches 
employed in the studies of these issue areas. Finally, this chapter specifies key 
explanatory factors of relevance for this study and positions it in the research 
field. 
As noted in the introduction, the global rise of new maritime security 
challenges following the Cold War termination has received much scholarly 
attention. As shown in Figure 2 below, the publication rate on maritime 
security literature has grown since the turn of the millennium. 
 
Figure 2: The number of books, book chapters, articles and dissertations that 
included the words “maritime security” in their title, presented by year of 
publication 1990–2015 (OCLC 2016). 
Notwithstanding, maritime security remains a concept suffering from a lack 
of comprehensive analysis, since the research efforts have predominantly been 
directed towards its specific issue areas but also towards the consequences of 
such local, regional or global problem remedy. From a policy perspective, these 
issue-areas are often interrelated and sometimes even interconnected. 
Scholars are increasingly addressing this conceptual lacuna, whereof the most 
ambitious studies take legal approaches. Below, an overview of maritime 
security research relevant to this study is presented, structured by the 
conceptual literature and by issue-area. 
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2.1. Conceptual maritime security literature 
Some scholars have engaged in conceptual approaches. First, in a volume 
edited by Rothwell et al. (2011), eleven scholars applied legal or policy 
approaches on Australia’s and New Zeeland’s maritime security developments 
through fourteen essays. Their common effort to conceptualise maritime 
security from a regional perspective is a benchmark contribution. Three of 
them – Bateman, Klein and Rahman – have authored a range of books, book 
chapters and articles of interest to this study.16 Although not explicitly 
employing International Relations (IR) or International Security Studies (ISS) 
theories, they combine national/international strategic and legal perspectives 
with a wide interpretation of security. They exemplify those scholars who 
elaborate on maritime security as the absence of certain threats to state 
interests in the maritime domain, i.e. a “negative” definition of the term. 
Second, Sloggett (2013: 3, 23–24, 36–46, 152–153, 183–190, 223–236) has 
portrayed contemporary maritime security through a seven-dimensional 
framework17 aimed at raising awareness among policymakers. We will not 
consider his examination of the US concept any further, since it is uncritical and 
widely reproduces the thoughts of US Admiral Gary Roughead.18 
Third, Till (2013) has provided a key conceptual text of scholarly value on 
the changing role of sea power.19 By taking a historical point of departure, he 
defines a spectrum of contemporary nation-state behaviour of which “modern” 
and “postmodern” paradigms – both acknowledging the role of sea power – are 
the two extremes (Till 2013: 32–43).20 The “modern” paradigm – arguably 
incorporating a set of traditional realist assumptions – correlates with 
                                                          
16 I.e.: Bateman (2010a; 2010b; 2012); Bateman and Bergin (2009; 2010; 2011; 2012); 
Bateman, Bergin and Channer (2013);Bateman et al. (2011); Bateman and Emmers 
(2009); Bateman and Ho (2010); Bateman et al. (2009); Bergin et al. (2002); Herbert-
Burns et al. (2009); Ho and Bateman (2012); Klein (2006a; 2006b; 2011; 2012); 
McCaffrie and Rahman (2010); Rahman (2007; 2008; 2009a; 2009b; 2009c); Rahman 
and Tsamenyi (2010). 
17 I.e.: state-on-state confrontation; trade protection; resource management; 
smuggling; terrorism; disasters; and oceanography. 
18 Sloggett appears dazzled by the 1,000-ship Navy concept, widely echoing the 
thoughts expressed by US Admiral Roughead in his “testimony to US Senate 
Subcommittee on Appropriations on Defence”.  
19 Also Esterhuyse (2010) noted the scholarly value of Till’s holistic approach to 
analysing “the role of navies in a globalised world” in his review essay of the 2009 
edition of this “standard text book” for teachers of naval strategy.  
20 Till determines states’ positions on the spectrum by their “doctrine and policy 
declarations”, capabilities and “the nature of their operations”. 16
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“continuity” in maritime security, as defined in this study, outlining naval 
behaviour and capabilities in terms of defence of the nation state and 
promotion of its national interests. Conversely, the “post-modern” paradigm21 
explains states’ use of their navies for maintaining international rather than 
national security. This more liberally oriented paradigm arguably draws on the 
ideas advanced by Buzan (1991a) that national security has transformed into 
international security, which multi-sectoral issue agenda has security 
communities rather than nation-states as referent objects. It correlates with 
“change” in maritime security, as defined in this study, involving a broad set of 
naval missions.22 Both paradigms are associated with distinct capability 
developments. 
Till (2013: 5–23, 282–304) provides conceptual insights of relevance to this 
study. A good starting point is his conceptualisation of the sea as a resource and 
a medium of: i) transportation and exchange; ii) for information and the spread 
of ideas; and iii) of dominion. Till also notes that the ambiguities of the terms 
“maritime security” and “maritime security operations” (MSO), which span 
“everything from ‘hard’ national defence concerns to issues of marine safety”. 
International collaborative perspectives thus mix with competitive national 
ones when states’ defend “good order at sea”. Till provides a “positive” 
definition of maritime security, i.e. implying the establishment of a safe and 
secure domain. Moreover, he points to changes in the attributes of the sea’s 
contribution to human development which are closely linked to contemporary 
maritime security developments, i.e. that the sea is developing from a source of 
power and dominion into an area of sovereignty and that increasing attention 
is given to the marine environment’s intrinsic values. Finally, Till notes that 
maritime sovereignty involves “instrumental” and “expressive” dimensions, 
the former deriving benefits to the state while the latter symbolises its values 
and power. He rightly argues that states need legal tools and naval capacity to 
assert, control and defend sovereignty over maritime areas for any of these 
reasons. 
Fourth, Yetkin (2013) has employed Till’s concept of “modern” and 
“postmodern” naval paradigms as a supporting framework in an article on 
                                                          
21 For early theoretical works on post-modernism, linked to post-structuralism, 
focussing on the role of agency instead of system in societies, see Bauman (1992) and 
Shaw (2000: 18). 
22 Till defines five missions for post-modern navies: i) sea control; ii) expeditionary 
operations; iii) stability operations/humanitarian assistance; iv) inclusive good order 
at sea; and v) cooperative naval diplomacy. 17
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conceptual change in maritime security. With some success, he combines it 
with an operationalisation of Michael Porter’s analytical framework 
comprising “five forces”23 for evaluating viable strategies for new firms 
entering existing business markets. He concludes that the maritime security 
environment has become more “sophisticated” by the effects of globalisation. 
States must thus not only consider potential naval adversaries when drafting 
their maritime strategies, but also apply a comprehensive “industrial analysis” 
approach to assess a “complicated and constantly evolving maritime security 
environment”. In the view of Yetkin, the change of navies into postmodern 
character represents a response to paradigmatic changes in supplier and threat 
environments. His study points to the effects of private actors’ involvement in 
maritime security governance, which arguably result from neoliberal thought 
among state governments (Leander and van Munster 2007: 202–204). 
Fifth, to Bueger (2015: 159–163), the above elaborations on the content of 
maritime security centre on an insufficient “laundry list” of threats, which 
absence define maritime security. Herein he includes a criticism by rhetorically 
asking whose security is provided by employing such a “buzzword” definition, 
and whom the beneficiaries are of the related measures being implemented by 
individual states and the international community. To Bueger, such rationalist 
interpretations of maritime security serve to “mask political interests (…) and 
underlying ideologies”. Instead, he suggests a constructivist interpretation of 
the concept by a three-pillar framework: i) mapping the relations between 
maritime security and other concepts; ii) studying securitisations in the 
maritime domain by employing the Copenhagen School theoretical 
framework24 – a pre-packed set of assumptions and research methods 
outlining security as the result of an intersubjective securitisation process (i.e. 
security practice theory); and iii) examining what actions are undertaken “in 
the name of maritime security”. Of relevance to this study is Bueger’s 
observation that “blue growth”, human security25, marine safety and sea power 
represent established concepts interrelated with – or concepts that even have 
become subsumed by – the contemporary concept of maritime security. In 
                                                          
23 I.e. rivalry among existing competitors (navies) influenced by the: i) power of 
suppliers (defence industry, human capital); ii) power of buyers (governments, ship 
owners, the public); iii) threat of new entrance (other navies); and iv) threat of 
substitutes (maritime private security companies, other military services or civilian 
instruments). 
24 See the founding works of Buzan et al. (1998), as well as Buzan and Wæver (2003). 
25 A concept launched in 1994 by the United Nations Development Programme aimed 
at reconceptualising the understanding of security by focussing on individual, instead 
of national, security (Schäfer 2013: 7). 18
19 
 
addition, his elaboration on maritime security communities, drawing on a 
concept conceived by integration theorist Karl Deutsch in the 1960s, deserves 
consideration in this study’s examination of the Baltic Sea region. 
Beyond these conceptual elaborations on maritime security, the 
controversies and practical challenges associated with the third United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (UN 2013) provide the sources of 
a rich body of legal literature.26 The intrinsic tension between UNCLOS granting 
maritime powers’ their much desired freedom of the seas while assigning 
coastal states legal rights to vast Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), has been 
addressed by Kraska. In a monograph attributable to Till’s “modern” paradigm, 
Kraska (2011a: 1–27, 157–230, 379, 397–403) suggests that international 
peace and security hinges on the ability of maritime powers, such as the US, to 
maintain the global liberal order. He laments what he interprets as a 
restraining trend on US access to littoral seas – “the epicenter of world politics” 
– by coastal states’ excessive territorial claims in their EEZs.27 In response, 
Kraska argues for the implementation of a more assertive US Freedom of 
Navigation Program to be followed by its allies. What he actually requests here 
is leveraged influence of US grand strategies on international legal norms. 
Liberal-oriented scholars have contrasted the ominous view of Kraska. The 
volume edited by Erickson et al. (2010), in which twenty authors identified 
prospects for increased US-China cooperation – and even maritime partnership 
– by applying perspectives attributable to Till’s “postmodern” paradigm is a 
good example. While noting that Taiwan remained a major impediment to 
expanded military and maritime cooperation, Erickson (2010: 429–458) as 
well as Erickson and Goldstein (2010: ix–xxi) pointed to: i) China’s “cautiously 
positive reaction to the new [2007] U.S. Maritime Strategy”; ii) the US-China 
maritime commercial partnership; and iii) the potential for expanding 
cooperation on maritime search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief operations, marine environmental issues and military education. 
Jianzhong (2010: 8–9) stressed the coastal character of the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) Navy build-up and the fact that China and the US 
                                                          
26 For two accounts taking different stands on whether and how sovereignty, threats 
to maritime security and overlapping maritime claims provided for by the UNCLOS 
contribute to the South China Sea dispute, see Hong (2012) and He (2011). For an 
edited volume comprising 20 essays evaluating UNCLOS, see Freestone (2013). 
27 He places emphasis on what he considers illiberal oceans policies pursued by Brazil, 
China, India and Iran, which most likely will inspire followers in their respective 
regions. 19
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shared: i) the aim of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region; and ii) an 
interest in development and prosperity. Collins (2010: 14–34), for his part, 
suggested that: i) China was equally dependent on the global maritime 
commons as the US; ii) commercial maritime interests pushed China’s naval 
developments; and that iii) China was dependent on secure sea lines of 
communications for its trade and energy security. Smith (2010: 101–119) 
elaborated on whether China’s terrorism encounters in the wake of its growing 
political and military status would foster US-China cooperation on countering 
such transnational security threats, but concluded that it presupposed a 
reduction in their geopolitical antagonism. 
This literature represents scholarly works of relevance to this thesis study 
of the US. 
Yet another volume edited by Potgieter and Pommerin (2009) has 
addressed the challenges and responses to Southern Africa’s maritime security. 
In essence, the authors focussed on its insecurity by arguing that the African 
states’ defiance of their fundamental obligation to exercise their sovereignty 
had jeopardised their trade, maritime resource extraction, economic 
development, and created humanitarian misery (Potgieter 2009: 5–22; Roux 
2009: 23–30; Yotamo 2009: 63–68; Allais 2009: 69–76; Fouche 2009: 77–87; 
Hugo 2009: 103–111; Purves 2009: 113–130). Regional cooperation and 
collective security were promoted to address piracy, illegal, unreported and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing, human trafficking, maritime terrorism and 
smuggling. One author took a stand for involving maritime private security 
companies in protecting maritime resource extraction off West Africa (Vreÿ 
2009: 89–102). This volume, firmly positioned in Till’s postmodern paradigm, 
contributes to set the context for this study. 
Global, regional and bilateral policy initiatives and agreements are 
interwoven with international and domestic law arrangements in all maritime 
security issue areas. Here, scholars have employed competing realist and 
liberal perspectives in their analyses of the legal developments. 
Klein (2011: 2–3, 304–307) has compared the legal improvements made to 
maritime security with the legal structures provided by the UNCLOS, arguably 
reflecting traditional security interests. She notes that coastal states’ 
promotions of exclusive security interests threaten the fundamental freedom 
of the sea principle. Klein argues that states’ threaten the inclusive interests 
shared by the international community by asserting ”sovereignty and/or 
jurisdiction in adjacent waters beyond the rights they strictly enjoy under the 20
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law of the sea”. Based on a comprehensive examination of the international 
legal developments in response to an expanding array of maritime security 
threats, she concludes that: i) responses to piracy and armed robbery remained 
a matter for affected coastal states; ii) an extensive body of law is available for 
states responding to miscellaneous maritime interests – including shipping and 
offshore installations – threatened by terrorism; and iii) smuggling of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction (WMD) is subject to similar legal avenues as maritime 
terrorism. 
Coastal states, Klein (2011: 2–3, 304–307) argues, remain the authority to 
counter: i) drug smuggling on their territorial waters, but bi- and multilateral 
agreements can authorise contracting states to interdict; ii) people smuggling 
on their territorial waters, but bilateral and regional agreements between 
source, transit and receiving states can authorise contracting states to 
intervene; iii) IUU fishing on their territorial waters, but recent legal 
improvements allow for responses by regional fisheries management 
organisations in certain high sea areas. Finally, she notes that port/coastal 
states have been granted greater legal powers to respond to intentional 
environmental harm to maritime areas, suggesting that maritime security 
would be best served if states emphasised their common interest. She thereby 
signals her normative commitment to conceptualising maritime security as 
common security. 
The in-depth account on the evolution of maritime security law provided by 
Kraska and Pedrozo (2013), viewed from a US maritime strategic policy 
perspective and firmly positioned in Till’s “modern” paradigm, contrasts the 
“postmodern” perspective of Klein. 
Lastly, the monograph of Germond (2015) examines whether or not the EU 
is a global maritime actor, departing from the notion of Till (2013: 25) that sea 
power has input (the sum of material assets broadly defined) as well as output 
(“capacity to influence”) dimensions. After engaging in an eclectic theoretical 
discussion spanning the realism, liberal, post-structuralism and Marxist 
schools of thought, Germond (2015: 5–17, 91, 191–192) proposes a new 
framework for analysis made up of: i) projection of military security; ii) non-
military security; iii) environmental security; and iv) securitisations and 
representations. After degrading his original framework to the status of a 
“conceptual background”, he applies a more austere framework composed of 
two distinct categories constituting sea power28 – i.e. material and ideational 
                                                          
28 N.B. backed by relevant institutional structures. 21
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elements – to his study of the EU. Germond concludes that economic interests 
and the securitisation of non-military threats have shaped the EU’s maritime 
policies. However, he also notes that the power of the EU remains at the 
discretion of its member states. Therefore, the EU policy documents – despite 
their vigorous rhetoric – only serve to delineate the “boundaries of what the 
EU can or shall do”. 
The monograph of Germond (2015), of relevance for this study’s 
examination of the Baltic Sea region, highlights the challenges associated with 
employing a (too) wide analytical framework. 
2.2. Piracy and terrorism in the maritime domain 
Maritime terrorism and piracy represent issue-areas that are prominent 
topics of the maritime security literature. Studies of the threats and their 
consequences, the effectiveness and unintended effects of international 
responses to thwart them, and last but not least their legal dimensions are the 
most common approaches. Some scholars have stressed the risk of a nexus 
between terrorism and piracy. Here, I will draw on texts authored by a few 
influential authors, being keen to admit that the amount of research on this 
topic is substantially larger. 
Liss (2010) and Raymond (2005; 2007; 2009) exemplify the range of authors 
who have sought to explain the root causes of regional piracy. Liss (2007; 2011; 
2012), for her part, has authored texts on the implications on energy security 
by piracy and maritime terrorism, as well as the use of Maritime Private 
Security Companies. In their analyses of Southeast Asian piracy, both Liss and 
Raymond have taken historical points of departure, using adequate statistics to 
support their framings of the problems before engaging with them, thus 
outlining the conditions creating and influencing them. Finally, they have 
analysed and discussed the national and international responses and their 
effectiveness. Field-studies and interviews have been key sources in their 
explanations of piracy as both a symptom and a result of socio-economic and 
security concerns (see Liss 2010: 360). Although the analyses of Liss and 
Raymond are not explicitly driven by theory, Raymond has highlighted the 
effects of piracy being securitised by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore 
following the 11 September 2001 events (Raymond 2007: 63–64). 
In a volume edited by Struett et al. (2013) use maritime piracy to expose 
incongruities in common understandings of global governance. The authors 
employ constructivist approaches in their efforts to understand various 
2
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international actors’ responses to maritime piracy. Gould (2013: 23–46), 
Heinze (2013: 47–70) and Dutton (2013: 71–95) address contemporary 
discourses on piracy in terms of its legal construction in international law29 by 
states, the shipping industry and international bodies. Bueger and 
Stockbruegger (2013: 99–120) – noting that piracy has developed from a 
neglected issue at the millennium into an international problem engaging a 
host of security actors – suggest that a global security governance arrangement 
is under construction. McGahan and Lee (2013: 150–162) point to alternative 
problem framings, suggesting that neoliberal approaches contrast approaches 
which frame piracy as a threat to human rights. They stress the role of such 
framings since activists and policymakers use them to shape policies, inferring 
that normative arguments can motivate costly actions when resonating with 
prevailing value frames. 
The much cited monograph of Murphy (2009: 28–45, 123–125, 161, 177, 
380–381) on contemporary maritime piracy and maritime terrorism is a 
rationalist account of these phenomena contrasting these constructivist 
approaches. Here, he outlines a framework of conditions which he argues have 
encouraged piracy throughout history, i.e.: i) legal and jurisdictional 
opportunities; ii) favourable geography; iii) conflict and disorder; iv) 
underfunded law enforcement/inadequate security; v) permissive political 
environments; vi) cultural acceptability/maritime tradition; and vii) the 
promise of rewards. He highlights weaknesses in statistics and contested 
definitions, seeking to address each issue from multiple viewpoints. To 
Murphy, piracy represents local problems created by criminal entrepreneurs 
or insurgent groups raising money for their struggle, occurring on a global scale 
with local or regional effects. He provides a comprehensive account also on the 
development of maritime terrorism – taking multiple references in the works 
of Peter Chalk, addressed below – while rejecting any concrete links to piracy. 
Murphy (2011: 1–2, 135–136) applies this framework in a much acclaimed, 
but also criticised, case study on the Somali piracy in 1991–2006.30 Hardly 
surprising, he finds it applicable to explain the rise in piracy by Somalia’s clan-
                                                          
29 I.e. the UNCLOS, the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts (SUA) 
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and its 2005 Protocol, and the United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1816, 1838, 1846 and 1851. 
30 See Samatar (2013), whose critique focused on Murphy’s: i) extensive use of secondary 
sources and the lack of field-studies; ii) downplaying of the triggering role of illegal 
Western fishing fleets off Somalia; and iii) allegedly inept portrayal of Somalis as 
uncivilized and tribal natives. 23
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based society and “the rise to power of elites that countenanced predatory 
behaviour”. Murphy concludes that they simply relocated their land-based 
kidnapping and extortion activities to a more lucrative maritime environment. 
While rejecting the choice of costly naval campaigns to thwart a problem 
originating from ashore, he calls on trading states to address the issues of weak 
states in the world’s littorals.31 
The monograph on piracy by Kraska (2011b), for its part, focusses on the 
legal developments, assigning prominence to US policy and strategy 
perspectives on the subject matter. Here, Kraska (2011b: xv, 1–100) takes a 
historical point of departure aimed at providing a pedigree of international 
piracy and an account of historic legal approaches to deal with these crimes. He 
then enters a path previously trodden by Murphy, elaborating on the 
contemporary developments of Southeast Asian piracy before approaching 
East Africa, the main region of study. Before we elaborate on Western naval 
strategy and policy concerning East African piracy, we will benefit from a brief 
account on the responses by the shipping industry in general and the 
coordinating work of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 
particular. N.B. the works of Murphy and Kraska highlight the need to examine 
the role of weak states – but also that of the IMO in managing piracy – to explain 
the conceptual development of US maritime security. 
Chalk (1998; 2000; 2001; 2008; 2009a; 2009b; 2011; 2012), see also Chalk and 
Ungerer (2008), has examined global terrorism and organised crime through a 
range of studies. Chalk (2008: 19–21) argues that these threats have evolved 
through a series of attempted and successful terrorist attacks by al Qaeda 
affiliates since the turn of the millennium, although the number of terrorist 
attacks on maritime targets has been low since 1976. These incidents have 
instilled fear among Western powers for a determined expansion of Islamist 
operations to the maritime domain. This fear was accentuated in the US, Chalk 
suggests, explaining why the US assumed the lead role in strengthening global 
maritime security control systems since 11 September 2001. 
Chalk (2006: 129) has employed the Copenhagen School for studying 
securitisations associated with the spread of new and re-emerging diseases in 
the Asia-Pacific, linking this issue to the threats of biological terrorism 
perceived among Asia-Pacific states including Australia. Aradau and van 
                                                          
31 Murphy boldly states that the Somali piracy has “exposed the futility as ever of 
deploying military power, in this case naval force, against even seemingly insignificant 
opponents in the absence of clear political objectives.” 24
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Munster (2012: 228–236) outline a suggestive mechanism for explaining 
collective responses to terrorist events. By drawing on psychological research 
on people who experienced the 11 September 2001 events, they argue that 
those involved in a traumatic event had to act in order to understand it. 
“Sociodrama”, i.e. fostering of cooperative potential and cohesion in a group, 
may thus explain securitisation processes as a mechanism through which 
decision-makers govern traumatic terrorist events or threats.32 
The possible nexus of piracy and Islamic terrorism is a part of the scholarly 
discussion. Concerning Asia, scholars have pointed to the former kidnapping 
for ransom activities perpetrated by the Indonesian separatist group Gerakan 
Aceh Merdeka (GAM).33 Concerning Somalia, Lehr (2009: 28–29), Reid (2011: 
13–15) and Chalk (2012: 164–165) have noted potential links between piracy 
groups and the al-Shabaab militia. Although not entirely dismissing a future 
nexus, most scholars have pointed to the inhibitory effect of the different 
motives of pirates and terrorists (see Chalk 2008: 31–33; Chalk 2012: 164–
165; Reid 2011: 12).34 
This overview shows that scholars using rationalist and reflectivist 
approaches have examined the issue-areas of piracy and terrorism. Among the 
approaches, the Copenhagen School theoretical framework stands out as a 
framework frequently applied by scholars who critically analyse and discuss 
the effects of certain security policy practices or phenomena. 
  
                                                          
32 Here, they call for an interpretation of securitisation processes wider than that of the 
Copenhagen School. 
33 GAM has been described both as a separatist or guerrilla movement and an al-Qaeda 
affiliated terrorist organisation, engaged in criminal activities to raise money for their 
political struggle (see Raymond 2007: 69–72; Banlaoi 2009: 256; Hansen 2009: 81). 
34 For a conceptual discussion on terrorism and criminality, see Hoffman (2006: 17–
18, 36–41). 25
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2.3. The smuggling of drugs and humans in the maritime 
domain 
Human and drug smuggling are maritime security issue-areas thoroughly 
analysed through theory-driven studies. Emmers (2004) employed the 
Copenhagen School theory in his study of non-traditional security threats in 
the Asia-Pacific through case studies of Thailand, Singapore and Australia. He 
concluded that Thailand had securitised drug trafficking, Singapore had 
securitised piracy and maritime terrorism, while Australia had securitised 
human smuggling. In an essay on the Asia-Pacific human trafficking problem, 
Emmers et al. (2008: 77) promoted national securitisation of what they 
regarded as “one of the [region’s] worst transnational criminal offences”. Yet 
another conceptual perspective of relevance to this study is the volume edited 
by Bateman and Emmers (2009), contrasting the strategic dimension and the 
rise of non-traditional transnational threats in the South China Sea region. 
Notably, they found that these dimensions were converging. 
Mallia (2010: 1, 7–8, 18, 27–34) stresses the need for international 
cooperation and coordinated approaches on transnational people smuggling. 
She notes a link between US perceptions on migrant smuggling by sea – held as 
the fastest growing transnational crime – and the risk of undetected entry of 
terrorists via smuggling networks. Accordingly, Mallia suggests that the US 
framed migrant smuggling as a threat to US national security in the wake of the 
11 September events, while the response measures introduced by the 
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code were preventive in 
their character. Its focus on port and container security – and its surveillance 
and monitoring provisions – were aspects of a desire for control, she argues, 
aimed at pushing the US border measures abroad. This is important concerning 
this thesis study of the US. 
Mallia (2010: 43–99, 111–160, 163–224) also contrasts the UNCLOS 
framework available to coastal states when interdicting suspected vessels in 
their maritime zones with the constraining humanitarian obligations 
incumbent upon all states. After elaborating on its limitations, she presents the 
treaty modifications adopted through the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime and its supplementing (Human) Smuggling 
Protocol. Based on case studies of Australian, EU and US practices on human 
smuggling, she concludes that finding solutions to the problems require the 
addressing of their root causes. 
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Allen (2012) provides a Caribbean perspective on human smuggling, 
supplementing the more common US perspectives. It frames the global 
problem from a perspective of the sending countries, i.e. Haiti, the Dominican 
Republic and Cuba. Having narrowed his focus to Jamaica, Allen (2012: 34–48) 
notes a recently established adequate legislative framework. He concludes, 
however, that domestic legislative provisions – and aggressive information 
campaigns to deter perilous migration attempts – are needed to make it work. 
Guilfoyle (2011) has provided a much-noted volume on the possibilities and 
constraints of the UNCLOS and shipping interdiction. Guilfoyle (2011: 4–6) 
approaches maritime security simply as a matter of enforcing peacetime 
jurisdiction, outlined as a two–step process: first, conducting boarding, 
inspection and search of suspected ships at sea; second, arresting the vessel 
and its crew or seizing its cargo if legal violations are substantiated. His volume 
is structured in three sections. The first outlines the general principles of flag 
state jurisdiction and maritime zones. The second elaborates on an array of 
regimes for conducting maritime interdiction and policing of piracy, drug 
smuggling, migrant smuggling, human trafficking and fisheries, with a focus on 
the US, the UK and Australia. The third is dedicated to deduce internationally 
accepted principles for maritime interdiction, drawing from the range of such 
practices and maritime law previously examined. His book adds to the range of 
substantiated legal analyses of relevance to this study. 
The surge in migrants passing the Mediterranean Sea in their often-fatal 
efforts to reach Europe in 2014 and 2015 has spawned an expanding body of 
scholarly work.35 Miltner (2015) applies a legal perspective on the maritime 
aspects of the European response to what has been referred to as “the 
Mediterranean migration crisis” since April 2015. This ongoing crisis highlights 
the complex global phenomenon of maritime “mixed migration”, referring to 
flows of various categories of migrants with differing motivation and need for 
protection who use the same migration routes and transport means while 
relying on the same smuggling networks, which policy implications are 
scrutinised by Roman (2015). Hammond (2015: 3) and Miltner (2015: 215) 
highlight the role of the Mediterranean Sea as a “connective tissue” for irregular 
migration from Northern Africa and the Middle East to Europe. They also 
discuss Italy’s ambitious Naval Search and Rescue operation Mare Nostrum, 
                                                          
35 The recent volume edited by Ambrosetti et al. (2016) exemplifies the scholarly 
literature on socio-economic perspectives of this crisis, which is not within the scope 
of this study. 27
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launched in 2013 and replaced in 2014 by the EU’s leaner Joint Border 
Surveillance operation Triton.36 
This maritime mass migration involves multidimensional challenges for EU 
member states. As noted by Miltner (2015: 213–232), the legal context of the 
maritime domain is replete with unresolved conflicts between the duties of 
states to protect human rights and their legal power to control immigration by 
interception. UNCLOS include mandatory provisions to rescue individuals in 
distress at sea, while the European Convention on Human Rights provides 
substantial rights to individuals coming under jurisdiction or control of EU 
member states. 
Scholars have pointed to the links of this crisis – having forged a deep divide 
in the EU over immigration and induced several member states37 to re-impose 
partial national border controls within the Schengen area (Traynor and Watt 
2016) – to traditional military considerations. In February 2016, NATO 
(2016b) announced the deployment of its Standing NATO Maritime Group Two 
to “conduct reconnaissance, monitoring and surveillance of illegal crossings in 
the Aegean Sea” in close coordination with the EU to “stem illegal trafficking 
and illegal migration”. As noted by Chapsos (2016), NATO’s deployment in the 
territorial waters of Turkey and Greece instead appears to have a military 
purpose, since Russia’s main supply route for sustaining their campaign in 
Syria38 from the Black Sea traverses the Aegean Sea. The scope of the refugee 
crisis is mainly due to the breakdown of order in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and 
Syria.39 The roles of Russia and Turkey in the latter have increased the stakes 
(see Oliphant and Weise 2016). 
  
                                                          
36 Led by Italy, but coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union (Frontex). In addition, Frontex coordinates operation Poseidon Rapid 
Intervention, led by Greece to manage migration flows in the Aegean Sea. 
37 Including Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Sweden.  
38 At the launch of The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2016, NATO Secretary 
General Stoltenberg (2017) described NATO´s naval presence in the Aegean Sea as a 
success, bringing “together Turkey and Greece, EU and NATO in the region”. 
39 In the third quarter of 2015, Syrians, Afghans and Iranians predominated among the 
flow of asylum seekers (Eurostat 2015), giving rise to the controversial March 2016 
EU-Turkey agreement aimed at ending the irregular migration from Turkey to the EU 
(EC 2016a). 28
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2.4 Maritime Private Security Companies 
The study of the maritime Private Security Companies (PSCs) issue-area is 
a niche topic of the maritime security literature. Arguably, it peaked in tandem 
with the use of PSCs to counter the rise in piracy off Somalia. Typically, it deals 
with the legal and regulatory problems, economic considerations, and the 
operational and tactical challenges associated with the use of maritime PSCs, 
lest to forget the results and the motives behind their emergence. This section 
introduces some key examples. 
The authors of a volume edited by Berube and Cullen (2012) have 
expounded on the shift in states’ management of maritime security risks from 
a direct – i.e. using traditional naval means – to an indirect form, i.e. by 
managing the security behaviour of private sector actors. Cullen (2012: 27–31) 
concluded that the ulterior motive was a shift in governments’ orientation 
towards precaution and risk management, thus transferring risks away from 
themselves by embedding security responsibilities into private industry. Such 
private initiatives could involve protection of clients against terrorism, he 
suggested, but more often against crimes. While assessing the probability of 
maritime terrorism as low (thus offering a small market), Cullen noted that 
criminality offered a viable market in regions where coastal states had failed to 
provide adequate maritime security. However, as Berube (2012: 76–78) made 
clear, the increasingly advanced and costly protection offered by maritime 
PSCs has been accompanied by a debate on their feasibility and their legal 
mandate to use lethal force. 
Pitney and Levin (2014) have examined the use of maritime PSCs to counter 
the maritime security threats off East and West Africa in 2008–2013. After 
reflecting on the 18th and 19th paramilitary practices of the British East India 
Company off the Horn of Africa, they discuss the emergence of this private sector. 
In their analysis, they note a range of legal, economic and operational challenges 
associated with the use of maritime PSCs. Pitney and Levin (2014: 177–229) 
partly attribute the decline in piracy off Somalia in 2012 and 2013 to the efforts 
of maritime PSCs, while its sharp increase off West Africa enables them to make 
cross-case comparisons. They conclude that the demand for maritime PSC 
services will “remain sensitive to the operational and legal outlook”, the 
adaptability of PSCs to future threats and the continued willingness of state 
sponsors. However, given the inability of poor coastal states to fund capable 
navies and coast guards, Pitney and Levin expect a continued role for PSCs. 
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2.5. Summary: Taking stock and moving forward 
Maritime piracy and human smuggling are the maritime security issue areas 
that have attracted the greatest academic interest. Here, scholars have 
employed various critical approaches to create understanding of (as opposed 
to explaining) the problem dynamics by examining social conditions and 
uncovering hidden structures. Usually, they have engaged themselves in 
critique of nation-state behaviours or dominant orders of society. When 
engaging in legal or policy analyses of these issue areas, these scholars have 
often aligned themselves with the interests of the migrants, the weak states, or 
even the often disfavoured individuals who have chosen – or been forced – to 
engage in piracy activities. 
Scholars have frequently employed securitisation theory to identify what 
issues state elites have successfully constructed as maritime security problems. 
Here, they have critically scrutinised the consequences for national policies or 
certain population groups. Typically, these scholars have proposed alternative 
frameworks for addressing the root causes of the problems securitised by 
states, which would allegedly thwart the negative outcomes of state practice. 
This body of work has spanned both policy and legal approaches, and this study 
benefits from their studies of the links between different issue-areas. As shown 
in the above review, rationalist approaches engaging in problem-solving policy 
or legal analyses has contrasted the reflectivist ones. The fact that these critical 
scholars have mainly been Europeans, while those taking rationalist 
approaches have essentially been of US or other Anglo-Saxon origin, confirms 
the division of IR-theory – and its sub-field security studies – as noted in the 
introduction (see also Wæver and Buzan 2010: 465). 
Notwithstanding the relevance of research focussed on each issue-area, the 
conceptual developments – i.e. the continuity and change in the understanding 
of maritime security among Western states and its role in their foreign policy – 
are most important to this study. It therefore builds on the efforts made by 
those scholars who have engaged themselves in conceptual approaches. 
Contrary to Bueger (2015: 160), this author considers a state centred 
conceptual analysis of maritime security a worthwhile endeavour, recognising 
that the US definition of the term maritime security exerts major influence on 
those of its partners and allies (and maybe even its adversaries). Here, we can 
expect diverging and/or converging political interests and/or normative 
understandings to interact in its regional application, in turn influencing the 
general conceptual understanding of the US and its partners and allies. 
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With regards to the aims of this study, the rationalist approach of Till (2013) 
occupies a unique position in existing research, centred as it is on 
conceptualising the role of maritime strategy and sea power in states’ foreign 
and security policies. Although his analyses are not explicitly theory-driven, 
realism, liberalism and even post-structuralism IR-theories loom in the 
background. This study addresses this limitation. Till (2013) provides a useful 
interface between a broad maritime security concept and the body of IR-
literature examining US strategy in the maritime East and South China Sea 
region. His widely used conceptualisation of the sea as a: i) resource; and as a 
medium: ii) of transportation and exchange; iii) for information and the spread 
of ideas; and iv) of dominion; is applicable also to this study. 
These categories are useful for incorporating the main explanatory factors 
for the conceptual change in maritime security highlighted in existing research. 
This change centres on: i) the rise in maritime piracy and the emergence of 
maritime terrorism in combination with ever-increasing sea-borne trade; ii) 
states’ territorialisation of the sea; the rise in people and drug smuggling; and 
iii) states’ shift to an indirect maritime security risk management approach40. 
This review of previous research shows the applicability of a wide array of 
theories to explain or understand the concept of maritime security. One could 
therefore argue that the employment of a comprehensive set of theories, fused 
into an eclectic theoretical framework, is required to explain the continuity and 
change in the maritime security strategies of large and small Western states. 
However, as we noted in Germond (2015), such an approach involves the 
challenge of maintaining analytical clarity, which this thesis opts to avoid by 
assigning priority to structural realism. This school of thought offers a sparsely 
defined theoretical lens centring on the role of the international system, 
defined by anarchy, and “the distribution of capabilities across states” (Waltz 
2004: 2–3). 
By engaging in a qualitative study employing structural realism as its main 
theoretical framework to explain the continuity and change in the US post-Cold 
War maritime security strategies and its policy behaviour in this regard, this 
                                                          
40 This factor involves the role of “free market mechanisms such as privatization, 
contracting out and the formation of agencies”, exposing public service organisations 
such as armed forces to competition and wider scrutiny (Callaghan et al. 2000: 4–5). It 
draws on the sociological concept of “risk society”, introduced by Beck (1992) and 
expounded on in a large body of research. To Shaw (2000: 25), the “common risk 
society” referred to the international community and the notion that new threats cross 
political boundaries.  31
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author makes a claim for originality. Given the effort devoted to understand the 
nuances of the process oriented research question by expounding on the 
lessons we can learn from recent employments of maritime security strategies 
in regions where traditional and non-traditional threats converge – with a 
justified focus on Finland and Sweden – this claim is both empirical and 
analytical. This thesis presents new information on Finland’s and Sweden’s 
policy responses of to a changing security environment, while the analytical 
framework for comparing the policy responses of the US, Finland and Sweden 
in regional contexts – and the analyses made in this regard – involve some 
novel features.41 By employing supporting analytical frameworks derived from 
Till (2013) and Knudsen (1988; 1996), its results are placed within the broader 
realist tradition and linked to the conceptual literature on sea power, as well 
as the literature on the security of small states. 
  
                                                          
41 In this regard, the challenging of structural realism by an analytical framework based 
on neofunctionalism in Article 3 stands out. 32
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3. The theoretical frameworks 
This chapter introduces the theoretical frameworks employed in the articles 
of this thesis, essential for providing a theory-driven analysis of the post-Cold 
War conceptual development of maritime security and its consequences in key 
regions. It is structured in three parts. First, a structural realism framework for 
analysis is formulated by departing from the defining work of Waltz 
(2010[1979]) and discussing the later elaborations of this research 
programme, i.e. its defensive and offensive strands. This framework suffices for 
analysing the US interactions with other great powers, but it also serves as a 
general framework for analysing the influence of the international system on 
states regardless of size. Second, the concept of small states is discussed and a 
complementary framework for analysing small state security made up of four 
variables and two conditioners is presented. This allows for the analysis of any 
leveraged influence of certain small states on the workings of the international 
system in regions subject to great power rivalry. These variables and 
conditioners are implicitly addressed in the study of Finland and Sweden – and 
their interactions with NATO and the US – outlined in articles 3 through 5. 
Thereto, the variables and conditioners are explicitly used for structuring the 
concluding analysis of the Baltic Sea region’s maritime security environment 
and to reflect on those of the East and South China Seas. Third, 
neofunctionalism is introduced as a tool for challenging the explanations of 
structural realism on the naval cooperation of Finland and Sweden in Article 3. 
3.1. Structural realism 
Various scholars (see Glaser 2010: 18; Tang 2008: 149) have expounded on 
the divide in structural realism between Waltz’s original theory and its 
offensive and defensive strands. Although its strands depart from the same 
“bedrock assumptions”, they draw differing conclusions on the nature of 
international politics. Waltz (2004: 6), however, maintains that depending on 
the situation at hand, a state may choose to adopt offensive or defensive 
strategies. Sections 3.1.1 to 3.1.3.5 are entirely dedicated to address this divide 
in structural realism, why the discussions herein are rather separate from the 
maritime domain. They involve exploring the assumptions and interaction 
logics of the two strands while comparing them with those put forth by Waltz. 
In section 3.1.4, the divide in structural realism is tentatively reconciled in 
order for us to merge the two strands into a single explanatory framework. 
Here, we will use it to deduce predictions for a state’s foreign policy behaviour 
and grand strategy priorities, drawing on the role of security pressure. Since a 
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maritime security strategy is a domain-specific grand strategy, we will deduce 
also specific predictions for a state’s foreign and security policy for the 
maritime domain. 
3.1.1. The origins of the structural realism research programme 
Waltz (2010[1979]) challenged classical realism by outlining a theory 
focussing on the constraints and opportunities generated by an anarchic 
international system instead of states’ individual motives and objectives. In so 
doing, Waltz (2001 [1959]: 231, 238) further elaborated on the causes of war 
explained by the “third image” – the level of analysis focussing on the 
“conditioning effects of the state system”, i.e. the structure of the international 
political system – found to be the “final explanation” preferably supplemented 
by those of the first (the man) and the second (the state). His seminal 1979 text 
developed into a research programme whose scholars share a set of bedrock 
assumptions regarding states. Accordingly, states: i) are the key, unitary, actors 
in international politics; ii) interact in an anarchic – i.e. lacking a central 
authority – international environment which defining feature is power; iii) 
identify threats to their survival as the main system-generated problem; iv) are 
self-regarding, acting in accordance with the self-help principle; v) assess each 
other in terms of power and capabilities, not from domestic characteristics; and 
vi) rationally select strategies whose expected gains exceed anticipated costs 
(Elman 1996: 18–21, appendix; Glaser 2010: 16–17). 
3.1.2. Contrasting and combining the two strands of structural realism 
Despite a common core, structural realism’s defensive and offensive strands42 
have provided additional competing assumptions and paid attention to different 
logics of interaction, resulting in disparate assessments of the probability for 
international competition and the prospects for cooperation (Glaser 2010: 18). 
Walt, Jervis, Van Evera, Snyder and Glaser advocate defensive realism, while 
Mearsheimer, Layne and Gilpin are offensive realists. To Waltz (2004: 6), “realist 
theory, properly viewed, is neither offensive nor defensive” why it “is best left 
without an adjective to adorn it”. Accordingly, their assumptions and interaction 
logics can be combined. Before we do that, however, the distinctions between the 
strands will be presented and their positions compared to that of Waltz. 
Proponents of both strands concur with the definition of international politics 
by Waltz (2010[1979]: 126) as a “realm of power, of struggle, and of 
                                                          
42 Mearsheimer (2001: 5) named his theory “offensive realism” while Snyder (1991: 12) 
first used the terms “aggressive” and “defensive” realism. 34
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accommodation”. Defensive realists emphasise the assumptions of Waltz (1988: 
616) that “the ultimate concern for states is not for power but for security” and 
his view of power as a means of achieving security and not its end. Offensive 
realists are more inclined to promote Waltz (1986: 336; 1988: 619) claim that 
states – even without fundamental conflicting interests – will be driven into 
competitive behaviour by the international system, making international 
cooperation difficult. This propensity is reinforced by their biased 
interpretations of each other’s efforts to bolster their security.  
Measures undertaken by one state will thus diminish the security of the 
others, creating what John Hertz termed the “security dilemma” (Waltz 
2010[1979]: 126–128, 186–187; Waltz 1988: 619; Waltz 2000: 222). In turn, 
insecure states tend to resort to balancing behaviour against the powerful state, 
thus moderating the competitive nature of the international system. As a more 
risky alternative, a weak state may join its stronger rival in a “bandwagoning” 
alliance, arguably an option more attractive to minor powers with “greedy” 
motives (Waltz 2010[1979]: 126; Mearsheimer 2001: 162–163; Glaser 2010: 22; 
Schweller 1998: 137–139). We may find such dynamics in the East and South 
China Sea and the Baltic Sea regions because of the rise in power of China and 
Russia, in turn influencing the maritime security strategies employed by state 
actors. 
Defensive realists disagree with Waltz on the prevalence of this general 
competitive tendency and claim that states under certain conditions can be 
highly secure (see Glaser 1996: 123–124, 159–163; Glaser 2010: 20, 24), while 
offensive realists portray an even more competitive world than Waltz. 
Mearsheimer (2001: 29–32, 40), outlines an international system in which great 
powers always seek relative power over their rivals, balancing against each 
other’s offensive capabilities in their quests to achieve the ultimate aim of 
hegemony, defining a hegemon as “a state that is so powerful that it dominates 
all the other states in the system”. 
Offensive realists disagree on the scope of such hegemony. While Gilpin 
(1981: 49, 135–173) and Layne (2002: 120–164) discuss global balance of 
power and world hegemony, Mearsheimer (2001: 27–42, 57–60, 83–85) limits 
the scope of hegemony to regional dimensions for reasons of geography. To him, 
“the stopping power of water” greatly limits states’ capabilities to project land 
power. Although Mearsheimer, as opposed to Waltz (2010[1979]: 191), 
emphasises land power, both define power as material capabilities rather than 
political outcomes of state interaction. However, based on additional, 
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interacting, assumptions on the international political system43, he argues that 
great powers are inclined to think and act offensively against each other.  
This disagreement on whether the anarchic international system spurs states 
to maximise their power or their security represents the first distinction 
between offensive and defensive realism. Their second disagreement is whether 
strategies of territorial conquest are rewarding or not. 
Defensive realists such as Snyder (1991: 11) and Van Evera (1999: 9) argue 
that aggressions seldom succeed, as expansive security strategies violate basic 
principles of international politics and cause balancing behaviour by other 
states. They are thus counter-productive, undermining the security of states 
pursuing them. Jervis (1978: 187–194) theory of the “offence-defense balance”, 
i.e. whether an attacker or a defender has the advantage44, supports assessments 
of intensities in security dilemmas. It is further specified by Van Evera (1998; 
1990/91)45 as well as Glaser and Kaufmann (1998)46, stressing that this balance 
often favours the defender. 
Mearsheimer (2001: 39) charges defensive realists with exaggerating the 
restraining forces of systemic factors and misinterpreting Hertz’s description of 
the security dilemma. The position of Waltz (2010[1979]: 127–128) on this issue 
is firmly in line with defensive realism. By linking the imitating and socialising 
behaviour among states to balance of power, “states will engage in balancing 
behaviour”, he concludes. Mearsheimer (2001: 166), for his part, emphasises 
that states do not only imitate successful balancing behaviour but also successful 
aggression. Schweller (1994: 85–92) points to a status-quo bias in Waltz 
                                                          
43 I.e.: i) great powers possessing some offensive military capability are inherently 
dangerous to each other; ii) since benign intentions can change immediately and malign 
intentions be misperceived due to deception or misinformation, states cannot be assured 
by other states; iii) since state autonomy is a prerequisite for achieving all other ends, 
survival is the foremost aim of all states; and iv) states are rational actors who think 
strategically in temporal dimensions about how to survive in the international system. 
44 To Jervis, the main factors determining whether offensive or defensive action is 
advantageous in actual or potential armed fight over territory are the technical 
capabilities and geographical positions of the rival states. 
45 Van Evera added the independent variables “social and political order” and “diplomatic 
factors” to the theory, creating and testing hypotheses on how real or perceived offensive 
advantage created incentives for preventive wars and instigated harsh diplomacy styles. 
He pointed to the danger of “offense dominance” and emphasised the roles of arms 
control agreements to limit offensive forces and defensive alliances. 
46 Glaser and Kaufmann added the variables “power”, measured in relative resources, 
and “military skill” in terms of strategical employment of their military technology to this 
theory. 36
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balance-of-power reasoning, which ignores the existence of dissatisfied states’ 
will to join the stronger power’s side in prospects of rewards, relative gains and 
improved ranking in the international system.  
The third disagreement between the two strands thus relates to whether 
states assume that other states have revisionist intentions or not (i.e. if they 
expect them to be security-seeking status-quo states). However, their 
disagreements can be resolved by reflecting on the fact that they are mainly 
resulting from contradicting assumptions on the level of security pressure.  
While acknowledging the importance of relative gains to great powers when 
international security competition is intensive, Waltz (2010[1979]: 118–122, 
166–168, 195, 203) argues that absolute gains rise in importance as it decreases. 
He does by no means exclude the possibility that states, as a result of domestic 
political processes, may choose expansive strategies involving the use of force to 
weaken or destroy other states. Notably, concerning this study’s examination of 
the Baltic Sea region, Waltz (2000: 24) has pointed to the maintenance and 
eastward expansion of NATO as a manifestation of how the US has used its 
unchecked power to extend its geographical sphere of influence. This extension 
is of key relevance to the current strategic situation in the Baltic Sea region. 
Waltz emphasises, however, the tendency of other states in the international 
system to react, uncoordinated, in ways creating balances of power that impose 
restraints on such power aspirations. The most stable international system is 
bipolar, he argues, which reduces uncertainty and calculations among the states 
of the world. In contrast, Waltz (2004: 4) finds unipolarity weakening the 
structural constraints and enlarging the field of action open to the super power, 
resulting in “arbitrary and destructive governance”. 
Tang (2008: 150–152) offers a useful rephrasing of the above presented 
theoretical divergences by formulating two typological strategies for achieving 
security. States pursuing offensive realist strategies seek security by 
intentionally decreasing the security of other states, he argues, dismissing true 
international cooperation (except for temporary alliances) due to their 
genuinely irreconcilable interests and their preparation for inevitable conflict 
and war. Conversely, states pursuing defensive realist strategies do not threaten 
each other’s security intentionally and not all of their conflicting interests may 
be genuinely irreconcilable, Tang suggests. States may therefore overcome the 
barriers to collaboration posed by anarchy, while conflicting interests need not 
necessarily lead to actual conflict. His reasoning regarding defensive realism 
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involves assessments of states’ intentions, a notably hard factor to determine.47 
For this purpose, Tang formulates two differentiating criteria, measuring 
whether states: i) recognise security dilemmas and understand at least parts of 
their defensive implications; and ii) exercise self-restraint and accept to be 
constrained by other states (see also Kydd 1997: 141–147). 
The outcome has policy implications. According to Tang (2008: 151), rivals 
guided by offensive realism are best countered by containment policies while 
cooperative engagement strategies are preferred towards rivals guided by 
defensive realism, given that one’s own state pursues a defensive realist strategy. 
Mearsheimer (2001: 402) applied this reasoning when he argued for a change in 
what he considered a misguided US policy of engagement on a revisionist China, 
recommending a strategy of containment. Arguably, such interpretation of 
whether rivalling states have revisionist intentions or not – and subsequent 
decision on its own strategies – are at heart of the US challenges of dealing with 
China and Russia. Regardless of the grand strategies chosen by the US to manage 
these rivalling powers in their home regions, their implementation by this 
external power necessitate the deployment of maritime strategies. Hence, there 
is a close connection between the US grand strategy and its maritime strategy. 
Following Waltz, offensive and defensive realism can be treated as 
complimentary strands of structural realism. Finding their dynamics interacting, 
Snyder (2002: 158) notes that the former best explains the security behaviour 
of revisionist states, while the latter best explains that of status quo powers. 
While offensive realism assumes that policymakers’ perceptions will lead to 
policies with concrete effects, Taliaferro (2001: 158–161) concludes, defensive 
realism assumes that they – acknowledging the security dilemma and adopting 
moderate policies – also often consider the perceptions of their policies among 
other states. 
In weighing the usefulness of offensive or defensive realism in explaining 
international politics, Waltz (2004: 6) deems that “[w]hether the best way to 
provide for one’s security is by adopting offensive or defensive strategies varies 
as situations change”. Toft (2005: 390), stresses that the disagreement between 
the strands does not pertain to whether states primarily seek survival or not, but 
rather about how states seek to ensure their survival. Brooks (1997: 447–449, 
457–458) notes that offensive realism is characterised by its assumption of high 
security pressure, predicting that states will act from possibility of conflict logics 
                                                          
47 Offensive realism recognises this challenge, thus predicting that a state cannot be 
assured by another state. 38
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and worst-case scenarios, while defensive realism assumes lower security 
pressures and thus predicts that states will act from probability of conflict 
logics.48 This thesis takes fully into account the above arguments of Waltz, Toft 
and Brooks, and applies their reasoning when combining the two strands of 
structural realism into a single explanatory framework in section 3.1.4 below. 
In a great power's quest to maximise its share of world power, Mearsheimer 
(2001: 147–155) expects it to opt for reaching the following objectives: i) 
becoming the world’s sole regional hegemon; ii) maximising its proportion of 
global wealth; iii) dominating the regional balance of land power; and iv) gain 
nuclear superiority. Layne (2002: 129), for his part, argues that once a great 
power becomes a regional hegemon it will seek global hegemony. Mearsheimer 
presents a range of great powers strategies for gaining power: i) launching costly 
wars; ii) blackmailing weaker states through coercive threats and intimidation; 
iii) inducing bait and bleed strategies; or iv) sustaining self-induced protracted 
conflicts between its rivals, i.e bloodletting strategies. 
A state may use complementary strategies to prevent rivals from gaining 
power. The rivals can be checked through external or internal balancing 
strategies and by buck-passing (free riding), involving attempts to cajole another 
state to balance the aggressor (Mearsheimer 2001: 155–164). Bandwagoning – 
i.e. conceding power to and joining forces with a stronger opponent – as well as 
appeasement are non-viable strategies for great powers, he argues, since both 
violate offensive realism’s core tenet that states seek to maximise relative power. 
These strategies are useful in this study’s formulation of testable structural 
realism predictions of state behaviour when security competition is intensive. 
While both strands of structural realism derive their main independent 
variable – the international distribution of power capabilities – from Waltz’s 
essentially structural theory, they also take into account the effects of 
intermediary, non-structural, systemic variables. Mearsheimer (2001: 155–159) 
adds the impact of states geographic location on their policies (i.e. geopolitics), 
which is supportive when predicting strategies of checking aggression in 
multipolar systems, i.e. which states will balance or “pass the buck” (se also Toft 
2005: 386, 389). Defensive realism acknowledges the importance of geography, 
but also emphasises the impact of technology and international economic 
                                                          
48 Brook’s term “neorealism” – including the writings of Waltz and Mearsheimer – is 
synonymous to “offensive realism”, while his term “postclassical realism” is synonymous 
to defensive realism (Taliaferro 2001: 134, note 22). 39
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pressures, so-called “structural modifiers” (Taliaferro 2001: 137; Brooks 1997: 
456). We will further elaborate on these factors below. 
3.1.3. The foreign policy predictions of structural realism 
In this section, general structural realism predictions for a state’s foreign 
policy behaviour and grand strategy priorities are deduced, but also specific 
predictions for the maritime domain. However, this task requires that we first 
expound on its fundamental assumptions. Structural realism’s main independent 
variable for explaining the foreign policy behaviour of states – i.e. the dependent 
variable – is their power position in the international system, determined by its 
share of certain material resources. In turn, the number of poles defines the 
structure of the anarchic international system. Yet, the strategic context of a state 
has additional dimensions: i) its geographical environment; ii) its regional and 
global relationships with other states; and iii) the nature of the international 
system (Tang 2008: 146). The last dimension involves whether states view each 
other as being revisionist49 or status quo and thus the level of security pressure. 
However, we will begin by discussing the views of the two strands on the 
fundamental concepts of power, autonomy and influence. 
3.1.3.1. The interrelated concepts of power and autonomy 
Structural realism defines power in quantifiable terms by material 
capabilities. It thus represents a concept separated from outcomes of state 
interaction and politics. Waltz (2010[1979]: 131) measures a state’s power by 
combining its: “size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic 
capability, military strength, political stability and competence”. Gilpin (1981: 
13), for his part, measures it by combining its “military, economic and 
technological capabilities”, while Mearsheimer (2001: 55) specifies it as the sum 
of its military and latent power, the latter referring to its wealth and size of 
population.  
Structural realism understands politics as relational interactions between 
like units designed to achieve objectives (Lentner 2006: 105; Mearsheimer 2001: 
57; Waltz 2010[1979]: 97, 100), while power is a means enabling a state to 
maintain its security and autonomy. The latter is understood as self-government 
of its domestic political order (Waltz 2010[1979]: 126, 194; Mearsheimer 2001: 
31). It predicts that states will always seek to preserve their security and 
autonomy, selecting instrumentally and rationally among options in policy areas 
                                                          
49 I.e. inclined to raise their position in the international system through political, 
territorial or economic expansion. 40
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which may involve threats to their national security (Grieco 1995: 27; Baumann 
et al. 2001: 39–40). Given the international system’s anarchic character, states 
must rely on self-help strategies for which independence (i.e. autonomy) is a 
prerequisite (Waltz 2010[1979]: 72; Mearsheimer 1995: 11; Grieco 1995: 27).  
Autonomy is thus a prerequisite for a state’s power and a strategic objective 
for which power is an important means. How is this possible? Arguably, this is 
due to realists’ threefold use of the term power. Power is conceived as “control 
over resources” when measuring a state’s power (position), which is translated 
into predictions of “control over actors (…) events and outcomes” through a 
conversion process (Hart 1976: 289–290, 296). Accordingly, it provides a great 
power with wider scopes of action and safety margins in dealing with weaker 
states, a higher degree of independence and ability to exercise influence on more 
dependent states, and greater capacity to manage the international system 
(Waltz 2010[1979]: 194–195). Gains in power thus augment a state’s autonomy 
and elevate its power position, which in turn improve its security. This 
mechanism may of course be reversed, making it more vulnerable to threats 
from other states.  
Both strands of structural realism predict that states will be averse to relative 
losses of power (Grieco 1990: 40; Mearsheimer 2001: 22). However, while 
offensive realism predicts that states will seek as much power as possible, 
defensive realism suggests that they will restrict themselves to possess only “an 
appropriate amount” (Waltz 1988: 616; Kydd 1997: 114, 122–123). This 
consequential disagreement apparently derives from their divergent views on 
the effectiveness of the balancing dynamic resulting from the “security dilemma” 
and deviant expectations of security pressure. 
The assumption of high security pressure in offensive realism – reducing the 
security dilemma to an irredeemably condition of anarchy fuelling international 
security competition – results in favourable assessments of offensive behaviour 
(Brooks 1997: 447, 450; Mearsheimer 2001: 36, 46; Snyder 2002: 156–157). It 
also leads to the prediction that states’ will assign low priority to non-security 
objectives such as the promotion of ideology, national unification or fostering 
human rights. To Mearsheimer, states might pursue non-security goals as a 
complement to their “hunt for relative power”, but only if they do not conflict 
with power and security imperatives. 
In contrast, defensive realism’s assumption of lower security pressure and the 
effectiveness ascribed to the balancing dynamic resulting from the inescapable 
security dilemma, results in unfavourable assessments of offensive behaviour 41
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and predictions that states will assign comparably higher priorities to non-
security objectives in their policies (Brooks 1997: 455; Snyder 2002: 153, 157; 
Snyder 1991: 12; Toft 2005: 390). Its assumption of lower security pressure 
involves an understanding of international politics as less conflictual and 
competitive than that of offensive realism (Snyder 2002: 153). Although they 
employ different assumptions on security pressure, both structural realism 
strands predict that states will seek to preserve or enhance their autonomy – a 
quest in which they need power. 
3.1.3.2. The quest for influence 
To be secure, states seek to influence their international environment to 
preserve their power position and protect their national interests (see Gilpin 
1981: 86). This requires power. A state’s ability to influence the behaviour of 
another state depends on their relative power positions, i.e. their relative 
distribution of capabilities (Glaser 1996: 133, note 27). This is one of the reasons 
why states are concerned with relative gains in cooperative affairs and practise 
“defensive positionality”, especially when security competition is intense (Grieco 
1990: 44–45; Waltz 2010[1979]: 195). Accordingly, structural realism predicts 
that states will seek to influence the actions of states as well as those of 
international organisations, a process that converts their capabilities into 
influence (Baumann et al. 2001: 41). Here, there is a link between a state’s desire 
to influence international organisations and the process of socialisation among 
states that ”limits and molds” their behaviour (Waltz 2010[1979]: 76). As failure 
to become socialised to the international system’s prevailing norms may be 
costly and dangerous (Gilpin 1981: 86), structural realism predicts that states 
will seek to influence the creation, or change, of these norms to ensure that they 
will suit their purposes (Baumann et al. 2001: 41). 
Since power broadens a state’s strategic options in a competitive 
international system, offensive realism offers a clear logic when predicting that 
states will seek to maximise their power. In essence, more power means 
increased autonomy, stronger influence and improved security. Given that Waltz 
(1988: 616) and defensive realism are somewhat indeterminate on the amount 
of power states will aspire for, while their proposal lacks specification (Baumann 
et al. 2001: 41), the framework of this study uses the proposition of offensive 
realism. Notwithstanding, structural realism does not expect all states to be 
driven by expansionist motives, although it remains a possibility which must be 
vigilantly considered. 
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Having recognised the key role assigned to power in structural realism and 
its predictions that states’ will seek autonomy as well as influence on their 
international environment, we will now discuss the divergent assumptions of 
offensive and defensive realism regarding whether possibility or probability 
calculations of armed international conflict shape their security strategies. 
3.1.3.3. The possibility or probability of armed international conflict 
The assumption that high security pressure characterises the anarchic 
international system, leads offensive realists to conceive of international 
relations as “a state of relentless security competition” in which “threat or 
seeming threats to their security abound” among actors who are “usually 
suspicious and often hostile” (Mearsheimer 1995: 9; Waltz 1988: 619). 
Uncertainty characterise these relations since “states can never be certain about 
the intentions of other states” (Mearsheimer 1995: 10). Since interstate 
aggression has many causes and benign intentions may rapidly change, states 
are preoccupied with identifying and counteracting dangers of war 
(Mearsheimer 2001: 31; Waltz 1988: 619). Since they condition themselves by 
the mere possibility of armed conflict, states always prepare for worst-case 
scenarios (Mearsheimer 2001: 2; Brooks 1997: 457, 471). The explanatory 
power of this assumption, combined with that of an anarchic international 
system, is considerable within offensive realism (Brooks 1997: 448–449). It 
predicts that geography influences states behaviour in two respects: i) oceans 
limit their ability of long-range power projection, making their foreign policies 
regionally focused; and ii) common borders with hostile states increase the 
propensity to balancing behaviour, while the opposite render them inclined to 
“buck-passing” if the international system is multipolar (Mearsheimer 2001: 83–
84, 271–272). 
Defensive realism opposes this view of international relations. By adding 
three material factors – technology, geography and international economic 
pressures – to the distribution of capabilities, its proponents expect that the 
character of the security pressure will vary over time (Brooks 1997: 446, 455, 
472). Technology has implications also for what Glaser (1996: 134) defines as 
the “offense-defence balance”, assigning advantages to defensive forces. 
Information technology developments increase the interaction capacity of states 
and strengthen forces of socialisation and competition, which in turn influence 
the range of regional subsystems and condition the impact of the global system 
level (Buzan et al. 1993: 70–77). 
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Already in the 1980s, satellite reconnaissance technologies enabled states to 
evaluate each other’s military and economic capabilities with unprecedented 
accuracy (Gaddis 1989[1987]: 232–233). In the 1990s, technological advances 
enabling networking of sensors, weapons and command, control and 
communications systems spurred the US adoption of a “Revolution in Military 
Affairs” (RMA) concept for conventional wars (Dyson 2010: 11–18). The 
expectations that RMA would cause a recalibration of the global rebalancing of 
power in its favour brought about a continuous US defence transformation, 
including using superior information technology as a lever and using conceptual 
innovation to establish tailored joint operational pictures. 
Jervis (1978: 179), suggested that a given territory may, or may not, be of 
interest to a conqueror, depending on whether it contains exploitable raw 
material of national interest to the latter. Van Evera (1993[1991]: 200–201), for 
his part, pointed out that the shift from smokestack-economies to “knowledge-
based” production in “post-industrial” economies – dependent on multinational 
exchanges – had diminished conquerors’ prospects of efficiently extracting 
economic resources from occupied territories. 
To Wohlforth (1994/1995: 109–111), international economic pressures 
contributed to explain the Cold War termination, given Soviet’s geopolitical 
overstretch resulting from its declining economic performance while the 
economic recovered in the West. The decline in its relative power, he suggested, 
serve to explain Gorbachev’s far-reaching policy-changes as an attempt to 
revitalise the competitiveness of the Soviet economy and reduce the security 
pressure posed by NATO. Wohlforth’s explanation highlights the potential of 
influencing states by using economic pressure, used exclusively or combined 
with the use of military means. 
Both strands predict that geography influences the usefulness of military 
power, i.e. geographically proximate states can more readily threaten each other 
with military force (Walt 1987: 24; Mearsheimer 2001: 267–272). Thereto, 
balancing efforts can be impeded if states are geographically arranged in ways 
enabling an aggressor to prevent other states from assisting a victim by military 
means (Van Evera 1993[1991]: 222, note 76).  
To account for the two strands’ diverging assumptions on the possibility or 
probability of armed international conflict, we will incorporate the factors 
provided by offensive as well as defensive realism when formulating the 
structural realism framework for this study. 
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3.1.3.4. Whether states adopt short- or long-term perspectives 
The diverging assumptions on the level of international security pressure by 
offensive and defensive realism result in different predictions on states 
preferences when weighing short-term military security against long-term 
objectives (Taliaferro 2001: 140). Given that survival is a prerequisite for 
pursuing all other aims, offensive realism predicts that states will neglect long-
term objectives such as economic growth or ideology and give priority to short-
term military preparedness when, and if, required (Mearsheimer 1992: 222; 
Mearsheimer 2001: 31). Defensive realism specifies conditions under which this 
prediction is valid, of which Taliaferro (2001: 140–141) has proposed the 
following: i) when geography hampers defence from invasion or blockade of the 
state; or ii) when states borders relatively strong neighbours. Both are linked to 
the nature of the international system, i.e. the threat environment resulting from 
the presence of revisionist or status quo states, while the second also involves 
relative power and the “offense-defense balance”. Defensive realism argues that 
war is always a way of resolving conflicts under anarchy, but the probability of 
aggression depends on factors making conquest more or less cost effective 
(Brooks 1997: 446–448, 456–457). Accordingly, states may take some risks 
regarding costly defence preparations when security pressure is low. 
To account for the two strands’ predictions on whether states adopt short- or 
long-term perspectives – based on their diverging assumptions on the possibility 
or probability of armed international conflict – in the structural realism 
framework for this study, we note that this theory predicts that when security 
pressure is high, rational state actors will prioritise short-term military security 
and subordinate other requirements despite adverse long-term effects. When 
security pressure is low, it predicts that states will give more equal weight to its 
short- and long-term requirements, regularly making intertemporal trade-offs50. 
3.1.3.5. The issue of weighing between military and economic power 
Based on its assumptions of intense security competition in the anarchic 
international system and that states seek to inhibit possible conflicts by self-help 
measures, offensive realism predicts that states will invariably favour military 
power to economic power whenever they come in conflict (Mearsheimer 1992: 
222). However, it does not expect states to be indifferent to economic wealth – 
economic power is certainly a prerequisite for building large military forces – 
                                                          
50 I.e. balancing between relative gains offered at different points in time. The economist 
Irving Fisher developed the theory of intertemporal choice in his 1930 book Theory of 
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but rather that the superior value of military security will outrank any other end 
a state may pursue. Defensive realists have charged offensive realism with 
insensitivity to probabilities and a lack of utility foundations (see Brooks 1997: 
454). To offensive realism, states are risk-averse actors seeking to minimise the 
maximum losses they may suffer, always assigning priority to short-term 
military security requirements. It incorporates Waltz (2010[1979]: 79, 107) 
conceptualisation of international politics as a separate domain, strictly outlined 
in terms of military security (Mearsheimer 1992: 222). Waltz, for his part, 
expects that states in a self-help system will “subordinate economic gain to 
political interest” when considering their security.  
Defensive realism expects that states will rationally negotiate between 
economic gains and reductions in military preparedness if “the potential net 
gains in economic capacity are substantial relative to the probability of security 
losses” (Brooks 1997: 447, 462). States will thus be flexible in their efforts to 
achieve their national interests and may seek to increase their power by military 
or non-military means. The latter involves a quest to: i) alter international trade 
patterns; ii) reduce their transaction costs and improve the protection of their 
property rights by influencing institutions; iii) secure their supplies of 
inexpensive raw materials from weaker states by using economic leverage; and 
iv) reduce their non-productive expenditures and increase the amount of 
resources available for economic advancement. We will used these predictions 
below when we formulate structural realism predictions on states’ foreign 
policies. 
3.1.4. Merging the predictions of the two structural realism strands into 
an explanatory framework of states’ foreign policy behaviour 
Given both strands’ prediction that a state’s foreign policy behaviour depends 
on its power position in the international system and the number of poles in the 
international system, its use of military or economic power to influence the 
actions and decisions of other states will invariably conform to its power. A 
state’s power is determined by its: i) size of population and territory; ii) resource 
endowment; iii) economic capability; and iv) military strength. 
Structural realism predicts that states share a strong interest in autonomy 
and influence. Since power enables them to pursue policies of autonomy and 
influence more intensely, they will seek a maximum of it. Autonomy-seeking 
policies, aimed at maintaining or increasing independence from influence of 
other states, will thus prevail in relations with stronger states and international 
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institutions. Thereto, states will pursue such policies more eagerly under intense 
security competition, when their freedom of action, independence, or even 
sovereignty is at stake. Accordingly, they will devote less attention to attain 
influence.  
Inversely, states will seek to influence if security competition is limited. 
Structural realism expects strong states to pursue influence-seeking policies 
versus weaker counterparts, using their relative power as a lever to achieve 
dominance and control over their international environment. Weaker states will 
seek to mitigate or prevent such domination by negotiating collaborative 
arrangements in inter- or supranational institutions, enabling them to “voice 
their concerns and interests” and influence their bi- or multilateral interaction 
processes (Grieco 1995: 34).  
Baumann et al. (2001: 49–50) have specified these policies. Autonomy 
involves the freedom from obligations to: i) consult with – or accept the 
judgement of – international bodies or to comply with certain duties; ii) refrain 
from acquiring prohibited goods (weapons); iii) using certain tools (e.g. tariffs); 
iv) implementing certain modes of behaviour vis-à-vis its own population (e.g. 
human rights regimes) or other states. It also involves the freedom from 
restrictions such as: i) asymmetric interdependence to its disadvantage (e.g. 
markets or imports); ii) imposing economic sanctions or military 
threats/actions versus other states.  
Influence means power to oblige other states to consult or inform themselves, 
and to accept and implement the decisions of international bodies taken with its 
participation. It also means power to prohibit them from: i) producing or 
acquiring certain goods (e.g. weapons); ii) using certain tools or resources (e.g. 
tariffs/weapons); iii) behaviour vis-à-vis their own populations or other states. 
Finally, influence means power to restrict other states by: i) asymmetric 
interdependence to their disadvantage; ii) imposing military threats or action; 
or iii) imposing economic sanctions. 
The results of states pursuit of policies promoting autonomy and influence 
can be mutually reinforcing or conflicting, Baumann et al. (2001: 52–53) have 
pointed out, a characteristic phenomenon of their policies towards international 
institutions. Typically, participation in multilateral actions involves a loss of 
autonomy but gains in influence, while non-participation involves a gain in 
autonomy but a loss of influence. Structural realism expects powerful states to: 
i) seek bilateralisation of its relations with weaker states; ii) weaken 
supranational institutions; iii) join international bodies whose decisions are 47
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binding also for non-member states; iv) withdraw from international bodies 
whose decisions apply to member states; v) increase its own share of intra-
organisational resources; vi) actively use positive or negative sanctions versus 
other states; and vii) strengthen international bodies in which it participates. 
These predictions involve a view on international institutions that are 
coterminous with that of defensive realism, assigning them the sole role as 
arenas for states’ efforts to exert influence on each other (see Glaser 1996: 157–
159).51 However, institutions are of minor importance when security pressure is 
high. 
We can now outline a pattern of structural realism predictions. Both strands 
predict that the international system’s anarchic character forces states to rely on 
self-help strategies. This will lead them to accumulate power and engage in 
power politics. Likewise, both strands predict that states will consider factors 
such as geography, technology and economy in their strategies. Figure 3 (below) 
illustrates the consequences of the two strands’ diverging assumptions on the 
level of international security pressure, leading to differing predictions on states’ 
preferences and behaviour in four foreign policy dimensions, i.e. actor 
disposition; security pattern; policy priority; and policy behaviour. Offensive 
realism squarely assumes international security pressure to be high, making 
state actors dispositioned to engage in possibility calculations, assigning priority 
to autonomy and military readiness while engaging in peacetime strategic 
competition and preparing for possible war. Defensive realism assumes that the 
international security pressure may also be low or moderate, making states 
dispositioned to engage in probability calculations, assign priority to influencing 
international bodies, seek security cooperation and evaluate the probability of 
armed conflict. N.B. the structural realism framework employed in this thesis 
recognises that the level of international security pressure perceived by a state 
represents the key factor determining whether it will rationally act as predicted 
by either offensive or defensive realism. 
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Figure 3: Structural realism’s pattern of predictions, resulting from diverging 
assumptions on the level of international security pressure. Source: Author. 
Based on the above discussion, we can conclude that a state perceiving high 
security pressure – e.g. facing a powerful rival who might seek territorial 
expansion – will pursue an autonomy-seeking policy, subordinate desires for 
economic wealth to military preparations and prepare for security competition 
and possibly war. Intervening factors such as geography, technology and 
international economic pressures will influence the resulting threat to its 
freedom of action, independence and ultimately its survival. On the contrary, a 
state perceiving lower security pressures – e.g. bordering only modern, 
democratic and industrialised states – may allow itself to lower its military guard 
and seek to maximise its economic prosperity and political influence through bi- 
and multilateral cooperation in inter- or supranational institutions and bodies. 
Structural realism predicts that a state, especially if it is a great power, will:  
 seek to maximise its power through military and non-military means 
 adjust the amount of power politics in its foreign policy in line with 
changes in its power 
 pursue policies of autonomy and influence, selecting instrumentally and 
rationally among options in policy areas which are likely to involve 
threats to its national security 
 seek to influence the creation or change of international norms to ensure 
its interest 
 seek to reduce its non-productive expenditures and increase the amount 
of resources available for economic advancement 
A state perceiving high security pressure will:  
o assign priority to autonomy-seeking policy over influence-seeking 
policy whenever they conflict 
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o invariably favour military power to economic power whenever they 
conflict and subordinate all other requirements despite adverse 
long-term effects 
o assign low priority to non-security objectives such as promoting 
ideology, national unification or fostering human rights 
A state perceiving low security pressure will: 
o give more equal weight to its short- and long-term requirements, 
regularly making intertemporal trade-offs 
o assign priority to influence-seeking policy over autonomy-seeking 
policy whenever they come in conflict 
o seek to influence: i) international trade patterns and alter them in 
their favour; ii) international institutions in order to reduce their 
transaction costs and improve the protection of their property 
rights; iii) weaker states by using economic leverage in order to 
secure their supplies of inexpensive raw materials 
Structural realism is a grand strategic theoretical framework while maritime 
security strategies are grand strategies for the maritime domain (see Figure 1). 
Accordingly, it is applicable to explain important aspects of states’ desire to 
dominate the maritime domain, its trade and its prosperity. Quite obviously, the 
maritime domain is not a habitat for human beings but an environment in which 
humans only temporarily reside in for particular purposes. However, as Article 
2 will show, temporary and purposeful use of the maritime domain is a 
characteristic that helps explain its attraction to states in terms of the four 
attributes we will assign to it. 
In the study of the maritime domain through a structural realist lens we can, 
based on the above reasoning, specifically expect that a state – i.e. a great power 
– will seek to use its power: 
 to maintain or increase its autonomy with regards to its: i) territorial 
waters; ii) EEZ; and iii) portion of the continental shelf 
 to influence international maritime trade patterns and seek to alter them 
in its favour 
 to influence the international standards for interpreting maritime law, 
assuring its unimpeded access to strategically important waters for 
power projection purposes  
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 to influence international maritime institutions in order to reduce its 
transaction costs and improve the protection of its property rights with 
regards to maritime trade as well as maritime resource extraction 
 to seek strategic control (i.e. dominance) of those aspects of the cyber 
domain that are interlinked with the maritime domain and serve to check 
the influence of its rivals 
Having contrasted the assumptions and combined the predictions of the two 
strands of structural realism into unified foreign policy predictions, while 
deducing general and maritime specific predictions on state behaviour, we will 
now engage with the concept of small states. 
3.2. Small states and international security 
3.2.1. The concept of small states and international security 
Small states typically lack the power projection capability over distance that 
is required for having systemic influence. They are therefore not in focus of 
structural realism scholars (see Waltz 2010[1979]: 72–73). As scholars of other 
IR-theories of US origin, they tend to analyse great power interaction with small 
states from the perspective of the interests and concerns of the former (Park 
2001: 131). The literature on small states thus became established as a European 
field of studies in the inter-war period by its growth out of the status of the 
residual 19th century “small powers” category, marked by ideational credentials 
(Neumann and Gestöhl 2006: 2–12). Following two decades of little academic 
interest, the pioneering works of Rothstein and Fox served to turn it into “a 
genuine school of small state studies” in the 1960s.  
Rothstein (1968: 1) established the key proposition that “small powers are 
something more than or different from Great Powers writ small” in his study on 
why small states ally with great powers or not. Fox (1959), for her part, 
examined the diplomacy of neutral Finland, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Turkey 
during the Second World War. In security studies, the small states literature 
spans three traditions (Knudsen 1996: 6–7). First, a legal approach focusses on 
individual neutral states’ policies with concerning international conflict or the 
implications of their EU membership (see Sundelius 1994). Second, a political 
approach studies the dominance and submission of small states by great powers. 
Third, a rational choice approach, to which this thesis contributes, studies the 
military strategic calculations of small states in crises. 
The IR-literature on small states peaked in the 1970s, following the rise in 
small states by decolonisation. Its decline in the 1980s has been attributed to the 
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influence of structural realism, degrading small states to the status of a residual 
category. Keohane (1969: 295–296) – arguably a neoliberal theorist influenced 
by structural realism – classified states into “system-determining”; “system-
influencing”; “system-affecting”; and “system-ineffectual” categories which, he 
argued, conformed with the traditional usage of “great”, “secondary”, “middle” 
and “small” states. There is thus a certain tension between the approaches 
elaborated on in this thesis. 
The lack of a universal definition of small states makes the concept of 
smallness relative rather than absolute. “Small states” is thus rather vague as an 
analytical concept, why some have considered it useless for analytical purposes 
(Knudsen 1996: 4). Fox (1969: 751), for her part, compared its conceptual 
vagueness with that of the international system, arguing that “[t]he small state 
is as meaningless a category as the international system, which varies through 
time” (italics in original). Neumann and Gestöhl (2006: 6) note that small states 
have traditionally been “defined by what they are not”, i.e. not being great or 
middle powers. In a European context, states whose population size is below that 
of the Netherlands – a middle power of 16 million inhabitants in 2006 – have 
traditionally been categorised as small states. With this quantitative yardstick, 
Finland and Sweden, whose populations in 2015 amounted to 5.5 and 9.7 million 
people respectively, fall squarely in this category (IISS 2016: 92, 143).  
This measure is often augmented by qualifiers such as territory, Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and military capability, which, for small states, are 
limited (see East 1973: 557). Sweden and Finland seem outmatched by Russia 
by default while they fare better in comparison with e.g. the Netherlands. This 
illustrates the relativeness of the concept and the indistinct definitional borders 
between categories such as “micro states”, “small states” and “middle powers” 
(Neumann and Gstöhl 2006: 6). Also Panke (2010: 801), using a qualitative 
measure consisting of the allocation of votes in the EU Council of Ministers, 
includes Finland and Sweden among its nineteen members of the small state 
category. Their bargaining capacity in the Council working groups is thus limited 
compared to the larger members. In addition, the facts that their financial means 
and their staff resources are comparably small limit their arguing capacity. 
Hence, the concept of small states has a bearing idea of relative weakness 
assigned to it. Smallness is “viewed as a handicap to state action, and even state 
survival” (Browning 2006: 669). Some scholars have concluded that the 
weakness of small states makes them “liable to be continuously threatened by 
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[even benevolent] greater powers”52 (Fox 1969: 751–762). However, other 
scholars have pointed to the intriguing ways that “advanced” small states have 
managed to safeguard their national interests and influence the international 
system in times of great power competition as well as through international 
organisations. 
3.2.2. The small states of Europe 
Finland and Sweden are among the six most active small state members in 
pursuing strategies aimed at counter-balancing their limited bargaining capacity 
within the EU (Panke 2010: 802–807). One such strategy is cooperating within 
the Nordic Council of Ministers, a geopolitical and inter-parliamentary forum 
established in 1971. N.B. the establishment of NORDEFCO in 2009 was a means 
to an end of promoting comprehensive defence cooperation. The considerable 
pay-offs for Sweden of joining the European integration process in the 1990s 
equalled those of Ireland in the mid-1970s (Sundelius 1994: 179, 193; Hirsch 
1976: 113–115). They reaped the economic advantages of access to a common 
European market and some influence on its rule making, while gaining a better 
platform of power for promoting their foreign and security policy objectives. In 
sum, the EU-membership gained by export-oriented Finland and Sweden in 1995 
offered potential market diversification and reduced a typical small state 
vulnerability. 
The reduction of the military threat following end of the Cold War increased 
the possibilities for small European states to pursue independent foreign policies 
(Wivel et al. 2014: 4). In addition, the effects of globalisation and increased 
interdependence leveraged the importance of diplomatic and institutional skills 
in international relations as well as the role of non-state actors. The small states 
literature duly reflects this rise in liberal influence on international relations and 
the EU’s gradual development into a security actor. The loose link between non-
military skills and capabilities and state power serves to explain their new roles. 
Thereto, small states has been increasingly requested – and able to – provide 
military contributions to multilateral crisis management operations, thus 
gaining influence in international organisations. 
3.2.3. The small states literature and structural realism 
How, then, does the small states literature correspond with and contrast to 
structural realism? First, it is not a coherent school of thought. Except for realist 
approaches, scholars employ liberal and constructivist theories when they 
                                                          
52 I.e. due to thrust of the resulting “power vacuum”. 53
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elaborate on the influence of small states on a wide range of military and non-
military aspects in international organisations. In the 1960s, Fox (1969: 753) 
noted, “the rapid growth in international organizations has given the smallest 
states both life and voice in international affairs”. In this, the end of the Cold War 
and the adoption of a widened security concept – spanning also issues of 
economic, societal, environmental security – in the policies of Western states and 
international organisations has had a far from negligible influence (Wivel et al. 
2014: 4). 
In contrast to the economic strategies employed by great powers, structural 
realism predicts that small powers’ domestic political institutions will be shaped 
by “foreign economic circumstances” (Snyder 1991: 62). Their economic 
vulnerability influences their foreign policy, which quality “depends largely on 
the articulation of national capabilities for the pursuit of foreign policy aims” 
(Hirsch 1976: 113). As noted in the 2000 European Commission’s Enlargement 
Strategy Paper, long-standing members – as opposed to member candidates – 
interpreted their EU membership as augmenting their capacity to influence 
events rather than a loss of sovereignty (EC 2000). The small states literature 
acknowledges this. Its scholars’ studies of how small states handle the 
constraints have resulted in an expanding body of literature on the foreign policy 
of small states and the EU (see Thorhallsson 2000; Miles 2005; Thorhallsson and 
Wivel 2006; Goetchel 2010). 
Unlike structural realist scholars, there is a consensus among small state 
scholars that domestic politics can influence the foreign policy of small states 
(see Doeser 2011). They therefore focus on dual levels of analysis, the domestic 
politics at state level and the international politics at the systems level.53 
Structural realist scholars, for their part, argue that the systemic level of analysis 
is most relevant for explaining alterations in small states’ foreign policies, since 
changes in their threat perceptions mainly result from power shifts in the 
anarchic international system while their scope of action is limited (see Snyder 
1991: 317–318). They typically conceptualise weak states as more attentive than 
strong states “to the constraints of the international environment” and threats to 
their survival, since they “operate on narrow margins” while “[i]nopportune acts, 
                                                          
53 The position on the levels of analysis issue among small state scholars employing 
realist theories coincides with that of neoclassical realism, introduced by Rose (1998), 
departing from structural realism’s assumption of systemic constraints but including 
also unit-level factors. Small state scholars typically use such factors to explain the 
relationship between the relative distribution of power in the international system – the 
independent variable of structural realism – and the foreign policies of states – the 
dependent variable of structural realism. 54
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flawed policies and mistimed moves may have fatal results” (Waltz 2010[1979]: 
194–195; Elman 1995: 175; Jervis 1978: 172–173). Accordingly, small states are 
less constrained by domestic political processes in their foreign policies than 
great powers (Doeser 2011: 222–223; Elman 1995: 175). As shown by Schweller 
(1992: 253, 264–268), a severe external threat may even induce a small 
democratic state to engage in the launch of a preventive war to safeguard its 
survival. 
Given the assumption that statesmen will acknowledge the constraints of an 
anarchic international system and respond rationally to threats to their states’ 
security and survival, a behaviour amplified by the fact that weak states are more 
vulnerable to external threats than more powerful states (Waltz 2010[1979]: 
109, 184–185, 195, Jervis 1978: 172–173). Contrary to Waltz (2010[1979]: 126), 
some structural realist scholars predict that small states will bandwagon with 
threatening proximate great powers rather than engaging in balance behaviour 
(see Walt 1987: 21–31; Walt 1991: 53–55). Walt expects weak states “to balance 
[only] when threatened by states with equal capabilities”. He illustrates their 
bandwagoning behaviour with that of Finland during the Second World War 
while acknowledging that both “balancing and bandwagoning are ideal types, 
and actual behaviour will only approximate either model”. This was also the 
conclusion of Fox (1959: 187) on Finland’s and Sweden’s “anti-balance of power” 
behaviours during the Second World War in her study on how small states – 
despite their military weakness and with varying success – managed to exercise 
influence and resist great power coercion by employing “economic, ideological, 
and diplomatic methods as well as military measures”. 
There is a relationship between bipolar great power tension and the influence 
of small states in the structural realism tradition (Lindell and Persson 1986; 
Goldmann 1979). Arguably, this is also the implication of Waltz (2010[1979]: 
168–169) reasoning on the benefits of bipolarity from a great power perspective. 
The findings of Fox (1959) supports the neutrality hypothesis, which has been 
further elaborated on by Goldmann (1979: 120–121) as well as Miller and Kagan 
(1997: 58–59), suggesting that high great power tension in a region enables its 
smaller states to exploit their rivalry by playing them out against each other for 
economic and military aid. Goldmann also elaborates on the deterrent 
hypothesis, i.e. that rival great powers deter each other from employing force on 
small states; and the coalition hypothesis, i.e. that high great power tension 
prevent them from forming coalitions against small states. Both are compatible 
with Fox (1959).  
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These findings confirm the scholarly consensus that the influence of the 
structure of the international system is the dominant – but not the sole – variable 
explaining the foreign policy of small states. A deviant case suggests that unit- 
and individual-level variables may cause the opposite behaviour. In a case study 
on Georgia, Gvalia et al. (2013) conclude that such variables – especially when 
elite ideas, identities, and preferences influence the formulation of foreign policy 
– are decisive in explaining its consistent balancing behaviour against Russia 
since 2003. 
3.2.4. A structural realism framework for analysing small state security 
This section introduces the further elaborations by Knudsen (1988: 115–
120) of the structural realism predictions presented in section 3.1.4. The 
resulting analytical framework supports this thesis analysis of relations between 
a small state and a nearby great power engaged in power rivalry with a more 
distant great power.54 It applies a great power’s perspective on the role of the 
small state, elaborating on the propensity of the nearby great power to apply 
pressure or intervene directly against it. The framework comprises three causal 
variables derived from structural realism, categorising the relations of the 
rivalling great powers with the small state and the role of the latter in the 
strategic relationship of the rivalling great powers. Hence, it aims at capturing 
the influence of diplomatic, political and military great power pressure (Knudsen 
1999: 8). The concluding chapter of this thesis uses this framework to structure 
the analysis of Russia’s – and the US – relationships with Finland and Sweden, as 
well as to reflect on the regional strategic pattern identified in the study of the 
US maritime engagement in the East and South China Seas. 
The first – main – independent variable is the level of tension between the 
rivalling great powers (i.e. the security pressure). It directly influences the 
strategic importance that the great powers assign to the small state. If great 
power tension is high and the small state is perceived as non-conforming, a 
proximate great power’s propensity to put pressure on – and seek control of – 
the small state by “restrictive” and “preventive” measures and minimise its 
options will be considerable. When security pressure is low, the strategic 
importance of the small state to the great powers will be more limited. 
The second independent variable is “the degree of extroversion” in the foreign 
policy of the neighbouring great power, in Knudsen’s conceptualisation resulting 
from a “cycle of power, proceeding from internal growth to external expansion 
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to overextension and subsequent decline”. The level of great power tension and 
the pressure on small neighbours will peak in the extrovert phase. Here, Knudsen 
draws on the works of Modelski (1978) and Gilpin (1981), associated with the 
realist school of International Political Economy. This study will neither engage 
with these theories nor seek an in-depth analysis of potential imperialist ideas 
among the Russian leadership. Instead, it notes that the offensive strand of 
structural realism predicts that ascending great powers will seek regional 
domination including territorial expansion, since “hegemony is the best way for 
any state to guarantee its own survival” (Mearsheimer 2001: 4). The second 
variable, which effect becomes visible to the small state by increasing great 
power pressure, is thus fully compatible also with opportunistic expansionism 
(Knudsen 1999: 12). 
The third independent variable represents the foreign policy orientation of 
the small state. Knudsen thus acknowledges the role of domestic politics to small 
states international relations with great powers, as found in most small state 
literature. The foreign policy orientation of the small state will send diplomatic 
signals to the proximate great power, confirming or rejecting whether it has 
succeeded in its attempt to influence the former. Accepting an alliance will pacify 
their relations. A neutral stance may give rise to “suspicion and vigilance on the 
part of the proximate great power,” while aligning with the rivalling great power 
will be seen as a direct threat. A particularly important aspect here is whether 
the foreign policy orientation of the small state conveys the impression of 
effective control over its territory to the nearby great power. 
We can derive a fourth independent variable from Knudsen (1988), i.e. the 
geographic location of the small state and its geostrategic significance to each of 
the rivalling great powers. The issue at hand is whether, and how, distant 
rivalling great power can strategically exploit the territory of the small state, 
regardless of the political will and irrelevant reassurances of the small state. A 
conditioner for the level of trust between the small state and its neighbouring 
great power can also be identified, i.e. the historical record of their relations. 
Knudsen (1996: 9–17) expanded his framework to six variables, making explicit 
this additional variable and defining the conditioner as an independent variable. 
He added an independent variable, which I define as a conditioner for the third 
variable, i.e.: “the existence of multilateral frameworks of security cooperation 
which might be able to stabilise power disparity”. It is worth noting that Knudsen 
(1999) returned to his 1988 framework when studying new security agendas in 
the Baltic Sea region. 
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As stated above, this thesis employs Knudsen’s framework – made up of four 
variables and two conditioners – to structure the concluding discussion in 
Chapter 6 on how Finland and Sweden seek to manage the dynamic regional 
maritime security environment by engaging themselves in bi- and multilateral 
cooperation. We will also use this framework when we reflect on the security 
dynamics of the East and South China Seas, thus facilitating cross-regional 
comparison of the logic of the interactions of the external superpower – the US – 
with small states and middle powers in this region. 
Having introduced the concept of small states and international security and 
presented a structural realism framework for analysing relations between a 
small state and a nearby great power engaged in rivalry with a more distant great 
power, we will now shift focus and introduce neofunctionalism – a rival theory 
of the liberalism camp. As stated in the introduction, this thesis employs 
neofunctionalism in Article 3. Here, it is used to contrast and challenge structural 
realism’s explanations on the bilateral naval cooperation of EU members Finland 
and Sweden, whose security policies are framed within the context of 
NORDEFCO and the common security and defence policy of the EU. This siding 
from the main theoretical framework of this thesis supports a more 
comprehensive understanding of their incitements for cooperating and our 
assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the explanations provided by 
structural realism. 
3.3. Neofunctionalism: a theory of regional integration 
employed as a contrast to structural realism in the study of the 
Swedish-Finnish naval cooperation 
Neofunctionalism is a thread of the sociological strand of liberalism, recently 
employed to explain various cases of defence cooperation among EU member 
states. Liberalism, a broad school of thought rooted in the classical texts of inter 
alia Immanuel Kant, has offered contrasting and competing perspectives to 
realism since the end of the First World War. While realists of all strands have 
focussed on the causes of international conflict, liberal scholars – including 
neofunctionalists – have elaborated on determinants of peace across the levels 
of analysis conceived by Waltz (2001[1959]) as “images”. We will now position 
the process-oriented theory of neofunctionalism within the liberal school of 
thought, introduce its key mechanisms and discuss its role in theorising on 
regional community building. 
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3.3.1. The key features of liberalism and its four strands 
In contrast to classical realism’s focus of on how the natures of political 
leaders influence states’ domestic and foreign policy at the individual level of 
analysis, liberalism have provided explanations on why individual liberty, 
interdependence, international (free) trade and prosperity contribute to peace 
(Russett 2013: 95, 101–102; Dunne 2011: 102–103). At the state level of 
analysis, collective security, democratic governments responsive to public 
opinion and national self-determination offer competing explanations to realists’ 
focus on why states’ internal structure and their ideologies foster foreign policies 
that causes conflict. Finally, liberalists argue that international law and 
international organisations – empowered to mediate between state contenders 
and enforce the rule of law and just order – can moderate and transcend the 
balance of power system at the system level emphasised by structural realism.55 
Unlike structural realism, liberalism emphasises the role of domestic factors 
in explaining states’ foreign policies. Ideas originating from the domestic realm 
– including core liberal values such as individualism and freedom – are applied 
to the sovereign state, seen to be shaped by an identity guiding its foreign policy 
behaviour (Dunne 2011: 102–103). What states define as their national interests 
may therefore differ between “successive governments and different leaders” in 
“similar geopolitical situations” (Nye 1988: 238–240). Most liberalism strands 
thus refute structural realism’s approximation of states as rational unitary 
actors. Also domestic political debates, involving bureaucracies and non-state 
actors, can boost cooperation and enable states to transcend the influence of 
anarchy on their foreign policies (Smith 2000: 35–36). 
Baldwin (1993: 4) specified four liberalism strands of which commercial 
liberalism was the first, advocating free trade market as a tool for peace. Second, 
Baldwin identified republican liberalism, arguing that democracies do not 
engage in war on each other. Third, he recognised sociological liberalism – a 
strand of which neofunctionalism is a part – linking transnational relations to 
international integration, in turn causing “transformation of the state” (see also 
Cerny 2010: 22–23). Fourth, Baldwin specified neoliberal institutionalism 
(neoliberalism), emphasising the role of international institutions and regimes 
                                                          
55 Dunne (2011: 103) points to a rift within liberalism between those advocating 
interventionist foreign policies and those who promote the principle of “tolerance and 
non-intervention”. He notes disagreements on whether robust or lean institutions are 
best suited for promoting liberal values in a multicultural international system and 
whether liberalism should preserve the right of individuals (and states) to prosper or 
give priority to international equality. 59
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to global governance. Liberalism acknowledges the anarchic character of the 
international political system and the constraints of war put forth by structural 
realism (Russett 2013: 95–106), but claims that additional constraints of war – 
i.e. democracy, economic interdependence and international organisations – act 
in parallel to them, which influence is measured on scales (see Figure 4 below). 
Their power to explain states’ foreign policy are due to the notion that states are 
“embedded in domestic and international society”, shaping the underlying 
preferences of their population and leaders, who represent “some subset of 
domestic social actors” (Moravcsik 1992: 2, 13). These preferences are thus 
more relevant for explaining states’ foreign policy than their relative power. 
 
Figure 4: “The Kantian triangle”, illustrating how liberalism’s constraints of war 
are seen to reinforce each other and interact in promoting peace. Source: Russett 
(2013: 106). 
3.3.2. The importance of the EU to sociological liberalism and 
neofunctionalism 
The EU represents an international institution which progressive and far-
reaching regional community building has come to assume a special status in 
liberalist thought and posed a challenge to structural realism (see Collard-
Wexler 2006). Sociological liberalists such as Deutsch et al. (1957), Rosenau 
(1992), Rosamond (2003) and Pollack (2004) have all expounded on the idea of 
transnational relations to explain why its enlargement process has been 
successful. Burton (1972), for his part, provided a much used “cobweb” model of 
international relations – centring on the role of individuals’ membership in 60
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overlapping social groups to cooperation – contrasting the antagonistic “billiard 
ball” model of structural realism (see Figure 5 below). 
 
 
Figure 5: The billiard ball56 and the cobweb models. Source: Jackson and 
Sørensen (2013: 104). 
Neofunctionalism is rooted in the liberal theorising on the political 
integration in Europe which began by Haas (1958) analysis of the European Coal 
and Steel Community, who was soon accompanied by Lindberg (1963; 1966) and 
Schmitter (1970). It aimed to describe, explain and predict how and why states 
“voluntary mingle, merge and mix with their neighbours so as to lose the factual 
attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict 
between themselves”, i.e. subject themselves to regional integration (Haas 1970: 
610). 
Neofunctionalism charged realism with not understanding the complexity of 
the state as a concept and not recognising the role of (Bache et al. 2015: 11–12): 
i) interest groups and bureaucratic actors outside the domestic political arena; 
iii) non-state actors in international politics; and iv) “spillover” effects to 
European integration. Haas, Lindberg and Schmitter elaborated on functional 
spillover, i.e. that successful integration in one issue-area (economic sector) 
leads to pressure of integrating related issue-areas and technical pressure to 
satisfy supranational capability to manage the issues. They also expounded on 
political spillover, i.e. that functional integration would lead to domestic 
                                                          
56 This metaphor is informed by Waltz (2010[1979]: 74, 101), holding states’ internal 
properties constant in his theory – i.e. downplaying the role of unit-level variables (i.e. 
domestic agents and agencies) on their foreign policies – and declaring them “like units” 
due to the socializing effect of the anarchic international system. 61
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pressure among groups in the states concerned and “a shift in actor expectations 
and loyalty” (italics in original) to the supranational level (Schmitter 1969: 166). 
To Haas (1958: xiv), “nationally constituted groups with specific aims, willing 
and able to adjust their aspirations by turning to supranational means when this 
course appears profitable”, were the actors who would drive the incremental 
“process of community formation”. 
Following stagnation and setbacks in the European integration process of the 
mid-1960s and early 1970s, which Haas (1970: 627) ascribed to the nationalistic 
oriented French President Charles de Gaulle, “regional integration ought to be 
subordinated to a general theory of interdependence”, Haas (1976: 179) 
concluded. This materialised in the work of Keohane and Nye (1977: 24–26), 
setting forth a theory of “complex interdependence” emphasising the role of 
transnational actors. Under such conditions – making world politics a “seamless 
web” of issue areas – states would give priority to managing welfare issues rather 
than national security. Notwithstanding, neofunctionalism was revived in the 
1990s by Sandholtz and Sweet (2012: 18–24), who incorporated elements of 
theory from Deutsch. Other scholars, such as Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991: 6) 
added cultivated spillover to explain the role of the European Commission in 
fostering integration, while Niemann (2006) added exogenous spillover to 
explain EU’s enlargement. As noted in the introduction, recent case studies on 
European defence integration have employed a slightly modified version of 
neofunctionalism (see Sauer 2015; Westberg 2015; Parrein 2011). 
Let us consider alternative integration theories to neofunctionalism. We have 
already touched upon the pioneering work of Deutch (1957: 3–5) on pluralistic 
security communities, in which international and transnational groups would be 
bound by a “sense of community”. In such communities, people (the members) 
would resolve social problems by “peaceful change”. Its contemporary 
application centres on the constructivism version of Adler and Barnett (1998), 
which is incommensurable with the rationalist approach of this thesis. As 
Oelsner (2015: 181) concludes after having employed this theory in a study on 
Latin America, “the concept of pluralistic security community has limited 
explanatory value to analyse security conditions in Latin America as a whole”.57  
                                                          
57 This outcome was due to “geographic, demographic, geopolitical, economic and even 
ideological structures” preventing the required “rapprochement between societies”. We 
cannot exclude a similar result within Europe. 62
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A more promising theory would perhaps be “new intergovernmentalism”58 
expounding on the replacement of the “nation state” by a concept of EU “member 
states”, promoted as a successor of both intergovernmentalism and 
neofunctionalism (see Bickerton et al. 2015). However, it has been criticised for 
merely constituting a rebranding of traditional intergovernmentalism (see 
Schimmelfennig 2015). Also multi-level governance theory, conceiving of the EU 
“as a polity in the making, in which power and influence are exercised at multiple 
levels of government” (Nugent 2010: 427), could be considered. 
Notwithstanding, in contrast to these theories and to non-modified 
neofunctionalism, the twofold aim of this study is to focus but on the logic of the 
maritime security strategies employed by rational state actors as components of 
their grand strategies – not on the EU level of analysis. Here, the slightly modified 
neofunctionalism analytical framework employed in Article 3 – centring on the 
effects of spillover – offers the precise predictions needed to challenge structural 
realism’s explanations of the naval cooperation of Finland and Sweden. 
Having introduced neofunctionalism – and discussed its diverging theoretical 
positions to structural realism – as a tool for contrasting and assessing the 
explanations provided by structural realism on the motives for the bilateral 
naval cooperation of Finland and Sweden over a period of varying security 
pressure, we will now move on to discussing the research design of this thesis. 
  
                                                          
58 Elsewhere called “Member State Theory”. 63
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4. Research design 
This chapter reiterates and elaborates on key aspects of the research problem 
presented in the introduction and specifies the framework for the qualitative 
studies outlined in Articles 1 through 5, which enable us to answer the four 
research questions in the concluding chapter of this thesis: 
• What explains continuity and change in the post-Cold War maritime security 
strategy of the US? 
• What lessons regarding continuity and change can we learn from the post-
Cold War employment of maritime security strategies in the East and South 
China Seas?  
• What explains continuity and change in the post-Cold War maritime security 
strategy of Sweden and Finland in light of the recent resurgence of regional 
military threats? 
• What lessons regarding continuity and change can we learn from the post-
Cold War employment of maritime security strategies in the Baltic Sea 
region? 
First, the chapter provides an account of the criteria used for selecting the 
regions and states for study. Second, it introduces the key maritime regions and 
the states herein selected for study. Third, the chapter specifies the type of data 
used in the articles, provides an account of the methods used in the articles and 
their contribution to answering the research questions. 
4.1. Selecting regions and states for study 
4.1.1. Selection criteria 
Given this thesis´ assumption that the development and employment of the 
US post-Cold War maritime security strategy has influenced states worldwide, 
examining the mutual influence of the US security engagements in key maritime 
regions is very relevant. To Stubbs and Reed (2006: 290–291), regions can be 
more or less developed along three dimensions. These dimensions represent the 
extent of which states in a distinct geographic area have: “significant historical 
experiences in common”; “developed socio-cultural, political and/or economic 
linkages”; and developed regional institutions for managing their collective 
affairs. To qualify as a key maritime region in this thesis it must fulfil not only the 
criteria of being significant developed along these dimensions. In the 
terminology of Buzan and Wæver (2003: 27–50), it must be a regional security 
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complex distinguishable from the global level by a significant degree of security 
interdependence.  
A region under study must be of a maritime character, implying that the 
maritime domain is vital to the prosperity of its states and their interactions. To 
enable us to study continuity and change in the maritime security strategies 
employed, its security dynamics must involve traditional and non-traditional 
security concerns. Finally, it must be a region in which the US use of power to 
promote its security is constrained by the international environment. A key 
maritime region thus includes great power security dynamics with implications 
at international systems level that enable us to assess whether and, if so, how 
“[s]tructures shape and shove” (Waltz 2010[1979]: 79). This leads us to select 
for study maritime regions of US interest with transforming security 
environments, i.e. those hosting a regional power willing and capable to 
challenge US supremacy.  
Phrased in the terminology used by Brooks and Wohlforth (2008: 14) and 
Taliaferro (2012: 198), we will study the influence on US maritime security 
strategies from developments in regions transforming from “permissive” 
security environments, in which the US faces “conditional and weak” constraints, 
to “restrictive” environments imposing “conditional and relative strong“ 
constraints on the US. Regions fulfilling the above criteria allow for examining 
developments at distinct national, regional and systemic levels of analysis. 
Hence, we will select for study key maritime regions in which national, regional 
and great power dynamics interact, collide or merge. 
To fulfil the twofold aim of this thesis, we must study the interactions of the 
US – and NATO59 – with key partners in the Baltic Sea region. States with strong 
national maritime interests – i.e. coastal states granted sovereignty (i.e. TTW), 
or sovereign rights (i.e. EEZ), over a substantial proportion of the region’s 
maritime domain – are of particular interest. Here, comparing the strategies 
employed by states of equal power with dissimilar geopolitical situations in the 
same region are most relevant. This will enable us to isolate the influences of 
geopolitics and to assess the impact of their geographic locations and facilitate 
discussions on their maritime strategies, pursued as subsets of their foreign 
policy. Moreover, we can expect that states characterised by transformative 
                                                          
59 Arguably, NATO embodies the US permanent commitment to protect Europe, inter alia 
by its arsenal of nuclear weapons (The Telegraph 2016). Notably, the main purpose of 
NATO is deterrence, as set out in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty on collective 
defence, binding the US to defend Europe in case of military aggression. 65
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developments in their foreign policies – i.e. those that are reconsidering their 
policies of alignment versus the dominant regional power, the external power 
and/or other states in the region – will provide particularly valuable information 
to answering the research question. 
4.1.2. Introducing the two regions of study: the East and South China Seas 
and the Baltic Sea 
To achieve this thesis aim of explaining the continuity and change in the US 
maritime security strategies over the past three decades, we must understand its 
implications in key maritime regions. To achieve this, we need to study also the 
foreign policies and maritime strategies of small states in key regions and their 
interaction with the US. For reasons set out below, the regions selected for study 
in this thesis are the East and South China Seas and the Baltic Sea. 
The security context of the region composed of the East and South China Sea 
is marked by legacies of conflict, manifesting itself in a multitude of territorial 
disputes and tensions involving small island states, China, Japan, the US and 
Taiwan. It is host to some of the world’s most busy sea lanes, important to all 
states of the region but on which China is particularly dependent (see Cole 2006: 
114). From a security policy perspective, the dense and asymmetric network of 
US bilateral alliances known as the San Francisco System60 distinguishes this 
region. 
There is no regional political institution for the East China Sea region, 
although its coastal states are members of wider economic forums such as the 
intergovernmental Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation for states of the Pacific 
Rim. For those of the South China Sea, the cooperation of the intergovernmental 
Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) organisation – which ten 
member states together form the third-largest economy in Asia (The White 
House 2016) – contrasts the US alliance network. Here, the legacies of conflict 
and diverging ideas on the principles for regional cooperation, fuelled by the US-
China rivalry for regional influence, have created a volatile dynamic in which 
economic and military security interact. So do the interactions of the two Koreas, 
China and Japan. In the security context of East and Southeast Asia – a maritime 
domain subject to a system-transformation process with global implications – 
the US and China are actors operating at international system level while ASEAN 
                                                          
60 This system refers to the results of the peace treaty signed by 48 states with Japan (N.B. 
excluding the People’s Republic of China [PRC], the Republic of China [Taiwan] and the 
two Korea’s) and the bilateral US-Japan Security Treaty, both signed in San Francisco in 
September 1951 (Dower 2014: 2–3). 6
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influences the geopolitical situation by “its leadership in establishing new 
platforms and channels for communication” (Egberink and van der Putten 2011: 
8–9, 45). Despite the frictions between its member states, ASEAN influences the 
international political process and the security situation in the entire region by 
its soft power. As argued by Friedberg (2005: 12–14), the US-China economic 
interdependence (and those of other states in the region) – managed through 
various international institutions in which the US and China participate – is a 
structural property creating incitements for peace and stability that to date have 
served to constrain the actors from engaging in conflict. 
The character of the Baltic Sea region differs markedly from that of East and 
South China Seas. Since all of its coastal states except Russia are EU members, 
the level of institutional integration is deep. Their interaction with the US differ 
from those of the ASEAN members partly due to the role of NATO, of which all 
coastal states except Russia, Finland and Sweden are members. However, the 
latter two maintain close bilateral relations with the US and are among the five 
states in NATO’s Enhanced Opportunities Programme for deep cooperation, 
resulting from the Partnership Interoperability Initiative endorsed at the 2014 
Wales Summit (NATO 2016a).  
In contrast to the East and South China Seas, only a few maritime territorial 
disputes remain between the coastal states61 of the Baltic Sea region, arguably 
due to the high level of integration into the EU and NATO (see Miniotaitė 2001: 
28–34). In fact, this region’s maritime boundary system was almost complete 
already in the mid-1990s (Leanza 1996: 182). Up to 2013, scholars and 
policymakers often referred to the Baltic Sea region as a zone of cooperation and 
peace, or even an emerging security community (see Bengtsson 2016: 452; 
Möller 2007: 12; Stoltenberg 1999: viii). Since 2014, however, it is clear that the 
revived geopolitical interests of Russia – including the maritime domain –once 
again poses challenges to regional and global security. 
Knutsen (2000: 1–8) rightly identified three actors operating at international 
systems level in Northern Europe – and thus the Baltic Sea region – influencing 
its security (of which maritime security is integral) and stability. The first was 
Russia, determining the role of the US in the European security arrangements 
and the security polices of the Nordic countries. The second was the US, while an 
                                                          
61 Following its 2005 withdrawal from its signature of border treaties with Estonia, 
including maritime borders, Russia resigned them in 2015 but has not yet ratified them 
(Einmann 2016). Latvia has not yet ratified its 1998 maritime boundary treaty with 
Lithuania, mainly due to concerns over oil exploration rights (Global Security 2016). 67
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integrated EU possessing independent actor capability would represent a third. 
For this study, it is clear that while NATO is a collective security organisation 
dominated by the US that maintains the power structure of the Cold War, Russia 
and a successfully integrated EU are actors that may become capable of causing 
system transformation. This links the regional liberal integration process of the 
EU – preferably studied by neofunctionalism – to the concept of international 
power structure given primacy by structural realism. 
The presence of a rising regional power and the importance of the maritime 
domain for resource extraction and communication (i.e. shipping) are common 
denominators of the Baltic Sea region and the region comprising the East and 
South China Seas. To fulfil the twofold aim of this thesis, the common 
denominators of these two regions and their differing characteristics render 
them particularly relevant to study. 
4.1.3. The logic of this thesis selection of states for study in the two regions 
The twofold aim of this thesis involves a focus on the maritime security 
strategies employed in the Baltic Sea region. To engage in in-depth studies of 
coastal states in the East and South China Sea region would therefore be beyond 
its scope. Notwithstanding, an overview of key coastal states’ security policy 
initiatives of importance to maritime security in this region – and their bi- and 
multilateral relations with the US, China and each other – will be provided. The 
provision of this overview is not a fortuitous bonus effect. Instead, we need it to 
be able to draw conclusions on the lessons learned from the post-Cold War 
employment of maritime security strategies in the East and South China Seas, 
thus answering the second research question. However, it is also imperative for 
answering the first research question. Since this thesis attention to the East and 
South China Seas is due to its second aim – i.e. to explain the continuity and 
change in the US post-Cold War concept by examining the development of its 
maritime security strategy – the asymmetry regarding the depth of the empirical 
studies in the two regions is acceptable. 
With regards to the Baltic Sea, we can expect that small states like Finland and 
Sweden – located at important geostrategic crossroads – will be able to punch 
beyond their weight as regional security providers (see Nordenman 2015: 96, 
102; Rûse 2015: 53), inter alia in the maritime domain. The transforming 
security strategies of these two non-aligned states in a region marked by a 
dynamic maritime security environment – and their leading roles in regional 
maritime security cooperation as well as their interaction with the US and its 
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regional contender Russia – render them particularly relevant for in-depth 
study. 
4.1.3.1 The US 
Waltz (2010[1979]: 73) is primarily concerned with those states that make 
the most difference, thus founding his theory on the behaviours of great powers 
while claiming the theory to be applicable also for lesser states “insulated from 
the intervention of the great powers of a system”. Danilovic (2002: 28), for her 
part, has suggested a useful specification of major powers by: i) a power 
dimension, “reflecting the sheer size” of their capabilities; ii) a spatial dimension, 
referring to their “geographic scope of interests, actions or projected power”; 
and iii) a status dimension, indicating the “formal or informal acknowledgement” 
of their status. Her specification points to the significance of the sometimes-
neglected spatial dimension, which serves to distinguish regional powers from 
globally dominant superpowers. 
According to these criteria, it is of paramount importance to examine the US, 
the sole superpower in the international system whose actions have global 
reverberation, possessing the world’s largest EEZ. Waltz (2010[1979]: 74–77, 
127–128) claims that international politics is a realm in which state actors are 
strongly influenced by socialisation and competition, which lead less successful 
states to replicate the behaviour of more successful ones. From a structural 
realism perspective, we can thus expect that its allies and partners on a global 
scale have more or less adapted the US conception of maritime security. The 
notion of socialisation among states – facilitated by international institutions – is 
central also to neofunctionalism and to the constructivist conception of security 
communities, although two latter centre on “norm setting and identity building” 
(Acharya 2009: 2–3) instead of adaptation to successful survival strategies. 
Accordingly, such a concept transfer is a reasonable assumption also from these 
perspectives. 
The study of the continuity and change in the US post-Cold War maritime 
security strategies outlined in Article 2 – which logically must include its bi- and 
multilateral relations with states in the region of the East and South China Sea – 
will provide the conceptual cornerstone to which we will contrast the more 
recent security developments in the Baltic Sea region. 
4.1.3.2. Finland and Sweden 
Non-aligned Finland and Sweden have been amidst of transformative 
developments in their foreign and security policies since the end of the Cold War. 
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While Finland was bound to its Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance 
(FCMA) agreement with the USSR until 1991 (Långström 2003: 218), strongly 
influencing its foreign policy, Sweden officially adhered to a policy of “non-
alignment in peace, aiming at neutrality in the event of war” (Post 2015: 320). 
Finland and Sweden became members of the supranational European Union in 
the aftermath of the dissolution of the USSR, which had evolved from the 
European Communities by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and adopted a three-
pillar structure including a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and 
Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters.62 The implications on their 
policies of neutrality by their EU memberships were addressed in the scholarly 
literature of the 1990s (see Sundelius 1994; Mouritzen 1994). Likewise were the 
implications of the 1999 launch of the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) and the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), both being tools for the 
CFSP (see Bailes et al. 2006). 
As Rieker (2006: 303–312) has noted, the EU is the sole “multilateral 
framework without a legacy from the cold war period”. Arguably, it adjusted to 
the prevailing security context by adopting a wide concept of security and an 
“innovative” comprehensive approach63, combining economic, political and 
military instruments of power in crisis management. Rieker found that the ESDP 
influenced Finland’s and Sweden’s national security discourses by placing 
emphasis on the international dimension and stepped up transformation of their 
defence forces accordingly. She also noted that the ESS replicated the threats 
specified in the 2002 US National Security Strategy64, but that the EU’s 
comprehensive approach centred on employing alternative policy tools for 
addressing them. While Finland combined national and international security 
perspectives, Sweden assigned the latter such weight that Till (2013: 43) 
subsequently defined its navy as “post-modern” due to its prime focus on UN-
mandated expeditionary operations. 
                                                          
62 The European Communities became the first pillar, the CSFP the second and Justice 
and Home Affairs the third. 
63 The understanding of the term comprehensive approach varies slightly. To NATO 
(2016c), it means, “nations, international organisations and non-governmental 
organisations (…) contribute in a concerted effort” when approaching crises since 
“military means, although essential, are not enough on their own to meet the many 
complex challenges to our security”. To the EU it means employing “a wide array of 
policies, tools and instruments at its disposal”, i.e. “diplomatic, security, defence, 
financial, trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid” when responding to 
“conflicts, crises and other security threats outside its borders” (EC 2013: 3). 
64 I.e. organised crime, regional conflicts, state failure, terrorism and weapons of mass 
destruction proliferation. 70
71 
 
The maritime security strategies pursued by Finland and Sweden cannot be 
studied in isolation of those of the EU. Rather, their strategies are layered by 
those of the EU and – more implicitly – by those of NATO. We must also consider 
their cooperation within NORDEFCO, a fact highlighting the importance of the 
Nordic dimension to their security policies. To Wivel (2014: 81, 88–89), the 
Nordic region is a security community in the sense of Deutsch et al. (1957), 
integrated in a “European security complex nested in an increasingly globalized 
international security system” and “a unipolar world order.” Within the EU 
Council, the three Nordic members of the EU – Denmark, Finland and Sweden – 
engage in informal “pre-meeting consultations” including the sharing of 
information and pooling of expertise (Rûse 2015: 53, 64). The Nordic Council 
and the Nordic Council of Ministers are institutionalised fora for intra-Nordic 
consultation and cooperation, while the Nordic-Baltic Six (NB6) and the Nordic-
Baltic Eight (NB8) are key fora for their interaction with Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania (MoFA Latvia 2016). Thereto, the NB8+, building on the 2003 
Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe (e-PINE) framework for US-NB8 
consultations, have included also the UK and approached regional as well as 
global issues. 
4.2. Data 
This thesis uses data from official foreign and security policy documents, i.e. 
legal documents, white papers, defence reviews, doctrines and other official 
strategic documents as a basis of state policy in the empirical in-depth studies of 
selected states. By presenting and discussing qualitative text analyses of a 
substantial body of secondary sources it builds on existing research. It uses 
official statistics to highlight, compare and contrast various dimensions of the 
states examined and for cross-regional comparison. To some extent, in-depth 
interviews provide supporting and contrasting perspectives, supplementing 
official political and organisational views. 
4.3. Methods used in the articles 
Chapter 3 presented structural realism and introduced a supporting 
framework for studying small states’ security. It also presented the sociological 
strand of the liberalism school of thought and introduced neofunctionalism as a 
prescriptive theoretical tool designed to explain European integration. In this 
endeavour, independent and dependent variables were specified, while 
constitutive propositions and predictions regarding the foreign policy of powers 
weak and strong – with a focus on the maritime domain – were deduced for 
structural realism. Although not explicitly stated in Articles 2 and 3 – the two in-
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depth studies of selected states which ambition are explanatory – the 
congruence method is used in a deductive approach (see Blatter and Haverland 
2012: 144–152, 189–191). Accordingly, we use the theories as comprehensive 
explanatory frameworks. The analysis of the Cuban missile crisis by Allison and 
Zelikow (1999) represents a classic example of this approach. 
Simply put, we will evaluate the congruence of the propositions and 
predictions derived from structural realism by comparing them with a broad set 
of empirical observations. In Article 3, we will contrast and compare the result 
of this evaluation with the congruence of propositions and predictions derived 
from neofunctionalism. The small-N research design of this thesis allows us to 
analysis diverse and fine-grained sets of observations of relevance to the 
maritime security strategy of each examined state. Given that this study covers 
an extensive time-period, this design helps us manage a large number of 
observations. Arguably, it also helps us gain control over the multiple factors and 
variables that influence – and even prompt the behaviour of – small and large 
states. One could rightly argue that its external validity is limited in comparison 
to that of a large-N study. However, this qualitative study is not aimed at making 
probabilistic generalisations to a population from the findings. Instead, it aims 
“to make logical generalizations to a theoretical understanding of a similar class 
of phenomena”, as set out by Popay et al. (1998: 348).  
To account for the influence of “timing”, “interaction effects” and contexts” in 
the US conceptual development of maritime security and the progression of the 
Swedish-Finnish naval cooperation, Article 2 and 4 use elements of what Hall 
(2003: 384–385; 2006: 27–28) terms “systematic process analysis”, 
supplementing the congruence method. This method focusses on assessing the 
processes whereby certain sequences of events result in actors’ responding by 
taking actions anticipated by the theories, i.e. whether the states examined 
behave in the way the theories expect them to do. To make clear the logic of the 
processes in developing their strategies among the actors examined, the 
narrative structure of each of these articles is linear. This involves presenting 
their security policy situation (the set-up); highlighting key incidents, events and 
initiatives; while stepwise examining the resulting policy and strategy responses 
of actors involved. The linear narrative is particularly prominent in Article 2 and 
influences its structure. 
In Article 1, we engage in both primary, i.e. conducting “new research to 
answer specific questions”, and secondary, i.e. “discovering information 
previously researched for other purposes” (Quesenberry 2015: 46), explorative 
research aimed at providing contextual understanding of the maritime security 72
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concept. This methodological approach involves reviewing scholarly work and 
official data to identify and gain insight into key maritime security issues/issue 
areas, create tentative conceptual understanding on maritime security and draw 
preliminary conclusions on areas of further research. Article 1 uses a mixed 
methods approach involving inductive as well as deductive reasoning in a 
“plausibility probe” (George and Bennet 2005: 75) on tentative factors causing 
conceptual change in maritime security. 
The last two studies of this thesis (Articles 4 and 5) aim at analysing current 
maritime strategic developments and drawing conclusions on viable strategies 
for providing maritime security. Accordingly, both include prescriptive elements 
with respect to maritime security strategies of the US, Finland and Sweden in a 
regional context, but do not employ any explicit theory. However, no qualitative 
inquiry starts with pure observation. As set forth by Schwandt (1993: 8), ”[p]rior 
conceptual structure composed of theory and method provides the starting point 
for all observations”, thus initiating and guiding the observations we make as 
inquirers. Accordingly, Article 4 and 5 make implicit use of the neoliberal and 
structural realist schools of thought to structure the arguments. 
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Figure 6: A flowchart outlining the process logic of state actors’ responses to 
threats to typical referent objects in key maritime security sectors – posed by 
undesired/unlawful activities of state and non-state actors – by adopting and 
employing maritime security strategies. Source: Author. 
This thesis understands the adoption and employment of maritime security 
strategies of states as responses to multi-sectoral threats in the maritime 
domain, posed by the activities of state and non-state actors to referent objects 
in four security sectors. N.B. since changes in the maritime security strategies 
pursued by the states studied are expected to logically stem from changes in their 
perceived maritime security situation (see Figure 6 above), Articles 1 through 5 
engage in the study of both. Given the fact that their responses induce 
adaptations by the actors posing the threats – while the specific security 
interests of nation states continually develop – the application of their maritime 
security strategies are further specified in policy documents adopted by those 
military (i.e. military strategies/doctrines) and civilian agencies that are 
assigned responsibilities in the maritime domain. One could rightly argue that 
studies at each of the five levels of analysis are necessary to provide a complete 
explanation. However, this thesis aims to explain continuity and change in post-
Cold War maritime security strategies by employing a structural realism 
analytical framework that assigns priority to the international system and unit 
levels of analysis. 74
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Accordingly, it accounts for the influence on their foreign policy of the 
anarchic international system and the regional sub-systems in which the 
examined states interact. Here, it addresses the sub-system level of analysis by 
employing the supporting structural realism framework for analysing small state 
security provided by Knudsen (1988; 1996) in the concluding analysis of 
Chapter 6. As an exception, this thesis addresses the sub-unit level of analysis – 
e.g. transnational firms and domestic organisations (here, armed forces) – when 
examining the motives and interests underlying the Finnish-Swedish naval 
defence cooperation in Article 3, where we employ neofunctionalism to contrast 
the explanations of structural realism. N.B. structural realism treats states like 
black boxes and does not consider the sub-unit and individual levels of analysis. 
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5. Articles 
This chapter briefly introduces the five articles of this thesis and their role in 
answering the four research questions and fulfilling the twofold aim of this 
thesis. Table 1 provides an overview by specifying the main themes of the articles 
and categorising them by state actor(s) under study; arena; type of study (i.e. 
purpose) and period of study. 
Table 1: An overview of the articles of this thesis. 
 # State 
Actor(s) 
Arena Main Theme Type of Study  Period 
 of 
Study 
 1 Maritime 
powers, 
weak and 
strong. 
Global. Examines the post-Cold War 
conceptual maritime security 
developments. 
Explorative. 1991– 
2012 
 2 The US. Global. 
Focus on 
the East 
and 
South 
China 
Seas. 
Examines the US post-Cold War 
conceptual maritime security 
developments through a 
structural realism lens. 
Explanatory. 1991– 
2016 
 3 Finland 
and 
Sweden. 
Regional. 
Focus on 
the 
Baltic 
Sea. 
Examines the Swedish-Finnish 
naval cooperation through 
neofunctionalism and 
structural realism lenses. 
Explanatory. 1991– 
2016 
 4 The US 
and the 
coastal 
states of 
the Baltic 
Sea 
region. 
Regional. 
Focus on 
the 
Baltic 
Sea. 
Examines the impact of 
maritime insecurity in the 
Baltic Sea on US interests and 
global security. Argues for the 
logical need for increased 
presence of the US Sea Services 
in the Baltic Sea. 
Descriptive65.
Advancing 
certain policy 
propositions. 
2013– 
2016 
 5 The US 
and the 
coastal 
states of 
the Baltic 
Sea 
region. 
Regional. 
Focus on 
the 
Baltic 
Sea. 
Examines the maritime 
security situation in the Baltic 
Sea region. Argues for the 
implementation of cooperative 
and comprehensive maritime 
security strategies among the 
region’s states to counter a 
multi-sectoral Russian threat. 
Descriptive. 
Advancing 
certain policy 
propositions. 
2014– 
2016 
                                                          
65 Defined in this thesis as aimed at expanding our understanding of the topic by 
providing additional information and analysis, while including elements of explanation. 76
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Article 1, titled “From Protection of Shipping to Protection of Citizens and 
National Economies”, provides an answer to why the maritime security concept 
widened on a global scale in the two decades following the end of the Cold War 
while elaborating on the consequences. To answer this question, it examines the 
global change in the referent object for maritime security in 1991–2013 by 
evaluating the influence of four prominent factors. The first factor is the role of 
new threat scenarios to nation states, while the second represents the ever-
increasing role of shipping to globalised trade and the advent of transnational 
maritime terrorism. The third factor is the economic and human security effects 
of the surge in piracy in densely trafficked sea areas, while the role of coastal 
states’ substantially expanded rights to exploit maritime natural resources by 
the 1994 entry into force of UNCLOS is the fourth. This explorative article 
provides the conceptual baseline for this thesis study of the continuity and 
change in the maritime security strategies of selected regions and states. The 
research presented in this article contributes to answering the first research 
question of this thesis. Article 1 was published in Journal of Defence Studies in 
2013. 
Article 2, titled “Continuity and change in US post-Cold War maritime security 
strategy”, represents the logical continuation of the research effort initiated in 
Article 1. It contrasts the traditional expressions in US maritime security 
strategies by the incorporation of broader security perspectives. By employing 
structural realism as comprehensive explanatory framework – while pointing to 
the limits of its explanatory power by contrasting it with predictions of 
neoliberalism – it sets out to explain the continuity and change in the US 
maritime security strategies in the period 1991–2016. The research presented 
in this article enables us to draw conclusions on how and why the US maritime 
security strategy has evolved the way it has done (i.e. the process). The research 
presented in this article enables us to answer the first research question of this 
thesis – explaining the continuity and change in the US post-Cold War maritime 
security. Given the nature of the US maritime security strategy developments, 
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this article focusses on the US economic and security policy engagements with 
states in the maritime region composed of the East and South China Seas. As a 
result, the research presented in this article also enables us to answer the second 
research question of this thesis. Article 2 is not yet published. 
In Article 3, titled “Swedish–Finnish naval cooperation in the Baltic Sea: 
motives, prospects and challenges”, we shift our focus towards the Baltic Sea 
region in order to present parts of the research required for answering the third 
and fourth research questions posed in this thesis. In this article, we employ 
neofunctionalism and structural realism as competing explanatory frameworks 
to explain the ever-deepening naval cooperation of Finland and Sweden. For 
comparison, we also examine the longstanding naval cooperation of Belgium and 
the Netherlands in this article. These are the two navies whose joint command 
then Swedish Supreme Commander Göranson promoted in 2013 as a role model 
for how Sweden could contribute to European pooling and sharing ideas 
(Lundqvist and Widen 2015a: 70). It draws conclusions on patterns of alliance 
formation and under what conditions each of the employed theoretical 
frameworks provides explanatory power. Article 3 was published in Defence 
Studies in 2016. 
In Article 4, titled “The New US Maritime Strategy: Implications for the Baltic 
Sea Region”, we maintain a focus on the Baltic Sea region. However, this article 
examines how US security interests – and the inclusion of the new pillar “all
domain access” in its sea power concept as outlined its 2015 maritime strategy 
– overlaps with those of the coastal states of this region, including Finland and 
Sweden. Accordingly, the research presented in this article contributes to 
answering the fourth research question of this thesis. Article 4 was published in 
the RUSI Journal in 2015. 
Article 5, titled “Maritime Security and Sea Power: A Finnish-Swedish 
Perspective on the Baltic Sea Region” represents the final article included in this 
compilation thesis. It interweaves the various strands of research presented in 
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Articles 3 and 4 into a geostrategic overview of the Baltic Sea, expounding on the 
character of the current maritime security environment and the recent 
responses of Finland, Sweden, the US and NATO. The conclusions drawn in this 
article on viable strategies to foster maritime security in the Baltic Sea are 
essential to answering the third and fourth research question of this thesis. 
Article 5 was published in 2016 as a chapter in the edited volume Focus on the 
Baltic Sea: Proceedings from the Kiel Conference 2015. 
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5.1. Article 1: “From Protection of Shipping to Protection of 
Citizens and National Economies: Current Changes in Maritime 
Security” 
Reprinted with permission from the Institute for Defence Studies and 
Analyses. The article originally appeared in Journal of Defence Studies, 2013, 7 
(3), pp. 57–80. The copyright was assigned to Institute for Defence Studies and 
Analyses in 2013. 
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From Protection of Shipping to Protection of  
Citizens and National Economies
Current Changes in Maritime Security
Stefan Lundqvist*
This article analyses the alteration of the referent object for maritime 
security from protection of shipping and port facilities to protection of 
citizens and national economies. It presents a tentative answer on the 
extent and consequences of this alteration applied by states in a global 
perspective, and focuses on validating four explanatory factors on why 
the alteration has occurred. The time period of study is between 1991 
and 2013. Its results illustrate a transition in states’ security policies 
from traditional expressions of maritime security to broader security 
perspectives, and also indicates radically altered maritime strategic 
perspectives among states.
IntroductIon
The maritime domain’s value for states can be described in terms of its 
natural resources, its importance for transport and trade, power projection 
and defence, and the marine environment’s inherent value.1 Consequently, 
social, economic, law enforcement and security interests converge and 
interact in this domain. Government and private interests are mixed with 
varying degrees of governmental, inter- and supra-national regulation 
and control, whose effectiveness are dependent on the coordination and 
interaction between the domain’s stakeholders. Maritime policies have 
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far-reaching ramifications and maritime security deficiencies tend to 
propagate into the land domain. In the Gulf of Guinea, for example, 
maritime insecurity has rendered significant regional loss of revenue, 
restrictions on investment, and caused crime rates to increase. Conversely, 
Somalia’s civil war and political decay has entailed lucrative maritime 
crime developments, involving piracy and illegal fishing, degrading the 
maritime security of Somalia and its adjacent states.2 
However, maritime insecurity can also be a driver for cooperation. 
As witnessed in South-east Asia, the challenges in providing security 
for the region’s maritime traffic has spurred deepened regional bilateral 
and multilateral cooperation, despite severe distrust and suspicion in 
the countries’ mutual relations and certain states’ relation to the US.3 
Collaboration needs have been prompted by the criminality in the 
Malacca Straits, which funnels sea traffic of great economic importance 
for Asian states.
Western powers have replaced traditional sea-power perspectives 
by comprehensive, transnational and global perspectives, as illustrated 
in Figure 1. Moreover, the referent object for maritime security has 
altered from shipping and port facilities to citizens and national economies. 
These changes become apparent by studying the developments of US 
and Australian maritime doctrines and policy documents, and when 
comparing them with the 2004 European Council (EC) regulation 725 
and the 2010 European Union (EU) Commission definitions of maritime 
security.4
Figure 1 Altered maritime strategic objectives and means for achieving 
maritime security in the US and Australia
Source: Author.
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Why then have these changes occurred and what are their consequences? 
This article presents a tentative answer to these questions by identifying 
and examining four factors candidate to explain this strategic change, and 
why the maritime security’s referent object is altered. The period of study 
is between 1991 and 2013, and includes key events such as the break-
up of the Soviet Union in 1991; the coming into force of UNCLOS 
III in 1994; the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001; the subsequent 
signing of the ISPS Code regime for international shipping in 2002; the 
2005 revision of the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence Against 
the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) Convention; and a surge in 
piracy in key ocean areas.5 It points to radically altered maritime strategic 
perspectives where the security policies and interests of the states studied 
have broadened far beyond traditional notions of maritime security. 
Thereto, it indicates that terrorism and maritime criminality by non-
state actors have altered states’ threat scenarios with legal and financial 
consequences.
Factor 1: End oF cold War Has lEd to  
nEW tHrEat scEnarIos
The global security environment just over 10 years into the new 
millennium differs significantly when compared to 1991. Accordingly, 
new maritime strategic challenges have progressively mounted during the 
more than two decades that have passed since the end of the Cold War. 
Chris Rahman identifies a revitalising incorporation of non-traditional 
security threats into national and international strategic thinking.6 Today’s 
security policy concepts were not drafted in the maritime environment, 
he explains, making a case for the necessity of considering maritime 
security as part of global security policy analysis and debate. Rahman 
considers the increased attention to human security as being an important 
trend supplementing nation-state perspectives, responding to states’ 
altered perceptions of transnational threats. I hold that the domination 
of the military threat during the Cold War was due to its imminent and 
existential nature, making states emphasize threats in the political and 
military security sectors. By inductive reasoning, we can expect states 
facing such threats today likewise suppressing threats in economical, 
societal and environmental security sectors. 
South Korea is a state perceiving a persistent and existential military 
threat with nuclear connotations from its northern neighbour, North 
Korea. Consequently, its security situation has gained much contemporary 
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attention. We will now challenge Rahman’s theses by briefly examining 
South Korea’s security policy developments.
As expected, South Korean policy papers prior to 2008 focused on the 
Korean Peninsula.7 The 2006 Defence White Paper exclusively discusses 
threats pertaining to the political and military sectors, focusing on states’ 
promotion of national interests through strategic coalitions, local conflicts 
contribution to regional instability, transnational terrorism and WMD 
proliferation.8 ‘Non-military’ threats are discussed as secondary matters in 
a chapter on establishing an ‘Integrated Defence Headquarters’.
The 2008 Defence White Paper conveys strikingly altered security 
notions. A rapidly altering security environment, with a rise of complicated 
and multifarious transnational and non-military threats, provides ‘new 
challenges and opportunities for the Korean military’.9 It sets the vision 
for a ‘Global Korea’, requiring global cooperation on economic, cultural 
and environmental issues. It outlines three objectives: maintaining peace 
and stability on the Korean Peninsula; building firmly the foundation 
for its security and national prosperity; and enhancing its international 
competence and status. This remarkable policy change is persuasively 
explained by Scott A. Snyder, senior fellow at the Council of Foreign 
Relations, through South Korea’s new role as a leading world economy, 
acquired G-20 membership and related needs of financial stability.10 Snyder 
notes a new ‘desire to participate in maritime security, peacekeeping, and 
post-conflict stabilisation missions’, far from the Korean Peninsula. South 
Korea’s growing dependence on global world trade explains its increased 
ambitions and related naval investments, he concludes. Its 2009 decision 
to join the US-led Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 counter-piracy 
operation was preceded by several piracy incidents involving South Korean 
ships and citizens off the Somali coast.11 Key to South Korea’s continuous 
and substantial involvement has been the new capabilities provided by its 
destroyer procurement programme.
The 2010 incidents—in which the South Korean corvette ROKS 
Cheonan was sunk and the island of Yeonpyeong was shelled by North 
Korean artillery—are echoed in the 2010 Defence White Paper.12 North 
Korea’s regime is portrayed as unstable and provocative, marked by a 
strategic goal to unite the Korean states under its regime. Notwithstanding 
this serious military threat, transnational and non-military security 
threats and the risk of inter-state conflicts in the region are emphasized.13 
Piracy, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation 
supplements military threats in a new global security environment.14 
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Maritime security is denoted a transnational and common security 
interest, designated status as a cooperation area at the 2010 Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus. 
The US–South Korea alliance is pronounced in its defensive position on 
the Korean Peninsula, but also in its commitment to promote global and 
regional peace and security through maritime security operations.
The volatile East and South China Seas are strategically important to 
South Korea. More than half of global shipping tonnage transfers through 
the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok en route to and from the 
South China Sea.15 Oil shipping is likely to increase in response to Asia’s 
growing energy demand, and Asian states are investing in regional offshore 
gas exploration. Certain exploitation areas are contested, for example, 
the Spratley Islands being claimed by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam. The 
East and South China Seas form a maritime regional security complex, 
the seasoned strategist Rommel C. Banlaoi adduces, in which the states’ 
security interests must be addressed comprehensively.16 He sets forth that 
disputes about energy, fish and overlapping claims on islands, territorial 
waters and EEZs feed interstate rivalries and form a regional maritime 
security dilemma involving the coastal states and other major powers. The 
main source of this dilemma is the economic and military rise of China, 
Banlaoi concludes, aggravated by the rising piracy threat with potential 
links to transnational terrorism.
We can thus conclude that: (1) South Korea’s expanded maritime 
security requirements and naval investments are due to a widened security 
focus and valorization of non-traditional security threats; (2) regional and 
global maritime security are now part of South Korea’s national interests; 
and (3) South Korea’s widened security focus is due to its increased 
dependence on financial stability and global trade flows, amplified 
by exacerbated regional piracy. However, 17 years elapsed from the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union until the South Korean Defence White 
Papers expressed broadened security notions. Apparently, existential and 
imminent military threats inhibit valorization of non-traditional threats 
in non-military security sectors. In contrast, they appear to be leveraged 
by financial and human security imperatives.
Factor 2: transnatIonal MarItIME tErrorIsM trEatEns  
cItIzEns and natIonal EconoMIEs
It goes without saying that terrorism is a prominent feature of today’s 
global security environment. Thus, a second factor candidate to explain 
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the change in maritime security is that transnational and ideologically 
motivated terrorism in the maritime domain poses a threat to national 
and global economies, accentuated by states’ increased dependence on 
maritime trade. These mechanisms are frequently discussed among 
contemporary scholars. Chris Rahman identifies transnational terrorism 
as a threat accentuated in US maritime strategy, managed as a dimension 
of territorial sea control, and by the maritime transport sector’s 
implementation of the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) 
security regulations.17 It is a concept associated with the risk of WMD 
proliferation, he argues, countered by maritime security operations. 
Captain (N) Charles Reid stresses the risk of a nexus between piracy and 
terrorism. In Somalia, increasingly advanced piracy is perpetrated by 
criminals affiliated with ideologically motivated terrorist groups which, 
according to Reid, preclude them from being managed as separate 
problems.18 Reid suggests that pirate leaders, with already usurped 
economic fortunes and attracted by status and political power, could be 
motivated to commit maritime terrorist attacks in the Strait of Bab el-
Mandeb. In turn, Islamist-influenced young pirates could be persuaded 
to participate. Understanding the costly consequences for maritime trade 
by closing this strait gives Reid’s concern a perspective.
This explanatory factor involves three assertions: (1) shipping’s 
importance to world trade; (2) the presence of maritime terrorist threats; 
and (3) these threats impact on human security and potency to induce 
adverse effects on national economies. Let us examine their validity.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) are useful sources 
for statistics on shipping and trade. The WTO estimates that shipping’s 
share of the global transport sector’s financial value increased from 36 per 
cent in 1995 to 43 per cent in 2006.19 In an internal report, the WTO 
Secretariat estimated that shipping’s share of the 2008 corresponding totals 
had increased significantly.20 A frequently used statistical claim, typically 
rendered without reference, is the maritime transport sector’s share of 
world trade, amounting to 90 per cent. I find these statistics relating to 
a 2008 UNCTAD newsletter, referring to volumes of transported goods 
from 2000 to 2006.21 In the wake of the 2008-09 financial crisis, 2009 
commercial shipping downturn was limited to 4 per cent compared to a 
12 per cent decline of the global export volumes.22 In contrast, the 2010 
global export volumes had a record increase of 14 per cent followed by 5 
per cent in 2011.23 The volumes of world seaborne trade correspondingly 
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grew by 7 per cent in 2010 and 4 per cent in 2011.24 Commercial 
shipping’s substantial growth between 1991 and 2011, in tandem with 
World Merchandise Trade and World Gross Development Product, 
is confirmed by the UNCTAD report, Review of Maritime Transport 
2012.25 WTO and UNCTAD statistics thus verify shipping’s increased 
importance to world trade since 1991.
Examining the alleged presence of a maritime terrorist threat reveals 
interesting facts. Peter Chalk, senior researcher on terrorism with the 
RAND Corporation, indicates that terrorist attacks on maritime targets 
only represent 2 per cent of the total number of international incidents 
reported from 1976 to 2006.26 Terrorist organizations have been located 
far from coastal areas, he explains, lacking the required resources and 
expertise to operate at and from the sea. The challenges and uncertainty 
of success has countered maritime terrorism. According to Chalk, the 
maritime terrorist threat has evolved in the new millennium through 
a series of attempted and successful terrorist attacks associated with al 
Qaeda.27 These incidents have instilled fear among Western powers for 
a determined expansion of Islamist operations to the maritime domain. 
This fear has been accentuated in the US, Chalk asserts, who has taken 
the leading role in strengthening global maritime security control systems 
since 11 September 2001.
Helmut Tuerk, a judge of the International Tribunal for the Law 
of the Sea, points to the UN Security Council’s recognition of a rising 
terrorist threat through multiple resolutions preceding and succeeding the 
events of 11 September 2001.28 The latter exposed the vulnerability of the 
global transportation infrastructure to terrorist attacks and its potential 
to transfer WMD, he explains, whilst the container system development 
has furthered shipping’s dual role as target and vector for terrorism. The 
ISPS Code and the revised SUA Convention must be seen in the light of 
these events, he declares, since the 1988 SUA Convention and Protocol 
were deemed inadequate to deter suicidal terrorist attacks by the IMO 
Council. The review process was, therefore, directed towards improving 
maritime transport security—suppressing and preventing terrorist acts 
against ships at sea or in port.
Peter Lehr, lecturer in terrorism studies at the University of St. 
Andrews, claims that the maritime terrorist threat is exaggerated, since 
it has been sparsely realized and with limited impact.29 He points to 
the difference between the now-deceased Osama bin Laden’s bombastic 
rhetoric and Jihadist (Al Qaeda) organizations’ inability to perpetrate 
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mega-size terrorist attacks in the intractable maritime domain. The 
development of terrorist groups describes a progression, Lehr asserts, in 
which different groups copy proven experience. A sudden use of ships as 
WMD vectors would represent a disproportionate increase in the attacks’ 
complexity, he concludes.
These analyses indicate a common belief that a maritime terrorist 
threat exists. It is addressed by states and in the international community’s 
legal programmes to protect citizens and the global trade system—a system 
in which shipping holds an increasingly important role. Let us continue 
by examining its impact on human security and national economies.
Chalk highlights three aspects of Islamist maritime terrorism. 
First, large passenger vessels represent venues of attacks, able to cause 
mass casualties and inflict fear among large population groups through 
media.30 Second, attacks on shipping offer a means of causing mass 
economic destabilization in the West. He recognises shipping’s key role in 
the advanced global logistics supply systems.31 Disrupting these delicate 
systems, for example, by forcing the closure of a major port or blocking a 
maritime bottleneck, would have a global domino effect on world trade. 
Chalk recognises the challenges in perpetrating such large-scale attacks, 
but emphasises the financial effects of limited maritime terrorist attacks.32 
Third, the voluminous and complex nature of the containerised sea freight 
system offers a viable environment for terrorist groups’ logistic movement 
of weapons and personnel.33 According to Chalk, Islamic militants 
remain intent to engage in maritime terrorism, visualised through the 
2010 attack on the M Star and the high-profile maritime plots prevented 
between 2008 and 2010.34
In line with Chalk, Tuerk asserts that terrorist attacks against shipping 
in key strategic areas for maritime transport possess the strength to 
seriously disrupt global trade.35
Lehr, for his part, analyses a range of attacks in which ‘improvised 
explosive devices’ have been used in different ‘modus operandi’ with 
varying degrees of success, placed on-board target vessels or carried on 
small craft in suicide attacks.36 Based on these analyses and case studies 
of hijacking and hostage-taking on ships, he suggests a focus shift from 
scenarios with low probability and high impact to scenarios with high 
probability and low impact.
Countering asymmetric maritime terrorism threats implies challenges 
for navies worldwide. The British intelligence officer Robert Snoddon 
highlights that existing organizational cultures and capabilities among 
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navies are shaped by the traditional task of defeating conventional 
adversaries.37 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Operation 
Active Endeavour, commenced in 2001, thus forced contributing navies 
to alter tactics and adapt to law-enforcement tasks. Notably, he depicts its 
unforeseen development towards a surveillance operation in international 
and cross-departmental partnership, promoting national and international 
interests through a comprehensive approach.
This examination indicates that limited maritime terrorist attacks have 
proven their potency of causing mass casualties, impacting on maritime 
trade flows and thereby threatening the global trade system. Consequently, 
maritime terrorism is firmly linked to the altered referent object of 
maritime security: the need to protect citizens and national economies.
Factor 3: PIracy and organIzEd MarItIME crIME HavE groWn  
Into rEgIonal tHrEats to HuMan and EconoMIc sEcurIty
The most common theme in today’s maritime security literature is 
undoubtedly piracy and maritime crime. In the light of its increasing 
prevalence and the extent of international responses, a third explanatory 
factor can be phrased: The level of organized maritime crime and regional 
piracy, linked to criminal and ideologically motivated organizations, has 
grown into levels posing regional threats to human security, shipping, 
national economies and regional economic systems. This line of thinking 
is given prominence by Charles Reid, who questions the validity of 
previous estimates of piracy costs in the waters off Somalia.38 Piracy poses 
a significant threat to regional economic security, the effects of which are 
unequally distributed among states in the region, he argues. Furthermore, 
Reid claims piracy to be mutually dependent on the global economic 
development, responding policies and strategies by the international 
community, and actions by regional and local actors.
This explanatory factor involves four assertions: (1) an increase in 
regional piracy and maritime crime; (2) its threat to human security 
and shipping; (3) a link between piracy and criminal and ideologically 
motivated organizations; and (4) a threat to national economies and 
regional economic systems by increased maritime criminality. I will now 
briefly examine these claims and identify their co-variation.
Arguably, the maritime areas suffering heightened criminality 
levels are maritime choke points in which the coastal states, for various 
reasons, have failed in providing adequate maritime surveillance and law 
enforcement. Sea traffic concentration areas represent two categories:
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(a) Transit ways, to which alternate maritime routes exist. If one 
route is blocked, alternate routes can and will be used; here, a 
disruption will merely delay the traffic. The Malacca Straits and 
the Gulf of Aden constitute such transit ways.
(b) Gateways, which must be traversed en route to or from enclosed 
seas. Closing a gateway prevents traffic along that route. The 
Strait of Hormuz may be described as such a gateway.
The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) is a useful source for 
statistics on piracy and maritime crime. IMB statistics are based on 
incidents defined in UNCLOS as piracy and by the IMO as armed 
robbery.39 In 2012, global piracy reached a five-year low by 297 reported 
incidents. This is a discernible drop from the 439 incidents reported in 
2011, but an upsurge compared to the 107 incidents reported in 1991.40 
In 2012, most reports emanated from Indonesia, describing 81 incidents 
of petty theft; and the waters off Somalia, the Gulf of Aden and the Red 
Sea saw a marked decrease, reporting 75 incidents compared to 217 in 
2011. IMB attributes these reductions to: (1) preventive and disruptive 
counter-piracy actions undertaken at sea and versus land-based camps; 
and (2) merchant vessels’ implementation of IMO’s ‘Best Management 
Practice’ instructions and employment of Privately Contracted Armed 
Security Personnel (PCASP). Although Somali piracy declined in 2012, 
the perpetrated incidents were violent; killing two, injuring one and 
taking 250 crewmembers hostage. Fifty-eight incidents were reported 
from the Gulf of Guinea in 2012, compared to 45 in 2011. As with the 
Somali piracy, vessels were hi-jacked, guns were usually used and 207 crew 
members were taken hostage. In 1991, IMB reported no piracy incidents 
in East or West Africa, Latin America or the Indian Ocean, but 14 in the 
South China Sea and 88 in the Malacca Straits.
Apparently, the levels of reported piracy and maritime crime have 
nearly tripled in from 1991 to 2012. This rise could logically be attributed 
to the setting up in 1992 of an IMB Piracy Reporting Centre in Malaysia. 
On the contrary, IMB claims that it was created in response to an alarming 
growth in piracy.41 
Let us also examine the impact and developments of piracy. IMB 
reports extensive piracy in the Malacca Straits in 1990–92 and 1999–2006, 
with a peak at the millennium.42 However, only singular incidents have 
been reported since 2008.43 This improvement contrasts with the post-
1994 rise in piracy in the South China Sea, likewise plaguing Indonesia 
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and Malaysia.44 Since IMB statistics indicate an end to a sustained period 
of considerable piracy, the Malacca Straits is a useful case to validate 
possible links between piracy and organized crime, as well as its impact 
on coastal states’ economies.45
Jayant Abhyankar, Deputy Director of the IMB, describes the 1990s 
piracy in the Malacca Straits as ‘Asian’, characterised by armed robbery of 
ships’ crews at night.46 Thereto, he describes the nascence of a violent form 
of piracy: hijacking and trading of entire vessels with cargo. The researcher 
Catherine Raymond confirms Abhyankar’s views on the Southeast Asian 
piracy developments47, portraying a highly violent piracy, often leaving the 
ships’ crews murdered or drifting in boats. Vessels carrying fuel oil were 
the 1990s most common victims and their cargoes were easily sold on a 
thriving black market, she explains. According to Raymond, this activity 
temporarily ceased in 2003 due to a break-up of certain international 
crime syndicates and a Chinese crackdown on the black market.
Peter Chalk describes the procedure applied as: hijacking ships at sea, 
transferring the cargo to other ships, and using the hijacked ships under 
false names and documentation.48 According to Raymond and Chalk, 
forged shipping documents are not unusual in international shipping, 
since ships easily can be re-registered under flags of convenience.49 
Raymond also highlights the 2001 emergence of a third category of piracy 
in Southeast Asia, including in the Malacca Straits, using an intermediate 
level of violence: kidnapping for ransom.
Raymond identifies three types of alleged criminal perpetrators 
in the Malacca Straits. The dominant category was petty criminals, 
perpetrating opportunistic armed robberies of ships’ crews in port or at 
anchorage.50 Another category was five Malaysia and Indonesia-based 
criminal syndicates, committing large-scale piracy and kidnappings. 
The last category was the Indonesian separatist movement Gerakan 
Aceh Merdeka, financing its struggle for freedom by smuggling and 
ship hijackings with hostage-taking. The 1997 Asian financial crisis 
seriously affected Indonesia, Raymond explains. She concludes that its 
consequences, conjoined with an increased flow of understaffed merchant 
ships in the Malacca Straits, reinforced the surge in piracy.
Several factors interacted in solving the Malacca Straits piracy 
problems. Raymond points to the effectiveness of the ISPS Code 
implementation and Indonesia’s, Singapore’s and Malaysia’s agreement on 
the ‘Trilateral Coordinated Patrols’.51 In 2005, joint aerial surveillance was 
initiated and in 2006 the three countries agreed on pursuing pirates in 
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each other’s territorial waters. Their concern and outrage about the 2004 
US proposal of stationing counter-terrorism forces on craft in the straits 
were essential to their sudden will to cooperate on maritime surveillance 
of the Malacca Straits, Raymond asserts.52 Raymond highlights the 
‘Regional Cooperation Agreement on Anti-Piracy’ entry into force in 
2006, involving the ASEAN states, Bangladesh, China, India, Japan, 
South Korea and Sri Lanka. Notably, Raymond suggests that Indonesia’s 
earlier reluctance to cooperate was due to its inability of funding adequate 
marine resources, why piracy partially funded its Navy.
These scholars emphasize the risks of piracy at various levels of 
analysis.53 Raymond discusses the shipping industry’s financial risks in 
terms of lost cargo, lost ships, risk premiums paid to insurance companies 
and ransoms paid for crew release.54 She also addresses the risk of pirates’ 
tactics being used by terrorist groups. Chalk emphasises mariners’ 
jeopardised security.55 Thereto, he elaborates on piracy’s risks to coastal 
states in terms of food security and costs for decontaminating sensitive 
environments. Nations in piracy prone areas face socio-economic risks 
from shipping boycott, he argues, addressing it as a current issue for 
terminals in Bangladesh, Nigeria, Indonesia and the Horn of Africa. 
Unlike Raymond, Chalk considers piracy’s costs to the shipping industry as 
manageable weighed against its financial turnover. Instead, he emphasizes 
its undermining consequences for affected coastal states’ legitimacy by 
the associated corruption of state government officials, as in Indonesia. 
Although Chalk considers the risk of partnerships between terrorist and 
pirate groups, he stresses their strongly divergent objectives.
Piracy is costly and its ramifications are, as we have noted, wide-
ranging. Let us examine some aspects of the Somali case. The Somali 
piracy’s costs to world economy have been estimated to US $7 billion 
in 2011, mainly relating to protecting ships traversing the Horn of 
Africa.56 This protection is mainly provided by navies through the EU’s 
Operation Atalanta, NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield and US CTF 151, 
including Vessel Protection Detachments. Since 2007, however, Private 
Security Companies (PSCs) offer increasingly advanced and costly 
protection in the area.57 Initially PSCs provided unarmed ‘security riders’, 
offering protection embarked on the commercial vessels by non-lethal 
methods. Gradually, PCASPs and escort platforms have been introduced, 
accompanied by a debate on their feasibility and legal mandate to use 
lethal force. These legal uncertainties, combined with concerns for the 
training and supervision of mariners and PCASPs, motivated the IMO’s 
94
 
94
From Protection of Shipping to Protection of Citizens . . . 69
series of recommendations during 2009 and 2012.58 Throughout these 
circulars, the IMO has encouraged self-protection measures aboard ships, 
but discouraged use of armed security—except under tight control of 
their flag state and following risk adequate assessments.
Another outstanding issue is the prosecution of the suspected pirates. 
Capturing states have been reluctant to prosecute them in their domestic 
courts, and international law59 has been interpreted as prohibiting transfer 
to a third state.60 Therefore, some states have applied a ‘catch-and-
release’ policy, while others have transferred the pirates to third states for 
prosecution by relying on UNCLOS jurisdiction. Kenyan courts began 
prosecuting captured Somali pirates in 2006, but alleged corruption and 
mistreatment of prisoners have plagued the US, UK, and EU transfer 
programmes since 2009. These problems have initiated cooperation 
with additional regional partners such as Mauritius, Tanzania and the 
Seychelles.61 The UNODC’s Counter Piracy Programme, established in 
2009, has provided these states ample assistance by judicial, prosecutorial 
and police capacity building programmes as well as equipment.62 Mauritius 
has adopted various relevant legislative instruments in its preparations, 
including a noticed anti-piracy law in 2011.63 Pirates have successfully 
been convicted in the Seychelles’ courts since 2010, and in January 2013, 
the first suspected pirates were transferred to Mauritius for prosecution.
This examination indicates that maritime crime and piracy, 
occasionally linked to ideologically-motivated organizations, have grown 
into regional threats to citizens, shipping, national economies, and regional 
economic systems. Obviously, countering piracy will remain a costly and 
legal challenge for the international community in the foreseeable future. 
In addition, it will require adequate operational coordination between 
navies and PSCs taking armed action in the maritime domain.
Factor 4: unclos III ExtEnsIon oF statEs’ EEzs Has  
IncrEasEd tHE MarItIME doMaIn’s IMPortancE
The extension of coastal states’ rights to exploit maritime natural resources 
by UNCLOS III is predominantly discussed among legal scholars, but 
its effects have wider significance. This explanatory factor draws on the 
effects of coastal states’ extended rights to exploit natural resources up to 
200 nautical miles (nm) from their baselines, and up to 350 nm of the 
continental shelf, enhancing the maritime domain’s influence on their 
food and economical security.
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This explanatory factor is discussed by Chris Rahman, emphasising 
the needs to protect the increasingly important offshore oil exploration 
from crimes, terrorism, accidents and environmental disasters.64 Martin 
Robson points to the South American economies dependency on 
maritime natural resources extraction and the need to meet its maritime 
security requirements.65 The strategic link between national interests and 
maritime security is, he asserts, most evident in the case of Brazil’s large-
scale offshore oil exploration investments.
Logically reasoning, states lacking adequate naval resources are less 
likely to take advantage of UNCLOS’s extended rights. Here, we will 
examine two African cases: the financially and military weak East African 
Mozambique, having Africa’s third-longest coastline, contrasting with the 
overall stronger West African Nigeria, whose coast is a quarter of its land 
border.
The former Portuguese colony of Mozambique, a member of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), has a 2,470 km 
coastline bordering the Mozambique Channel.66 Mozambique ratified 
UNCLOS III in 1997 and claims a territorial sea of 12 nm and an EEZ 
of 200 nm.67 Despite agricultural and mining activities dominating its 
economy, fishing is important. Between 1991 and 2002, its fish capture 
production varied between 23,195–41,579 tonnes, increasing to 189,831 
tonnes in 2011.68 Although Mozambique’s domestic fish production grew 
by 34 per cent in 2004-08, its domestic market’s concurrent 63 per cent 
increase in demands turned the balance of fish export weight from positive 
to negative values.69 However, despite this change and declining unit prices 
on shrimp in the international market, Mozambique’s 2008 balance of 
fish export value remained positive and amounted to $23,393.70 However, 
fishing is important for Mozambique from additional aspects. The UN 
agency Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) estimates 500,000 
Mozambicans being directly dependent on fishing for their livelihoods, 
whereof 80 per cent are artisanal fishermen.71 FAO emphasises fish 
importance as a source of animal protein for Mozambique’s population, 
and fish imports are required since the demand continuously exceeds its 
national supply. Trade balance is met through exports of valuable fish and 
shellfish to SADC, EU, and Asian countries, and imports of, for example, 
low-price Namibian mackerel. According to FAO, fish exports are an 
important economic growth area contributing to international interest 
in developing Mozambique’s fisheries management and production, 
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for example, fish farming. A recent example is the UK’s ‘Aid-for-Trade’ 
project which assured continued fish exports to the EU.72
Fish stocks, such as the important Sofala Bank located in the centre of 
Mozambique’s claimed EEZ, are one aspect of the unresolved territorial 
conflicts between France, Madagascar and the Comoros concerning 
the islands in the Mozambique Channel.73 Overlapping EEZ claims 
contribute to Mozambique’s problems to settle their EEZ. At a UN-led 
Law of the Sea Conference in 2011, Mozambique’s Commissioner linked 
its unresolved territorial dispute to its challenges in providing maritime 
security in the Mozambique Channel.74 Mozambique’s Navy Chief shared 
this view, but considered the decisive factor being the imbalance between 
Mozambique’s scarce marine resources and the size of its maritime 
jurisdiction area.75
Africa’s most populous state, the former British colony of Nigeria, 
has a coastline of 853 km bordering the resource-rich Gulf of Guinea.76 
Nigeria is a member of the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) and ratified UNCLOS III in 1986.77 A disputed 
national legislation from 1978, in which Nigeria claimed a territorial 
sea of 30 nm, was replaced in 1998 by claims of 12 nm and an EEZ 
of 200 nm. Overlapping EEZ claims in the Gulf of Guinea have been 
set by bilateral agreements, including a notable apportionment and 
collaboration agreement for oil exploration with the island state of Sao 
Tome e Principe.78
In 2009, Nigeria’s main export products were crude oil and 
liquefied natural gas, which accounted for 86.3 per cent and 7.5 per 
cent of the export value.79 Its exports value grew from 1990 to 2009, 
but its proportion of the total export value declined from a peak value 
of 99.5 per cent in 2000. Nigeria’s economy is thus totally dominated 
by its oil and natural gas revenues; a condition that has evolved since 
the 1958 initial export of high quality oil, which was consolidated in 
the 1990s.80 In 2009, Nigeria was the world’s eighth-largest oil producer. 
Up to the 1990s, oil was mainly extracted from land-based fields. The 
deteriorating security situation at the land-based oil fields in the 1990s, 
including repeated sabotage, large-scale oil spills and hostage-taking by 
rebel groups forced expansion to offshore fields in the Niger Delta. The 
major deep sea oil fields in Nigeria EEZ are Bonga (2005), Erha (2006), 
and Agbami (2008), each with a capacity to deliver 210,000–250,000 
barrels of oil and 150–450 m3 of natural gas per day. In his much noted 
review, the journalist John Ghazvinian suggests four reasons for the oil 
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industry’s investments in Nigeria: (1) Nigerian oil quality enables cost 
effective refining, (2) Nigeria’s membership in OPEC ensures the oil’s 
market price, (3) the offshore oil-fields offers a geographical distance from 
land-based conflict areas, and (4) additional oil reserves are expected to 
be found.81
Francois Vreÿ opposes the argument raised by Ghazvinian concerning 
the value of the offshore oil fields’ geographic distance from land-based 
conflict areas.82 Considering the Gulf of Guinea’s geostrategic importance, 
he questions how long this geographical distance can estrange maritime oil 
and gas extraction from the ongoing land conflicts. Vreÿ draws on 2008 
statistics to illustrate the threat to Nigerian maritime security, emphasizing 
the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) attack 
on the Bonga oil field and 35 reported attacks on merchant ships. Vreÿ 
argues that Nigeria, like all West African coastal states, is devoid of marine 
resources—resulting in the US Navy presence in the Gulf of Guinea, 
securing their national interests. He concludes that Africa’s coastal states 
need PSCs to meet their maritime security requirements.
Defence analyst Helmoed Heitmann proclaims that African coastal 
states’ must increase their maritime attention.83 He points to shipping’s 
90 per cent share of South Africa’s foreign trade in bulk goods and oil 
imports, and the offshore fields’ contribution to the oil export’s 80–95 per 
cent share of Nigeria’s, Angola’s, Equatorial Guinea’s, Gabon’s and Congo-
Brazzaville’s export incomes. According to Heitmann, fishing represents 
7–10 per cent of Namibia’s, Ghana’s and Senegal’s GDP and 50–75 
per cent of the populations of Angola’s, Ghana’s and Senegal’s animal 
protein intake. Africa’s maritime domain is strategically and financially 
important, he argues, and controlling its resources is such an attractive 
objective that it eventually will form an operational area for insurgents, 
terrorists or foreign forces. Heitmann notes a shift of UN-led peace 
support operations in Africa from inland to coastal states since 1960 and 
the African states’ lack of real naval capabilities. Africa’s dependency on 
commercial shipping and few deep-water harbours make the coastal states 
vulnerable to external intervention, he argues. In an era where emerging 
great powers flex their muscles and secure raw materials supplies and 
market shares, Africa is, according to Heitmann, the sole remaining area 
in the world being both accessible and vulnerable to their involvement. He 
illustrates this by highlighting the US military training teams deployed to 
African states and China’s ‘armed police forces’ protecting Chinese-owned 
oilfields in Sudan.
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This examination reveals that UNCLOS provision of extended rights 
to coastal states regarding exploitation of maritime natural resources has 
increased the maritime domain’s impact on their food and economic 
security—with related maritime security requirements. This is also the 
case in states possessing as weak marine resources as Mozambique.
conclusIons
To conclude, I will reiterate the cardinal consequences of maritime 
security’s altered referent object. First, securing the maritime domain from 
a holistic perspective is a complex task. It involves a magnitude of tasks, 
stakeholders and often competing interests, requiring a comprehensive 
approach to be managed. Second, securing the maritime domain from a 
holistic and cooperative perspective has forced navies to take on a wider 
range of activities. A new naval operations type—maritime security 
operations—involving maritime law enforcement has been developed, 
typically spanning counter-piracy, maritime counter terrorism and 
maritime interdiction tasks. These operations are principal tasks for 
today’s navies, often conducted in international and cross-departmental 
partnership in support of national and international interests. These low-
intensity operations presents challenges for navies, whose organizational 
cultures and capabilities are shaped by the traditional task of defeating 
conventional adversaries. The emergence of private security companies 
offering armed protection of commercial vessels, on board or as their 
close escorts, pose operational and legal challenges. Securing the maritime 
domain by these means is a costly endeavour.
Third, the legal framework for maritime security has been 
fundamentally revised in the wake of maritime terrorism’s advent at 
the millennium. New tools have been provided by the international 
community to prevent maritime terrorism and extensive regulations for 
port and shipping security have been globally implemented. Compliance 
with these provisions is costly and burdensome to costal states and the 
shipping industry, raising questions on the quality of its global application. 
Fourth, polities’ awareness of the maritime domain’s value and maritime 
powers strategic interests in Africa’s natural resources raise questions on 
resource management and states’ independence. These consequences 
independently pose valid explanations for the rise of contemporary 
maritime security studies.
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5.2. Article 2: “Continuity and change in US post-Cold War 
maritime security strategy” 
This unpublished article is an extended and updated version of my paper 
presented in the Maritime Security section of the 9th Pan-European Conference 
on International Relations, arranged by the European International Studies 
Association (EISA), Sicily, 23–26 September 2015. 
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Continuity and change in US post-Cold War maritime 
security strategy 
Introduction 
This article argues that control of Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) for 
the purposes of power projection and trade has been consistently at heart of the 
US concept. It notes that the 1994 entry into force of the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) increased the stakes for maritime resource extraction 
and brought new concerns for US Freedom of Navigation (FON). Thereto, is 
concludes that the advent of terrorism in the late 1990s entailed a substantial 
broadening of the US maritime security concept, from a strict military focus on 
SLOCs to one in which law enforcement and governance issues are at centre 
stage in a vast littoral environment. This change is persistent. However, as the 
military dimension of China’s rise became increasingly problematic to the US, it 
used the addressing of security threats at the lower level of the conflict spectrum 
in the South China Sea region as tools for the US Navy (USN) and the US Marine 
Corps (USMC) to deploy in theatre and thus counterbalance China. 
Pointing to the influence of structural realism theories on post-Cold War 
debates on US-China, China-India and Europe-Russia relations, Tang (2010: 2–
4) has asserted that defensive realism is “an appropriate guide for security 
strategy in our time”. Departing from this assumption and the fact that maritime 
security represents an integral part of states’ foreign and security policy, this 
article examines the extent to which the predictions of structural realism explain 
continuity and change in the US post-Cold War maritime security strategy. 
Employed as a comprehensive explanatory framework, it notes a certain 
correlation between structural realism’s predictions and the US maritime 
security policy behaviour. 
The setting 
Maritime security is of contemporary interest while Maritime Security 
Studies is an emerging sub-discipline within Security Studies (Bruns 2014). The 
attention is due to several interacting factors, of which the maritime domain’s 
growing importance to states’ economic prosperity arguably is the most 
important. It manifests in new cross-sectoral maritime security strategies 
centring on maritime resource extraction, maritime trade flows and the utility of 
naval forces in future conflict scenarios. These strategies mix traditional sea 
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power conceptions with new concepts for managing a plethora of risks and 
threats, indicating continuity and change. Here, continuity refers to a continued 
Cold War focus on military control of the maritime domain for the purpose of 
territorial defence, naval access, power projection and maritime trade. 
Conversely, change involves incorporation of wider, multi-sectoral, definitions of 
security, focussed on fostering good order at sea to the benefit of many by 
employing civilian and military resources in coalition operations to counter 
crime and terrorism in the maritime domain. Arguably, the role of the US – the 
sole superpower – is of importance for gaining conceptual understanding of the 
contemporary maritime security developments worldwide. 
The outline of the article 
This article is organised into three chronological periods in order to provide 
the required overview of the massive empirical material and to allow for an 
aggregated analysis. Each period involves at least one distinct change in 
strategies adopted at federal government level, i.e. the US grand strategy or 
maritime security strategy, or in the maritime strategies adopted at military 
service level. This approach allows us to study the cumulative effect on the US 
maritime security conception by economic and geostrategic changes as well as 
those of major crisis and events. Each period provides a selective account of the 
national strategies, presidential directives, service strategies adopted and 
various official reports. Existing research is used to contrast and augment the 
empirical findings, thus placing them in a wider research context. Comments 
based on the theoretical framework introduced below are continuously 
provided, while the empirical findings of the first two periods are summed up by 
short reflections. To fulfil the aim of this article, i.e. to examine the conceptual 
continuity and change in the US post-Cold War maritime security strategy of the 
entire period, a concluding analysis is presented at the end. 
First, however, we will introduce the theoretical framework and a supporting 
framework outlining four attributes of the sea. Here, we derive hypotheses from 
structural realism, which we employed in the subsequent analysis in order to 
draw attention to the structural context in which states operate. The aim of this 
article is not to engage in theory testing. However, we will use the congruence 
method (see Blatter and Haverland 2012: 144–152, 189–191) in a deductive 
approach to reflect on the explanatory strengths and limitations of structural 
realism. Following Waltz (1996: 56), we will draw on “all sorts of information, 
along with a lot of good judgment” since “a theory becomes useful in devising an 
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explanation of events [only] when combined with information about them” 
(Waltz 1997: 916). 
The predictions of structural realism 
Structural realism is firmly rooted in empiricist epistemology. The “offensive” 
and “defensive” strands of this research programme take reference in an 
objective conception of security defined in relative material terms, while 
defensive realism also includes subjective conceptions of threat and perception. 
The two strands differ in their assumptions regarding the level of security 
pressure, which explains their differing – yet compatible – strategy preferences 
(see Figure 1). Structural realism defines theories as instruments from which we 
can deduce hypotheses, aimed at seeking objective knowledge by testing their 
ability to explain or predict observable phenomena in a real world separate from 
the human mind (Waltz 2010[1979]: 1, 7–10, 124). Given Waltz definition of 
international politics as “a system with a precisely defined structure” (Waltz 
1990: 30) characterised by “organized complexity”1 (Waltz 2010[1979]: 12), 
structural realism explanations “may well refer to factors that are excluded from 
the theory on which it draws” (Humphreys 2012: 395–402). 
Structural realism uses a narrow conception of security in international 
politics, marked by power politics and realpolitik. It is based on five interacting 
assumptions on the international system: i) the international political system is 
anarchic, i.e. lacking a central authority; ii) great powers possessing some 
offensive military capability are inherently dangerous to each other; iii) states 
can never be assured about other states intentions since benign intentions can 
be changed immediately and malign intentions misperceived through deception 
or misinformation; iv) survival is the foremost aim of all states, as state 
autonomy is a prerequisite for achieving all other ends; and v) states are unitary 
rational actors, thinking strategically in temporal dimensions about how to 
survive in the international system. 
Structural realism predicts that states will always seek to preserve their 
security and their autonomy, selecting instrumentally and rationally among 
options in policy areas which are likely to involve threats to their national 
security (Grieco 1995: 27; Baumann et al. 2001: 39–40). Due to the anarchic 
                                                          
1 I.e. the structure and its interacting units are mutually affecting, which “involve dealing 
simultaneously with a sizeable number of factors which are interrelated into an organic 
whole” (Weaver 1948: 537). 
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character of the international system’s, states must rely on self-help strategies 
for which autonomy is a prerequisite (Waltz 2010[1979]: 72; Mearsheimer 
1995: 11; Grieco 1995: 27). In this quest, gains in relative power augment their 
autonomy and elevate their power positions, which in turn improve their 
security. Hence, structural realism predicts that all states will seek to maximise 
their power. 
Structural realism also predicts that states will seek to influence the actions 
of states as well as those of international institutions and organisations, a 
process converting their capabilities into influence. Such ability requires power. 
By influencing their international environment, states can protect their national 
interests and preserve their power positions (Gilpin 1981: 86). N.B. structural 
realism predicts that international organisations represent “arenas for acting out 
power relationships” between states (Mearsheimer 1995: 13). The process of 
socialisation among states, however, “limits and molds” their behaviour (Waltz 
2010[1979]: 76). As failure to become socialised to the international system’s 
prevailing norms may be costly and dangerous (Gilpin 1981: 86), structural 
realism expects that states will seek to influence their creation, or alter those 
existing, to ensure that they suit their aims and purposes. Great powers will also 
seek “bilateralisation” of its relations with weaker states, which means gains in 
both autonomy and influence (Baumann et al. 2001: 52–53). 
The main independent variable in structural realism for explaining a state’s 
foreign policy behaviour, the dependent variable, is its power position in the 
international system, determined by its share of certain material resources and 
the number of poles in the international system. Accordingly, the amount of 
power politics performed by a state, i.e. its use of military and economic power 
to influence the actions and decisions of other states, will invariably covary with 
its power. At the heart of structural realism is balance of power theory, 
predicting that states will avoid being dominated by stronger powers or 
coalitions by joining defensive alliances (i.e. external balancing) or by increasing 
their economic growth and military spending (i.e. internal balancing) (Waltz 
2010[1979]: 118; Walt 1985: 5).  
The alternative is to “bandwagon”, i.e. joining with the stronger party, which 
involves putting the state’s survival at risk. Although proponents of offensive and 
defensive realism employ differing additional parameters, both strands rank a 
state’s power by its: i) size of population and territory; ii) resource endowment; 
iii) economic capability; iv) military strength; v) political stability; and vi) 
competence (Waltz 2010[1979]: 131). Given that this concept of power is hard 
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to quantify and measure in its political sense – and balance of power thus being 
difficult to operationalise – the assumption that actors are rational is prominent 
in structural realist modelling of state behaviour (Buzan 1996: 51, 54).  
With regards to economic power, which can be used against a target state to 
change its foreign policy, Krasner (1996: 116) offers a solution. He suggests that 
opportunity costs – i.e. the value of something that must be given up to acquire 
or achieve something else – represent a useful way of operationalising economic 
power. If the cost for altering the economic policies is low for the initiator but 
high for the target state, the relative opportunity costs are asymmetrical and 
allow a stronger party in international relations to make credible threats. This 
author argues that we can take Krasner’s reasoning one step further, as relative 
opportunity costs can be used also as a positive incitement towards a target state. 
As a prescriptive positivist theory, structural realism not only explains and 
predicts (Waltz 1990: 22) but also instructs on how states – and especially great 
powers – should go about to be successful in international politics. It prescribes 
a ladder of strategy for a great power’s interaction with peer competitors (see 
Figure 1 below). Both strands of structural realism agree that a hegemon such as 
the US is a “status quo state" that “wants to maintain its dominating positions 
over potential rivals” (Mearsheimer 2001: 2). Its preferred strategy thus 
depends on the level of security pressure, i.e. whether a state perceives its 
competitors as guided by offensive or defensive realism preferences. 
Accordingly, we can expect to find the US strategy situated among the 
alternatives in the middle part of the ladder. 
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Figure 1: Structural realism’s ladder of strategies (Source: Tang 2010: 104). 
Structural realism uses a top-down approach to strategy. It assumes that 
policy decisions direct a state’s security strategy – and thus its maritime strategy 
– which in turn determines the composition and use of its sea services. This line 
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of thought is closely linked to its conceptualisation of states as rational unitary 
actors, representing a simplification of reality. Waltz (1990: 23, 27) considers 
such simplifications necessary to construct a theory that deals with complexity. 
Which then are the attributes that make the maritime domain worth studying in 
its own right, leading us to expect that it will be susceptible to structural realism 
explanations? The conceptualisation of the sea by Till (2013: 5–23) as a resource 
and as a medium: i) of transportation and exchange; iii) of dominion; and iv) for 
information and the spread of ideas; is a useful starting point. These 
interconnected attributes of the maritime domain deserve closer examination 
through a structural realism lens. 
Capability to dominate the maritime domain is imperative for projecting 
power at and from the sea. As suggested by defensive realist Posen (2003: 8–9), 
command of the sea – analogous to command of the commons – is the key to the 
US global power position, enabling it “to exploit more fully other sources of 
power” such as its economic and military might or that of its allies. Also 
Ikenberry, Mastanduno and Wohlforth (2009: 10) hold that the US command of 
the commons has made it the sole state capable of organising “major politico-
military action anywhere in the [international] system”. Mearsheimer (2001: 
83–84) takes an opposing position when crafting his offensive realism theory, 
assigning prominence to land power due to his notion of a “stopping power of 
water” which to him prevents any state from reaching global hegemony. 
However, the closely related offshore balancing2 strategy that he promotes relies 
on “nuclear deterrence, air power and – most important – overwhelming naval 
power” (Mearsheimer 2011: 31; Layne 1997: 112–113).  
Hence, structural realism acknowledges the importance to a state of 
dominating the maritime domain for: i) employing its economic power; ii) 
defending itself against military attack; and iii) to project power. Let us expand 
on the first dimension. A state’s desire for maritime domination is firmly linked 
to its needs to influence, or even control, maritime trade. When security pressure 
is high, it is relevant to discuss the conditions associated with the classic term 
command of the sea3 – or the related concept control of the sea, concerned with 
                                                          
2 This strategy envisions insulating the US from future great power wars and maximising 
its relative power position in the international system – thus becoming an insular 
“offshore balancer” – by disengaging from its overseas military commitments and 
terminating its extended nuclear deterrence commitments. 
3 This term denotes a relationship of relative strength between two or more navies 
opposing each other in which one enjoys a significant superiority over the other(s) that 
enables it freedom of action.  
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local and temporary naval conditions in peace and wartime (Rubel 2012b). The 
establishment of either of these conditions will then promote the security of 
one’s own merchant shipping and that of its allies and partners. In peacetime, the 
beneficiaries are numerous, virtually all seafarers participating in the global sea-
based trade system. In times of conflict and war, these numbers will be 
substantially lower, while merchant ships of opposing states might be targeted. 
When security pressure is low, it is essential to influence the terms of 
international (maritime) trade to impose asymmetrical economic costs on its 
trade partners, thus consolidating its economic (and military) power position. 
For the security providers, direct and indirect benefits in terms of 
uninterrupted sea freight may reach levels corresponding with their investments 
in seaborne trade and land-based production or markets. In the long term, peace 
and stability in the maritime domain promotes the economic prosperity of all 
trading states, although disproportionally. A state can use its economic 
prosperity to improve its military (naval) capabilities, which in turn will improve 
its power. It can use its increased power to influence the terms of the trade and 
thus reduce its transaction costs and/or transfer costs for its protection to its 
trading partners. Till (2013: 17, 21) refers to this reversible cyclic mechanism as 
“the virtuous maritime circle”, emphasising that seafaring and trade produce 
universal “trading values” (italics in original), see Figure 2 below. Arguably, 
these values – previously applied by Chinese and Japanese rulers – are organic 
to the liberal Western states of today. 
 
Figure 2. The virtuous maritime circle. Source: Till (2013). 
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The need to dominate the maritime domain include also the protection of 
marine resource exploitation. Arguably, the entry into force of the UNCLOS in 
1994 increased the importance of the sea as a resource on a global scale in 1991–
2015, but also from the concurrent effects of the technological developments 
that enable states to harvest the marine resources of the sea and exploit those of 
the seabed. Crippling fish stocks and ever increasing demands for fish, partly 
resulting from population growth, have caused a growing resource deficit.  
“Blue growth” is a novel term for strategies aimed at boosting economic 
growth and employment opportunities in the maritime domain, spanning 
diverse activities as aquaculture, coastal tourism, marine biotechnology, ocean 
energy and seabed mining. Since the environmental impact of these activities 
remains to be further clarified, most comprehensive maritime strategies take 
into account environmental concerns. Scholars (see Till 2013: 7) have referred 
to this tendency among coastal states to think of the sea as an extension of their 
land as “territorialisation”. From a structural realist perspective, we can thus 
expect that states will seek strategic control of their adjacent waters, since access 
to and control of resources – on land and at sea – constitute essential elements 
of their power base. Thereto, we can expect that their strategies will lead to 
international competition over sea areas, fuelled by technological advances that 
enable exploration and exploitation of deep-sea resources. 
The need for controlling the flow of information through the maritime domain 
is greater than ever. Although the seabed has been used for such purposes since 
the first transatlantic telegraph cable was laid in 1858 (IET 2015), recent 
developments are astounding. In 2014, 263 undersea fibre-optic cables4 
transferred 99 percent of all transoceanic data traffic – i.e. internet 
transmissions, phone calls and text messages – exposed to various natural and 
man-made risks, including acts of intelligence gathering, sabotage or terrorism 
(Main 2015; Neal 2014). The establishment of this continuously expanding cable 
network began in 1989 with the UK-France line (Woollaston 2014). The 
multitude of power-cables and gas pipelines laid on the seabed need protection 
from physical disruption, while such fibre-optic cables also need protection from 
cyber-attacks. Such attacks involve information manipulation and injection of 
malicious software, with potentially severe security consequences for public 
infrastructure or corporate and economic systems. 
                                                          
4 Another 22 cables were set to be operational by the end of 2015. 
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Increasingly networked military command and control system architectures 
involve software vulnerabilities across the electromagnetic spectrum that states 
can exploit in adversaries but, inversely, also require them to protect their own 
systems from exploitation. From a structural realist perspective, we can thus 
expect that states will seek capabilities to dominate over rival states in the cyber 
domain, including those aspects that are part of or interlinked with the maritime 
domain. Thereto, we can expect that states’ gradually assign cyber-defence and 
cyber-attack concepts more prominent roles in naval warfare. 
The intrinsic links between the maritime domain, the use of naval forces to 
dominate it, maritime trade and states’ prosperity represent mechanisms that 
are at heart of structural realism. Notwithstanding, the maritime domain is not a 
habitat for human beings but an environment in which they reside only 
temporarily for particular purposes. Temporary and purposeful use is thus a 
characteristic of the human use of the maritime domain that helps explain its 
attraction as discussed above. Thereto, structural realism is a grand strategic 
rather than a maritime strategic theoretical framework, which has 
methodological consequences. Studying the security of the maritime domain 
through the structural realism lens in isolation is therefore futile and 
counterproductive. Instead, we must consider the grand strategies that states 
pursue and the subordinate – but essential – role that the maritime domain holds 
for realising them. We must focus on those features and aspects of the maritime 
domain that influence states’ grand strategies, and those grand strategic 
mechanisms that manifests in the maritime domain. For this purpose, the four 
attributes make up an adequate supporting framework that we will use in the 
forthcoming analysis. 
When studying the maritime domain through a structural realist lens we can, 
based on the above reasoning, specifically expect that states will seek to 
maximise their power through military or non-military means and use it to: 
 maintain or increase its autonomy with regards to their: i) territorial 
waters (TTWs); ii) Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs); and iii) portion of 
the continental shelf 
 influence international maritime trade patterns and alter them in their 
favour 
 influence the international standards for interpreting maritime law, 
assuring their unimpeded access to strategically important waters for 
power projection purposes  
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 influence international maritime institutions in order to reduce their 
transaction costs and improve the protection of their property rights with 
regards to maritime trade as well as maritime resource extraction 
 seek strategic control (i.e. dominance) of those aspects of the cyber 
domain that are interlinked with the maritime domain and serve to check 
the influence of its rivals 
Conceptual continuity and change in the 1990s 
The 1991 US maritime security concept was integral of the declassified 1985 
The Maritime Strategy: Global Maritime Elements for U.S. National Strategy and 
the unclassified 1986 The Maritime Strategy (Hattendorf and Swartz 2008). 
These documents detailed an operational strategy of global scope for the USN 
and the USMC, covering the entire conflict spectrum and focussing on the 
military forces of the Soviet Union (USSR). As noted by Haynes (2015: 5), it was 
essentially naval and included guidelines for resource allocation. The first phase 
outlined a deterrence and containment strategy, while the following detailed 
how the USN and the USMC would fight a global, nuclear, war (Hattendorf and 
Swartz 2008: 246–253, 288–308). At this time, maritime security was cast in 
terms of ensuring deterrence and secure access by sea for power projection 
purposes, facilitated by naval missions together with its NATO allies. 
The 1991 US National Security Strategy (NSS) proclaimed the start of a new, 
more hopeful, era while discerning challenges for US leadership in NATO due to 
the waning security threat in Europe. It stressed the perils of regional instability, 
the need for US forward presence and enhancement of partners’ abilities to 
facilitate US deployments through security assistance programmes (Bush 1991: 
1, 15, 19–21, 27–31). The NSS pointed to the US challenges of managing the 
global economic transformation – noting the link between economic and military 
strength – while declaring a pending 25 percent force size cut. It only made three 
references to the maritime domain. Notwithstanding, the US was considered a 
maritime nation for which FON on the high seas was defined as a vital interest, 
why unimpeded access to air, sea and space had to be ensured through maritime 
and aerospace superiority. It placed emphasis on the lessons learned from the 
intensified efforts of the USSR in the 1980s aimed at restricting the access of 
naval forces in ways contrary to internationally recognized rights. 
The US reduced its military forces and domestic bases in the 1990s through 
the base realignments and closures process (Lockwood and Siehl 2004). The 
number of USN ships fell from 526 in 1991 to 318 in 2000 and its active 
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personnel from 570,262 to 373,193 (Hattendorf 2006: 4). USN and USMC 
overseas bases, however, remained intact or increased to enable forward 
presence, with the exception of the 1992 closing of the Subic Bay, its then-largest 
navy base in the Asia-Pacific. The Philippines unilateral decision not to renew the 
lease based on the 1947 US-Philippine Military Bases Agreement was preceded 
by strong anti-US sentiment from some domestic groups (Sanger 1991; Shalom 
1990). As opposed to this disengagement, the US-Philippines launched the 
Balikatan exercise in 1991. USN logistic support activities were partly relocated 
to Singapore, enabled by a 1990 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) granting 
the USN wider use of its facilities for repairs and training (IISS 2013). 
The declassified 1992 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) FY 1994–1999 
sheds ample light on the US position. It designated the USSR collapse – allegedly 
discrediting communist ideology – and the First Gulf War as victories of the US 
and its allies, while it identified the latter as a defining event in US global 
leadership (DoD 1992: 1). The “integration of leading democracies into a U.S.-led 
system of collective security and the creation of a democratic “zone of peace” was 
considered a less visible success. As suggested by Haynes (2015: 3), the US won 
this fight between competing systems models mainly because “nearly all the 
world’s richest states ended up on its side linked by a robust network of trade 
that was connected and sustained by American sea power”. 
It defined four aims to promote US national security interests (DoD 1992: 1–
2): i) to deter or defeat attacks against the US, its citizens and forces while 
honouring its historic and treaty commitments; ii) to extend and strengthen 
defence arrangements that bind democratic, like-minded, nations together in 
common defence (i.e. promote collective responses through regional defence 
strategies); iii) to preclude any hostile power from dominating any region critical 
to US interests (i.e. Europe, East Asia, the Middle East and Latin America) and 
prevent the re-emergence of a global threat to the interests of the US and its 
allies; and iv) to reduce sources of regional instability and limit violence should 
conflict occur by encouraging the spread and consolidation of democratic 
government and open economic systems, while discouraging the spread of 
technology such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 
As duly noted, these ambitions required a substantial military force and 
continuous economic growth. Thereto, it stipulated that a future US president 
would “need to have options that will allow him to lead and, where the 
international reaction proves sluggish or inadequate, to act to protect our critical 
interests” (DoD 1992: 7). Such unilateral ideas convey the view of a state 
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determined to let its national interests prevail by setting the rules of the 
international game. They are fully compatible with structural realism’s 
predictions of the behaviour of a state having achieved the level of security that 
comes with the systemic position of a hegemon, seeking to consolidate its 
position. The outcome for US defence planning follows from the 1993 Report on 
the Bottom-up Review, in which “capability to fight and win two major regional 
conflicts” set the bar (Aspin 1993: iii, 30). 
The entry into force of UNCLOS in 1994 meant that provisions on ocean 
borders were introduced that expanded the rights of coastal states. It assigned 
them exclusive rights to explore and exploit “minerals and other non-living 
resources” in the subsoil of its continental shelf (Part VI). Moreover, it inter alia 
established (UN DOALOS 1982): i) EEZs (Part V), granting coastal states 
exclusive rights to exploit natural resources; ii) the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea (ITLOS) for dispute settlement5 (Part XI); and iv) the 
International Seabed Authority (ISA) to organise and control exploration and 
mining activities on the seabed outside states’ TTWs or EEZs (Part XI) through 
authorisation, while distributing mining royalties. 
In order to explain the US maritime security strategies we must consider its 
position on UNCLOS. In 1983, the US President explained his refusal to sign it by 
pointing to “several major problems in [its] deep sea mining provisions”, which 
he deemed contrary to US interests (Reagan 1983: 378–379). Notwithstanding, 
he backed its navigational provisions reflecting “existing maritime law and 
practice” and declared a US EEZ. Agents of the Heritage Foundation have 
expounded on this argument, pointing to the US problem of being only one of 160 
stakeholders and lacking veto-power over the decision-making of the ISA (THF 
2011). To them, “proceedings at the ISA would be dominated by anti-U.S. 
interests” just “like the U.N. General Assembly”. By acceding to UNCLOS, the US 
would have to participate in its mandatory dispute resolution mechanisms for 
claims made by other members. Such a loss in influence would be incompatible 
with structural realist expectations, as would accepting its provisions in Article 
82 stipulating transfer of royalties to developing states via ISA for resources 
exploited in the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles of the baseline (UN 
DOALOS 1982: Article 82; Groves 2012: 2). The US debate continues and in 2012 
US Secretary of State rejected the above argument and argued for US accession 
to UNCLOS (Clinton 2012). 
                                                          
5 Parties may also submit disputes to the International Court of Justice for settlement. 
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The US has placed emphasis on the principles of freedom of the seas, the right 
to innocent passage6 of states’ TTWs and passage through international straits 
for decades (Groves and Cheng 2014: 7–8). It has consistently issued diplomatic 
protests and used the USN for routine transits in response to coastal states’ 
alleged excessive maritime claims since the 1950’s, activities operationalised 
through the 1979 Freedom of Navigation Program. A declassified 1990 national 
security directive reauthorized the programme, aiming at protecting US 
“navigation, overflight, and related interests on, under and over the seas” against 
such claims (Bush 1990). It has thereafter been maintained, while states subject 
to USN challenges have been recorded in annual US Department of Defense 
(DoD) reports. 
In the 1990s, the US Chiefs of Naval Operations (CNOs) released a series of 
influential concept documents, spearheaded by the USN and the USMC 1991 The 
Way Ahead. Key incrementally outlined ideas included a joint (Hattendorf 2006: 
4, 9–15, 69, 96, 107, 136, 154, 163, 196, 231, 246): i) focus on supporting the 
land battle rather than sea battle; ii) emphasis on forward presence and 
expeditionary littoral operations; and iii) widening of the engagement scope to 
include humanitarian assistance, nation building, security assistance, 
peacekeeping, counternarcotic, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and crisis 
response operations. The 1992 …From the Sea document introduced the concept 
of mobile sea bases while the 1994 Forward…From the Sea encouraged systems 
thinking for measuring operational effectiveness. Although omitting the term 
maritime security, these documents noted the role of secure SLOCs and FON for 
global access and trade, and the enduring responsibility of the USN as a provider 
of both. 
The Maritime Security Act of 1996 is instructive as regards the continuity in 
the maritime security concept of the US. It established the subsidy Maritime 
Security Program for US flag oceangoing ship owners and operators “in return 
for making their ships and crews available to the US DoD for sealift operations 
during times of war or national emergency” (GPO 1996, Econometrica 2009). 
The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 authorised the continuation 
of the programme until 2015 (GPO 2002). 
Change is emergent in the US maritime security conception of the 1994 NSS, 
that notes the conducive role of US leadership for the signing of two 
                                                          
6 I.e. not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state (UN DOALOS 
1982: 31). 
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counterterrorism treaties: i) the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of 
Violence at Airports Serving International Aviation; and ii) the 1988 Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Attacks Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (SUA) that came into force in 1992 (Clinton 1994: 1, 9). Both treaties 
centred on prosecuting and punishing the perpetrators. Here, we make two 
observations. First, the 1994 NSS did not define all security risks as military in 
nature. Instead, it defined terrorism, drugs trafficking, environmental 
degradation and refugees as transnational threats with short and long-term 
implications for US security policy. Second, it considered US leadership and 
international engagement necessary to prevent them from festering. 
The 1998 NSS, issued after the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi 
and Dar es Salaam, explicitly linked terrorism to maritime security (Clinton 
1998: iii, 16, 27). It deemed that perpetrators driven by “hatred for democracy, 
a fanatical glorification of violence and a horrible distortion of their religion to 
justify the murder of innocents” were targeting the US for ideological reasons. 
Considering the 1997 Asian financial crisis, it stressed the need for US leadership 
in international financial and trade institutions to promote US prosperity, a core 
objective required for maintaining “an unrivalled military and the attractiveness 
of our values”. 
Structural realism fails to explain this inclusion of transnational threats in the 
US national security. Notwithstanding, the US administration addressed them by 
its available diplomatic, information, military and economic tools of power when 
it had recognised them as such. However, the US efforts to influence relevant 
international institutions through “leadership” in order to protect their national 
interests are fully consistent with structural realism predictions. 
In contrast to more recent national security strategies, the USN 1997 Anytime, 
Anywhere: A Navy for the 21st Century and the 2000 (1999) Navy Strategic 
Planning Guidance7 maintained a strand of continuity in their maritime security 
concept. Both documents focussed on the enduring role for USN “forward 
presence”, while the latter specified the need for “assuring U.S. access abroad and 
influence ashore in the 21st Century” through a set of prioritised strategic 
capabilities and “transformation to a network-centric and knowledge-superior 
force” (Hattendorf 2006: 178–183). The USN employment in “Military 
Operations Other Than War” manifested its engagement to assure continuous 
influence across the spectrum of operations, linking its forward presence to the 
                                                          
7 The expanded, unclassified, 2000 version augmented the classified 1999 version. 
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1997 NSS objective “being actively involved in the world beyond our borders in 
an era of globalisation” (Clinton 1997). The USN should remain postured for “the 
high end of military conflict”, maintaining a forward deployed “capability to 
dominate the maritime environment to dissuade global naval ambitions by a 
future regional power” and perform an “enduring role in strategic deterrence”. 
N.B. this would enable USN support to maritime law enforcement (MLE) 
agencies in their countering of non-military challenges by default. 
These documents conveyed a conceptual novelty. To project power ashore in 
regions involving emerging “area denial” capabilities, the USN needed not only 
secure SLOCs but seamless control of the littorals (Hattendorf 2006: 174–176, 
182, 196–201). USN forward presence – a “force-in-being” – would provide rapid 
response capability for emerging contingencies, while entirely foreclosing the 
options of a future regional power. Without specifying the regions concerned, the 
documents offered a new framing of the traditional maritime security concept. 
To manage the rise of a peer competitor in 2020 – and non-state actors – able to 
challenge US national interests on a regional scale, they specified the need for: i) 
forward presence in key operating areas of likely crisis or conflict, “routinely 
collecting intelligence and gaining valuable knowledge”; ii) “ability to achieve a 
real-time, shared understanding of the battlespace at all levels”; and iii) to 
develop critical partnerships and enhance interoperability. While achieving this 
ultimate aim, they envisioned that US forces would serve as “effective 
[peacetime] instruments for shaping the international environment”. 
The widened geographical requirement of sea control to littoral areas thus 
stemmed from state-based threats. Viewed through a structural realism lens, this 
change was necessary to allow for US hedging or containment strategies versus 
potential opponents in Asia and the Middle East. The 2000 (1999) Navy Strategic 
Planning Guidance specified that China, Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Russia 
pursued area denial capabilities (Hattendorf 2006: 190–191). Here, the US 
relations with key Asian states in a truly maritime region help us understand the 
developments of its maritime security concept. 
First, the US-China differences over Taiwan fuelled the tension in US-China 
relations – a reality since the US prompt suspending of their security cooperation 
following the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown – throughout the 1990s (Sutter 2015: 
127). A major crisis in their relations ensued by China’s series of ballistic-missile 
tests in July 1995, diverting shipping and commercial flights in the Strait of 
Taiwan. The US interpreted these provocations as an attempt to influence the 
December 1995 Taiwanese presidential elections (Elleman 2015: 128–133; 
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Sutter 1998: 70–73). Large Chinese air and naval exercises in August and 
November 1995 and another round of missile tests followed them in March 
1996, establishing exclusion zones around Taiwan. In response, the USS Nimitz 
transited the strait in December 1995 and two carrier groups from the US 7th 
Fleet were deployed in the area in March 1996 while maintaining a diplomatic 
dialogue. These events illustrate the usefulness of maritime force to influence the 
decision-making of other states, but also the US need for sea control for 
intervening in ways interpreted as coercive naval diplomacy (Tai 1998).8 US 
arms sales also influenced the security calculus, as Taiwan acquired Patriot 
Advanced Capability (PAC-2) guided missiles and associated missile defence 
units in 1997 (Kan 2014: 16). 
Second, Japan – which post-World War II economic development has been 
described as a miracle, marked by close cooperation between government and 
business sectors – lost its status as the second economic power in the world to a 
rising China at the end of the Cold War (Sutter 2015: 167–169, 174–177). Japan 
experienced economic stagnation and growing regional military security threats 
in the 1990s – the Taiwan issue posed the risk of drawing Japan into conflict with 
China – while confidence in its value as a US ally was reduced. Economic 
development and restructuring of its internal market rules took precedence in 
the priorities of the Japanese governments. N.B. the US remained its key 
economic partner despite frictions such as market access barriers to US exports.  
The much noted 1995 rape of a schoolgirl by US servicemen, followed by 
massive protests, brought international attention to the local problems 
associated with US bases on Okinawa9 (Pollack 1995), situated at “China’s only 
good route to the open ocean beyond the first island chain” and hosting three 
quarters of the US military installations in Japan (Tiezzi 2015b). A portion of the 
US 7th Fleet forward-deployed ships was based in Yokosuka10 and Sasebo11. 
Despite these frictions, the close US-Japan alliance without which “the U.S. 
influence in the Asia-Pacific would be severely constrained” was maintained 
(Sutter 2015: 164). Japan’s elevation to a more “equal partner to the U.S in 
international security matters” in the 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines – 
                                                          
8 In this case, the possible enforcement of the provisions outlined in the Taiwan Relations 
Act, enacted in 1979. 
9 Including a Marine Expeditionary Force and US Air Force Composite Wing. 
10 Hosting Carrier Strike Group Five. 
11 Hosting parts of Expeditionary Strike Group Seven/Task Force 76. 
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increasing its regional security responsibility and clarifying their wartime roles 
– strengthened their alliance (Ajemian 1998: 323–325, 342). 
Third, the US maintained good relations with the Philippines, a former US 
colony12 and longstanding Southeast Asian ally. The US maintained its economic 
aid although terminating remuneration for its terminated access to military 
bases (Tarnoff and Nowels 2001: 13–14). The value of the US-Philippines trade 
more than quadrupled between 1991 and 1999, while the US remained its main 
foreign direct investor (Medalla and Balboa 2006: 4–6). The Philippines turned 
the Philippine Republic Day of 4 July (celebrating its independence from the US) 
into a Philippine-American Friendship Day in 1996, while making a presidential 
visit to the US in 1998 (Delmendo 2004: 132, 192). A Visiting Forces Agreement 
was concluded in 1998, enabling deepened military cooperation under the 1951 
Mutual Defense Treaty (US DoS 1998) and resumption of the bilateral Balikatan 
military exercise series (Lum 2012: 15).13 
Forth, South Korea’s security dependency on the US, including its extended 
deterrence, harks back to their 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty (Manyin et al. 2015: 
8–10, 20). The perceived North Korean threat, backed by its ally China, has 
consistently been the dimensioning strategic concern of the US-South Korean 
relationship. Since 1994, the US 7th Fleet is assigned responsibility as 
Commander of Combined Naval Component Command for the defence of South 
Korea, tasked to conduct air superiority and battlefield interdiction missions and 
provide air support to the US and South Korean ground forces (Mizokami 2014). 
Marine units based on Okinawa are a mobile reserve. However, the management 
of the historically troubled Japan-South Korea relationship and their competing 
claims to the Dokdo/Takeshima islands was a challenge to the US. North Korea’s 
nuclear programme induced a crisis in the US-North Korea relations in the early 
1990s, involving US considerations of a pre-emptive military strike on its nuclear 
facilities (Chanlett-Avery et al. 2015a: 4–5). Negotiations led to the 1994 US-
North Korea Agreed Framework for dismantling its plutonium programme, 
monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). North Korea’s 
1998 launch of a long-range ballistic missile over Japan and the disclosure of a 
hidden nuclear weapons site prompted new negotiations in 1999, resulting in an 
agreement on cancelled missile tests (Sutter 2015: 140). 
                                                          
12 1898-1946. 
13 The Philippines cancelled this exercise series in 1995 due to a dispute on the Visiting 
Forces Agreement. 
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In the 1990s, South Korea emerged as a major US economic partner and the 
value of their trade more than doubled (Manyin 2002: 52–53, 57, 65–66). 
Notwithstanding, their interaction was marred by disagreements over trade 
policies. In the wake of the 1997 financial crisis, however, the US replaced Japan 
as South Korea’s largest supplier of imports while the International Monetary 
Fund forced South Korea to further open-up its economy and implement far-
reaching reforms of its financial and corporate sectors. As the US-South Korean 
trade and the level of US Foreign Direct Investment grew in 1999 and 2000, so 
did their economic interdependence. N.B. the US typically used its greater power 
and South Korea’s economic dependency to set the agenda of their trade talks. 
Moreover, the level of their trade frictions was principally affected by “whether 
or not political or security issues [were allowed to] override bilateral trade 
considerations”. 
In sum, the strategies of the USN and the USMC were marked by continuity in 
their maritime security conception in the 1990s. The outstanding conceptual 
change were the widened geographical requirement of sea control to littoral 
areas, required to facilitate hedging or containment strategies. This change 
involves operations in an environment far more complex than the open sea, in 
turn requiring new types of naval capabilities. The pending (February 2002) USN 
(2015a) initiation of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) programme – a vessel type 
designed to dominate the coastal battlespace and defeat asymmetric threats such 
as mines, coastal diesel submarines and fast attack craft operating from ashore – 
must be seen in this context. In fact, the emerging anti-access capabilities of 
potential US opponents were based in the coastal rims. USN units had to be 
capable of approaching the shores and operate within reach of these threats, but 
the USN deemed indispensable aircraft carriers too valuable to expose them to 
these inexpensive weapons. The USN and USMC ambition to control the littoral 
environment did thus not only require new vessel types, it also required regional 
partnerships for their basing, logistic support and intelligence collection. 
The US ambition relates to regarding the sea as a medium of dominion, 
reverberating with the state-centric threat perception predicted by structural 
realism. However, the focus of White House and the US Department of Defense 
strategies were wider, involving also the reduction of sources to regional 
instability, the encouragement of open economic systems and promotion of 
maritime trade. These strategies thus also heeded the attribute of the sea as a 
medium of transportation, regarding it as a prerequisite for US economic growth 
by mastering globalisation. These aims were secondary to the USN and the USMC, 
to be solved “en route” if their main task of deterring potential opponents and 
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projecting power were solved when and where needed. Rather, they regarded 
them as a task for US MLE agencies. 
The entry into force in 1994 of UNCLOS did not alter the US maritime security 
conception. However, it did raise the stakes for states’ maritime resource 
extraction, increasing the tensions between US FON requirements and coastal 
states’ devotion to exercise national jurisdiction. Clearly, it increased the 
tendency among states to regard the sea as a resource. 
From the turn of the millennium 
The turn of the millennium was followed by high-profile maritime terrorism 
incidents associated with al-Qaeda, such as the failed attack on the USS Sullivans 
in January 2000 and the fatal attack on the USS Cole in October 2000, both in the 
Yemeni Port of Aden (Chalk 2008: 20). Plans by the Jema’ah Islamiyah network 
to attack visiting USN vessels were revealed in Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore (Percival 2005: 9). The contentious issue of US FON operations and 
military activities in international airspace flared up in April 2001, when a 
Chinese fighter-interceptor collided with a USN reconnaissance aircraft over the 
South China Sea (Dutton 2009: 703–707).14 Chinese officials requested a halt of 
such missions over their EEZ, while US officials argued that Chinese intercepts of 
their aircraft had become “increasingly aggressive”. In the wake of this serious 
incident, the official Chinese news agency Xinhua published a legal analysis 
arguing that such flights were national security threats violating the UNCLOS. 
Accordingly, analysts warned that China would continue challenging the US 
presence and interests in Asia (Kan et al. 2001: 22). 
Authorised by the US Congress to use military force following the 11 
September 2001 attacks, the US President launched a Global War on Terrorism 
(GWOT) including Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001 (Feickert 
2005). The latter involved the successful use of USN carrier strike groups to 
topple the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, but also established the US-led 
Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 – tasked to monitor and interdict suspect 
shipping in the Horn of Africa region (Haynes 2015: 151–152; Ho 2009: 506). 
Following NATO’s invocation of Article 5 on 12 September 2001, Operation 
Active Endeavour provided NATO naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Profound domestic changes were set off in the US administration and legislation 
                                                          
14 The Chinese pilot died while China detained and interrogated the USN crew following 
their emergency landing on Hainan Island (Rinehart and Elias 2015: 5). 
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resulting in the implementation of pervasive security programmes. The 
controversial USA Patriot Act, passed in October 2001, provided US law 
enforcement agencies with tools designed to uncover terrorist cells (Ball 2005: 
xiii–xxvii, 16–24). From March 2003, the new Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS)15 – established through the 2002 Department of Homeland Security Act – 
coordinated the implementation of the programmes. 
As argued by Waltz (2000: 13–15), a state’s “impulse to protect one’s identity 
– cultural, political and economic – from encroachment by others is strong”. This 
corresponds well with the essence of the US perception of being “under attack” 
in September 2001. His predictions that: i) “States having a surplus of power are 
tempted to use it”; ii) “the vice to which great powers easily succumb in a (…) 
unipolar world [is] overextension”; and iii) “intervention, even for worthy ends, 
often brings more harm than good”, almost seem to have foreboded the 
protracted and costly US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Among the frantic US activities to address maritime security was the address 
to the General Assembly of International Maritime Organization (IMO) by the 
Commandant of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) in November 2001, urging 
IMO to implement a scheme for port and shipping security (DHS 2003: 60448). 
His request was heeded and Resolution A.924(22) became adopted, calling for a 
thorough review of: i) measures and procedures to prevent terrorist acts 
threatening the security of passengers and crews, and the safety of ships; and ii) 
“all existing measures already adopted by IMO to combat acts of violence and 
crime at sea” (IMO 2015). The resulting International Ship and Port Facility 
Security (ISPS) Code and augmentary measures were developed by the IMO 
Maritime Safety Committee and its Maritime Security Working Group (IMO 
2015). The ISPS Code – amending the 1974 International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) – was part of a wider counter terrorism initiative 
linked to the actions of the Counter Terrorist Committee of the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373, the International Labour 
Organization’s 2003 revision of the Seafarers’ Identity Documents Convention, 
and various initiatives of the World Customs Organisation (WCO) to improve 
supply chain security. To assist developing countries’ contributions to the global 
effort of protecting shipping from terrorist attacks, a major IMO programme was 
launched in 2002. 
                                                          
15 Incorporating 22 US federal agencies into one organisation. 
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The USCG continuously submitted comprehensive security proposals to the 
meetings of the IMO Maritime Security Working Group, based on work it had 
been coordinating since October 2001 (DHS 2003: 60448). It held meetings with 
US Federal agencies with security responsibilities, coordinated outreach 
meetings with the US as well as foreign shipping, labour and port associations, 
and arranged a workshop in Washington DC for members of the national and 
international marine community in January 2002. In December 2002, the IMO 
adopted the ISPS Code with entry into force set to 1 July 2004 (IMO 2015), except 
for its provisions of an Automatic Identification System (AIS) for vessels on 
international voyages which was set to December 2004 (DHS 2003: 60449). 
Notably, the USCG thus managed to align the provisions of the ISPS Code with 
those of the US Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, enacted in 
November (GPO 2002). 
The USCG was also authorised to develop and implement a Long-Range 
Identification and Tracking (LRIT) system for ships in US waters that were 
equipped with a Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (DHS 2007: 56601–
56602). In 2002–2006, the US “aggressively” and “energetically” pushed at IMO 
– through its Maritime Safety Committee and its bodies – for amending the SOLAS 
convention to authorise flag state, port state and coastal state access to LRIT 
information, i.e. ship identity and its location. In May 2006, Resolution 
MSC.202(81) established the legal mechanism requested by the US, binding the 
contracting governments to implement the LRIT regime. It involved installing 
required equipment on cargo ships exceeding 300 gross tonnage, passenger 
ships and mobile offshore drilling units on international voyages, as well as 
establishing national LRIT data centres or linking themselves to such 
cooperative centres from 1 January 2009. 
As suggested by Enders and Sandler (2012: 28), protecting the lives and 
property of the state is essential in liberal democracies and imperative for 
governments who want to stay in office. Accordingly, the US 2003 National 
Strategy for Combatting Terrorism placed emphasis on protecting US citizens 
and interests from transnational terrorism – linked to WMD (EOP 2003: 9–11, 
15). As Enders and Sandler show, there is a “robust and unequivocal” link 
between liberal democracies and transnational terrorism, the former being 
vulnerable by the built-in restraints protecting its citizens’ liberties (Enders and 
Sandler 2012: 9, 16, 29–30).16 The DHS was swiftly established to coordinate the 
process of eliminating the US domestic weaknesses. Without a world 
                                                          
16 I.e. freedom of movement, speech, press and association, and citizens’ right to privacy. 
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government, the US was forced to engage in multinational cooperation to 
address the international weaknesses conducive to transnational terrorism, by 
definition involving some combination of perpetrators, victims, institutions, 
governments or citizens from more than one state.  
Empirical studies have shown that neither liberal democracy per se nor 
economic globalisation explain the post-1968 rise in transnational terrorism 
(Enders and Sandler 2012: 9, 37, 49–50). Instead, (wealthy) liberal democracies 
were targeted by transnational terrorism (originating from poorer states) only 
if they were: i) involved in foreign policy crises; ii) US allies; or iii) intervening 
in civil wars in other states. US citizens and property were the main targets, 
accounting for 38 percent of all transnational terrorist attacks in 1968–2008. 
Arguably, the US thus benefitted more than other states from a successful, 
coordinated, effort to fight transnational terrorism. Still, the partial success of 
the US efforts to “marshal and sustain international coalitions” (EOP 2003: 15) 
might be explained by the perceived threat being common to all states in a 
globalised world in which the US is a major trading partner. In structural realism 
terms, such behaviour – i.e. when states ally themselves with the stronger party 
in a conflict – represents “bandwagoning for profit” (Schweller 1994). 
The 2002 NSS safeguarded against rising powers but was braced against the 
global terrorist threat, emphasising US leadership in creating a “balance of 
power” by a coalition of states professing freedom, democracy and free 
enterprise versus terrorism and its state sponsors (Bush 2002: 1–2). As 
defensive realist Walt (1985: 9, 26) posits, coalitions and alliances are usually 
formed against distinct powerful threats while “ideology does play a 
[subordinate] role in alliance choices”. Also, “states may balance by allying with 
other strong states, if a weaker power is more dangerous for other reasons”. Such 
hopes apparently guided the 2002 NSS, casting transnational state sponsored 
terrorism as a threat to “freedom-loving people across the globe”, centring on “a 
struggle of ideas” (Bush 2002: 1, 13, 15, 31). Arguably, it resembled the Cold War 
threat arrayed against NATO by the USSR, which imminence was considered 
requiring preventive and even pre-emptive counteraction. 
The US influenced the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
counterterrorism approach. It pushed through UNSCR 1373 (2001), establishing 
a legal framework for international cooperation on terrorism prevention, and 
UNSCR 1267 (1999) on thwarting the financing of terrorism (Terlingen 2010: 
132). By invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNSCR 1373 imposed 
indefinitely binding obligations on all member states to prevent the financing of 
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terrorism and freeze terrorists’ assets. However, the term “terrorist act” was not 
defined, why the counterterrorism efforts have relied on the various definitions 
of the member state. In 2002 (1986), the US DoD defined terrorism as “the 
unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or 
property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve 
political, religious, or ideological objectives” (White 2003: xiii, 12; Schmid and 
Jongman 1988: 33). This definition involved targeting of combatants and non-
combatants, contrasting the distinction of the latter in the definitions of the US 
Department of State (1983), the US Department of Justice (1984) and the 2003 
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. For the US DoD, attacks on US 
military personnel or units deployed in operations may consistently represent 
terrorism (DoD 2015c: 243). 
When the UNSC adopted UNSCR 1267 in 1999, it established a Sanctions 
Committee composed of its fifteen members. It was assisted by an eight-member 
Monitoring Team tasked to “identify and ensure the freezing of assets of 
individuals, groups, and corporations associated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban 
anywhere in the world” – i.e. the Consolidated List (Terlingen 2010: 132–133). 
UNSCR 1373 established a Counter-Terrorism Committee to supervise its 
implementation. To these interacting resolutions, the US managed to add “some 
200 names to the Consolidated List” shortly after the 9/11 events. UNSCR 1540, 
adopted in 2004 following a US/UK initiative, invoked Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter and obliged member states to take action to prevent the proliferation of 
WMD, their delivery systems and related materials, especially by non-state 
actors (Oosthuizen and Wilmshurst 2004: 2–4). UNSCR 1566 established a 
working group tasked to impose measures upon individuals, groups or entities 
of terrorist networks other than the al-Qaeda and the Taliban (UNSC 2004b). N.B. 
the 2002 ASEAN-US Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International 
Terrorism – committing the signatories (including the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations [ASEAN]) to cooperate on information sharing, policy and regime 
development, capacity-building, transportation, as well as border and 
immigration control (ASEAN 2002) – referred to UNSCRs 1267 and 1373. 
Concerns that terrorists could use ocean containers for smuggling WMD into 
the US, led the US to introduce the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism 
in November 2001 and the Container Security Initiative in January 2002. The 
former sought to bolster global supply chain security in the private sector in 
response to the seven million containers arriving annually at US seaports while 
regulations were deemed lax (GAO 2003:1). The guidelines of the voluntary 
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism security programme were 
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tailored to each segment of the supply chain, which the applicant had to apply 
and respect (UNCTAD 2004: 4–9). The Container Security Initiative established 
a partnership programme for managing high-risk containers. Built on bilateral 
agreements, it allowed US customs to establish security criteria for containers 
and provided for deployments of its custom officers at foreign ports to control 
their pre-screening.17 Notably, the costs for screening and detection equipment, 
screening facilities, personnel and training are borne by the host country. Closely 
linked was the “24 Hour Rule”, effected by amendments in US customs 
regulations in October 2002, requiring provision of detailed manifest 
information for US bound cargo 24 hours before loading at the foreign port. This 
information enables US customs officers posted in Container Security Initiative 
host countries to identify high-risk containers prior to loading (Ireland 2009: 
343). All maritime containerised cargo bound for the US is thus screened while 
high-risk cargo is scanned and, if needed, physically inspected. 
Again, an intergovernmental organisation apparently echoed the US domestic 
and bilateral efforts. As noted by Ireland (2009: 341), supply chain security and 
counter-terrorism were not traditional roles and responsibilities of customs 
administrations. In response to the June 2002 demand for cooperative action on 
international transport system security towards terrorism by Group of Eight 
(G8) leaders (G8IC 2002), the WCO adopted a resolution on “security and 
facilitation of the international trade supply chain” noting the global concern 
with acts of international terrorism (WCO 2002). It established a task force that 
developed a set of customs guidelines on Integrated Supply Chain Management, 
which core principle was to implement risk management at the national level 
(WCO 2004a). To consolidate this achievement, a small “High Level Strategic 
Group” was established in 2004 to “enhance the position of the WCO and 
Customs administrations on security and facilitation matters”, tasked to prepare 
a framework on these matters (WCO 2004b). To promote contributions of less 
developed countries, the WCO Council approved a customs capacity-building 
strategy in June 2003 and launched regional “capacity building operational 
programmes” (WCO 2010: 1–3). 
This correlates well with structural realism’s prediction that great powers 
seek bilateralisation of its relations with weaker states and oblige them to accept 
and implement its decisions. 
                                                          
17 Or vice versa, if the partner would so prefer. 
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Fear of terrorists’ acquisition and use of WMD typified the 2002 NSS and the 
2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NSWMD). The 
latter proclaimed a fundamental US policy change through the (EOP 2002: 1–6, 
15): i) GWOT; ii) homeland security strategy, iii) new deterrence concept18 and 
iii) new WMD approach. The NSWMD comprised three pillars: i) counter-
proliferation; ii) strengthened non-proliferation; and iii) consequence 
management. Capability of deterrence by retaliation was still considered 
effective versus conventional state actors, while “rough states” and terrorists 
were deemed to require intelligence-based anticipatory action. Accordingly, the 
NSWMD concluded that the US had to improve its: i) intelligence gathering on 
WMD-related facilities and activities; ii) law enforcement and military agency 
interaction; and iii) intelligence cooperation with partners and allies.  
These elements are essential to understand the change in the US maritime 
security concept. 
In response to a perceived gap in the global non-proliferation system, the US 
launched the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in May 2003. It set a vision for 
active partnership and practical cooperation in the air and maritime domains 
(Dunne 2013: 2, 5, 21–24, centring on a Statement of Interdiction Principles for 
merchant vessels that acceding states and international bodies were to endorse. 
The US also sought bilateral ship-boarding agreements with its partners, 
concluded with key flag-states Liberia, the Marshall Islands and Panama in 
2004.19 As noted by Dunne, the PSI positioned itself within the legal boundaries 
set by future UNSC resolutions, e.g. UNSCR 1540 (UNSC 2004a) obliging all states 
to establish effective national WMD export and transhipment controls, including 
laws and regulations. Again, the US used its power to influence the UNSC in order 
to impose obligations on other states. 
Structural realism explains the US great power behaviour in terms of linking 
terrorism to alleged state sponsors, imposing obligations on the latter, and its 
efforts to ban their acquisition of WMD. It also explains the stated utility of 
seizing “the global initiative” in the 2002 NSS, seeking to induce regional powers 
such as China, India and Russia to cooperate and prevent a “possible renewal of 
old patterns of great power competition” (Bush 2002: 6, 13–18, 26–30). N.B. it 
                                                          
18 Including: i) offensive strike systems; ii) active and passive defensive systems; and iii) 
new capabilities; augmented by networked command and control systems and “exquisite 
intelligence” (DoD 2001). 
19 As of August 2015, eleven states had concluded ship-boarding agreements with the US 
(DoS 2015). 
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declared that the time had come “to reaffirm the essential role of American 
military strength” to inter alia “dissuade future military competition”. For this 
purpose, the 2002 NSS maintained a traditional emphasis on forward presence, 
in turn requiring bases and temporary access arrangements. As noted in the 
2002 NSWMD, it also required coordinated multinational intelligence collection. 
Again, the case of the Philippines is instructive on US foreign and security 
policy. It designated the Philippines the status of a major non-NATO ally in 2003, 
following its: i) acceptance of US military training of its security forces; ii) troop 
contribution to the war in Iraq; and iii) successful campaign in apprehending 
members of the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Jema’ah Islamiyah (Sutter 2015: 215–
216). In return, the Philippines envisaged economic help while recognising that 
there “may be others who might feel timid or hostile about U.S. leadership in the 
war against terrorism” (Garamone 2003). Here, China is widely recognised as 
the state referred. Likewise, Thailand received this status in 2003 as a reward 
for its troop contribution to the Iraq war and its policy change, offering the US 
forward sites for military supplies. Singapore reportedly turned down a similar 
offer, but entered negotiations on the bilateral Strategic Framework Agreement 
for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defence and Security, which was signed 
in 2005 (IISS 2013). It involved defence-technological collaboration and sharing, 
a Strategic Policy Dialogue and a Protocol of Amendment to the 1990 MOU, 
extending the access for US ships and aircraft to Singapore facilities. 
As set forth in the 2002 NSS, the enactment of bilateral free trade agreements 
(FTAs) was important for promoting US security and prosperity. This tool was 
made readily available by the U.S. Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 
2002, assigning the President a five-year authority to negotiate FTAs with other 
states, while limiting the mandate of Congress to approve or disprove them 
(Bush 2002: 19; LRC 2012). Prior to the millennium, the US concluded only two 
FTAs20, while it signed a US-Jordan FTA in 2000 (Aggarwal 2013: 175–178, 194). 
In contrast, the US signed FTAs with Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco and the 
Dominican Republic-Central American FTA (CAFTA-DR) in 2003–2004. Except 
for the US-Chile FTA, all FTAs were closely linked to securing or rewarding US 
allies21, facilitating US balance of power considerations and/or promoting 
                                                          
20 With Israel (1985) and Canada (1988). 
21 The US-Jordan FTA, economically significant to Jordan but of minor importance to the 
US, is a prime example. The US Senate delayed its ratification until September 2001, 
when Jordan swiftly supported the GWOT (Press-Barnathan 2009: 78-79). 
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regional security, while the support of economic reforms was a key US driver for 
the US-Morocco, the CAFTA-DR and the US-Bahrain FTAs. 
The post-millennium developments of US relations with the remaining Asian 
states approached in the previous section are also instructive. First, Taiwan 
remained a contentious issue in US-China relations, characterised by the latter’s 
continuous build-up of forces targeting Taiwan and potentially impeding US 
assistance in case of a conflict over Taiwan (Sutter 2015: 129). In response, the 
US continued its arms sales to Taiwan. Following the 2001 US-Taiwan arms sales 
talks, negotiations on attack and utility helicopters began in 2002 (Kan 2014: 8–
20). They signed contracts on US sale of amphibious assault vehicles22, Kidd-class 
destroyers and a Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4) 
programme in 2003, while Taiwan received its first delivery of Advanced 
Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles. 
Second, Japan remained a key US ally in the Asia-Pacific region, seen by the US 
as a “cornerstone” of its ability to promote its interests in the Asia-Pacific and to 
advance its security (Sutter 2015: 163, 177). Accordingly, Japan was reassured 
on the US alliance commitments. The much noted 2002 disclosure that North 
Korea pursued a covert programme for highly enriched uranium – violating the 
1994 framework agreement placing its frozen nuclear weapons programme 
under IAEA monitoring – and the restart of its production facility while 
requesting the IAEA inspectors to leave, led to a new crisis (Pritchard 2007: 164). 
North Korea’s: i) test-firing of a short-range, anti-ship missile and two Silkworm 
ground-to-ship non-ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan; ii) its interception of 
a US Air Force reconnaissance plane in international airspace over the Sea of 
Japan; iii) the Japanese Coast Guard’s 2001 chase and sinking of sank a North 
Korean intelligence gathering ships in its EEZ; and iv) 2001 confession that 
eleven Japanese citizens were abducted in the 1970s and 80s, four of whom were 
allegedly alive (Nanto 2003: 18–26); added to the Japanese concerns regarding 
North Korea’s nuclear capabilities (Sutter 2015: 175). At this time, distrust and 
suspicion between Japan and South Korea impeded the US efforts for a US-Japan-
South Korea management of North Korea. In 2003, Japan began to acquire US-
developed BMD technologies and interceptors (Chanlett-Avery et al. 2015b: 23). 
Third, North Korea remained the main concern of the US-South Korea 
relationship (Manyin et al. 2015: 10). South Korea’s change in attitude from 
                                                          
22 Under a programme managed by the US Marine Corps. 
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confrontation to reconciliation towards North Korea23 – reflecting the increased 
confidence in its regional force projection capabilities by its force modernisation 
programmes – and its trend towards closer alignment with China – replacing the 
US as South Korea’s largest export market in 2003 – added to uncertainties 
regarding the US alliance commitment stemming from the significant US troop 
reductions announced in 2004 (Cha 2004: 139–142). US President George W. 
Bush labelling of North Korea as being part of the “axis of evil” in 2002 disturbed 
South Korean opinion and raised doubts on whether the alliance actually served 
South Korea’s national interests (Snyder 2009). Although frictions over these 
issues were substantial in 2002–2004, economy and policy realities worked for 
the alliance. South Korea contributed medical personnel and engineers to the US-
led coalitions in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003 (Axe 2010). Following 
the increasing market shares of China, South Korea began to lose 
competitiveness against Chinese goods in 2004, while a growing proportion of 
its firms operating in China perceived losses in their comparative advantage in 
technology (Snyder 2007). South Korea’s 2001 establishment of a maritime 
observation facility and helicopter-landing platform on the disputed Ieo-
do/Suyan Jiao reef became a source of China-South Korea discord. 
The USN 2002 Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities envisioned 
a USN capable of performing “global joint operations against regional and 
transnational dangers” (Clark 2002). It would deploy in key regions marked by 
a mix of states “poised for conflict”, “well-funded terrorist and criminal 
organizations”, and “failed states” producing frequent crises with little warning. 
The strategy, which made no use of the term maritime security, outlined three 
concepts for its forward presence and management of a wide array of threats. 
Sea Basing involved sustained and forward deployed naval forces avoiding shore 
basing, Sea Shield outlined their defensive posture – an “extended homeland 
defense” – while Sea Strike centred on capability and capacity to project power 
ashore. An internal and external information network, the ForceNet, would 
interlink them. The USN response to a “transformed strategic environment” thus 
focussed on sustaining and projecting sea power, a capability w it enhanced by 
information technology. The USN elaborated further on this strategy with the 
USMC, resulting in the 2003 Naval Operations Concept for Joint Operations. As 
Haynes (2015: 165) puts it, its relevance and direction “would be cast into doubt 
within a year” due to the bleak experiences from the US 2003 invasion of Iraq. 
                                                          
23 The June 2000 summit in Pyongyang between the leaders of both Koreas brought this 
issue to the fore. 
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In December 2004, the US president Bush (2004: 1–9) declared that the 
security of a broadly defined Maritime Domain was a global concern. A Maritime 
Security Policy Coordinating Committee was established and tasked to produce 
a comprehensive National Security Maritime Strategy (NSMS) to consolidate the 
US increasingly extensive policies and strategies. N.B. this committee was about 
to develop eight supporting plans to the NSMS, which conceptual implications 
we will elaborate on below.24 
In sum, the years after the turn of the millennium was a time of upheaval for 
the US people. The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 ripped away the 
perception of security among its population, arguably resulting from the 
background of living on a continent insulated from wars on other continents by 
wide masses of water. It brought about a massive domestic security programme 
with global repercussions in many domains, including the maritime. Focus was 
on fighting the global war on terrorism declared by the US President. It involved 
the launch of a frenetic, coordinated strategy development at all department 
levels and the creation of the influential Homeland Security department. Without 
doubt, it also opened up an opportunity for the USCG to push forward its view of 
maritime security domestically as well as internationally. 
The USCG success in this quest would later contribute to shaping the first US 
maritime strategy25 in 2007, in which the three Sea Services jointly outlined a 
strategy with a focus on sustaining the liberal international economic order (see 
below). However, the US maritime security conception wad widened already in 
2004 due to its maritime counter-terrorism endeavour that required 
international collaboration and cooperation. Support to MLE agencies had thus 
become a major task not only for the USN, but also for navies worldwide. This 
development was closely linked to emphasising the role of the sea as medium of 
transportation, one of dominion and – less obvious – for the spread of ideas. 
The focus on maritime threats at the lower level of the conflict spectrum – e.g. 
terrorism, piracy, people and drug smuggling – in various US maritime strategies 
addressed what was later to be termed Maritime Security Operations (MSOs), 
did not transform the USN capabilities, which persistently has centred on carrier 
                                                          
24 I.e. plans for: i) MDA; ii) Global Maritime Intelligence Integration; iii) Domestic 
Outreach; iv) Coordination of International Efforts and International Outreach; v) 
Maritime Threat Response; vi) Maritime Infrastructure Recovery; vii) Maritime 
Transportation System Security; and viii) Maritime Commerce Security. 
25 I.e. a marked change from previous naval strategies. 
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strike groups. This context is key to understanding the implications of the USN 
2002 launch of its LCS project, representing an additional capability that would 
eventually prove to be a useful tool also for supporting MLE agencies and 
improving partner interoperability and capabilities. The USN and USMC 
capabilities remained structured for the high-end of conflict, or what the Royal 
Navy – as opposed to MSOs – termed “the real thing” (RN 2010: 33). One could 
perhaps describe this naval mode of operations as business almost as usual. 
Despite the emergent widening of the US maritime security conception, the 
growing military capabilities of certain powers was a worrying concern in US 
strategies at all levels. Flaring disputes on military intelligence gathering in “the 
global commons” were worrying signs of pending conflict, related to regarding 
the sea as a resource and a medium of dominion. 
2005 and onwards 
The Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee submitted the still 
valid NSMS in September 2005. In this strategy, the committee linked maritime 
security to two strategic aims outlined in the 2002 NSS: i) igniting a new era of 
global economic growth through free markets and free trade; and ii) preventing 
US enemies from threatening the US, its allies or its friends with WMD (EOP 
2005: 2–12). It set three tiered maritime security strategic principles: i) 
preserving the freedom of the seas; ii) facilitating and defending commerce to 
ensure an uninterrupted flow of shipping; and iii) facilitating the movement of 
desirable goods and people across US borders, while screening out dangerous 
people and material. The committee also derived four maritime security 
strategic objectives from these principles: i) preventing terrorist attacks and 
criminal or hostile acts; ii) protecting maritime-related population centres and 
critical infrastructures; iii) minimising damage and expedite recovery; and iv) 
safeguarding the ocean and its resources. N.B. the NSMS identified threats from 
transnational criminals and pirates, environmental degradation and illegal 
seaborne immigration, adding to the state and terrorist threats specified in the 
2002 NSS and the NSWMD. This inclusion of threats traditionally managed by 
law enforcement and civil contingency agencies entails a substantial conceptual 
broadening of maritime security. 
The NSMS is preferably read in conjunction with the US DoD 2005 National 
Defense Strategy, framing US security along with that of the international order 
and its partners (DoD 2005: 1–7, 15). It prescribed international partnerships as 
the remedy to the US vulnerability to indirect threats resulting from instability 
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in the international system. While the strategy deemed the lack of “a global peer 
competitor” to be a US strength, the 2005 National Defense Strategy defined the 
US globally leading position as vulnerability in terms of breeding unease and 
resistance. Reaffirming the 2002 NSS, it concluded that the US had to attain its 
role as a protector of the international system by collective action with its 
partners, whose capabilities in turn required to strengthening. The strategy thus 
aimed at seizing the opportunity of key partners’ willingness to deepen their 
integration into a US-led security system, while new ones would join. In this 
effort, it considered forward deployed forces instrumental. 
USN Admirals Morgan and Martoglio (2005) echoed the principles and 
objectives of the NSMS in an influential article. While assuming a given role for 
US global leadership, they recognised the US inability to respond unilaterally to 
an altered international security environment and expounded on an argument 
centred on the presumed advantage to all states of “promoting and maintaining 
the security of the global maritime commons”. By turning maritime security into 
an “exportable product”, they argued, US shipbuilding industry would benefit. 
Drawing on the implications of a globalised trade system, they suggested that 
global security on the high seas and in the world’s littorals, harbours and ports 
was a cornerstone of the prosperity of all. Accordingly, they noted that 
transnational threats mostly occur in the TTWs of less developed, but still 
sovereign, states with limited naval and MLE capabilities. 
These littoral areas were legally out of reach for the US. Accordingly, Morgan 
and Martoglio (2005) identified a need for cooperative partnerships to ensure 
MDA and pre-posturing of US assets to enable emergency and crises response. 
They emphasised the need to overcome “resistance based on sovereignty 
concerns”, seen as “a delicate issue” due to the influence of allies, peers, or other 
nearby nations. In a follow-up article, Morgan (2006) expanded the “Navy of 
Navies” concept into a “Maritime Force” augmented by Coast Guards, citing US 
CNO Mullen’s set of principles for establishing a Global Maritime Network 
through multiple Regional Maritime Networks. The 2006 Navy Strategic Plan 
translated the concept into strategic guidance for USN planners and 
programmers, otherwise promoting the principles of Sea Power 21 (USN 2006: 
3, 20–21). For its part, the 2006 Naval Operations Concept launched the Global 
Fleet Station concept of deployed sea-based, adaptive naval force packages in 
areas of US interest (USN and USMC 2006: 30). 
The USCG (2007: 47–51) January 2007 Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, 
and Stewardship echoed the need for forward-deploying USCG units and 
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elaborated on its expanding cooperation with the USN. It used a broad concept 
of maritime security, placing emphasis on collaborative advancement of global 
maritime governance in terms of safety and security. Here, it pointed out weak 
coastal states as a major source of threats to the maritime commons and the 
continuity of global commerce by being “potential havens for terrorists, 
criminals, and other hostile actors”, engaged in smuggling, piracy, human 
trafficking, illegal migration, WMD movement and terrorism. In this strategy, the 
USCG proclaimed “a leadership role in developing international maritime 
regimes to promote effective and responsible management of the global 
maritime domain” and appointed itself as the best-suited organisation for the 
mission. Its bilateral support were to be selective, tailored to improve maritime 
governance through a risk management approach when and where such 
activities supported US national security interests. In essence, the strategy 
outlined an international engagement programme based on maritime strategic 
calculations. 
The idea of a Global Maritime Network, rephrased as a Global Maritime 
Partnership, was incorporated in the USN, USMC and USCG October (2007) A 
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS21). As opposed to previous 
naval and coast guard strategies, it was the first US maritime strategy, balancing 
between addressing traditional sea power considerations and maritime security 
threats at the lower level of the conflict spectrum. Centring on the idea of the 
maritime domain as the “the lifeblood of a global system” in terms of sea borne 
trade, less emphasis was placed on issues pertaining to state sovereignty and 
more on protecting and sustaining a peaceful global system’s “interdependent 
networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance”. 
As noted by Rubel (2012a), the CS21 was built on systems’ thinking, 
construing the global system as made up of a wide range of interdependent and 
interacting elements which whole was greater than the sum of its parts. 
Accordingly, it sought to integrate US sea power with those of its allies and 
partners and with other elements26 of its national power (USN, USMC and USCG 
2007). Its logic was that no one nation was capable of providing holistic systemic 
protection, while the effects of each state’s operations would “ripple throughout 
the system as a whole”, resulting in the security of the system being either 
enhanced or reduced (Rubel 2012a: 8). This explains its seminal statement that 
“preventing wars is as important as winning wars” (italics in original), used as 
the rationale for establishing a cooperative approach to global maritime security 
                                                          
26 I.e. diplomacy, information and economy. 
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(USN, USMC and USCG 2007). Such an approach requires trust and confidence, 
which indeed “cannot be surged”. This emphasis on US policy interdependence 
with other states in the CS21, resulting from globalisation, has clear liberalism 
connotations. 
Notwithstanding, the CS21 maintains a strand of conceptual continuity 
readily explained by structural realism. It addresses the need for the US to 
maintain “regionally concentrated, forward-deployed task forces with the 
combat power to limit regional conflict, deter major power war [and] win our 
Nation’s wars as part of a joint or combined campaign” (USN, USMC and USCG 
2007). By noting that “we cannot be everywhere”, it makes clear that US 
maritime forces will be concentrated to regions where “conflict threatens the 
global system and our national interests”. To structural realism, the global 
system represents a set of interacting state units while a systemic change 
involves altering the hierarchic order of its units (Waltz 2010[1979]: 40, 82).27 
Accordingly, the US efforts to protect the global system involved defending its 
leading position. At this time, the US increasingly cast China as a peer competitor 
whose rise and military expansion was not necessarily going to be peaceful 
(Bush 2006: 41). A structural realist interpretation thus focuses on the US 
assumption that China was defensively oriented and therefore subject to a policy 
of engagement, while requiring a hedge for an opposite development. Structural 
realism offer less explanation to why the US set up CTF 151 in 2009 in response 
to piracy attacks off Somalia. 
The CS21 did not specify adversaries, but US maritime forces were to be 
continuously postured in the Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean 
(USN, USMC and USCG 2007). Duly positioned, they would offer readiness to 
respond alongside other elements of national and multi-national power and 
provide political leaders “a range of options for deterrence, escalation and de-
escalation”. While dissuading “peer competitors”, they would be committed to 
promoting regional security in close concert with partners and US allies. In 
conclusion, the CS21 envisioned a dual use of US maritime forces. 
The 2008 Maritime Security Partnerships is a study of conceptual importance 
to US maritime security (NRC 2008: 16–17, 41, 128–129). First, the study 
committee observed that maritime security for the USN had “evolved from 
                                                          
27 To Waltz, three elements arrange the structure: the ordering principle (anarchy), the 
(lack of) functional differentiation of units, and the distribution of capabilities (the 
polarity). 
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conventional maritime operations against a peer competitor to dealing with an 
environment rife with asymmetric threats and supporting law enforcement 
functions in the maritime domain” (see Figure 3). It noted that the USN’s 
international involvement had not always been accepted and highlighted the 
successes of the USCG in promoting various cooperative maritime security 
initiatives. It made clear that some states had interpreted the US interest in 
promoting the Global Maritime Partnership as an “extension of its intelligence 
operations” and US homeland defence. In this interpretation, the reduced size of 
the USN explained the US need for ensuring that naval vessels of other states 
were made available to patrol the world’s oceans on its behalf. As a remedy to 
their lack of will, the committee proposed that the US would show real concerns 
for local problems instead of terrorism and the prevention of WMD proliferation. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Spectrum of US post-Cold War maritime security activities. Source: NRC 
(2008). 
Second, the committee set forth information sharing as the unifying concept 
for the MSP, using the Joint Interagency Task-Force South concept for countering 
Caribbean drug traffic as a role model (NRC 2008: 5, 8, 18, 47). Third, it 
recommended that the USN should address its lack of cultural awareness and 
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language skills that were hampering its partnership efforts by “expanded formal 
educational and bilateral/multilateral training”. Forth, the committee proposed 
forward-deployment of USCG cutters to address local maritime security 
concerns jointly with the USN. Fifth, it suggested a bottom-up approach to build 
trust and confidence in the US bilateral relationships by addressing local security 
concerns and progressively expand those to cross-sectorial (i.e. civil-military) 
groups. Sixth, the committee addressed the need for a more robust funding of the 
MSP programme. 
It is clear that the US proclamation of true benefits to its partners was not a 
manifestation of a collective US goodwill. Rather, it was a prescription for 
obtaining success in its quest for continued global leadership. This is apparent 
when examining the committee’s proposal to tailor US information sharing to: i) 
(differing) levels of trust; ii) bilateral (more) versus multilateral (less) 
arrangements; iii) focus on coordinated action at tactical level rather than 
information sharing; and iv) (uneven) levels of technological maturity and 
sophistication (NRC 2008: 56, 76–77, 112–113). By implementing differing 
information security and protection regimes across the maritime security 
spectrum (see Figure 2), information to and from each participant could be 
filtered and protected. Through a multilevel information architecture, close allies 
would share secret information of the entire spectrum, while less trusted 
partners could gain access to an unclassified “shared information space” and a 
“user-defined operational picture” suitable for law enforcement agencies. 
Let us further elaborate on the US rationale for employing a cooperative 
approach and posturing of US maritime forces in the Western Pacific. Rubel 
(2008: 72, 77), in charge of developing strategy options and analyses of the CS21, 
reveals that China, Iran and North Korea all were considered for inclusion as US 
security threats. The staff, however, chose not to identify specific threats because 
such considerations could prove to be self-fulfilling and thus counterproductive 
to the intention of furthering cooperation and preventing war. Hence, the staff 
could not convincingly pursue their traditional threat-based planning. As writing 
team member Ennis (2009) specifies, China was the most controversial and 
engaging issue of the process. He confirms that the staff sought to phrase the 
strategy so that China would be invited to maintain the global system rather than 
fuel Chinese antagonism, while expecting the Chinese to “read themselves into 
the document” (as a US threat) in relevant places. Ennis refers to positive open-
source Chinese reactions to the resulting descriptions of a “multipolar” world, 
but conveying a sense of foreboding to its cooperation objectives. To a large 
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extent the CS21 approach corresponds with that of the DoD 2006 Quadrennial 
Defence Review (DoD 2006: vi, 30) which, in contrast, designates China as a 
”near-peer” US competitor requiring prudent US hedges if the cooperative 
approach would fail. 
At this time, China’s economic growth, increasingly assertive international 
diplomacy, maritime exploitation in the South China Sea and emerging anti-
access strategy increasingly worried the US (Dumbaugh 2008). Its improving 
capabilities in terms of theatre-range ballistic missiles, land-attack cruise 
missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, land-based aircraft, 
naval mines, submarines, surface combatants, amphibious ships, nuclear 
weapons and high-power microwave devices were particular USN concerns 
(O’Rourke 2008). However, there was also an economic dimension to China’s 
emerging power. Through its 2002 FTA with ASEAN – institutionalising their 
economic relations – China aimed at building trust and partnership, promoting 
its foreign policy objectives and aspirations for a regionally leading role (Cai 
2004: 589, 594). Hence, it was a move to exclude the US. Control of ASEAN’s raw 
materials, energy resources and the three quarters of China’s energy imports 
passing the South China Sea were vital to Chinese current and future economic 
growth (Koo 2013: 97). Following China’s lead was, and may still be, prudent for 
ASEAN state leaders who consider the importance of exports to China in their 
economic growth and the political legitimacy of their governments. 
Following a ten-year period of dialogue and cooperation between China and 
the ASEAN member states that included the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) on peaceful resolutions of their differences 
became increasingly apparent from 2006 (Fravel 2012: 34–38, 47; Raine and 
LeMière 2013: 32–34, 45–47). This included the extent of China’s sovereignty 
claims over islands and reefs in the South China Sea and its interpretation of 
international maritime law. Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam 
dispute the territorial claims by China – identical to those of Taiwan – that were 
laid down in its 2009 submission to “the UN Commission on the Limits on the 
Continental Shelf”. The US has taken no position on these complex territorial 
disputes. The US treaty commitment to Japan includes the Senkaku Islands in the 
East China Sea, a Japanese territorial claim fiercely disputed by China (The White 
House 2014). Since the 1990s, China has bolstered the capabilities of its MLE 
agencies. As China opted out from the ITLOS when ratifying the UNCLOS and 
rejects “internationalisation” of the disputes (Storey 2012: 58), these agencies 
de facto enforce Chinese national laws within the Chinese “nine-dashed line” 
enclosing most of the South China Sea (Holmes 2012: 110). 
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The increased efforts of ASEAN member states to assert and exercise their 
competing claims to maritime rights, superimposed by China’s increased 
enforcement of its national laws, have resulted in numerous incidents and 
diplomatic tensions (Fravel 2012: 36–38, 44–47). Chinese MLE vessels have 
regularly escorted and aided Chinese fishing vessels during fishing activities in 
disputed areas, ready to intervene with vessels of the other claimants. In 2006, 
Vietnam’s unilateral decision to pursue oil exploration with foreign oil 
companies in the disputed Phu Khanh basin led to Chinese protests, while its 
continued efforts prompted China to threaten the US oil company Exxon Mobil 
in 2008. Vietnamese fishing operations in disputed waters from 2005 involved 
confrontations with Chinese MLE vessels, who confiscated the catches, 
confiscated or expelled the vessels while fining and/or detaining the crews. In 
2011, Chinese vessels repeatedly interfered with Vietnamese and Filipino 
seismic survey activities. The dispute on US FON within China’s EEZ in the South 
China Sea triggered the 2009 incidents, where Chinese vessels harassed the 
survey ships USNS Impeccable and USNS Victorious, while China opposed an 
ocean surveillance operation in the Yellow Sea by the USS George Washington in 
2010 (O’Rourke 2015: 10–12, 27). In 2001–2010, China interfered with US air- 
or seaborne intelligence gathering activities at five occasions (Cole 2010: xviii).  
US Secretary of State Clinton (2011) duly recognised the geostrategic 
importance of the Asia-Pacific region, its role in global economy and politics, and 
its maritime character in her statement on the US “pivot” to Asia. She announced 
an increased US military presence in the region to ensure its allies and partners 
on the reliability of US commitments and its desire to influence events, including 
managing US-China bilateral relations. The 2010 NSS also emphasised the US 
readiness to manage the implications of China’s expected “expansion of its 
interests within and beyond the region” (Obama 2010: 3, 13). However, as noted 
by Holmes (2012: 102), USN capacity is dwindling while China’s capacity to 
discourage actions that it considers “inimical to its interests is growing along 
with its diplomatic clout” is increasing. N.B. both powers are dependent on an 
uninterrupted global transportation system, while their economic 
interdependence may dampen the US eagerness to defy the will of China. 
We must see the 2005 US NSMS against this backdrop. On the one hand, the 
US cannot abandon its national interests in the South China Sea region. On the 
other, the US must reassure China of its peaceful intentions when it gets 
increasingly involved in re-establishing itself as the regional leader. This is in 
accordance with structural realism prescriptions. The dual nature of naval 
power – which latent warfighting capability can be activated at any time – makes 
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cooperative missions hard to distinguish from competitive ones (Holmes 2012: 
108, 112). Given the US-China mistrust, USN forces deployed to the South China 
Sea are likely to be seen by China as tools for US attempts of dominion and vice 
versa. Indeed, one reason that Chinese leaders prefer bilateral over multilateral 
negotiations with ASEAN states might be the risk that they jointly seek to 
counterbalance China – by themselves or aided by the US. Trust is thus the 
essential ingredient, and it takes time and efforts to build. As suggested by 
Holmes, the choice of instrument matters and coast guards are not as threatening 
as warships, although China opposes all kinds of US involvement in the region. 
The US Southeast Asian maritime security engagement involved deepened 
military cooperation with the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore through 
exercise series such as: i) the US/Philippines bilateral28 Balikatan; ii) the 
multilateral US-led Rim of the Pacific, iii) the US/Thailand-led multilateral Cobra 
Gold; and iv) the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training involving US 
bilateral exercises with Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand and Timor Leste (Raine and Le Mière 2013: 
155; USN 2015b). The US has thus replaced its traditional “hub-and-spokes” 
model of alliance operations in Asia by a distributed network with stronger inter-
partner military relations. The US non-deployed engagement has thus actively 
promoted the regional multilateralism that China has sought to prevent. Here, 
the gradual warm-up of US-Vietnam relations since 2004 stands out. It was due 
to: i) the establishment of an annual political, security and defence dialogue 
involving maritime security issues; ii) the 2011 MoU on bilateral defence 
cooperation; iii) non-combat naval exchange activities including maritime 
security; and iv) the 2013 US-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership resulting in 
Vietnam being denoted a key US partner (DoD 2014: 17; Thayer 2013). 
Taiwan has participated in the Container Security Initiative since 2005 and in 
the Megaports Initiative29 since 2006 (Kan and Morrison 2014: 6–17), 
supporting the US counterterrorism efforts. More important, Taiwan and China 
resumed their quasi-official dialogue in 2008, resulting in closer economic 
engagement, social contacts and reduced political tensions. In 2011, however, US 
officials noted a large increase in its exports to China and warned Taiwan for 
“over-reliance” on the Chinese market, urging its leaders to seek a balanced 
relationship with the US as part of a national security agenda. In 2011, US Acting 
Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Lavoy voiced concerns that Taiwan was 
                                                          
28 The participation of Australia since 2014 has made it multilateral (Fonbuena 2014). 
29 Aimed at detecting and interdicting nuclear and other radioactive materials in cargo. 
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vulnerable to a People’s Liberation Army attack – which would be contrary to 
China’s pledge of a “peaceful development” of its Taiwan links – entailing the risk 
of inviting the “aggression U.S. policy seeks to deter” (Kan and Morrison 2014: 
11). The US intended sales of submarines, refurbished P3C ASW aircraft and F-
16C/Ds fighters failed to materialise, but Taiwan signed a contract for an Early 
Warning Radar System in 2009 – successfully tracking North Korea’s 2012 long-
range missile test – and acquired additional sets of upgraded Patriot batteries 
and missiles in 2010 (Kan 2014: 11–25). In 2012, Taiwan also signed a contract 
for upgrading their F-16A/B fighters. 
Japan, the world’s third largest economy, deepened its economic and defence 
cooperation with the US in 2005–2015. Strengthened by domestic political 
stability since 2012, Japan: i) revised the Japan-US Mutual Defense Guidelines in 
2013–2015, introducing a standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism and 
expanding their cooperation to inter alia include the defence of SLOCs; and ii) 
passed a controversial security legislative package in 2015, enabling Japanese 
engagement in collective self-defence30 (Chanlett-Avery et al. 2015b: 1–28). 
Japan also enhanced its security ties with Australia, ASEAN and India – 
emphasising FON issues in the South China Sea and deterrence of “Chinese 
aggression on its maritime periphery”. Pushed by the US – requiring US-Japan-
South Korea cooperation to manage North Korea’s nuclear threat and China’s 
rise31 – Japan slightly improved its relations with South Korea by attending US-
led summits in 2014 and 2015, and by issuing a World War 2 anniversary 
statement of remorse in 201532.  
The Japan-US bilateral economic relationships gradually improved as they 
settled their trade disputes through the WTO33, while China rose as a regional 
economic power. Japan’s joining of the US Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations 
in 2013, key to the US pivot to the Asia-Pacific, was equally essential. Twelve 
member states34, including Japan but excluding China, signed this trade 
agreement covering 40 percent of the world economy in February 2016 (Howard 
                                                          
30 It now permits the use of military force to defend another state under attack if the 
attack threatens Japan. 
31 The US envisions an integrated US-Japan-South Korea BMD system as part of the US 
“extended deterrence” concept, utilising Japan’s second-most potent land/sea based 
BMD capability in the world. 
32 It specifically addressed the contentious issue of South Korean “comfort women”. 
33 Thereto, Japan’s economic growth continued to be slow. 
34 I.e. Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, 
Singapore, the US and Vietnam. 
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2016). Yet Japan has also joined Asia-Pacific trade negotiations that exclude the 
US.35 Its decision to freeze its nuclear power industry following the 2011 
Fukushima accident made Japan the world’s leading liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
importer. The US LNG exports commencing in 2017 will increase Japan’s 
dependency on the US for its energy security. 
In parallel with South Korea’s gradual transformation into a leading and 
democratic economic power in the post-Cold War period, the scope of its security 
interest expanded from an exclusive focus on the Korean peninsula to global 
perspectives reflecting a much broader conception of security (Lundqvist 2013: 
60). This change was salient in the vision of a “Global Korea” outlined in its 2008 
Defence White Paper, requiring global cooperation to promote its new role in the 
world economy and match its position a new G20 member. The US-South Korea 
alliance relationship thus turned into a more comprehensive and equal 
partnership based on shared interests and values (Snyder 2009: 2). Although 
China and Japan surpassed the US as South Korea’s largest and second-largest 
trading partners, the US remained its prime supplier of Foreign Direct 
Investment in 2005, as well as its third-largest trading partner36 and its second 
largest export market (Manyin 2006: 1–3). In February 2006, South Korea-US 
launched FTA negotiations. They signed the resulting agreement in June 2007 
and it came into force in March 2012 (USTR 2016), solving contentious issues 
and increasing the US market access. The Office of the United States Trade 
Representative described it as “the most commercially significant” FTA in almost 
two decades. 
The 2010 incidents then North Korea shelled the island of Yeonpyeong by 
artillery and sank the Republic of Korea Navy Ship (ROKS) Cheonan, highlighted 
its role as the dominant strategic concern of the US-South Korea alliance 
(Lundqvist 2013: 60). In response, the two allies adopted a “proactive 
deterrence” policy and established the bi-annual Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense 
Dialogue bilateral framework (Manyin et al. 2015: 13–19). They introduced: i) 
B-2 and B-52 strategic bombers in their exercises; ii) South Korean BMD 
capability development interoperable with US regional systems; iii) a delay in 
the transfer of wartime operational control of Korean troops to South Korea 
(recognising its advances in economic and military strength) while conditioning 
                                                          
35 I.e. a trilateral FTA with China and South Korea, as well as the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership involving ASEAN, China, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and 
India – launched as an alternative to the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thereto, the Japan-
Australia Economic Partnership Agreement came into force in 2015. 
36 From a US perspective, South Korea was its seventh-largest trading partner. 
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it by enhanced South Korean C4 capabilities; and iv) South Korean procurement 
of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and RQ-4 “Global Hawk” unmanned aerial vehicles 
– involving an upgrade in its status as a US arms purchaser. Thereto, the US 
consideration of deploying a Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 
battery to South Korea – capable of monitoring large parts of Chinese airspace – 
instigated a Chinese protest in 2015. 
Alongside knowledge transfer and training, the US began deployment of 
marines to Australia in 2012 (reaching 2,500 troops in 2017) and LCSs to 
Singapore (reaching four in 2018), to meet the US needs for access to and 
security of the South China Sea region (DoD 2014: 4; Bender 2015; Siegel 2012). 
Thereto, the USCG transferred two decommissioned cutters to the Philippines 
Navy in 2011 and 2013 (USCG 2011; Panda 2014). One vessel was involved in 
the 2012 incident in which China seized Scarborough shoal, following a three 
months standoff with Philippine navy and coast guard units (Nguyen 2012). 
Following a series of failed negotiations with China concerning their territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea, the Philippines decided in 2013 to challenge 
China’s claims by submitting their dispute to the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
in Hague, under the provisions of UNCLOS. China has consistently refused to join 
the arbitration case. Instead, it has warned the Philippines that it could damage 
their bilateral relationship (Wu and Pam 2015). In July 2016, the tribunal ruled 
that China’s nine-dash line claim – including the features in the Spratly Islands 
chain – and accompanying claims to historic rights had no validity under 
international law (Panda 2016). Thereto, it found the physically obstruction of 
Philippine vessels by Chinese ships unlawful. 
China has been willing to cooperate with ASEAN member states. Following 
increased US engagement, it even signed guidelines for the implementation of 
the 2002 DoC with ASEAN in 2011 (Raine and Le Mière 2013: 62–63, 127). 
However, China has sought to control the process by seeking bilateral rather 
than multilateral agreements through which their national interests are duly 
considered. Its refusal to join the arbitration case with the Philippines is 
illustrative on this behaviour. ASEAN is the smallest of possible multilateral 
forums for China, and – not least important – one in which the US is not 
represented. Arguably, China has carefully used its economic advantage through 
a divide and rule strategy to break up the unity of ASEAN on the South China Sea 
disputes, e.g. by preventing a joint communiqué at the 2012 summit. In contrast 
to the Philippines, Vietnam has not submitted its territorial disputes with China 
to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (Chapman 2016). Although supporting 
this move of the Philippines – and in contrast to the candid reactions by the 
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governments of Indonesia and Singapore (AFP 2016; Siow 2016) – it has been 
very careful in its official comments to the ruling. Vietnam’s economic 
dependence on its northern neighbour China is suggestive to why. 
In 2013, China began intense and extensive land reclamation, dredging and 
construction activities on seven disputed reefs in the Spratly Islands chain 
(Dolven et al. 2015: 1–4, 11–15; Tiezzi 2015a). Both ASEAN and the US regarded 
these activities as part of an assertive Chinese strategy to bolster its sovereignty 
claims, violating the principles of the 2002 DoC. In spring 2015, China argued 
that its activities at the Spratly Islands – to which it claims “indisputable 
sovereignty” – sought to “meet various civilian demands” and satisfy “the need 
of necessary military defense”. China, for its part, stressed the lawfulness of its 
activities, while accusing the other claimants37 for illegal construction activities 
in the South China Sea. The installations are widely expected to increase China’s 
capability to maintain ship and aircraft operations in the South China Sea and its 
capacity to enforce a future Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South 
China Sea. Based on domestic laws, China declared such a zone in the East China 
Sea in November 2013 (Rinehart and Elias 2015), covering a large swath of 
airspace which overlapped pre-existing ADIZs of Japan, South Korea and Japan, 
and airspace over disputed islands. The states concerned and the US Chinese 
issued strong protests, while Japan and the US also interpreted the Chinese 
measure as a challenge of the status of the Senkaku Islands. 
The broad US maritime security concept and the emphasis on threats at the 
lower end of the conflict spectrum are maintained in the 2015 A Cooperative 
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready (CS21R). The 
systemic perspective of its predecessor is prominent, while its emphasis on the 
prospects of addressing threats to mutual maritime security interests through 
work in formal and informal networks is maintained (USN, USMC and USCG 
2015: 1–2, 13). The CS21R highlights the USCG role in US TTWs and EEZ as well 
as in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, where it enhances regional partners’ maritime 
safety and security capabilities. In line with the recommendation of the 2008 
Maritime Security Partnerships study proposed, it directs the US Sea Services to 
address local rather than global maritime security challenges. 
The CS21R includes a new pillar of sea power termed “all domain access”, 
centred on safeguarding the US offensive capability to defeat opponents’ anti-
access systems in contested regions (USN, USMC and USCG 2015: 19–21). This 
                                                          
37 I.e. Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan. 
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pillar relates to the classified 2010 USN and USAF Air-Sea Battle concept (DoD 
2010: 32), renamed Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global 
Commons in 2015 and including also the US Army and the USMC (DoD 2015b). 
The all domain access capability elevated in the US current maritime strategies 
is intended to be employed in coordination with sea control and power 
projection capabilities to facilitate power projection in contested areas. Although 
not spelled out in the strategy, the concept seems tailored to counter China’s 
military capability to challenge or even hinder a US naval intervention close to 
China’s homeland. However, it is applicable on any maritime region hosting a 
rival with anti-access area-denial capabilities. 
USN carriers and their maritime air power are critical means for projecting 
power ashore and these high-value vessels must not be crippled or sunk. In brief, 
by creating all domain access capabilities the US aims at maximising its 
battlespace awareness before and during operations. Units will minimise signal 
emission while passively collecting as much signal information as possible, 
which is processed and disseminated throughout the force. The concept is a 
version of network-centric warfare envisioned in the strategies of the late 1990s, 
seeking to thwart the command and control capabilities of an opponent through 
the US domination of all domains – including space, cyberspace and the 
electromagnetic spectrum – with non-kinetic means, allowing for kinetic strikes 
against the opponent’s command and control nodes rather than its individual 
weapons. 
Notably, all domain access has a peacetime dimension, materialising through 
routine manoeuvres in contested waters, well exemplified by the much-noted 
USS Lassen FON patrol in October 2015. This Arleigh Burke-class destroyer 
sailed within 12 nautical miles of five disputed – partly artificial – reefs in the 
South China Sea, provoking fierce Chinese statements such as that it was “not 
afraid to fight a war with the U.S. in the region” (Sciutto and Hunt 2015; McKirdy 
and Hunt 2015). China claims indispensable sovereignty over these reefs of the 
Spratly Islands chain, including TTWs and EEZs. This incident highlights the 
influence of the maritime domain on great-power strategy and the significance 
they assign to dominate it. While the USCG operates solitary in South Pacific 
regions such as Micronesia and Melanesia, it takes on a joint endeavour with the 
USN and the USMC in the South China Sea region. The rationale is explicit. When 
the USN and the USMC foster bi- and multilateral maritime security cooperation 
among the ASEAN members, they are deployed in-theatre and thus enhance the 
US warfighting advantages (USN, USMC and USCG 2015: 13). Tailored maritime 
security cooperation in key regions thus serves the triple purpose of providing: 
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i) access for influence and deterrence, when necessary preceded or augmented 
by USCG units; ii) MDA; and iii) burden-sharing on managing threats at the lower 
end of the conflict spectrum. This approach embodies the statement associated 
with USN Admiral Mullen, “the implication is a general need to work smarter, not 
harder, and so achieve more” (Sohn 2009: 47). 
Being devoid of permanent bases in the South China Sea until very recently 
(see below), the US collaborative effort has contributed to building trust and 
confidence in its regional commitment. After all, maritime security is 
consistently regarded as “a promising area for expanded cooperation with our 
allies and partners” (USN, USMC and USCG 2015: 26) since it collectively benefits 
to all states – including China. Promoting maritime security with credible forces 
is thus a useful tool also for a US engagement strategy versus China, involving a 
reassurance element (showing China its benign intentions) and a hedging 
element (a deterrent). Thereto, if the US extends its multilateral maritime 
security cooperation offers to include China, they constitute a litmus test of its 
strategic intentions. Incremental deepening could follow if China chooses to 
engage in such US-led security cooperation. If China opts out, the US could 
resolutely step up on structural realism’s ladder of strategies (see Figure 1) and 
implement a containment strategy (i.e. deterrence without reassurance). 
Recognising the growing complexity of the Asia-Pacific maritime domain, the 
August 2015 US DoD The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy sets three 
maritime security objectives and four lines of effort to achieve them (DoD 2015a: 
1–17). The objectives place emphasis on: i) safeguarding the freedom of the seas 
(i.e. FON); ii) deterring conflict and coercion; and iii) promoting adherence to 
international law and standards. The strategy also spells out why they are vital 
to the US. The US considers FON necessary for global shipping and a “stable 
economic order”, but also to “ensure access in the event of a crisis”, while 
regional conflict and coercion threatens to impede the former. Adherence to 
international law and standards is required for “shared use of maritime 
waterways and resources” and “safe operations within the maritime domain”. In 
plain language, the latest strategy focusses on preventing a rising China from 
asserting and dominating the East China Sea and the South China Sea regions 
through a traditional threats-based approach in which the military dimension is 
centre stage. Conceptually, maritime security thus centres on the same 
dimensions as in 1991, namely US global access to and control of SLOCs to enable 
power projection versus a peer competitor. The means, however, are adapted to 
fit the geostrategic and operational realities at hand. 
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The first line of effort, “strengthening our military capacity to ensure the 
United States can successfully deter conflict and coercion and respond decisively 
when needed” (italics in original), involves a comprehensive weapons 
modernisation programme for power projection, centring on forward presence 
and contingency management (DoD 2015a: 19–33). Here, continuity manifests 
and is evident in the renewed US-Philippines negotiations on Subic Bay, 
reopened as a military base in 2015 in response to China’s maritime ambitions 
(The Guardian 2015). On 12 January 2016, the Philippines Supreme Court 
approved the ten-year security accord signed in 2014 – the Enhanced Defense 
Co-operation Agreement – offering access to eight bases for US rotational 
deployments of air and sea assets while catering for US assistance in revamping 
the Philippine military (Hernández and Whaley 2016; the Guardian 2016). In 
March 2016, the Philippines opened five bases38 to permanent American 
presence by rotational air force and army deployments (Tilghman 2016). 
However, the confrontational rhetoric by Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte 
– elected in May 2016 – aimed at the US has cast doubts about the future 
prospects of their alliance (Morales, Petty and Perry 2016). 
Change is evident in the character of the US contingency management. The 
need for addressing a broader range of threats has been manifest since the late 
1990s, serving as a catalyst for integrating the US Sea Services and developing 
the LCS vessel. Continuity as well as change is evident also in the second line of 
effort, “working together with our allies and partners from Northeast Asia to the 
Indian Ocean to build their maritime capacity” (italics in original). Its emphasis 
on alliances is an enduring feature of US strategy, while their networked 
architecture and the key role assigned to the USCG are novelties. 
In the third line of effort, “leveraging military diplomacy to build greater 
transparency, reduce the risk of miscalculation or conflict, and promote shared 
maritime rules of the road” (italics in original), the role of international 
organisations (e.g. ITLOS) are enhanced as compared to 1991 (DoD 2015a: 20–
33). However, the significance of naval diplomacy remains the same while 
mechanisms such as the 2014 US-China MOU on rules of behaviour for Safety of 
Air and Maritime Encounters (US DoD and PRC MoND 2014) resembles that 
signed with the Soviet Union in 1972. The multilateral approach outlined in the 
fourth line of effort, “working to strengthen regional security institutions and 
encourage the development of an open and effective regional security 
                                                          
38 I.e. the Antonio Bautista, Basa, Lumbia and Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Bases and the 
Fort Magsaysay Army Base. 
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architecture” (italics in original), involves the most prominent change as 
compared to 1991. Today, the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus Experts 
Working Group on Maritime Security is an essential forum for this cooperative 
US maritime security approach. When considering its Cold War engagement 
strategies, however, continuity is apparent in its support of regional collective 
security institutions such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. 
Concluding analysis 
This article set out to explain continuity and change in the US post-Cold War 
maritime security strategy through a structural realism lens. We will now discuss 
our findings and compare them with the hypotheses on US maritime policy that 
we derived from structural realism and the supporting framework composed of 
the four attributes of the sea. 
The above account has shown that the US maritime security concept 
broadened in 1991–2015, from a strict military focus on deterrence and secure 
SLOCs for the purposes of power projection and trade, to one in which law 
enforcement and governance issues took centre stage in a vast littoral 
environment. After its embedding in balance of power considerations in 1991, 
the process of incorporating a broader security concept began in the late 1990s. 
This process increased in intensity by the 2001 launch of the ongoing GWOT39, 
involving US attempts to secure the entire trade supply chain, centring on 
maritime transport activities, and expand the range of available international 
legal tools. Here, the US used its power to influence international bodies such as 
the UNSC, the IMO and the WCO, prompting them to accept standards drafted by 
US agencies and compatible with US domestic measures. It also used its power 
as a major trader to shift costs for cargo security to the exporting countries 
through bilateral security agreements, pursuing a strategy of “pushing the 
Homeland Security mission overseas” (DHS 2015). Notably, US national interests 
were served by the principle that all states obtained absolute gains in security 
while – in respect of being the world’s top trading nation until 2012, when it was 
surpassed by China (Bloomberg News 2013) – the US benefitted most by also 
obtaining relative gains. 
                                                          
39 E.g. by Operation Inherent Resolve (the US intervention against Daesh), Operation 
Freedom's Sentinel (the US intervention in Afghanistan) and Operation Noble Eagle 
(US/Canadian military support to homeland security). 
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This elevation of governance issues in international politics is clearly linked 
to promoting certain norms at the systemic level. It may seem to contradict 
structural realism’s focus on military power, as US naval power apparently 
declined during this period. As discussed in the introductory section on 
structural realism predictions, however, structural realism acknowledges that 
societies establish behavioural norms in informal and spontaneous ways, 
encouraging conformity and reducing variety (Waltz 2010[1979]): 75–76). 
Indeed, Waltz (1986: 326) even referred to the international system as an 
international society. Structural realism also acknowledges a process of 
socialisation in international relations which conditions state behaviour. 
However, structural realism does not expect that this process will affect their 
properties. Instead, they are held constant. 
According to structural realism, adherence to international rules and norms 
are optional to strong states. Waltz (2010[1979]: 94) argues that major “states 
set the scene in which they (…) stage their dramas or carry on their humdrum 
affairs”. Brute material power simply trumps what we might refer to as powerful 
ideas in a systemic structure, characterised by the distribution of material 
capabilities. The absence of a peer US competitor after the Cold War – relieving 
the US from the dual threat to its state institutions from Soviet Union military 
forces and ideology – allowed this hegemon to promote a multitude of less vital 
foreign policy and security interests other than its survival. Although structural 
realism – preoccupied with how and why states manage their external security 
interests (i.e. “hard security”) – does not provide guidance on their management 
of lower level threats in various security sectors, the widening does not 
contradict the theory. According to Waltz (2000: 29, 30), the unipolar conditions 
are an anomaly and capriciously wielded “unbalanced power leaves weaker 
states feeling uneasy” will sooner or later induce a capable country – or a group 
of countries – to establish a new balance of power. 
Dominating the maritime domain has remained a key means in the US 
continuous endeavour to safeguard against rising powers aspiring to establish 
such a balance in any region critical to US interests. Capability to establish and 
maintain peacetime control of the sea in such regions – in turn requiring MDA 
and regional basing arrangements – is arguably a prerequisite for enabling 
command of the sea versus an opposing power if conflict arises. This centres on 
the need for control – and thus security – of SLOCs for the purposes of power 
projection and trade. Hence, structural realism well explains this continuity in 
the US maritime security conception in 1991–2015. 
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However, there is also conceptual change. One is the widening of the 
geographical scope of sea control from SLOCs to seamless control of the littorals 
in the USN maritime strategies from 1997 and onwards. The original, and still 
valid, reason for this essential change was certain emerging powers growing 
capabilities to pursue what was later to be termed anti-access/area denial 
strategies, assessed as precluding the air and sea power of US carrier groups 
from dominating SLOCs by 2020. Structural realism explains this change. 
However, forces deployed to achieve this aim can also fulfil secondary roles as 
tools for shaping the international environment. Structural realism provides 
only a partial explanation of this fact (see below). 
The 1994 entry into force of the UNCLOS increased the stakes for maritime 
resource extraction and involved new and consistent concerns for US FON. The 
US persistent reluctance to accede to the convention corresponds with structural 
realism predictions, since it would involve a loss in international influence and 
thus in power. However, for the purposes of globally enforcing its views on ocean 
rights and boundaries – and to assert its FON rights – the US recognised it as 
codification of customary international law. These issues stem from states 
regarding the sea as a resource. They involve a tension between those states (i.e. 
China and Russia) that seek to exercise national jurisdiction over the entirety of 
its EEZ and those (mostly Western) states that asserts the rights to FON codified 
in UNCLOS.  
Indeed, the US was the first to challenge the long established freedom-of-seas 
doctrine in 1945 by unilaterally extending its jurisdiction to its continental shelf 
and its natural resources (UN DOALOS 1998). Throughout the period of study 
and despite being a party to the UNCLOS, however, the US bas been the foremost 
advocate of international maritime law. Arguably, this harks back to its need for 
global maritime access to project power – i.e. to dominate the maritime domain 
– but also to sustain the global trade system. Hence, in line with structural 
realism predictions, the US promoted the acceptance of those international 
norms and rules that it deemed best served its national interests. 
The conception that marine resources are valuable and that the sea 
constitutes an important medium for transport represent conceptual continuity, 
while change is apparent in the leverage that UNCLOS exerted on states’ 
valorisation of these values on a global scale. It simply increased importance of 
the sea to coastal states, a development reinforced by the technological 
developments that have made its resources increasingly discoverable and 
exploitable. As the stakes increased in this competition for maritime territory 
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and resources, as well as for control of maritime areas, so did their impact on the 
US concept for maritime security. Here, the growing challenges to the UNCLOS 
provisions by rising powers such as China and Russia became a foremost US 
concern. China’s incipient enforcement of its disputed claim for large swaths of 
the South China Sea prompted the US recent regional maritime security strategy, 
while Russia’s establishing in law its national jurisdiction over its EEZ became an 
issue in the Arctic region in 2012 (Depledge 2015). 
We can thus conclude that the two hypotheses predicting that the US would 
seek to influence international maritime institutions in order to: i) improve the 
protection of their property rights with regards to maritime resource extraction; 
and ii) maintain or increase its autonomy with regards to its TTWs, EEZ and 
portion of the continental shelf; have gained support. The US refusal to become 
a party to the UNCLOS made this manifest. Acceding to UNCLOS would reduce its 
autonomy and influence, since it would be: i) forced to share some of its revenues 
from deep-sea mining with developing states via the ISA; ii) lacking veto-power 
over the ISA’s decision-making; and iii) obliged to participate in the mandatory 
dispute resolution mechanisms for territorial claims made by other parties to the 
convention. We can also conclude that the US has strongly enforced the UNCLOS 
provisions concerning FON in order to assure unimpeded access to strategically 
important waters for the purpose of power projection. Hence, also the 
hypothesis that the US would influence the international standards for 
interpreting maritime law has gained support. 
With regard to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea we can conclude 
that structural realism’s prediction that states regard international 
organisations as “arenas for acting out power relationships” has gained support. 
China, as well as the US, has sought to influence ASEAN by linking trade and 
security. China has sought bilateralisation of its territorial disputes with certain 
ASEAN states in order to maximise its bargaining position and avoid consulting 
with them as a collective unit. Inversely, the US has promoted multilateral 
conflict resolution mechanisms involving ASEAN – urging them to bring their 
cases to international courts – seeking to oblige China to accept and implement 
its decisions. Clearly, self-interested strategic considerations motivated the US 
increased participation in ASEAN activities and the recently established US-
ASEAN annual summit. Influence in ASEAN made a difference in the US and 
Chinese pursuit for greater regional influence. Such influence, in turn, meant 
gains in relative power versus its competitor. Since economic and security issues 
of concern in Southeast Asia were intrinsically linked to the maritime domain, its 
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security became organic parts the US grand strategies. Apparently, China drew 
the same conclusion. 
The cooperative partnership approach set forth in various maritime strategic 
documents from 2005 and onwards has liberalism connotations. From this 
perspective – most obvious in the 2007 USCG and the joint CS21 strategies – 
maritime security was conceptualised as a requirement for sustained 
globalisation and the establishment of collective ends that went beyond states’ 
selfish pursuit of their national interests. In an all-out systemic 
conceptualisation, which these two strategies approximates, maritime security 
becomes an organic part of the politics of a global, interconnected and 
interdependent society inhabited by various kinds of transnational actors. It is 
somewhat telling that the launch of both strategies preceded the 2008–2009 
global financial crisis. McGrew (2011: 16–18, 25–28) suggests that when social, 
political, and economic activities are globalised they are no longer “organized 
solely according to a territorial logic”. This blurs the traditional distinction 
between domestic and international affairs. The systemic conceptualisation of 
maritime security in these strategies clearly draws on what he labels “a global 
governance complex” composed of states, international institutions, and 
transnational networks as well as public and private networks. Such an 
enmeshed world forces states to engage in cooperative maritime security 
operations and intervene to promote stability and order, rather than preparing 
for and engaging in interstate conflict. This liberal logic, aiming at a more pacific 
world order catering for wealth and prosperity, is thus highly applicable to the 
concept outlined in these US maritime strategies. Notwithstanding, structural 
realism offers an alternative conceptualisation. 
Structural realism does not deny globalisation, but stresses that if 
rudimentary transnational governance will ever materialise it will be entirely 
dependent on the distribution of power (Dunne and Schmidt 2011: 97). This is 
due to the anarchic character of the international self-help system that limits 
cooperation of functionally like units, who worry that a division of labour may 
favour others more than themselves (Waltz 2010[1979]: 104–106). They are 
also concerned that the more they specialise, the more they rely on others “to 
supply the materials and goods [they] are not producing”. High interdependence 
thus represents a “mutual vulnerability”, why states – at least strong ones – seek 
to secure that which they depend on or, otherwise, aim at reducing the extent of 
their dependency. This counteracts the visions, ideas and ambitions of those 
transnational movements that promote national specialisation within integrated 
international structures for efficiency and mutual enrichment. By linking the 
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globalisation process to the distribution of power, the role of the US becomes 
clear. As noted by Dunne and Schmidt (2011: 96), “liberalism, capitalism and 
consumerism” are core US values, but also to proponents of globalism. 
Accordingly, structural realism explains the reasons for the US change in its 
maritime security strategy up to and including the 2007 strategies. The US 
economic revival in the 1990s – mainly attributed to its increased global 
economic engagement – defied the doubts raised in the 1980s about its 
competitiveness and consolidated its position as the global economic leader 
(Litan 2000). Arguably, the US lead role in the 1995 creation of the WTO, vested 
with authority and responsibility for reducing trade barriers and settling trade 
disputes, was part of this quest. The pace of globalisation and the networks of 
interdependence spanning continents increased dynamically, accompanied by 
the US efforts to shape the international environment in ways conducive to its 
interests and values (Lindsay, Greenberg and Daalder 2003). Through means 
such as the Internet, transmitted globally through sub-sea cables and made 
available for citizens in less-developed states, globalisation became a political 
and cultural phenomenon. Since power – although providing strong states with 
more influence and wider ranges of action (Waltz 2010[1979]: 194) – does not 
reliably bring control, globalisation brought new perils for the US in such wide 
terms as financial speculation, transnational terrorism and adverse effects of 
global climate change.  
We can thus understand globalisation as the result of a deliberate process 
launched by major (Western) powers – whereof the US arguably had the greatest 
incentive and capacity – to advance their national interests. As Moon (2006: 
438–440) has shown, the US applied a dual strategy of removing the trade 
barriers of other states through multilateral action while unilaterally erecting 
such barriers to protect American firms competing with import. Thereto, its 
regional FTAs such as the North America Free Trade Agreement arguably 
created liberalisation “structured along the lines favored by the American 
vision”, namely regimes without institutions. Hence, the US bilaterally forced 
weaker states to accept provisions that opened their markets to foreign 
investment under highly favourable terms, to avoid exclusion from the lucrative 
US market.40 As suggested by Moon, this was “a divide and conquer strategy not 
available in multilateral global settings”. Here, it could well be that the unequal 
                                                          
40 This would hardly have gained approval within the WTO, where groups of nations can 
bargain as one unit. 
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benefits of globalisation have induced some of the transnational threats that 
breed maritime insecurity and risk undermining the global economic system. 
We can thus conclude that globalisation also has a structural realism 
conceptualisation, reverberating Waltz’s (2010[1979]: 95) claim that states “are 
the units whose interactions form the structure of international-political 
systems”. The US influence on international trade patterns – in which container-
based ship freight has a dominating role – clearly had a maritime dimension. This 
is apparent in the 2005 NSMS’s linkage of maritime security to the strategic aim 
of “igniting a new era of global growth through free markets and free trade”.  
The US combined its enactment of various bilateral FTAs with efforts to 
ensure an uninterrupted flow of shipping on its terms. It obliged its trade 
partners to accede to various security initiatives, on their expense, for access to 
the US market. In order to maintain the US security guarantees Japan and South 
Korea had to make concessions in terms of opening their domestic markets in 
trade negotiations. The hypothesis that the US would seek to alter the maritime 
trade patterns in its favour has thus gained support, illustrating the role of the 
sea as a medium of transportation. Moreover, its significance to globalisation as 
a medium for exchange of information and the spread of ideas are apparent by 
the sub-sea communication cables that provide the means that enable real-time 
global communications, essential to global finance flows as well as 
transgovernmental networks. Finally, we can conclude that the hypothesis that 
the US would seek to influence international maritime institutions in order to 
reduce their transaction costs and improve the protection of their property 
rights concerning maritime trade has gained support. 
It has been argued that the liberal international order is weakening due to the 
changing global power balance as autocratic states increase their military 
capabilities (Auslin 2014: 140). Here, China stands out as the main challenger, 
followed by Russia. Given that globalisation is a state driven phenomenon with 
the US in the lead, the reduction in its power risks slowing or even reversing the 
globalisation process. This has implications for the US conceptualisation of 
maritime security. As the military dimension of China’s rise became 
incrementally problematic to the US, addressing lower level security threats in 
the South China Sea region became a tool for the USN and the USMC non-
deployed presence in theatre to counterbalance and deter China. This was a 
required step since the region was markedly influenced by Chinese soft and hard 
power, while some Southeast Asian states – notably Indonesia and Malaysia 
(Sutter 2003: 214) – were concerned about the US regional security policy. The 
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US maritime security efforts thus partly aimed at re-building confidence in the 
US among the ASEAN member states and create incentives for deepened military 
cooperation. 
In tandem with China’s increasingly assertive geostrategic behaviour, the US 
began more openly to designate it as a threat to regional security and stability, 
its FON and its global leadership. Accordingly, the US efforts to counterbalance 
China in situ, and to hedge against its perceived efforts of regional dominance, 
prompted a renewed emphasis on the military dimension of maritime security. 
The need to manage threats to good order at sea was not reduced, but became 
conceptually encapsulated as a specific operations type (i.e. MSOs) by the US 
effort to achieve its maritime security in a more traditional military sense, 
centred on countering the threat of a rising China. That a great power assigns 
priority to such a threat is at the heart of structural realism. In response to the 
increasing security pressure, the broad US maritime security concept thus 
gradually re-centred on balance of power considerations. 
The US efforts to counter China’s growing military capabilities support the 
hypothesis that it will seek strategic dominance of those aspects of the cyber 
domain that are interlinked with the maritime domain and serve to check the 
influence of its rivals. The increasing China-US tension involves the risk that they 
will move upwards on the structural realism ladder of strategies (see Figure 1) 
in their interaction. A critical and problematic aspect of the realist worldview 
thus takes central stage in the present situation, namely the problem of 
uncertainty. From a US perspective, one is inclined to pose the question of 
China’s intentions. Has Chinese established its military installations on the 
islands and reefs in the South China Sea for the alleged defensive purposes, or is 
it masking its expansive ambitions until it deems that its power is enough for 
offensive action? Although cooperating for the purpose of wealth and prosperity, 
the dominant attribute of states is that they will always be self-regarding. Hence, 
the US must consider whether China is inclined to apply a defensive or offensive 
military strategy in the South China Sea region. 
Conclusion 
Structural realism explains continuity and change in the US post-Cold War 
maritime security strategy. The hypotheses derived from the theory all gained 
support by our examination of the US case. As expected, the US strategies 
concerning the maritime domain have been far from isolated from those of the 
land, air and cyber domains. It has therefore not been possible to isolate the 
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mechanisms driving the US conceptualisation of maritime security to the 
maritime domain. While some mechanisms stem from its intrinsic 
characteristics, grand strategic mechanisms are simply applied to it. A blend of 
mechanisms thus overlaps and interacts in reinforcing or weakening each other. 
Throughout the studied period, conceptual continuity has prevailed in terms of 
a continued emphasis on the military dimension. Here, the US has maintained the 
capability to dominate the sea for the purpose of defence and power projection. 
Change has been apparent in terms of shifts in the opponents identified by the 
US. The vacuum that followed the USSR collapse was not filled until the events of 
11 September 2001, when pariah states including those allegedly supporting the 
al-Qaeda network – jointly labelled the “axis of evil” – took its place. In the final 
part of the period, China and Russia have become the regional powers that 
increasingly challenge the still hegemonic superpower. 
Conceptual change was apparent also with regard to the effects of globalisation, 
increasing the role of the maritime transport system and closely interacting with 
the land components of the increasingly complex international trade system. In 
the period of study, this system became subject to extensive regulation and 
intervention to counter a wide array of new and old threats. Here, the 
considerable increase in the demands for maritime domain awareness stands 
out as the main feature of conceptual change in maritime security. In fact, a 
considerable degree of security competition in this regard is visible in the US 
relations with China and to an increasing extent Russia. 
The 1994 entry into force of UNCLOS did not bring about conceptual change. 
However, it did raise the stakes for dominating the sea, controlling and extracting 
its vast resources. It also spurred new territorial disputes involving land and sea 
areas and conflict of interests between FON and the exercise of national 
jurisdiction. This was of course contrary to the intentions. According to the 
official records, UNCLOS sought to address “the super-Power rivalry that was 
spreading to the oceans”, “the conflicting legal claims and their implications for 
a stable order and (…) the rich potential that lay on the seabed” (UN DOALOS 
1998). Here, structural realism’s view of the nature of international politics 
offers cogent explanation of why the maritime domain remains filled with these 
types of issues. 
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ABSTRACT
Recently, Finland and Sweden decided to substantially deepen their 
defence cooperation and this project involves creating a bilateral 
standing Naval Task Group (SFNTG). The present article aims at 
examining the deepening naval cooperation between Finland 
and Sweden from a regional integration perspective, focusing on 
its motives, current challenges and future prospects. Driven by 
perceptions of common challenges and desires for cost-effectiveness, 
and strengthened by recent successes on sea surveillance and a 
combined Amphibious Task Unit, the bilateral project has considerable 
potential to achieve success. To fulfil its objectives, substantial legal 
changes in both countries are required to allow the use of force on 
each other’s territorial waters. To cater for the requirement of not 
conflicting with EU, NORDEFCO or NATO cooperations, the bilateral 
Task Group must operate according to NATO standards and by 
using English as the language in command and control. The costs 
of adjusting the naval units to NATO’s technical requirements are far 
from negligible and this issue still remains to be solved. If Finland and 
Sweden manage to incorporate new policies, common structures and 
common organisational norms among their navies, an even deeper 
integration, as in Belgium and the Netherlands, are conceivable.
Northern Europe’s security environment has been in flux since the late 1980s. The dynamics 
following the Soviet disintegration in 1991 – providing independence to Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania while assigning them a new role in the security structures of the new world order 
(c.f. Hanska 2015, p. 13) – have leveraged the importance of the Baltic Sea region to the EU, 
NATO, and the US. The EU focus policy areas – prosperity, marine environmental sustainability 
and regional transport, and energy systems connections (c.f. EC 2010) – differ, however, from 
the security dimension given priority by NATO and the US. This observation does not thwart 
the fact that it has nurtured the aim of developing a security dimension within its Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)1 since 1991, in order to gain capability to respond to 
European or international crises. The 1998 British-French Saint-Malo Summit (EU Council 
1998) concluded that the EU required capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible 
and readily available military forces, while the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) focused 
on cooperative security on a global scale. Notably, this strategic framework – assigning 
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priority to transnational threats2 – was based on the premises that the US was the dominant 
global military actor and that close relations were maintained with a friendly Russia, seen 
as “a major factor in [EU’s] security and prosperity” (EC 2003).
Just over ten years later, the European Commission noted that the transformations of the 
global system were putting the EU’s adaptive capacities to the test and that its bilateral 
relations regularly suffered from a lack of coherence (EC 2014, pp. 5–7, 38–39). The “turning 
of the EU into a strategic foreign policy actor” was still in the making, conditioned upon the 
“willingness of its Member States to invest political capital in a genuine European foreign 
policy”. While the ongoing EU–US negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership was a unifying effort in the area of trade, the EU still counted on the US “to step 
in when crisis situations arise”. Given Russia’s more assertive stance following Vladimir Putin’s 
infamous speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference (The Washington Post 2007), NATO’s 
importance to European security is thus once again growing. The surge in the number of 
refugees and migrants passing the Mediterranean Sea in their risky efforts to reach Europe – 
referred to as “the European refugee crisis” since April 2015 – has strained European cohesion 
and “shaken [the Schengen system] to its core” (EC 2016, p. 1). Tellingly, NATO took action to 
assist in mitigating this crisis in February 2016 by launching a naval reconnaissance, moni-
toring and surveillance operation in the Aegean Sea, in response to proposals by Germany, 
Greece and Turkey (NATO 2016a).
Concerns regarding a Russian strategy to split the cohesion of NATO and the EU have 
been voiced by German, UK and US government representatives (c.f. Fisher 2015, Foster 
2016, Schäuble 2016). According to Philip Breedlove, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 
Russia is “deliberately weaponising migration in an attempt to overwhelm European struc-
tures and break European resolve”. Fear of Russian attempts to sow discord among the 
European states was jointly expressed by Nordic defence and foreign ministers in 2015, 
arguing that the deteriorating regional security situation called for solidarity and deepened 
military cooperation within the frameworks of Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), 
the EU and NATO (Eriksen Søreide et al. 2015). Here, the geostrategic significance of the Baltic 
Sea was duly noted.
Arguably, individual EU member initiatives are increasingly important to peace and sta-
bility in the Baltic Sea region. Examining the security policy developments of Finland and 
Sweden – its top two countries by length of coastline – are therefore of particular relevance 
to understand the current security dynamics of Northern Europe. Major and von Voss (2016, 
pp. 1–3) even suggest that this region is a test case for European security, since the Baltic 
and Nordic states – “exposed to Russian military and non-military intimidation” – can “neither 
defend nor maintain regional security by themselves”. Conversely, Russia’s regional anti- 
access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities make the US and NATO dependent on access to 
Swedish and Finnish territory for fulfilling their security guarantees to the Baltics.
Non-aligned Finland and Sweden are amidst of a transformative development. As shown 
in the 2015 US BALTOPS exercise, an intervention in response to Russian aggression in the 
Eastern Baltic will centre on the air, naval, and cyber dimensions (Lundqvist and Widen 2015b, 
p. 46). Accordingly, their bilateral defence cooperation is spearheaded by the navies. When 
considering the maritime domain’s importance to regional security in this region, we find 
ourselves able to narrow the scope of this article and pose the following twofold research 
question: Why have Finland and Sweden jointly responded to the altering security situation 
in the Baltic Sea region?; and what are the prospects for success in their naval cooperation? 
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For comparison, we will use experience from the Belgian–Dutch naval cooperation, widely 
recognised as a successful integration of two NATO navies. In 2013, the former Swedish 
Supreme Commander Sverker Göranson referred to it as a role model for combining the 
navies of Finland and Sweden (Lundqvist and Widen 2015a, p. 70).
The article is organised as follows: In the first section, we construct an analytical framework 
by consulting theories relevant to addressing the research problem. The following two sec-
tions provide overviews and analyses of the Belgian–Dutch and the Swedish–Finnish naval 
cooperations, in which the analytical framework is applied. The final section provides a com-
parative assessment of the results of the two cases in a wider security policy framework 
while answering the research questions. It also draws conclusions with regards to the explan-
atory power of the theories employed in the study.
Analytical framework
In creating an analytical framework, relevant theories in international politics and its subfield 
foreign policy analysis must be consulted. The range of theories is substantial. However, 
Finland’s and Sweden’s post-cold war policy developments are marked by their deepening 
EU integration. We therefore expect that neofunctionalism in the tradition of Haas (1958, 
p. 13, 1964, p. 35) and Lindberg (1963, p. 149) – focusing on the internal dynamics of insti-
tutionalised interest politics and regional integration processes – will provide viable expla-
nations. Conversely, Russia’s reappearance as a regional power has raised deep security 
concerns in Finland and Sweden. The influence of such external changes in the international 
system on states’ foreign policies are at the centre of structural realism as articulated by Waltz 
(2010[1979]). Of particular relevance are Walt’s (1987, 1988) refinement of balance of power 
theory – a core tenet of structural realism – and Baker Fox’s (1959) classical study on the 
anti-balance-of-power behaviour of weak European powers, including Finland and Sweden, 
during WW2.
Rival integration theories challenge neofunctionalism. Intergovernmentalism, presented 
as a counterargument by Hoffmann (1965) and updated by Moravcsik as liberal intergov-
ernmentalism in the 1990s, suggests that states integrate to promote their national interests 
in an anarchic international system (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009). Governments 
participate in and even control regional integration, they argue. Therefore, cooperation will 
be limited to matters of common interest in “low politics” issue areas, i.e. economics and 
social affairs, in which domestic interest groups are influential, but will not take place in 
national security affairs where such interest groups lack influence.3 Also federalists assign 
priority to national and international security concerns, i.e. “high politics”, promoting a fully 
fledged union for reasons of political influence and stability (Andreatta 2011, p. 24). For them, 
two tiers of government – state and federation – are required, assigned distributed functions 
of which the federation must control the supranational instruments of power. For neofunc-
tionalists, federations are only one of several possible outcomes of integration.
Finland’s and Sweden’s current security situations resemble those of 1990/1991 when 
they considered policy shifts towards the European Community. Both were closely linked 
to the European Community as full members of the European Free Trade Association. Sweden 
applied for European Community membership in July 1991 while Finland followed suit in 
March 1992. The Swedish government, however, maintained its traditionally restrictive posi-
tion to European Community membership until 1990, since it was considered incompatible 
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with its non-aligned policy aiming at neutrality in wartimes (Sundelius 1994, p. 177). As 
noted by Mouritzen (1994, pp. 164–174), Finland was prevented from officially considering 
such membership until the failed coup of August 1991 in Moscow came to an end, bound 
by its Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance agreement with the Soviet Union. 
Based on his study on the Nordic reactions to this coup, he suggests that closer geographical 
proximity to a threatening great power increases a small state’s anti-balance-of-power behav-
iour. For Walt (1987, pp. 29–30), such “bandwagoning” behaviour is likely if a weak power is 
threatened by a proximate great power “capable of rapid and effective action” or if allies are 
unavailable. Today, as in 1991, Russia is the threatening power while the political issue is 
whether or not Finland and Sweden should apply for membership in an international organ-
isation. This time, the organisation at issue is NATO.
Structural realism predicts that balance-of-power considerations resulting from external 
threats will explain Finland’s and Sweden’s increased defence cooperation, as they might 
rationally consider themselves to be better off as allies than as individual actors (Waltz 
2010[1979], pp. 19–27, 1987, pp. 18–19). According to Walt, “[r]egional states are more sen-
sitive to local threats, because how they choose to ally make a significant difference”. However, 
their ever closer defence cooperation cannot be seen in isolation. The role of the US and 
NATO must also be considered. Based on his study on principal alliances in the Middle East 
in 1955–1979, Walt (1987, pp. 161–172) concluded that perceived “aggressive intentions [by 
a state with offensive power] encourage balancing behaviour” among states in a region, will 
tend to make them regard “one superpower as favourably inclined and the other as hostile.” 
He notes that “proximity, offensive capabilities, and intentions” are determining factors in 
alliance formation, why states will “ally with the superpower that seems least aggressive.” 
Accordingly, distant superpowers “are ideal for a regional power that faces a direct military 
threat from one of its neighbors,” but “states may be forced to choose among partners of 
equal capability.” It is thus for structural reasons that the US will remain the preferred pro-
tector of smaller European states (Jervis 2003, p. 385).
Notwithstanding, historical experiences and differing threat perspectives, vulnerabilities 
and national interests could – as highlighted by Walt (1987, pp. 172–178) – restrain alliance 
formation. Although non-aligned, the implications of Finland’s and Sweden’s EU membership 
and defence collaboration within the NORDEFCO must be duly considered. Baker Fox (1959, 
pp. 8, 181–183), for her part, pointed to the “variety of circumstances” under which small 
states were able to punch beyond their weight when confronted with great-power demands, 
ensuring themselves genuine range of action “within the limits set by inter-great-power 
relations.” While the great powers’ wider range of interests often limited their attention to 
individual small powers, the latter could usually concentrate on sole threatening powers.
Neofunctionalism belongs to the liberal school of thought, a complimentary approach 
to structural realism with regards to explaining how states define national interests and why 
they sometimes differ between “successive governments and different leaders” in “similar 
geopolitical situations” (Nye 1988, pp. 238–240). This emphasis on domestic factors is vital. 
While acknowledging the international system’s anarchic structure, most liberalism theories 
refute structural realism’s approximation of states as rational unitary actors. A core liberalism 
assumption is that international institutions and domestic political debates – involving 
bureaucracies and non-state actors – can boost cooperation and enable states to transcend 
the influence of anarchy on their foreign policies (Smith 2000, pp. 35–36). Neofunctionalism 
is also founded on the liberalist premises that states seek absolute gains – rather than relative 
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gains as assumed by structural realism – making them care more about economics than 
military security. Its advocacy of institutionalised supranationalism – i.e. pooling of state 
sovereignty – and commitment to European integration are normative stands, making it a 
theory and a manual for regional integration (Mutimer 1994, pp. 30–35).
Deutsch et al. (1957) conceptualised the European Community as a “pluralistic security 
community” characterised by expanding transactions and communications and sharing a 
common set of values, which members abstained from using war to settle their differences. 
Haas (1958, p. 4) distinguished his theory from the cybernetic integration theory of 
Deutsch by premising it on pre-existing “political institutions capable of translating ideolo-
gies into law.” Although constructivists (c.f. Adler and Barnett 1998, Laporte 2012) have 
adopted Deutsch’s concept, neofunctionalism remains the dominant approach to EU 
integration.
Neofunctionalists argue that integration results from a spontaneous, incremental, process 
(Haas 1971, p. 23). Its core assumption is that integration – technical or otherwise – in one 
issue area will create “pressures for integrating contiguous issue areas for which the original 
area is crucial and which, therefore, can no longer be controlled at the national level” 
(Andreatta 2011, p. 25). Such “functional” spillover4 will, in turn, generate “technical” spillover 
enlarging the supranational level’s capability to manage the issue. Finally, “technical” spillover 
may generate “political” spillover, shifting political loyalty and attention to the supranational 
level. As Haas (1971, p. 23) suggests, a “new central authority may emerge as an unintended 
consequence of incremental earlier steps.” The expected success of actors advocating this 
transformative process is due to politicians being “incapable of long-range purposive behav-
iour,” stumbling “from one set of decisions into the next,” unable to “foresee many of the 
implications and consequences of the earlier decisions.”
Neofunctionalism – temporarily discarded following Haas 1975 declaration that it had 
become obsolescent – was revived by Sandholtz and Sweet (2012, pp. 18–24) in the 1990s. 
Following Deutsch, their point of departure in explaining the movement toward suprana-
tional governance in the EU were “actors who engage in transactions and communications 
across national borders within the context of the institutional arrangements established in 
the Rome Treaty.” Such expanding activities increase the “functional demand for European-
level rules and policies and for supranational capacity to supply them,” they argue, why 
transactors – “firms, interest groups, legislators, courts, and bureaucrats” – “exert pro- 
integration pressure on their own governments.” Transactors “propel the system forward, 
sometimes into uncharted areas” by creating, applying, and interpreting “systems of rules,” 
i.e. institutions. Expanding in scope, they may become “more formal and specific over time, 
in ways […] not predictable or expected from the ex ante perspective of those who establish 
them.” Such international cooperation may result in supranationalism involving some loss 
of national sovereignty.
We can thus expect that, under budgetary pressure, also defence bureaucracies of EU 
member states within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) institution – fully 
institutionalised by the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon – may become actors engaged in cross-national 
interaction generating “functional” spillover. As Ojanen (2006, pp. 60–64) suggests, although 
Haas did not envision the defence sector having spillover potential equal to the social and 
economic sectors in his original formulation of the theory, the process leading up to the 
CSDP confirmed that the force of spillover had eventually reached it. In turn, it provided 
credibility to other fields of integration, notably its CFSP. Following Ojanen, we base this 
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article on the assumption that the defence sector is “subject to similar transforming processes 
as any other field,” rendering neofunctionalism applicable to analysing the defence policies 
of EU member states.
Recent studies apply neofunctionalism as a framework for analysing defence cooperation 
between EU member states (Sauer 2015), the Nordic states (Westberg 2015) and the Belgian–
Dutch naval cooperation (Parrein 2011b, Breyne and Parrein 2013). They study the launch 
of intensified cooperation on defence capabilities – labelled “pooling and sharing” in the EU 
and “smart defence” in NATO5 – in response to escalating capability gaps resulting from 
declining defence spending in Europe. “Pooling” of capabilities refers to the use of nationally 
owned or multinationally procured military capabilities on a collective basis, while “sharing” 
means that member states “relinquish some capabilities with the assumption or the guar-
antee that other states will make them available when necessary” (EDA 2013). Notably, NATO 
is an intergovernmental alliance absent of supranational institutions. Also NORDEFCO – the 
vehicle for an unprecedented level of practical defence collaboration – lacks a supranational 
mandate (NORDEFCO 2013a).6 Nonetheless, pooling and sharing within NORDEFCO are key 
to non-aligned Finland’s and Sweden’s EU integration.
Building on the work of Schmitter (1970), Westberg (2015, pp. 99–100) argues that four 
distinct outcomes of regional defence cooperation projects can be anticipated on the basis 
of neofunctionalism: (i) coordinated integration by successive widening and deepening of 
the cooperation, increasing national and collective military capabilities;7 (ii) retrenchment, 
reducing the number of cooperation areas although increasing national and collective mil-
itary capabilities; (iii) non-coordinated integration, extending the cooperation to new sectors 
without increasing national and collective military capabilities;8 and (iv) disintegration of the 
cooperation structure or any of its parts – which are renationalised or transferred to other 
organisations – or by one or more party withdrawing.9
We expect to find that neofunctionalism predictions of expanding cross-national inter-
action by maritime defence establishment representatives have generated functional spill-
over, creating political dynamics which involve some loss of national sovereignty. For 
studying the practical aspects, narrower supporting categories are needed. Following Sverre 
Diesen (2013, pp. 61–65), we will distinguish in this article between three types of coordi-
nated defence integration: (i) role specialisation, implying a division of labour between the 
actors and singular responsibility of certain military capabilities; (ii) pooling and sharing, 
involving joint procurement of weapon systems for use in operations, jointly or at times by 
single members; and (iii) joint force generation, spanning cooperation on education, training, 
exercises, maintenance, armament development, and international operations (see 
Table 1).
Given that neofunctionalism avoids rather than explores the influence of anarchy on 
states’ foreign policy, it is premised on limited security pressures. As previously noted, a 
benign European security climate and close cooperation with Russia were prerequisites for 
the global ambitions outlined in EU’s 2003 ESS. Alas, Russia’s increased military power and 
more assertive stance since 2014 have induced its neighbours to adjust their foreign policies 
and increase their defence spending. This enables us to examine any potential limitations 
of neofunctionalism explanations with regards to increasing security pressure. It also enables 
us to indicate whether Finland and Sweden are engaged in balance-of-power or anti- 
balance-of-power behaviour, relating this article to the literature on small states’ strategy.
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As was the case at the millennium (Schmidt 2000, p. 39), the debate on European 
integration theory still centres on structural realism and neofunctionalism. Their dividing 
line on defence cooperation and integration is the underlying motives. While “bottom-up” 
neofunctionalist integration processes are driven by rational actors promoting organisational 
interests of cost-efficiency, structural realism suggests that alliances are forged “top-down” 
through rational state actors’ strategic considerations to preserve national sovereignty in 
the face of external threats. Stressing the influence of anarchy in the international system, 
structural realism posits that states will refrain from ceding sovereignty in defence policy 
due to fear of abandonment or entrapment by their partners – thus limiting the depth and 
scope of cross-national defence cooperation (Snyder 1984, p. 461). Hoffmann (1965) incor-
porated this view into intergovernmentalism from the outset, contradicting neofunctional-
ism scholars’ envisioned prospects of deeper defence cooperation within the EU and NATO 
today.
Following Westberg (2015, p. 94), an analysis framework for determining possible limita-
tions in the explanatory power of neofunctionalism’s integration processes on defence 
cooperation can be constructed (see Table 1).
While some research (c.f. Parrein 2011a, Sauer 2015) is available on the Belgian–Dutch 
case, the Swedish–Finnish case has gained scant scholarly attention. We therefore use official 
documentation from the Swedish MoD and Armed Forces, supplemented by interviews with 
senior Swedish and Finnish officials involved in the cooperation. We have also conducted 
interviews with senior Belgian and Dutch officers, as well as NATO officials, to acquire updated 
information. Given that our analyses are based on partly novel empirical material on two 
distinct cases of European naval cooperation, and that our assessments are based on an 
analytical framework contrasting two competing approaches to international politics, our 
claim for originality is both empirical and theoretical.
Table 1. A framework for studying multinational defence cooperation.
Neofunctionalism Structural realism/intergovernmentalism
Motives and interests Budgetary pressures/domestic factors induce 
representatives of defence and law 
enforcement agencies to engage in 
cross-national cooperation to promote 
organisational interests 
external military security threats to the 
national interests of contracting states, 
perceived as unmanageable by their own 
capabilities, generate the defence 
cooperation. Power, identity and past 
experiences influence their strategic 
calculations
Dynamics Enabling and driving factors: following 
institutionalisation of the defence 
cooperation, spillover effects generate new 
incentives for deepening it
Enabling and driving factors: the common 
need to counterbalance powerful states, 
and/or the ability of one state to define the 
terms of the defence cooperation and 
ensure compliance with the covenant
Restraining factors: Opposition from 
organised nationalistic groups
Restraining factors: Diverging national 
interests/identities complicate consensus on 
aims, means and ways of cooperating
Outcomes Coordinated integration
Retrenchment
Non-coordinated integration
Disintegration
A limited treaty-based intergovernmental 
cooperation reflecting the distribution of 
power between the parties, clearly 
specifying their rights and obligations
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The Belgian–Dutch naval cooperation
Background, the actors and their motives and interests
The deep integration of the Belgian Naval Component (BNC) and the Royal Netherland’s 
navy (RNLN) – the “crown jewel of international defence cooperation” (Homan 2012, p. 15) – 
receives attention as aggregate reductions in European states’ defence budgets create con-
cerns (c.f. Biscop 2015, p. 86, Sauer 2015). From a NATO perspective, they centre on the 
duplication of capabilities and decreasing capacity (de France and Witney 2013, p. 9). The 
US 2012 announcement of its partial withdrawal from Europe when rebalancing towards 
Asia – and its decision to limit its funding of NATO’s capability targets to no more than 50% 
(Mattelaer 2014) – aggravated these problems by shifting more responsibility for providing 
European security towards NATO’s European members (Biscop 2015, pp. xi–xii). NATO’s adher-
ence to “smart defence” must be seen against this backdrop. The Ukraine crisis, however, 
redefined Russia as an adversary to the US, an “existential threat […] ahead of all its other 
concerns” (Joseph Dunford, Chairman of US Joint Chiefs of Staff, cited in Clern 2016, p. 75). 
The 2014 Wales Summit highlighted the urgency in rebuilding capability, resulting in a 
pledge by the member states to restore defence spending to the stipulated 2% of their Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) (NATO 2014b).
The depth and durability of Belgian–Dutch naval cooperation make it, some argue, a role 
model suitable for application in all military services of the parties and for Europe (Parrein 
2011a, Biscop et al. 2013). The parties maintain close international relations, marked by a 
common history and culture, a common Dutch/Flemish language, extensive inter-communal 
links, significant trade, a multitude of investment cooperations and largely aligned security 
interests (NL MoFA 2015). Notwithstanding, certain differences affect their cooperation.
First, the parties’ military capabilities and capacities differ markedly. One way of visualising 
this is to compare their defence spending. In 2015, the Netherlands’ defence budget more 
than doubled that of Belgium (IISS 2016, pp. 78, 122).10 Measured as parts of their GDPs, 
Belgium allocated 0.9% and the Netherlands 1.2% on defence. This ratio in their defence 
spending has been stable since 1995, despite progressive cuts (NATO 2014a, Table 1). The 
Belgian reductions have mainly hit the army, while the BNC has preserved much of its capac-
ity and managed to develop its capabilities. Analysts (Parrein 2011a, Mattelaer 2014) have 
ascribed this outcome to their naval cooperation. Nonetheless, the BNC was limited to 1500 
personnel operating 2 frigates, 5 mine countermeasures vessels (MCMVs), 2 patrol crafts and 
8 support ships in 2015 (IISS 2016, pp. 79, 122–123). In comparison, the RNLN enlisted 9150 
personnel manning 6 frigates, 6 MCMVs, 4 tactical submarines, 4 Ocean Patrol Vessels, a 
Marine Corps brigade, 2 principal amphibious ships and 31 support ships.
Second, their strategic cultures differ. Both parties operate major seaports, the Port of 
Antwerp in Belgium – important to Germany and France – and the Port of Rotterdam – 
Europe’s largest seaport – in the Netherlands. This aligns much of their maritime security 
interests. However, Belgium possesses no overseas territories, a minor part of its territory 
borders the sea and its limited EEZ amounts to an area of 3453 km2 including territorial 
waters (TTWs) (Sea Around Us Project 2015). The attacks over its eastern land borders and 
subsequent occupation during both world wars have arguably fostered a strategic culture 
focusing on the land dimension of security (Sauer 2015, pp. 46–47). This might explain why 
a single structure was imposed on the Belgian Armed Forces in 2002.
The Netherlands – a seafaring nation for more than five centuries – maintains strong 
commercial links to the seas through a diverse maritime industry. Its shipbuilding industry, 
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such as the globally operating Damen Shipyards Group, is a national interest. The “golden 
triangle” partnership in which TNO,11 Thales Nederland12 and the RNLN interact in seeking 
coordinated research and development (R&D) is a feature of a Dutch naval business model 
(Keyzer 2014). Three Caribbean territories are integrated with the Netherlands as special 
municipalities, while another three belong to the Kingdom of the Netherlands with auton-
omy in their internal affairs (NL Gov 2010, CIA 2015). The Netherlands is responsible for the 
defence and foreign affairs of these overseas territories, requiring large naval vessels for 
patrolling its sizeable TTWs and EEZ of 144,864 km2 (Sea Around Us Project 2015).13
According to Parrein (2011b, pp. 5, 48, 142, 159, 189) ideological or normative decisions 
did not instigate the Belgian–Dutch naval cooperation. He concludes that it was due to a 
bottom-up process creating spillover effects that eventually required top-down coordination. 
The chiefs of the two navies gave it new impetus in response to decided and foreseen future 
defence cuts, which would create imminent risks of losing essential military capabilities 
preventing meaningful future bi- or trilateral political cooperation. Although the navies differ 
in size, Parrein (2011a, p. 18) finds their partnership “balanced” due to mutual functional 
dependency: Belgium having lead for MCMVs and the Netherlands for frigates.
Parrein (2011b, pp. 17, 109–110) confirms neofunctionalism’s predictions, concluding that 
integration established by influential actors within one domain of interest to the Belgian–
Dutch naval cooperation generated pressure for integration in other domains. While recog-
nising the smallness of the Belgian–Dutch political cooperation structure as compared to 
the EU, he points to its strategic contribution to the European common defence project and 
the similarity of their integration dynamics. Parrein distinguishes between four types of 
institutionalisation established in this naval cooperation (which is consistent with Diesen’s 
three types of coordinated maritime defence integration as previously described): exogenous 
cooperation structures; endogenous cooperation structures; job specialisation, i.e. common 
structures for tasks previously undertaken by both parties; and institutional alignment.
Institutionalisation and formal structures of the cooperation
The Belgian–Dutch naval cooperation currently involves an endogenous, binational, per-
manent cooperation structure composed of an integrated operational staff, the Admiral 
Benelux (ABNL), a binational admiralty board, three binational schools, binational weapon 
system management cells, and binational cells within the two naval maintenance centres 
(Parrein 2011a, pp. 10–13). Since 2012, it is coordinated by an exogenous cooperation struc-
ture, the Benelux Sub-Steering Group Naval, established within the likewise permanent 
Benelux Defence Cooperation structure (Breyne and Parrein 2013, pp. 80–82). As will be 
discussed below, further steps have been taken with regard to the air domain.
The level of cooperation has fluctuated along an axis of gradual and stepwise deepening. 
Common platforms have influenced their collaboration on logistic support, education and 
training (Parrein 2011a, pp. 11–18). Successes in single cooperation areas have built mutual 
trust and incited collaboration in others. The initial step was the set-up of the first binational 
school, the EGUERMIN, which was preceded by their decision to procure identical MCMVs 
and illustrating functional spillover in this regard. Education and training were initial collab-
orative steps also in the 1990s, when both navies operated Dutch S-type frigates. Here, the 
allocation of responsibilities reflected their differing power and national interests: the 
Netherlands assumed responsibility for the operational warfare school in Den Helder, while 
Belgium set-up a binational catering school in Bruges. While relations at the two schools 
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located in Belgium were balanced, the Netherlands took a marked lead of the operational 
warfare school from the outset. Also, the parties have retained their national establishments 
for strict military education and academic training, pursuing only exchange programmes.
The second step was their 2001 decision to opt for binational modernisation of their 
MCMVs – effectuated in 2006–2010 – which forged their conceptual development of 
“leading parties” and assigned Belgium responsibility for logistical, material and mainte-
nance support of both parties’ MCMVs (Parrein 2011a, pp. 13–16, 2011b, pp. 189–191).
The third step was linked to Belgium’s 2005 procurement of two Dutch M-frigates. Parrein 
(2011a, pp. 13, 17) concludes that functional spillover dynamics from prior successes of deep 
cooperation in mine warfare explain this Belgian achievement, contingent on the mutual 
trust established between the parties and its proven efficiency in terms of financial gains. 
Belgium could thus reintegrate its operational training with the Netherlands, terminated 
when the RNLN – but not the BNC – decommissioned its S-type frigates. It influenced their 
2006 decision to assign the RNLN responsibility for the logistical, material and maintenance 
support of M-frigates of both parties. Operating identical platforms enabled economy of 
scale in the fields of equipment replacement and maintenance (A. Warnaar, personal com-
munication, 5 Feb 2015). To facilitate their cooperation, the structure of the BNC was grad-
ually adapted to mirror that of the RNLN.
The fourth step was the 2010 decision to align the curriculums of the technical naval 
schools of the parties which, however, remain national establishments (Parrein 2011a, p. 11).
Their naval cooperation on frigates and MCMVs thus developed stepwise into spanning 
three domains: operational support; operational steering, work-up and training; and navy 
education. We agree with Parrein that this progressive development confirms neofunction-
alism predictions of coordinated integration through spillover dynamics. The two navies 
have managed to implement role and task specialisation – arguably the deepest level of 
defence cooperation – in turn requiring almost identical means.
Parrein (2011a, pp. 17, 21) stresses the functional balance of this cooperation, manifest 
in each party having lead for the operational support of a certain capability of both parties. 
Although this is obvious in the domain of operational support and partly in that of navy 
education, we note that the Netherlands dominates their cooperation in many respects. 
Parrein correctly suggests that equal partners have more incentives to cooperate. Our pre-
vious comparison of defence spending and naval capabilities reveals, however, that they 
are far from equals. Their differing size and capabilities, approximately a five-to-one ratio, 
prevent their partnership from being as balanced as Parrein alleges. The multidimensional 
warfare capabilities of frigates make them tools for pursuing the core function of navies; 
gaining or disputing sea control. In this respect, MCMVs represent a supporting capability.
This imbalance is well explained by the structural realism/intergovernmentalism predic-
tion that the stronger party will seek to protect its national interests by defining the terms 
for the defence cooperation. Let us inspect the internal workings of ABNL a bit closer.
The Commander of the RNLN holds the position of ABNL. In this capacity, he commands 
the binational operational steering and training of those units allocated to the cooperation 
structure (Parrein 2011a, p. 10). Although their relationship is described as cooperative rather 
than hierarchic, the Belgian counterpart remains the deputy. According to the Belgian 
Director Management Support C. Gillis (personal communication, 3 Feb 2015), this could be 
subject to change, since nothing in the agreement precludes a periodic alternation of this 
assignment between the two nations. Despite this hope for a change, the ABNL will probably 
remain Dutch in the foreseeable future. Head of Naval Policy A. Warnaar (personal 
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communication, 5 February 2015), clarifies the logic of the ABNL having a Dutch commander, 
since the RNLN brings exclusive national capabilities to it, while a Belgian commander would 
require a reappraisal of the current cooperation structure.
The inherent conflict between national sovereignty and deep defence cooperation is 
addressed by the parties retaining the authority to assign their vessels to international operations 
(A. Warnaar, personal communication, 5 Feb 2015). However, personnel in binational staff posi-
tions or logistic support units must make all-out efforts in operations undertaken by any party. 
When a unit is assigned to the ABNL command for work up and training, the nation delegates 
Operational Command (OPCOM). Upon completion, OPCOM is returned to the nation for national 
deployments or retained by ABNL if the unit remains in a training environment. This concept is 
based on the parties’ “gradual redefinition of the relationship between armed forces and national 
sovereignty,” Sauer (2015, p. 55) suggests, giving priority to retaining military policy options 
through cooperation at the expense of exclusive national decision-making power.
Outcomes and inherent challenges
The fact that the Belgian–Dutch naval cooperation has been a role model for the tri-service 
Benelux Defence Cooperation (Breyne and Parrein 2013, pp. 77–80) illustrates the power of 
functional and technical spillover. Its permanent structure was established through the 2012 
Benelux Declaration, designating four cooperation areas: (i) logistics and maintenance; 
(ii) education and training; (iii) execution of military tasks; and (iv) equipment procurement. 
Specific projects have included acquisition of the NH-90 helicopter, common air policing 
and centralised training of paratroopers (Biscop et al. 2013, pp. 1–3). quick progress was 
noted in education, training and exercises, while decisions involving losses of nationally 
owned facilities and capacities have compromised local socioeconomic interests. In Belgium, 
however, long-term social issues have arisen from long distance movements of the workforce, 
and language problems are immediate hurdles at lower levels of cooperation.
Common education and training facilities entail that officers assigned as teachers/trainers 
stay away from home (weekdays) during extended periods of their career, or that their fam-
ilies accede to temporary stationing in the partner state. Such multi-year assignments involve 
non-negligible social strains. Also language is a hurdle, stemming from those Belgian 
non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and sailors who only speak French. The BNC manage this 
challenge, as Dutch is the agreed working language (C. Colonval14 and A. Warnaar, personal 
communication, 5 Feb 2015). So far, discrepancies in national health and safety laws and 
regulations have prevented them from integrating education and training of divers.
Analysts have noted the potential for success of the Benelux Defence Cooperation, but 
also the need for transferring defence planning and programming to the international level. 
Biscop et al. (2013, pp. 3–5) conclude that for an effective defence cooperation to be estab-
lished, increasing dependencies must be accepted also at the political level. This, in turn, 
requires mutual trust between the parties as well as international parliamentary sessions. 
Hence, political top-down coordination of bottom-up integration processes comes at a cost 
and might be hard to implement. This illustrates, in neofunctionalism terms, the challenges 
inherent in technical spillover.
Such a result was achieved in March 2015, when the Benelux countries signed a defence 
agreement on shared surveillance and protection of their airspaces from civil aircrafts that 
might pose a terrorist threat (Maurice 2015). The prime ministers of Belgium and the 
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Netherlands referred to this achievement as a step forward within the framework of European 
defence policy. However, the Benelux Defence Cooperation is a top-down coordination 
mechanism which inner workings have a bottom-up character. Therefore, it needs manning 
with people having “the right attitudes towards cooperation” (C. Gillis and A. Desfossés15 
personal communication, 3 Feb 2015).
A key issue for the future of ABNL is the replacement programmes for MCMVs and 
M-frigates. Notwithstanding the benefits, A. Warnaar (personal communication, 5 Feb 2015) 
also notes the costs associated with defence cooperations, of which the most important was 
that “you have to keep in mind the wishes of your partner.” Belgian and Dutch national pro-
curement procedures, and specific national interests such as the Damen Shipyards, had 
therefore to be coordinated bilaterally. Since their views on desired capabilities and financial 
strengths were not always in line, additional coordination efforts could result in protracted 
discussions if not carefully managed. These discussions must preferably result in identical, 
binational, solutions (i.e. platforms), Warnaar explained, since the key success factor from a 
binational perspective is the economy of scale resulting from common arrangements. Since 
the ABNL is a “life-line” not only for preserving Belgium’s frigate capability but “for the Belgian 
Navy as such”, C. Gillis (personal communication, 3 Feb 2015) expected that a Belgian decision 
to abolish its frigate capability would adversely affect the Netherlands and the cooperation 
structure. From this perspective, the parties are mutually dependent on each other. As of 
May 2016, Belgium’s new strategic plan appears to have remedied their concerns, setting 
out a future equipment path including BNC acquisition of two new frigates and six MCMVs 
(Georges Heeren, Commander of the BNC, cited in Toremans 2016).
Some preliminary conclusions can be drawn (see Table 2). First, neofunctionalism’s explan-
atory power is significant with regards to the motivations of the parties to this naval 
Table 2. Outcome of the ABnL case-study (+/− indicate supportive/weakening outcome).
Neofunctionalism Structural realism/Intergovernmentalism
Motives and interests + Aggregated defence cuts and fear 
of losing critical capabilities 
induced representatives of the two 
navies to engage in naval 
cooperation to reach economy of 
scale and cost savings
− external military security threats have not 
influenced the defence cooperation
+ Strong historical ties, political identities, and 
favourable experiences of military collaboration 
facilitated the cooperation
+ Differing economic/military power, national 
interests and policy priorities influenced their 
strategic calculations
Dynamics Enabling and driving factors: 
+ navy representatives used 
procurement of identical vessels as 
a lever for functional spillover to 
education, training and logistics
+ Successful ABnL cooperation 
brought technical spillover to the 
Benelux Defence cooperation
Restraining factors: 
+ Decisions involving loss of 
nationally owned facilities have 
compromised local socioeconomic 
interests
Enabling and driving factors: 
− no actor refers to a common need for counterbal-
ancing powerful states
+ the netherlands has managed to define the terms 
of the cooperation, making the Den Helder navy 
Base the node of ABnL while assigning Belgium a 
secondary role
Restraining factors: 
+ Diverging national interests, budgetary strength, 
land/sea identities and Belgium’s french-speaking 
community have complicated consensus on aims, 
means and ways of cooperating
Outcomes + Coordinated integration + Despite their deep integration, the parties’ have 
retained much – but not all – of their sovereignty in 
terms of operational deployments. the ABnL 
structure reflects their distribution of power, clearly 
specifying their rights and obligations
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cooperation and the spillover dynamics in the integration process. Its bottom-up character, 
stepwise deepening and widening to other areas, domains and nations – eventually requiring 
political top-down coordination – are telling characteristics. Second, a successfully coordi-
nated integration of two navies offer substantial cost savings, but requires consideration of 
each other’s national interests. Third, international defence cooperation is accompanied by 
national sovereignty implications, requiring mutual trust and coordinated efforts to be man-
aged. This takes time to establish. Fourth, Belgium and the Netherlands are forced to deal 
with non-negligible frictions stemming from somewhat differing national interests, of which 
most are related to dissimilar policy priorities. Fifth, as opposed to Parrein’s argument, these 
differing national interests are integral to the dynamics of this naval cooperation and have – 
as predicted by structural realism/intergovernmentalism – a restraining effect on their 
integration.
Economy of scale and common education, training, maintenance, and logistics, require 
identical naval platforms. Thereto, the parties must give up nationally controlled facilities in 
favour of common solutions. Despite their common language, Belgium’s minority language 
has proven a hurdle for cooperating at lower management levels. Also, adequate Human 
Resource support for personnel temporarily stationed in a partner country is essential.
The Swedish–Finnish naval cooperation
Historical background, the actors and their motives and interests
During the cold war, Swedish–Finnish defence cooperation was limited. A formal agreement 
on exchange of military technical information did not materialise until 1989 (SOU 2002:108, 
p. 649). Finland’s reluctance to sign such agreements emanated from its 1948 “Friendship, 
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaty” with the Soviet Union, setting forth “potential 
military cooperation in crisis and war” (Lindberg 1994, p. 437). Detached from these imped-
iments, naval cooperation was intensified in the 1990s. The 1998–2006 bilateral Loviisa exer-
cise series – involving Fast Patrol Boats (FPBs), submarines and fighter aircraft – aimed at 
strengthening their ability to cooperate in crisis response operations (CRO) (Embassy of 
Finland 2004). Sweden’s desire for NATO interoperability and cost-effectiveness eventually 
made it obsolete (SwAF 2005, Annex 5, p. 42). Thereafter, they joined up in NATO-led exercises 
series such as the Northern Coast (SwAF 2008, Appendix 4.1, pp. 4, 26).
However, their naval cooperation has involved more than exercises. In 2001, preparations 
began for organising a combined Swedish Finnish Amphibious Task Unit (SWEFIN ATU) for 
CROs (SwAF 2003, p. 16). Its continuous development has led to the parties separate assign-
ments of contributions to pools of forces within the EU, NATO and the UN. Finland’s contri-
bution consists of parts of the Nyland Brigade while parts of the 1st Marine Regiment constitutes 
that of Sweden. In 2001, Finland, Sweden and Norway signed a joint acquisition project for 
the NH-90 helicopter (SwAF 2003, p. 18). In 2006, the Sea Surveillance Cooperation Finland 
Sweden (SUCFIS) interface for exchanging target information in the Northern Baltic Sea 
between their autonomous surveillance systems was declared operational (MoD Swe 2006). 
Their success resulted from a bilateral cooperation initiated in 2001, aimed at gaining a 
common maritime picture contributing to maritime domain awareness (MDA) in the Baltic 
Sea.16
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The two parties have commonalities and differences. The 2015 Swedish defence budget 
almost doubled that of Finland: EUR 4.81 billion compared to EUR 2.69 billion (IISS 2016, 
pp. 92, 143–144). However, Finland’s 2015 1.3% defence spending as a share of its GDP 
outmatched Sweden’s 1.1%. Notably, Sweden’s defence budget includes costs for its Coast 
Guard and civilian emergency agencies, while it operates a costly professional force and 
allocates significant funds for procurement and R&D.17
Although differences are apparent with regards to staffing and capabilities, when 
weighted they indicate a cooperation between equal navies. In 2015, the Swedish Navy 
enlisted 2100 active duty personnel, manning 1 amphibious battalion, 5 submarines, 
9 corvettes/FPBs, 7 MCMVs and support vessels (IISS 2016, pp. 93, 143). The Finnish Navy 
enlisted 350018 personnel, manning 1 amphibious brigade, 8 corvettes/FPBs, 5 minelayers, 
7 MCMVs and support vessels. Also, Finland’s conscript system enables its navy to muster a 
31,000 personnel reserve. Unlike Finland, Sweden operates tactical submarines. Unlike 
Sweden, Finland is capable of laying sea mines. The former Chief of the Swedish Navy J. 
Thörnqvist (personal communication, 12 Feb 2015) deemed these capabilities complemen-
tary, while combined operation of their corvettes/FPBs and MCMVs would offer a desired 
increase in capacity.
Internal and external factors influence this defence cooperation, the emphases of which 
have changed over time. Already when Vladimir Putin took office as president, Swedish 
Members of Parliament voiced their concerns of Sweden’s “vigorous disarmament” and risks 
associated with pending capability losses (Swedish Parliament 2000). Today’s Swedish–
Finnish naval cooperation builds on the activities launched within the Nordic framework 
from 2005. Then, former Swedish Supreme Commander Håkan Syrén (2009a, pp. 62–63) 
concluded that Sweden had “reached the end of the road […] in its pursuit of maintaining 
a versatile and modern armed force on a strict national basis,” since its defence budgets had 
reached such low levels that further reductions would involve “loss of entire functions and 
capabilities.”
At this time, Norway was Sweden’s preferred partner with whom it shared border, CRO 
experience, political interests and the vision of establishing a battlegroup. In 2006, Syrén 
(2009b, pp. 90–91) argued that Norway’s membership of NATO but not of the EU – while 
Sweden had the opposite affiliation – was “an additional argument for close cooperation” 
as it could harmonise these organisations’ developments. In 2008, he repeated the Swedish 
Parliamentary Defence Committee’s position that “Sweden will not remain passive if another 
EU Member State or Nordic country suffers a disaster or an attack,” expecting them to act in 
the same way if Sweden was similarly affected (Syrén 2009c, pp. 142–146). The Norwegian–
Swedish defence cooperation had to be seen in wider Nordic, EU, NATO and UN frames, he 
urged, as Sweden would not respond to emerging regional security threats on its own. 
Finland, Denmark and Iceland joined the discussions in 2008 – establishing the “Nordic 
Defence Support” – in close temporal with Russia’s intervention in the Georgian provinces 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In 2009, the Nordic countries signed the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) establishing NORDEFCO (2009).
NORDEFCO adopted a vision in 2013, emphasising the parties’ commitment to “enhanced 
cooperation and coordination in capability development […,] activities in international 
operations and capacity building, […] increase pooling of capabilities” (NORDEFCO 2013b). 
The May 2014 Action Plan for Deepened Defence Cooperation between Sweden and Finland 
echoed this vision, setting the aim of “increasing effect and efficiency through combined 
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use of resources, […] increased interoperability and […] closer dialogue” while specifying 
targets at the military and political levels (Mod Fin and MoD Swe 2014). Cooperation was 
limited to “activities in peacetime” in “supplement [of ] other multinational cooperation”.
In sum, the Swedish–Finnish defence cooperation was premised up to this point on devel-
oping peacetime CRO capability and capacity. Their security was managed within the frame-
work of the EU’s CSDP while desires for cost-efficiency and savings influenced their strategic 
thinking. The May 2014 action plan – to be further addressed below – resulted from a bot-
tom-up process centring on the 2013 vision document between the chiefs of the navies. 
This illustrates the workings of functional and technical spillover induced by leading naval 
representatives in their response to top-down demands of cost reductions which – as in the 
Belgian–Dutch case – were deemed unmanageable on a national basis.
Russia’s March 2014 annexation of Crimea brought a sense of urgency to the Swedish–
Finnish defence cooperation. Its conduct in Ukraine, intrusions into Swedish and Finnish air 
space and altered military exercise practices in the Baltic Sea heightened their perceptions 
of external threat. In the words of the former Chief of the Finnish Navy K. Takanen (personal 
communication, 18 Mar 2015): “The situation in Ukraine and the Crimea gave the politicians 
a kick and it was actually the latter that started a process of making the whole cooperation 
deeper, also looking at the air force [and] the army.” Although Russia is omitted in the official 
joint documents which we refer to, phrases such as “common challenges” and “aim for better 
security in a regional context” are pointed in its direction (SwAF 2014a). The October 2014 
submarine intrusions deep into Swedish TTWs19 recalled cold war experiences and high-
lighted Sweden’s apparent lack of ASW helicopter capability. In December 2015, Sweden 
received the first of five NH-90 ASW helicopters (Jennings 2015). It will also convert four 
search and rescue helicopters already delivered to the same ASW-configuration.
Since 2015, Finland and Sweden have sought to use the cooperation as a deterrent – or 
a vehicle for diplomatic signalling – expecting it to give “a significant signal to the surround-
ing region” on “both parties’ commitment to raise their relationship to a new level” (SwAF 
2015a; J. Thörnqvist personal communication, 12 Feb 2015). Strikingly, the initial emphasis 
on cost-efficiency and cost savings is redefined as a long-term aim, while increased opera-
tional effectiveness has become a short-term priority requiring “additional personnel and 
financial resources.” The former Chief of the Finnish Navy K. Takanen (personal communica-
tion, 18 Mar 2015) explained that “the basic idea is to cooperate in peacetime, training and 
exercising together with secure communications networks between the nations which will 
make it possible also to do something in times of war.” As neither Finland nor Sweden are – 
or currently aspire to become – NATO members, they seek to enhance the operational capa-
bilities of their armed forces by cooperating bilaterally (E. Mikkola, Ministry of Defence of 
Finland, personal communication, 18 Mar 2015).
Sweden’s and Finland regional interests align and they share a concern regarding Russia’s 
behaviour. These non-aligned states are dependent on safe and secure sea routes for their 
import and export (Lindqvist 2010, MoTC Fin 2014), and their ministers of defence have 
emphasised their shared history and common set of values (Hultqvist and Haglund 2015). 
Such commonalities facilitate successful defence integration. While the two navies recognise 
their common interests and identity, practical differences remain to be addressed 
(J. Engström, K. Takanen and E. Mikkola, personal communication, 18 Mar 2015).
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Institutionalisation and formal structures of the cooperation
The October 2013 “Vision for the Swedish Finnish Naval Task Group (SFNTG) 2023” – signed 
by the chiefs of the two navies – is a restricted armed forces document including elements 
of strategy. One unit, the SWEFIN ATU, already fulfilled much of the requirements. 
Acknowledging the project’s bottom-up character, J. Thörnqvist (personal communication, 
12 Feb 2015) clarified that from the outset, the SFNTG was launched as a tangible instrument 
for focusing the efforts of the navies’ personnel. He explained that it was intended as an 
operational tool for crisis prevention and crisis management. Given the opaque nature of 
contemporary conflicts, however, these formal restraints do not prevent a substantial inte-
gration of the two navies. By fulfilment of the vision, the two navies expect increased oper-
ational effect and cost-effectiveness within the stipulated time frame. Their contributions 
to the SFNTG are balanced, each party allocating 10 surface combatants (altogether 1 
Offshore Patrol Vessel [Carlskrona class], 12 FPBs, 5 corvettes [Visby class] and 2 multi-role 
minelayers [Hämeenmaa class]).
The May 2014 action plan – outlining areas of bilateral cooperation at the military and 
political levels – set a time frame for the project in short-, medium- and long-terms (MoD 
Fin and MoD Swe 2014). Emphasis was placed on the latter. The political level cooperation 
areas involved facilitating secure communications at various command levels, a video tele-
phone conference link, MoD cross-manning and the launch of joint studies.
The requirement to remain compatible with the NORDEFCO framework – on which MoU 
this defence cooperation is founded – is essential and requires transparency and intercon-
nectivity. K. Takanen and E. Mikkola (personal communication, 18 Mar 2015) clarified the 
logic behind their decision to direct their forces to operate according to NATO standards 
and use of English as command and control language. They placed emphasis on the require-
ment of interoperability with EU and NATO members, since “interoperability according to 
the Finnish understanding also means capability to receive help.” Accordingly, J. Thörnqvist 
(official statement at Marinstridsdagarna, 21 Jan 2015) declared in 2015 that “the way [for 
Sweden and Finland] to become interoperable is NATO standard and no other standard.” 
One year later, the chiefs of the two navies declared that they were fully on track (J. Thörnqvist 
and V. Taipalus, official statements at Marinstridsdagarna, 26 Jan 2016).
The June 2014 implementation plan set the agenda for realising the action plan. 
Reaffirming the guidance of the 2013 vision document, it stipulated far-reaching naval coop-
eration on (SwAF 2014a, pp. 3–6, Annex A): (i) exercises; (ii) education and training; (iii) sea 
surveillance; (iv) common use of base infrastructure; (v) combined units; and vi) capability 
of inter-naval transfer of Operational Control. It set a tight timetable for the bilaterally staffed 
group handling the “Focus Area Navy”, chaired by Sweden. In December 2014, the restricted 
“Final report for deepened defence cooperation between Finland and Sweden in focus area 
Navy” was delivered, while policy decisions were presented in February 2015 (SwAF 2015a).
The two navies envisage a two-tiered objective, establishing: (i) a bilateral Naval Task 
Group (the SFNTG) with initial operational capability to conduct Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance Operations in 2017; and (ii) a standing SFNTG with full operational capability 
to conduct operations up to and including Protection of Shipping Operation in 2023. The 2017 
objective involves continuous surveillance of an assigned area of operations in order to 
detect and identify violations, illegal activities and other deviations from the recognised 
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maritime picture. This may involve the handling of violations that include authorisation to 
use lethal force in accordance with mutually agreed Rules of Engagement (ROE).
The 2023 objective
involves protection of activities or objects in order to uphold security and the freedom of move-
ment at sea and in needed land areas. [It supports] military or civilian operations or activities 
on land. To establish sea control is an implicit means of protection of shipping by denying a 
counterpart the ability to use the sea. (SwAF 2015a)
At this stage, the SFNTG must be “fully trained, equipped and have promulgated and imple-
mented all necessary plans, orders and [standing operational procedures]” required for this 
type of operation.
The SFNTG, led by a Task Group Commander with staff, has pursued a dedicated bi- and 
multilateral exercise programme since 2014 (T. Tiilikainen, personal communication, 25 Apr 
2016). It is manned by personnel having trained together in bi- or multilateral settings during 
the last decade, while NATO’s tactical manuals bridge their national disparities without hav-
ing to settle whose procedures are the most effective. Also, mutual trust and cultural under-
standing is being built through exchange of officers and NCOs at all levels of command. As 
anticipated by former Head of Plans at the Swedish Navy Department, S. Larsson (personal 
communication, 1 Oct 2014): “In all organisational change, trust and motivation are key 
success factors which in turn require a stepwise approach.” Given the navies’ commonalities, 
the two-tiered objective separated by a six-year implementation period meets such an 
approach. Media attention to events, such as when SFNTG vessels filled up Visby harbour 
while preparing for Protection of Shipping Operations exercises in the waters off Gotland 
during the Swedish–Finnish Naval Exercise 2016, contribute to the parties’ domestic and 
international signalling (SwAF 2016).
In sum, SUCFIS and the SWEFIN ATU are successful parts of the cooperation structure, 
while the SFNTG is in the making. Institutionalisation thus far consists of a bilateral MoU, 
joint release of public documents, cross-manning, establishment of a formal navy steering 
board, binational manning of the SFNTG and execution of a dedicated exercise programme. 
In February 2015, J. Thörnqvist (personal communication, 12 Feb 2015) noted that: “The rate 
of progress has been so high that Swedish Armed Forces representatives have requested 
political guidance on whether further integration of the forces is feasible. So far there has 
been consensus on the way ahead.” This illustrates the need for top-down coordination, 
i.e. technical spillover, resulting from functional spillover. Contrary to neofunctionalism pre-
dictions, resistance from nationalistic groups has arisen neither in Finland nor Sweden.
Potential outcomes, practical implementation issues and inherent challenges
To deepen their understanding of the project’s operational and legal challenges, Sweden 
hosted a strategic tabletop discussion with broad participation on a fictitious Baltic Sea crisis 
scenario in November 2014. The findings are illustrative. The After Action Report (AAR) com-
mended their established capacity to share bilaterally RMP and information conducive to 
MDA – including SECRET information – through the SUCFIS system (SwAF 2014b). It stressed, 
however, the need to also share Daily Intention Messages and Maritime Tasking and 
Co-ordination Orders. Moreover, it revealed incoherencies in ROE procedures and contents 
among the parties, therefore suggesting the initiation of an alignment process.
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Notably, both levels of the SFNTG’s two-tiered objective may involve the use of force. This 
is by no means restricted to wartime scenarios and may be required on each other’s TTWs. 
In 2014, former Head of Plans at the Swedish Navy Department, S. Larsson (personal com-
munication, 1 Oct 2014) admitted that neither Finland’s nor Sweden’s legislation fully sup-
ported these types of operations on each other’s TTWs.
The 2014 Final Report from the Focus Area Navy and the AAR highlighted the need for 
Finnish legislative challenges, of which some are potential “show-stoppers” (SwAF 2014b, 
p. 2, Annex E). First, Finland’s Act on the Defence Forces prescribes that although its armed 
forces may assist another state – or another Finnish authority – in case of major accidents, 
natural disasters, or terrorist attacks, it may not use military force in providing such assistance. 
Second, its Territorial Surveillance Act does not allow for territorial surveillance by foreign 
authorities. Third, Finland’s Conscript Act limits the international use of conscripts to exercises 
and training, preventing its fulfilment of the EU’s mutual defence clause and the bilateral 
cooperation from evolving into a tool for wartime scenarios. The drafting of new legislation 
meeting the requirements of their envisioned “territorial surveillance cooperation and other 
operative cooperation” – which Finland initiated in November 2014 – has reached white 
paper stage and will reach the Finnish national parliament in May 2016 (MoFA Fin 2014, 
pp. 7, 8, SwAF 2014b, Annex E, O’Dwyer 2016a).
The 2014 AAR also identified the need for legislative changes in Sweden, to enable a 
defence cooperation as envisaged in the 2013 vision document. Here, the Instrument of 
Government (a constitutional law) and the Ordinance concerning Intervention by the Swedish 
Armed Forces in the event of Violations of Swedish Territory in Peacetime and in Neutrality (the 
IKFN Ordinance) prevent sharing the duties of territorial surveillance and maintaining terri-
torial integrity with another state’s armed forces. However, the Swedish Government can 
decide on Swedish military support to Finland if authorised by a prior decision of the Swedish 
Parliament (SwAF 2014b, Annex E). In November 2015, the Swedish Government – in con-
sensus with the Swedish Parliamentary Defence Committee – initiated a study on the con-
stitutional conditions for enhanced international defence cooperation, in particular with 
Finland, to be presented in September 2016 (Government of Sweden 2015).
Two more essential areas of legal clarification and adjustment result from the Swedish–
Finnish naval cooperation, viz., the need for: (i) “deeper and wider research” on possible 
amendment of Finland’s sole duty “to secure and protect the neutrality and integrity of the 
Åland Islands area”, laid down in the Convention on non-fortification and neutralisation of the 
islands of Åland; and (ii) Finland to implement legislation related to Article 42 of the Lisbon 
Treaty on EU member states joint defence responsibility (SwAF 2014b, Annex E).
Capability requirements and implementation of NATO technical standards are major – and 
perhaps sensitive from political and defence industry perspectives – long-term issues closely 
related to funding that Finland and Sweden must agree upon. Sweden’s initial adaption to 
these standards in the 1990s was a far more troubling (i.e. costly) issue than implementing 
NATO procedures for command and control (SOU 2002:108, p. 740). The AAR highlights the 
operational challenges associated with intervention operations, as long as the parties lack 
full command and control compatibility (SwAF 2014b, Annex D, pp. 1, 2). In the words of 
Finnish Defence Command Staff T. Tiilikainen (personal communication, 18 Mar 2015),
One of the reasons we chose the vision for the SFNTG to reach full operational capability in 
2023 was that we already had identified that Sweden was a couple of years behind Finland with 
regard to a NATO interoperable command and control system.
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 Our analytical framework specified three types of defence integration: pooling and sharing; 
role specialisation; and joint force generation. Thus far, Sweden and Finland have opted for 
joint force generation, signified by joint training, bi- and multilateral exercises, and joint 
participation in CROs. Informal discussions have dealt with future role-specialisation. Here, 
Sweden would take the lead for submarines and ASW, while Finland would assume lead for 
mine warfare and air defence. In 2015, no formal evaluations or directions had been made 
in this regard (J. Thörnqvist, personal communication, 12 Feb 2015).
As for pooling and sharing, there is a pending need to replace older surface combatants 
and a joint procurement would certainly bring new impetus to the collaboration. J. Thörnqvist 
(personal communication, 12 Feb 2015) explained that Swedish Stockholm and Gothenburg 
class corvettes will need replacement in the mid-2020s. Although not yet planned or 
financed, a preliminary conceptual description had been drafted, indicating a Swedish desire 
for a lean manned, high endurance corvette, capable of performing multidimensional war-
fare regardless of season. In September 2015, Finnish Minister of Defence J. Niinistö author-
ised the Finnish Navy to launch the project “Squadron 2020”, aimed at replacing six vessels 
with four new surface combatants to be built in 2019–2024 (MoD Fin 2015). It remains to be 
seen whether a bilateral coordination of vessel procurements is possible.
As for the outcomes of the Swedish–Finnish naval cooperation, the early phase of their 
integration process prevents a definitive assessment. So far, it has landed squarely in the 
category of “coordinated integration”, successively expanding and creating increased national 
and collective operational capability, while steps are taken to pool sovereignty (see 
Table 3). This outcome is due to the presence of multiple enabling factors and, thus far, an 
absence of restraining factors. The two navies consider role specialisation a valid future 
Table 3. Outcome of the Swedish-finnish case-study (+/− indicate supportive/weakening outcome).
Neofunctionalism Structural realism/intergovernmentalism
Motives and interests + Aggregated defence cuts and fear 
of losing critical capabilities 
induced representatives of the two 
navies to engage in naval 
cooperation to reach cost-efficiency 
and cost savings
+ from 2014, the perceived Russian security threat 
influenced the defence cooperation and its navy 
pillar
+ Strong historical ties, political identities, and 
favourable post-cold war experiences of military 
collaboration facilitated the defence cooperation 
and its navy pillar
− no significant impact of differing economic/military 
power on their defence cooperation and its navy 
pillar
− Largely aligned national interests and policy 
priorities have so far resulted in converging strategic 
calculations
Dynamics Enabling and driving factors: 
+ Overarching defence cooperation 
resulted as an effect of functional 
and technical spillover from the 
establishment of promising naval 
cooperation
Restraining factors: 
− no resistance from popular groups 
detected
Enabling and driving factors: 
+ Both parties refer to a common need for counterbal-
ancing a powerful Russia
Restraining factors: 
− the need for merging differing national standards 
has been circumvented by the parties using english 
as command language and nAtO tactics, techniques 
and procedures
Outcomes + Coordinated integration, but the 
parties are in an early phase of their 
integration process
− So far, the parties retain their sovereignty, but steps 
are being taken to pool it
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option, while examining pooling and sharing possibilities. The question of a military alliance 
is an issue which the present Swedish government has been particularly reluctant to consider. 
Notwithstanding, the perceived Russian military security threat boosted the Swedish–Finnish 
defence cooperation and its navy pillar from 2014.
Although their national security interests align, Finland’s 1340 km land border with Russia 
means higher risks and geostrategic sensitivities than for Sweden. This might induce Russia 
to step up its pressure on either of the two parties in an attempt to create friction and split. 
It is worth noting that Swedish representatives until 2016 refrained from officially considering 
a defence union with Finland, while Finnish officials raised this issue already in 2014 
(Lundqvist and Widen 2015a, p. 65). This outcome is consistent with the structural realist/
intergovernmentalist prediction that contracting parties to defence cooperations primarily 
seek to safeguard their particular national interests from external security threats.
A comparative assessment in a wider framework
We will now engage more deeply with our twofold research question, in light of our analytical 
framework and by comparing the result of our two case studies: Why have Finland and 
Sweden jointly responded to the altering security situation in the Baltic Sea region and what 
are the prospects for success in their naval cooperation?
It is clear that the Swedish–Finnish defence cooperation project stems from a cross- 
national cooperation initiated by the chiefs of their navies, in turn explicitly inspired by the 
successful Belgian–Dutch naval cooperation. It is equally clear that these two naval cooper-
ations were launched in response to their fear of losing critical capabilities resulting from 
aggregated cuts in defence spending, while envisioning substantial cost savings by coop-
erating. Empirical evidence shows that favourable experiences of previous collaboration 
facilitated both projects and that they were launched within wider security policy frame-
works. For the ABNL, both NATO and the EU were indispensable frameworks within which 
their cooperation could be pursued. For the SFNTG, the EU was the framework and NORDEFCO 
the vehicle for managing the practical aspects of establishing.
The two case studies reveal striking similarities regarding motives and interests, dynamics 
and outcomes, although the level of integration in ABNL is significantly higher than in the 
Swedish–Finnish naval cooperation, which is still under establishment. We therefore expect 
that the navies of Finland and Sweden will face similar challenges as those experienced by 
Belgium and the Netherlands if it evolves into role specialisation and/or pooling and 
sharing.
With regards to motivations, however, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 turned the 
table. The fact that its military capabilities were more limited during its south-eastward 
intervention into Georgia in 2008 might explain why the same level of alarm was not raised. 
In accordance with balance of threat theory as outlined by Walt (1987, p. 5), Finland’s and 
Sweden’s geographical proximity to this powerful potential aggressor – and the western 
direction of its expansion – made the threat appear more severe and acute than for 
e.g. Belgium and the Netherlands. For the latter two, it sufficed that NATO leaders continu-
ously addressed the crisis in Ukraine from the Wales Summit in September 2014, through 
measures such as its Readiness Action Plan, the Connected Forces Initiative, and their agree-
ment to reverse the trend of declining budgets among its member states (NATO 2014b).
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Trends in defence indicate the perceived urgency of the Russian threat to individual states. 
The Netherlands’ 2015 defence expenditures corresponded to its 2012 level, while that of 
Belgium reached an all-time low (NATO 2016b, p. 4). In 2015, Sweden decided to increase 
its defence budget for 2016–2020 by 1.09 billion EUR [10.2 billion SEK), explicitly motivated 
by the Ukraine crisis (Government of Sweden 2014, pp. 1, 6). Finland raised its 2016 defence 
budget by 0.227 billion EUR compared to that of 2015, despite its shrinking GDP (MoD Fin 
2016). Also in Finland, government officials referred to the Ukraine crisis as the rationale for 
allocating extra funds for procurement of new fighter jets and warships (Tiessalo 2015). In 
conclusion, the determining variable explaining the difference in outcomes of the two cases 
is the perceived level of external military security threats.
Although deliberately downplayed in public discussions in favour of its economic inter-
ests, security considerations loomed in the background of Finland’s 1992 application for 
European Community membership (Venna 1995). Economic imperatives, i.e. “the prospects 
of being left outside the united West European market after 1992,” were key domestic issues 
also for Sweden, while the dominant Social Democratic party was the protector of its policy 
of credible neutrality (Sundelius 1994, pp. 179–181). Its representatives solved the issue of 
a supranational European Community – which would limit Sweden’s sovereignty – by declar-
ing that Europe was evolving into “a new peace order,” where “bloc divisions [had] disap-
peared” (Prime Minister I. Karlsson cited in Sundelius 1994, p. 181). From 2014, this regional 
order no longer exist and the main players of the old one – Russia and the US – are at centre 
stage.
Belgium and the Netherlands deal with this change through NATO. Finland’s and Sweden’s 
pre-1992 dilemma, however, is repeating itself and renewing the relevance of structural 
realism and weak-power theory. For Mouritzen (1994, pp. 156–161), the impact of balance-
of-power – and anti-balance-of power (applicable only to non-aligned states) – theory is 
preferably studied in connection to “wide ranging and sudden power shifts.” Arguably, the 
2014 Ukraine crisis was such a shift. What then are the theoretical implications of our 
Swedish–Finnish case study?
We note the trend that Finland and Sweden seek to safeguard their core national interests 
and values in the short-term by merging their military capabilities, but also by committing 
themselves to what they consider the stronger pole – the US – through various NATO arrange-
ments. Their joint signing of NATO Host Nation Support agreements – and their accepted 
nomination to NATO’s Enhanced Opportunities Programme – during the Wales Summit in 
September 2014 stand out. Notably, their bilateral cooperation does not prevent any party 
from applying for NATO membership. As NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for 
Operations M. Soula (personal communication, 3 Feb 2015) made clear: “Sweden and Finland 
are most valued partners to NATO who contribute more to NATO then many member states,” 
“politically wanting more access to NATO in terms of consultation”, whose “bilateral cooper-
ation easily can fit into the wider framework of NATO’s Maritime Strategy.”
In May 2016, Finland and Sweden met with NATO in a “28 + 2” constellation for a “close 
dialogue on European security” (SvD 2016).20 Thereto, Sweden has established bilateral 
defence collaboration with neighbouring NATO members. A framework agreement on deep-
ened defence cooperation was signed with Poland on 14 September 2015 (Government 
Offices of Sweden 2015), and an MoU on enhanced defence cooperation was signed with 
Denmark on 14 January 2016 (MoD Den and Swe Gov 2016).
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These recent developments – involving the defence ministers of Finland and Sweden 
officially voicing their considerations of forming a treaty-based defence union (O’Dwyer 
2016b) – seem to confirm the predictions of Walt (1987, pp. 161–172) that a distant super-
power is ideal for the weak state facing direct military threat from one of its neighbours, as 
well as that it may be “forced to choose among partners of equal capability.” In contrast to 
Mouritzen’s (1994) findings on their behaviour in the aftermath of the cold war, Finland and 
Sweden appear to be engaged in balance-of-power behaviour rather than anti-balance-of-
power vis-à-vis Russia. quite tellingly, Sweden adopted a tougher military strategy doctrine 
in March 2016 and for its Supreme Commander Micael Bydén, the possibility that Sweden 
“for some reason would have to stand alone” is the exception under which its armed forces 
“will fight to the last man or woman” (DN 2016).
Conclusions
Neofunctionalism explains the motives and interests underlying the initiation of Swedish–
Finnish defence cooperation, spearheaded by their navies. Aggregated cuts in the defence 
spending of both parties diminished their military capabilities and capacities. In order to 
compensate for the losses, representatives of the two navies saw defence cooperation as a 
viable remedy. Given the low security pressure in Europe from mid-1990s until 2013, they 
became the main proponents of defence cooperation. Here, focus was on cost savings and 
cost-efficiency within wider NORDEFCO/EU security frameworks. The developments up to 
2013 closely follow those of Belgium and the Netherlands, except for the NATO 
framework.
When the perceived military threat re-emerged by Russia’s westward expansion in 2014, 
their lack of military capabilities became a tangible security problem. Structural realism and 
balance-of-power theory serve to explain their responses vis-à-vis Russia, each other and 
the US, in which NATO appears to be given a decisive role. Since Finnish and Swedish territory 
is critically important also for the US in fulfilling its security guarantees vis-à-vis the Baltic 
States and Poland – and by their joint action – their bargaining position is strong, which 
enable them to punch beyond their weight in a European security context. Although the 
final outcomes remain to be seen, their naval cooperation is so far a success.
Notes
 1.  Established by the Treaty of Maastricht, signed on 7 February 1992.
 2.  Specifying five principal threats: (i) terrorism; (ii) proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; 
(iii) regional conflicts; (iv) state failure; and (v) organised crime.
 3.  To Hoffmann (1966, p. 882), permanent excesses of losses over gains made integration of “high 
politics” unlikely.
 4.  based on a positive feedback loop to a specific institutional arrangement.
 5.  Introduced in 2012, it involves pooling and sharing of military capabilities, priority setting and 
procurement coordination among NATO members (Doninovska 2014).
 6.  Westberg (2015, p. 99) finds neofunctionalism’s spillover process applicable to the study of 
NORDEFCO’s internal dynamics by limiting its ulterior aim of creating supranational institutions 
to the advancement of its member states’ national and collective defence capabilities.
 7.  Requiring “functional”, “technical” and “political” spillover as specified by Haas (1971) and 
Schmitter (1970).
 8.  Equating Schmitter’s concepts “spill-around” and “muddle-about”.
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 9.  Equating Schmitter’s concept “spill-back”.
10.  The Netherlands’ 2015 defence budget amounted to EUR 8 billion, while that of Belgium was 
EUR 3.58 billion. In 1995, the Netherlands spent EUR 6.35 billion and Belgium EUR 3.25 billion 
on defence.
11.  The Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research.
12.  Company producing electronics for defence and security applications.
13.  The sum of 63,912  km2 (the Netherlands [Europe]), 68,783  km2 (the Netherlands Antilles 
[Leeward]) and 12,169 km2 (the Netherland Antilles [Windward]).
14.  Chief of Staff at the Netherlands-Belgian Operational Warfare School.
15.  Assistant Chief of Staff of the Policy Branch of the Benelux Steering Group.
16.  It spurred a 2008 Swedish–Finnish initiative on unclassified MDA cooperation – Sea Surveillance 
Cooperation Baltic Sea (SUCBAS) – in the Baltic Sea (Lundqvist forthcoming). Since March 2015, 
SUCBAS comprises Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and the UK.
17.  Sweden allocated EUR 1.77 billion (SEK 16.9 billion) to procurement, maintenance, and R&D, 
EUR 0.11 billion (SEK 1.04 billion) to its Coast Guard and EUR 0.30 billion (SEK 2.82 billion) to 
its civil emergency agencies in 2015 (CoF Swe 2014, pp. 9–10).
18.  1600 permanently assigned personnel. 1900 conscripts undertake basic training.
19.  Although the perpetrator remains unconfirmed (SwAF 2015b), experts widely assume Russian 
involvement.
20.  Attended also by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
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THE NEW US MARITIME STRATEGY
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BALTIC SEA REGION
STEFAN LUNDQVIST AND J J WIDEN
The new US maritime strategy has received praise from many corners of the world. As
a manual it is well suited to guide the efforts of its three sea services in navigating a
challenging global security environment in the years ahead. The strategy emphasises
maritime presence, both where conflict threatens the global system and US national
interests, and where allies require reassurance, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region.
However, Stefan Lundqvist and J J Widen argue that the document fails, to some extent,
to address Russia’s increasingly challenging conduct and its implications for Northeast
Europe and the Baltic Sea region.
I
nMarch 2015, the three sea services
of the United States (US) – the
US Navy, Marine Corps and Coast
Guard – released a revised and expanded
version of their 2007 maritime strategy,
entitled A Cooperative Strategy for 21
st
Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged,
Ready.
1
The predominantly positive
reviews thus far have focused on its
implications for actors and relationships
in the Indo-Pacific region, accentuated by
the explicit designation of a rising China
as a threat to peace and stability in the
region.
2
Others have emphasised the
implications of the strategy’s inclusion
of a new pillar, ‘all domain access’,
in the concept of sea power.
3
Some
have, with good reason, pointed to the
consequences for maritime security in
the Mediterranean of the US rebalancing
to the Asia-Pacific.
4
Yet the implications
of the 2015 US maritime strategy for
maritime security in the Baltic Sea region
have not yet been discussed, a gap that
this broad analysis seeks to address.
US Maritime Strategy: Strategic
Context and Major Changes
The 2015 US maritime strategy retains
its predecessor’s long-term focus on
protecting the global economic system
and its emphasis on international
co-operation and partnership. It also
continues the effort to clarify the utility of
maritime power in maintaining the US’s
position of global leadership. Produced
in a strategic context in which the US
is no longer engaged in combat in Iraq
or Afghanistan, it provides a detailed
account of how the country intends to
deploy and employ its sea services in the
different regions of the world.
5
This is a
significant clarification of the previous
maritime strategy’s general positions
on ‘forward presence’ and ‘forging
international partnerships’.
6
The Indo-
Pacific, marked by a rising China whose
naval expansion is deemed to present
opportunities and challenges, stands
out as the region of prime strategic
importance – and thus most deserving
of US attention.
7
In this way, the 2015
US maritime strategy adds a strand of
traditional geopolitical concern to its
predecessor’s almost exclusive systemic
focus.
China’s rapidly increasing ability
to deny the US access to the South
China Sea clearly represents the reason
for including ‘all domain access’ as an
essential function of US sea power, with
an emphasis on addressing challenges
and opportunities in cyberspace while
acknowledging the need for the US to
regain control of the electromagnetic
spectrum to create war-fighting
advantages.
8
This is arguably the most
significant change in the latest US
maritime strategy. All domain access
is also exercised in peacetime through
routine manoeuvres in contested waters.
The much noted USS Lassen freedom-
of-navigation cruise within 12 nautical
miles of five disputed artificial islands
in the Spratly Group in October 2015,
provoking fierce Chinese reaction, is the
most recent example.
9
Perhaps a less prominent, but still
notable, change is the declared impact
of persistent US fiscal uncertainties
and austerity (not discussed in the
previous strategy), requiring the
careful prioritisation of US maritime
engagements and adequate risk
management. These constraints must
be considered in combination with
the revised strategy’s recognition
of ever-growing volatility, instability
and complexity in the global security
environment.
10
The need to maintain
credible US combat power in key regions,
the authors of the strategy claim, and
‘to deter conflict, reassure allies and
partners, and respond to crises’ is
therefore greater than ever, especially in
the Asia-Pacific.
11
It can be argued, however, that
China is not the only state actor to pose
a major threat to US national interests
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and the global system. A similar threat
also comes from Russia and its attempt
to re-establish itself as a great power
in Europe and on the world stage –
something recently asserted by General
Philip Breedlove, commander of the US
European Command and Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (SACEUR), who
pointed to Russia’s vast nuclear inventory
and its explicit threats to use it.
12
The
Russian threat turns the Baltic Sea region
– particularly vulnerable to Russian
aggression – into one of relevance to
global, rather than regional, security. Yet
this region is notable by its absence from
the 2015 US maritime strategy.
Maritime Security Challenges in
the Baltic Sea Region
As emphasised in the 2015 US maritime
strategy, Russia’s military modernisation,
illegal seizure of Crimea and active
role in ongoing military aggression in
Ukraine threaten European security and
stability.
13
The Russian Baltic Fleet, for
example, based in the Russian exclave of
Kaliningrad and outside of St Petersburg,
will be reinforced with new vessels
and weapon upgrades through the
ongoing 2020 armament programme.
14
Accordingly, the number of military
exercises and levels of intelligence
activity in the Baltic Sea will likely
continue to rise, alongside the intensity
of commercial shipping. This highlights
the geostrategic importance of the Baltic
Sea region. Here, the fact that Finland,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland
constitute the northern boundary of the
Schengen Area, in which the participating
countries have eliminated their internal
border controls, is worth noting since
they maintain the EU’s common external
border with Russia.
The 2015 US maritime strategy
also points to the globally skyrocketing
demand for energy and resources,
underscoring the importance of
the free flow of commerce through
strategic maritime crossroads.
15
The
Baltic Sea is a primary example of
the growing centrality of the seas, as
both resources and trade routes: its
seabed is increasingly exploited for oil
extraction, submarine cables, wind-
power farms, and pipelines – with Nord
Stream, the world’s longest sub-sea
pipeline, delivering natural gas from
Russia to Germany through the Exclusive
Economic Zones (EEZs) of the region’s
coastal states, deserving particular
mention in this regard.
16
Approximately 2,000 vessels
travel through the Baltic Sea every day,
carrying some 15 per cent of the world’s
container shipping, including a large
share of Russian trade (see Figure 1).
Shipping intensity is, however, not only
about numbers and maritime safety. It
also involves considerations of maritime
security, such as the intentions of the
ship masters, the type of cargo, and any
associated threats posed to or by the
vessels – at sea and in ports – as noted in
the 2015 maritime strategy.
17
Following
the Baltic States’ decision to put an end
to their dependence on Russian gas,
18
Norwegian-supplied liquefied natural
gas (LNG) is brought across the Baltic
Sea to a recently established terminal in
Klaipeda, Lithuania, located only a short
distance from Kaliningrad.
19
Conflicting
interests on land thus radiate outwards at
sea and as tension rises between Russia
and its neighbouring states, so does the
strategic importance of the Baltic Sea,
an important fact absent from the US
maritime strategy.
Post-Cold War Maritime Security
Co-operation in the Baltic Sea
Region
The security challenges associated with
the Baltic Sea region are closely linked to
European security and stability which –
according to the 2015 maritime strategy
– remains a vital US strategic interest,
preferably dealt with through NATO.
20
Given the partial withdrawal from Europe
by the US, and its rebalancing towards
the Indo-Pacific, as well as the country’s
decision in 2014 to restrict its funding of
NATO’s capability targets to no more than
50 per cent,
21
the reduction by European
states of their defence budgets is creating
serious concern about retaining military
capabilities across NATO as a whole.
22
The
coastal states of the Baltic Sea (like many
states in continental Europe) put their
trust in deepening security co-operation
and rely on the use of multilateral
mechanisms. They now collaborate
on sea surveillance through various
exchange mechanisms, so that shared
maritime domain awareness (MDA) may
be achieved in a cost-effective manner.
Among the Baltic Sea states,
non-NATO members Finland and
Sweden take lead roles in wider Baltic
Sea and EU sea-surveillance networking
Source: Region Blekinge.
Figure 1: The Shipping Routes in the Baltic Sea.
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projects (known respectively as SUCBAS
and MARSUR). The military SUCBAS
sea-surveillance system,
23
which became
operational in 2010, has gradually been
improved and since 2012 has involved
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden.
24
The two countries have also taken a
more ambitious approach through a
bilateral sea-surveillance system (known
as SUCFIS), exchanging information at an
advanced level. Furthermore, Sweden
and Finland have deepened their
defence co-operation by establishing a
joint standing naval task group covering
surface warfare, mine counter-measures
(MCM) and amphibious capabilities.
The task group is set to reach an initial
operational capability to conduct
surveillance and reconnaissance
operations by 2017; and to form a
standing task group with full operational
capability, ready to protect shipping, by
2023. Besides increasing operational
efficiency in an era of constrained
defence budgets, the main concern of
these two navies – and the key driving
force of ever-closer defence co-operation
within the Nordic Defence Co-operation
(NORDEFCO) framework in general – is
Russia’s current conduct, perceived as
‘challenging’ and ‘aggressive’.
25
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania –
driven by their sense of insecurity
vis-à-vis Russia – have, for their part,
actively sought to co-ordinate their
defence policies, moulded as they are
by geographical proximity, a common
cultural and historical context, and
considerable security interdependence.
Indeed, they have maintained and
deepened the trilateral military
co-operation they established in the
1990s, centring on the Baltic Battalion,
the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON),
the Baltic Defence College and the Baltic
Air Surveillance Network.
26
BALTRON has
since its inception in 1998 focused on
MCM activities and search-and-rescue
operations.
27
Since 2004, when the
three Baltic States joined NATO,
28
the
countries’ armed forces have also been
incorporated into the NATO security
structure and they arguably punch well
above their weight inside the Alliance, a
status gained through significant troop
contributions to its missions (mainly in
Iraq and Afghanistan). With regard to
the addition of ‘all domain access’ as a
pillar of present US maritime strategy,
the 2008 establishment of a NATO
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of
Excellence (CCDCOE) in Estonia and the
latter’s recently created Cyber Defence
League reserve force are notable. Also,
the 2013 establishment of NATO’s Energy
Security Centre of Excellence (ENSECCOE)
in Lithuania is striking in light of Russia’s
use of LNG as a strategic tool of power.
The peaceful post-Cold War
security environment in the Baltic Sea
region paved the way for an agenda
seeking to establish a Baltic Sea security
community involving also the states of
its eastern shore. At that time, the main
question was whether to initiate a self-
reinforcing community-building process
using a ‘top-down’ (EU) or ‘bottom-up’
(Nordic) method.
29
It was envisaged
that, through political and economic
relations, Russia would be bound into ‘a
web of commitments’ and socialised into
mutual trust, thus eliminating the need to
deter it. However, the hopes of fostering
Russian partnership and encouraging its
adoption of democracy and liberalism
have come to naught. Today, it pursues
an agenda of its own. In fact, Russia is
the main actor inducing insecurity in the
Baltic Sea region, which is also a major
reason why maritime security is given a
more traditional interpretation among
the region’s coastal states. Accordingly,
aspects of ‘essential functions’ such as
all domain access, deterrence, sea control
and power projection outlined in the
2015 USmaritime strategy are interlinked
with their maritime security efforts.
30
The
baseline for maritime security constitutes
of (shared) MDA and, quite tellingly,
Russia has consistently refused to accept
the invitations to participate in the
SUCBAS co-operation since its inception.
As noted by Gerard O’Dwyer, Poland
and Sweden have recently embarked
on investment programmes leveraging
their naval strike capabilities.
31
Poland
is seeking to acquire cruise-missile
systems for its new submarine series and
has ordered naval strike missiles for an
additional shore-based coastal missile-
defence squadron. Sweden has launched
a modernisation programme for parts of
its corvette and submarine fleets, and
ordered two A26 submarines.
32
In May
2013, Poland and Germany signed a
Declaration of Intent (DOI) on enhanced
maritime co-operation, outlining twenty-
eight projects covering: operations – for
instance, maritime security operations
(MSO), MCM and a common submarine
operating authority; capabilities
(pooling and sharing); education,
training and exercises; and logistics.
33
This co-operation at the national level,
spanning the full spectrum of conflict,
was mirrored by bilateral co-operation
between the respective single services.
Here, it is clear that the prospect of arms
export leads to security co-operation.
Accordingly, the Swedish government
declared on 7 November 2015 that it
will also sign an agreement on enhanced
security co-operation between Poland
and Sweden,
34
following the DOI on
close co-operation between the Swedish
company SAAB and the Polish Naval
Shipyard when building Polish next-
generation naval vessels, including
submarines.
35
‘Being Where it Matters, When it
Matters’
Based on a multiregional survey of the
diversified global threats from state and
non-state actors to US national-security
interests, and in an enduring context
of constrained resources, the 2015
US maritime strategy assigns strategic
priority to the Indo-Pacific and the
Middle East, with forward-based naval
forces in ‘places like Guam and Japan’,
forward-operating forces deploying from
Singapore and rotationally deployed
forces from US bases of first concern.
36
As a consequence, the 2015 maritime
strategy ranks Europe as third in terms
of regional importance to the country’s
sea services. US and NATO officials have,
however, repeatedly stressed that this
strategic rebalance to the Indo-Pacific
does not imply that the US has lost its
interest in European security.
37
Rather,
they have stressed that European states
remain important economic partners to
the US, while the 2015 maritime strategy
emphasises the need for maintaining
interoperability with its European
allies.
38
Hence, the US Navy maintains
its forward-based naval forces in Europe
(stationed in Rota, Spain).
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US President Barack Obama speaks in Tallinn, Estonia, accompanied by Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Latvian President Andris Berzins and Lithuanian
President Dalia Grybauskaite, September 2014. Courtesy of AP Photo/Charles Dharapak.
In accordance with the elements
of its title – ‘Cooperative’, ‘Forward’
and ‘Engaged’, – the 2015 US maritime
strategy places emphasis on maintaining
interoperability with ‘NATO and
[its] European allies and partners’, a
requirement partly met by those US
naval forces still in Europe.
39
Indeed,
these forces are a key enabler for NATO
in the collective defence of the three
Baltic States from Russian aggression.
This commitment was emphasised by US
President Barack Obama during his visit
to Estonia in September 2014.
40
However, the deployment of
the Standing NATO MCM Group One,
comprising only five ships, to the Baltic
Sea on 22 April 2014,
41
did not provide
a credible naval deterrent.
42
Calls from
NATO members in Central and Eastern
Europe for more robust reassurance
measures thus prompted the US to
launch Operation Atlantic Resolve
in June 2014 as part of its European
Reassurance Initiative.
43
Within this
programme, the US European Command
has undertaken a series of rotational
land, air and sea deployments and
exercises, mostly as part of NATO. The
2014 Northern Coast and BALTOPS
multinational maritime exercises focused
on improving interoperability between
US, NATO and partner forces.
44
The 2015
BALTOPS exercise – involving training
for amphibious landings, air lifts, and
assaults in Poland, Sweden, Germany
and the Baltic Sea – was designed to
demonstrate the resolve of NATO and its
partners to defend Poland and the Baltic
States from any potential attack.
45
With these smaller NATO members
experiencing mounting security pressure
from their eastern neighbour, UK
Defence Secretary Michael Fallon noted
the ‘real and present danger’ of Russia
trying to destabilise them, using tactics
‘similar to those it used in Ukraine’.
46
A
major concern is that the souring of the
Russian economy – badly affected by
the global drop in oil prices, as well as
US and EU trade sanctions – will tempt
Russia to seek an escalating regional
crisis (possibly involving threats to use
nuclear weapons there).
47
Finland and
Sweden are also highly attuned to the
fact that NATO territory in the Baltics is
potentially under threat. In spite of their
official non-alignment, both countries
are embedded in the longstanding
US framework Enhanced Partnership
for Northern Europe (e-PINE) for
co-operating with the eight Nordic and
the three Baltic States on, inter alia,
security.
Reflecting on the 2015 maritime
strategy’s emphasis on the challenge
posed by the Chinese pursuit of anti-
access/area denial (A2/AD) capability in
the Western Pacific, some analysts have
noted the Russian desire for creating an
A2/AD zone in the EasternMediterranean
– potentially challenging US and NATO
access to the Black Sea and the Suez
Canal.
48
Alas, this is also the Russian
ambition in the Baltic Sea, reflected by
its continual development of capabilities
(such as improved air defence and
Iskander missiles) aimed at, among other
things, countering the US traditional
approach to power projection.
49
Whether or not Russia is capable
of mounting such threats to the US
and NATO is disputed; however, mere
perceptions of its growing capacity
breed fear among its neighbours and
threaten to undermine confidence in
NATO’s collective defence among the
member states of its northeastern flank.
The recent increase in Russian violations
of national airspace, aggressive exercise
scenarios, harassment of state vessels in
the Baltic Sea, and suspected submarine
intrusions into Swedish and Finnish
territorial waters, have all caused such
sentiments. In this way, there is a risk that
a vicious circle of actions and reactions
might develop. Its momentum, however,
stems from the Russian search for power
and influence. Given the scope of the
global commitments and challenges
facing the three US sea services, the
2015 US maritime strategy appears to
assign the Russian problem only a modest
priority. Recent developments indicate
that this might need to be changed.
Russia’s geopolitical assertiveness
has revived the somewhat languid
security policy debates in Sweden
and Finland, which jointly signed a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
with NATO in September 2014 aimed
at sustaining NATO-led forces in, or
supported from, their territories as
‘Host Nations’ during operations.
50
Both
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countries are recognised as small but
credible security actors. As Michel Soula,
NATO deputy assistant secretary general
for operations, aptly puts it: ‘Sweden
and Finland are most valued partners
to NATO who contribute more to NATO
than many member states ... politically
wanting more access to NATO in terms of
consultation’.
51
At the bilateral level, the
multifaceted US–Swedish relationship has
likewise been broadened and deepened
in the last decade, encapsulated in the
visit by US President Barack Obama
to Sweden in 2013. The two countries
share an interest in developing stronger
transatlantic links. With regards to trade,
both advocate the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership currently
being negotiated between the US and the
EU. In terms of defence and security, they
maintain their 1987 MoU on defence
procurement and industrial collaboration,
while meeting for security-policy
dialogues in the recently established fora
of the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable
and the US-Nordic Security Dialogue.
At the military-to-military level, they
collaborate on training, education and
exercises to maintain and enhance force
interoperability, while the defence-
industrial relationships are remarkably
developed.
52
US–Finnish relations are
similarly close.
There are real and mutual
benefits to strengthening bilateral and
multilateral security relations between
the US and the coastal states of the
Baltic Sea. The existing sea-surveillance
co-operation mechanisms meet the basic
requirements of a shared MDA, of which
the SUCFIS system – operational since
2006 – enables Finland and Sweden to
share secret information. It would be
preferable, however, for their pursuit of
closer co-operation, aimed at enabling
combined MSO to prevent and manage
regional crises, to be made in strategic
partnership with the US and NATO.
Indeed, the naval capabilities of
Sweden and Finland, accentuated by
their knowledge of – and operational
experience in – this littoral environment,
can contribute significantly to the US
Navy’s forward presence in the Baltic
Sea. Furthermore, joint capability and
development would help to develop
these littoral-warfare capabilities,
especially in light of the emerging A2/AD
challenge in the Baltic Sea. Developing
and utilising the capabilities of the
Swedish and Finnish navies through an
‘operationalised partnership’ would
leverage these partners’ Host Nation
Support Agreements with NATO.
53
Such
an arrangement would send a clear
diplomatic signal of the US and NATO
commitment to defend their allies and
partners in the Baltic Sea region, as
well as the readiness of NATO’s regional
partners to provide military assistance.
In this way, the US Navy’s forward
presence could also be extended to an
important region given scant attention
in the 2015 US maritime strategy, and at
limited cost. As the strategy notes, such
presence – preferably by naval forces –
is needed if allies and partners are to
be reassured of the US’s political and
military commitment.
54
As BALTOPS 2015
has shown,
55
the Swedish coast offers
excellent basing areas for the persistent
presence of US and NATO maritime
forces, actively shaping the maritime
domain and negating the need for a
forcible entry into the Baltic Sea.
Given Russia’s ongoing capability
development, it is also necessary for the
coastal states of the Baltic Sea region
to invest in all domain access. Sweden
recently decided to allocate a portion of
the 11 per cent increase in its defence
spending in 2016–20 to enhancing its
intelligence capabilities and to developing
defensive (passive and active) and
offensive cyberspace capabilities.
56
This
allows for joint capability development
with NATO, which the Swedish
government recognises as vital.
57
Conclusion
The 2015 US maritime strategy is a
comprehensive manual, well suited
to guide the efforts of its three sea
services in navigating a dynamic and
challenging global security environment.
The strategy’s emphasis on sustaining a
maritime presence, both where conflict
threatens the global system and US
national interests, and where allies
require reassurance, is particularly
important in relation to the Baltic Sea.
However, the document fails to address
the impact of this region’s growing
maritime insecurity on global security.
Given Russia’s increasingly challenging
conduct, the US needs to acknowledge
the possibility of a serious crisis emerging
in Northeast Europe. Instead, the
strategy disregards the need for a more
permanent US Navy presence in the Baltic
Sea to reassure the allies of the eastern
flank, which might best be established in
strategic and operationalised partnership
with non-NATO members Sweden and
Finland.
Sweden and Finland have already
assumed leading roles in fostering
maritime security in the Baltic Sea, and
could act in concert with the US and
NATO to protect the Baltic States and
Poland. Needless to say, this would
require their extended involvement
in joint capability building, training,
exercises and operations. Some aspects
of this, such as the US BALTOPS series,
NATO’s regional exercise programme
(including the Northern Coast), and
the 2018 high-visibility exercise Trident
Juncture, hosted by Norway, are already
in place. Existing bilateral and multilateral
sea-surveillance exchange mechanisms
further provide a certain level of
regional MDA, while Sweden has recently
launched cyber-defence programmes
enabling all domain access. Perhaps
most importantly, a prompt multilateral
US engagement in and around the Baltic
Sea would send a clear and much-needed
diplomatic signal to the states in the
region. In this increasingly tense region,
US Navy presence matters and it matters
right now.
Lieutenant Commander Stefan Lundqvist
teaches Joint and Naval Operations at
the Swedish Defence University and is
pursuing a PhD in political science at
Åbo Akademi University, Finland, on
post-Cold War maritime security
developments among Western states.
J J Widen is Associate Professor in War
Studies and Director of Research for
Naval Operations at the Swedish
Defence University. He holds a PhD in
history from Åbo Akademi University,
Finland.
© RUSI JOURNAL DECEMBER 2015
RUSI 160_6 Text.indd 46 14/12/2015 10:52:06
 219219
47
LUNDQVIST AND WIDEN
Notes
1 US Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard,
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready
(Washington, DC: Department of the
Navy, 2015).
2 Ibid., p. 4. See also Bryan McGraph,
‘America’s New Maritime Strategy: How
Will China Respond?’, National Interest,
10 April 2015, <http://nationalinterest.
org/blog/americas-new-maritime-
strategy-how-will-china-respond-12592>,
accessed 20 April 2015; and Abhijit
Singh, ‘The New US Maritime Strategy
– Implications for “Maritime Asia”’,
Center for Strategic and International
Studies, PacNet No. 24, 14 April 2015,
<http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-24-
new-us-maritime-strategy-implications-
maritime-asia>, accessed 18 April 2015.
3 Geoffrey Till, ‘New US Maritime
Strategy: Why it Matters – Analysis’,
Eurasiareview, 23 April 2015, <http://
www.eurasiareview.com/23042015-new-
us-maritime-strategy-why-it-matters-
analysis/>, accessed 26 April 2015.
4 Jonathan Altman, ‘Expanding A2/AD:
Is it Time to Start Worrying about the
Eastern Mediterranean?’, Information
Dissemination, 16 April 2015, <http://
www.informationdissemination.
net/2015/04/expanding-a2ad-is-it-time-
to-start.html>, accessed 21 April 2015.
5 The Indo-Pacific, the Middle East,
Europe, Africa, the Arctic and the
Antarctic. US Navy, Marine Corps and
Coast Guard, A Cooperative Strategy for
21st Century Seapower, pp. 9–18.
6 US Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard,
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower (Washington, DC: Department
of the Navy, 2007).
7 US Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard,
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready,
pp. 3–4, 11–13.
8 Supplementing ‘deterrence’, ‘sea
control’, ‘power projection’ and
‘maritime security’. See US Navy, Marine
Corps and Coast Guard, A Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower:
Forward, Engaged, Ready, pp. 19–26.
9 Jim Sciutto and Katie Hunt, ‘China Says
it Warned and Tracked U.S. Warship in
South China Sea’, CNN, 27 October 2015;
Euan McKirdy and Katie Hunt, ‘Showdown
in the South China Sea: How Did We Get
Here?’, CNN, 28 October 2015.
10 See US Navy, Marine Corps and Coast
Guard, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged,
Ready, pp. 3, 8, 13, 27, 37.
11 Ibid., p. 13.
12 PBS Newshour, ‘NATO Commander:
Russia’s Use of Force in Europe is a
Major Threat’, 29 July 2015.
13 US Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard,
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready, p. 4.
14 Märta Carlsson, ‘De ryska
marinstridskrafterna [The Russian Naval
Forces]’, FOI MEMO 3700, 7 May 2012,
Stockholm, FOI, pp. 1, 8.
15 US Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard,
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready,
p. 6.
16 These exploitation activities overlap with
the legacy of past destructive practices
such as the dumping of chemical-warfare
agents and the laying of extensive
minefields during the First and Second
World Wars, unexploded ordinance
and munitions that still create risks and
hazards. See Stefan Lundqvist and J J
Widen, ‘Cultivating Regional Maritime
Security: Swedish-Finnish Naval Co-
operation in the Baltic Sea’, in Ioannis
Chapsos and Cassie Kitchen (eds),
Strengthening Maritime Security Through
Cooperation (Amsterdam: IOS Press,
2015), pp. 63–73.
17 US Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard,
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready,
p. 26.
18 See President of the Republic of
Lithuania, speech by President Dalia
Grybauskaitė at the Klaipėda LNG
terminal opening ceremony, 6 February
2015.
19 Rune Thomas Ege, ’Her er prosjektet
som setter en effektiv stopper for
Vladimir Putins gassmonopol i de baltiske
landene: Et norsk milliardskip [This
is the Project which Effectively Stops
the Gas Monopoly of Vladimir Putin in
the Baltic States: A Norwegian Billion
Ship]’, Verdens Gang, 27 October 2014,
<http://www.vg.no/nyheter/utenriks/
dette-norske-skipet-knuser-putins-
gassmonopol/a/23323424/>, accessed
30 October 2014.
20 US Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard,
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready,
pp. 4, 14.
21 Alexander Mattelaer, ‘Strategic Insurance:
The Future of the Belgian Armed Forces’,
policy brief No. 04, Brussels, Institute for
European Studies, 2014.
22 See David Galbreath, ‘Western European
Armed Forces and the Modernisation
Agenda: Following or Falling Behind?’,
Defence Studies (Vol. 14, No. 4, 2014),
pp. 394–413; and Mattelaer, ‘Strategic
Insurance’.
23 See the website for SUCBAS, <http:
www.sucbas.org>.
24 SUCBAS was launched in 2008 following
an initiative by Sweden and Finland.
Lundqvist and Widen, ‘Cultivating
Regional Maritime Security’, p. 67.
25 Stefan Lundqvist and J J Widen,
‘Swedish-Finnish Naval Co-operation in
the Baltic Sea – Motives, Prospects and
Challenges’, forthcoming.
26 This section refers to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia,
‘Baltic Defence Co-Operation – Main
Joint Projects’, 2 December 2014,
<http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/security-
policy/co-operation-with-nato-member-
states-and-candidate-countries/
baltic-defence-co-operation-main-joint-
projects>, accessed 12 August 2015.
27 The Estonian Defence Forces, BALTRON,
6 January 2015, <http://www.mil.ee/
en/defence-forces/international-co-
operation/BALTRON>, accessed
12 August 2015.
28 Luke Coffey and Daniel Kochis, ‘The Baltic
States: The United StatesMust
Be Prepared to Fulfill its NATOObligations’,
RUSI 160_6 Text.indd 47 14/12/2015 10:52:06
 220220
THE NEW US MARITIME STRATEGY
Heritage Foundation, 29 September 2015,
<http://www.heritage.org/research/
reports/2015/09/the-baltic-states-the-
united-states-must-be-prepared-to-fulfill-
its-nato-treaty-obligations>, accessed 11
November 2015.
29 See Hans Mouritzen, ‘Security
Communities in the Baltic Sea Region:
Real or Imagined’, Security Dialogue
(Vol. 32, No. 3, September 2001),
pp. 303–06.
30 Ibid., p. 19.
31 Gerard O’Dwyer, ‘Nations Respond to
Russian Buildup in Baltics’, Defense
News, 12 April 2015, <http://www.
defensenews.com/story/defense/show-
daily/sea-air-space/2015/04/12/russia-
baltic-sweden-poland-submarine-high-
north-crimea/25368547/>, accessed
14 April 2015.
32 Ibid.
33 ‘Declaration of Intent between the
Federal Ministry of Defence of the
Federal Republic of Germany and the
Minister of National Defence of Poland
on Enhanced Maritime Cooperation’,
Rostock-Warnemünde, 27 May 2013,
<http://augengeradeaus.net/wp-content/
uploads/2013/05/DEU-POL-Marine-DoI.
pdf>, accessed 15 November 2015.
34 Swedish Government Offices, ‘Vi utvecklar
och fördjupar våra militära samarbeten’
[We are Developing and Deepening
ourMilitary Cooperation]’, 7 November
2015, <http://www.regeringen.se/
debattartiklar/2015/11/vi-utvecklar-och-
fordjupar-vara-militara-samarbeten/>,
accessed 13 November 2015.
35 Svenska Dagbladet, ‘Saab siktar på
ubåtsbygge till Polen [Saab Aims at
Building Submarines for Poland]’,
5 November 2015, <http://www.svd.se/
saab-siktar-pa-ubatsbygge-till-polen>,
accessed 13 November.
36 US Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard,
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready,
p. 9.
37 See Anders Fogh Rasmussen, ‘NATO:
Ready, Robust, Rebalanced’, speech at
the Carnegie Europe Event, 19 September
2013, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natolive/opinions_103231.htm>; see
also US Navy, Marine Corps and Coast
Guard, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged,
Ready, p. 4; Leon Panetta, speech at the
Munich Security Conference, 4 February
2012, <http://www.cfr.org/united-states/
panetta-clintons-remarks-munich-
security-conference-germany/p27293>,
accessed 16 November 2015.
38 USNavy,Marine Corps and Coast Guard,
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready, p. 14.
39 Ibid.
40 David Jackson, ‘Obama Pledges to
Defend Baltic Allies against Russia’, USA
Today, 3 September 2014.
41 NATO Allied Command Operations,
‘Standing NATO Mine Counter-Measures
ONE deploys to the Baltic’, 2014, <http://
www.mc.nato.int/PressReleases/Pages/
Standing-NATO-Mine-Counter-Measures-
Group-ONE-(SNMCMG1)-departed-into-
the-Baltic.aspx>, accessed 11 November
2015.
42 Simultaneously, NATO Baltic Air Policing
was reinforced, while the US deployed
600 paratroopers to Poland, Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia, fighter jets to Poland
and marines to Romania. See Paul
Belkin, Derek E Mix and Steven Woehrel,
‘NATO: Response to the Crisis in Ukraine
and Security Concerns in Central and
Eastern Europe’, Congressional Research
Service, Report R43478, 31 July 2014.
43 US European Command, ‘Operation
Atlantic Resolve (2014)’, January 2015,
<http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/
features/2014/0514_atlanticresolve/
Operation_Atlantic_Resolve_Fact_
Sheet_2014.pdf>, accessed 19 August
2015.
44 Ibid.
45 US European Command, ‘Operation
Atlantic Resolve (August 2015)’, August
2015.
46 BBC News, ‘Russia “Danger” to Latvia,
Lithuania and Estonia – Fallon’, 19 February
2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
31528981>, accessed 24 April 2015.
47 See Loren Thompson, ‘Why Putin’s
Russia is the Biggest Threat to America
in 2015’, Forbes, 1 February 2015,
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/
lorenthompson/2015/01/02/why-putins-
russia-is-the-biggest-threat-to-america-
in-2015/>, accessed 24 April 2015.
48 See Altman, ‘Expanding A2/AD’.
49 Octavia Manea, ‘The Third Offset
Strategy in Historical Context’, Small
Wars Journal (Vol. 11, No. 11, January
2015); Richard Fontaine and Julianne
Smith, ‘Anti-Access/Area Denial isn’t Just
for Asia Anymore’, Defenseone.com,
2 April 2015 <http://www.defenseone.
com/ideas/2015/04/anti-accessarea-
denial-isnt-just-asia-anymore/109108/>,
accessed 21 April 2015.
50 NATO Allied Command Operations,
‘Finland and Sweden Sign Memorandum
of Understanding with NATO’, news
release, 5 September 2014, <http://www.
aco.nato.int/finland-and-sweden-signing-
a-memorandum-of-understanding-with-
nato-for-operational-and-logistic-support.
aspx>, accessed 12 October 2014.
51 Author interview with Michel Soula,
3 February 2015.
52 Magnus Nordenman, ‘Of Eagles and
Griffins: A View fromWashington’, Royal
Swedish Academy of War Sciences,
Proceedings and Journal (No. 1, January/
March 2015), pp. 95–106.
53 See also Michael Hannan, ‘Punching
Above Their Weight: How Four Small
European Navies Can Support U.S.
Strategic Rebalance’, Armed Forces
Journal (September 2012).
54 USNavy,Marine Corps and Coast Guard,
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready, p. 13.
55 Daniel Schumacher, ‘17 Nations Conduct
BALTOPS 2015 Amphibious Landing in
Sweden’, US Naval Forces Europe/U.S. 6
th
Fleet, 15 June 2015, <http://cne-cna-c6f.
dodlive.mil/17-nations-conduct-baltops-
2015-amphibious-landing-in-sweden/>,
accessed 12 November 2015.
56 This section refers to Government
Offices of Sweden, Försvarspolitisk
inriktning – Sveriges försvar 2016–2020
[The Swedish Defence Bill 2016–2020],
Prop. 2014/15:109 (Stockholm:
Regeringskansliet, 23 April 2015).
57 Ibid., p. 38.
© RUSI JOURNAL DECEMBER 2015
RUSI 160_6 Text.indd 48 14/12/2015 10:52:06
 221221
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
222
  
 
5.5. Article 5: “Maritime Security and Sea Power: A Finnish-
Swedish Perspective on the Baltic Sea Region” 
Reprinted with permission from the University of Kiel. The article originally 
appeared as a chapter in A.J. Neumann and S. Bruns (eds.), Focus on the Baltic 
Sea: Proceedings from the Kiel Conference 2015. Kiel: Institute for Security 
Policy at Kiel University, pp. 16–28. 
  
223
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
224
Proceedings of the Kiel Conference 2015  
 
- 16 - 
Maritime Security and Sea Power: A Finnish-Swedish Perspective on the Baltic Sea Region 
Stefan Lundqvist 
 
Abstract 
Recent European and U.S. maritime security 
strategies are characterised by addressing the 
multidimensional threats to the maritime 
domain that result from statesǯ increased 
dependency on seaborne trade and maritime 
resource exploitation. Stefan Lundqvist notes, 
however, that in the Baltic Sea – as in the 
Asia-Pacific region – there is a continuing 
need for navies. This is due to certain regional 
powers pursuing strategies that include the 
wielding of sea power in ways that violate 
international law, heightens the risk of acci-
dents and threatens international security. 
Given the hybrid character of the threats, he 
recommends that states in the region opt for 
a co-operative and comprehensive regional 
approach to maritime security – like that of 
the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
Introduction: The Dual Character of Recent 
Maritime Security Strategies 
The increasing importance of maritime securi-
ty is highlighted by recent releases of mari-
time security strategies: the UK National 
Strategy for Maritime Security in May 2014 (UK 
Gov 2014); the EU Maritime Strategy in June 
2014 (EU Council 2014); and The Asia-Pacific 
Maritime Security Strategy: Achieving U.S. 
National Security Objectives in a Changing 
Environment in August 2015 (U.S. DoD 2015). 
These strategies focus on protecting national 
interests, maritime trade flows and maritime 
resource extraction, while securing blue 
growth opportunities. They all apply a wide 
conceptual framework for maritime security, 
resulting in calls for regional and global mari-
time governance. This concern for maritime 
management is closely linked to the econom-
ic dimension of security. Environmental secu-
rity is also addressed, bringing into focus the 
need for clarification of the environmental 
impact of some activities associated with 
Ǯblue growthǯ. 
Traditional sea power considerations, howev-
er, are also at the heart of some of these 
strategies. Evidently, conflicting geopolitical 
interests now tend to superimpose low level 
threats such as Human Smuggling, Drug 
Smuggling, Piracy and Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing (IUU). With regards to 
the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region4, 
it is worth noting that the U.S. Coast Guard 
operates independently to foster maritime 
security in island states such as Micronesia 
and Melanesia, while conducting integrated 
operations with the other Sea Services in bi- 
and multilateral co-operation in the South 
China Sea (Lundqvist 2015a: 23; U.S. Navy, 
U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard 2015: 
13). 
Some key aspects of the U.S. Asia-Pacific Mar-
itime Security Strategy deserve to be high-
lighted. Firstly, promoting maritime govern-
ance is closely linked to the U.S. effort to fur-
ther liberal norms and free trade. In this en-
deavour, the U.S. Coast Guard has taken on a 
leading role in the Caribbean, Africa and 
Southeast Asia, supported by the U.S. Navy 
and the U.S. Marine Corps (Lundqvist 2015A: 
18-25; U.S. DoD 2015: 25-29; U.S. DoD 2014: 
17). Addressing local maritime security chal-
lenges, rather than global ones, have contrib-
                                                          
4 The U.S. rebalance – launched in ͚͙͙͘ as a Ǯpivotǯ 
– to Asia initially focused on military strategic 
initiatives but broadened in late 2012 to also in-
clude the economic and diplomatic dimensions 
subsequently emphasised by the Obama admin-
istration. For the launch of the initiative, see Clin-
ton (2011). For a thorough account on its devel-
opment, see Sutter (2015: 69-107). 
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uted to making states such as Indonesia and 
Malaysia more willing to co-operate political-
ly, economically and militarily with the U.S., 
but also to making Vietnam a U.S. strategic 
partner. 
Secondly, as widely recognised, China has 
gradually been assigned the role of a U.S. 
rival, influencing the direction of U.S. strategy 
and capability developments (Lundqvist 
2015a: 17-25). China uses the assets of its five 
maritime law enforcement agencies to pro-
tect its national interests, such as fishing and 
maritime oil exploitation. Around disputed 
artificial islands, to which it claims indisputa-
ble sovereignty, China claims territorial wa-
ters and an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In 
some cases, Air Defence Identification Zones 
(ADIZs) have been declared. Notably, China 
considers its national jurisdiction applicable in 
its EEZ. The U.S., for its part, has been enforc-
ing its right to conduct military activities on 
and above the high seas through its Freedom 
of Navigation (FON) programme. The sailing 
of USS Lassen within 12 nautical miles of five 
disputed islands of the Spratly group on 27 
October 2015 resulted in fierce Chinese pro-
tests (Lundqvist & Widen 2015B: 42). 
Although a U.S.-China military confrontation 
over U.S. FON operations is unlikely, there is a 
risk that minor incidents could result in mili-
tary escalation. The worst case scenario could 
involve Chinese Anti-Access/Area Denial 
(A2/AD) capabilities being put to the test 
against U.S. All Domain Access capabilities 
and its Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver 
in the Global Commons. So far, both protago-
nists trust their own capabilities. Notably, 
Chinaǯs intensified construction activities on 
disputed reefs and islands, and growing anti-
access capabilities – combined with the ef-
fects of fiscal restraints on U.S. naval capabili-
ties – make U.S. naval operations in the South 
China Sea increasingly risky (Denyer 2016; 
Tiezzi 2015). 
 
The Maritime Security Environment in the 
Baltic Sea 
Let us apply these insights from the Asia-
Pacific region to the Baltic Sea region, where 
one of the coastal states exhibits striking simi-
larities with China. The Baltic Sea, widely 
agreed by geographers to be delimited in the 
west by a line between Drodgen and Lange-
land, is one of the worldǯs largest inland seas 
with brackish water by surface area (Natio-
nalencyklopedin 2016). Its shallow and narrow 
connection to the North Sea is particularly 
sensitive to disturbances. The Drodgen Sill is 
only 7 metres deep, which limits access to the 
narrow Øresund strait, while the depth of the 
Darss Sill in the Belt Sea area amounts to 18 
metres. A disruption of shipping here would 
have far-reaching consequences for the sea-
borne trade of the regionǯs coastal states. 
We must also consider some key geostrategic 
areas in the Baltic Sea. The usefulness of the 
Island of Gotland – located in the centre of the 
Baltic Sea – is apparent if we consider an in-
tervention in support of the Baltic States (Ar-
onsson 2015). The demilitarised Åland archi-
pelago is of particular legal concern with re-
gards to the ever closer naval co-operation 
between Sweden and Finland (Lundqvist and 
Widen forthcoming). For Finland and Russia, 
the Gulf of Finland is of critical strategic im-
portance. The widely varying topography of 
the Baltic Sea bed influences some of the 
current maritime security challenges. Its max-
imum depth of 459 metres is found in Land-
sortsdjupet, while Gotlandsdjupet, with a 
depth of 239 metres (Nationalencyklopedin 
2016), has been the scene of conflicting inter-
ests in the last two years. The Baltic Sea is an 
important area for Russian submarine trials 
(c.f. TASS 2015) and Gotlandsdjupet, situated 
on the high seas, is often used for deep water 
tests. 
A range of factors need to be taken into ac-
count when assessing the regionǯs security 
policy environment (Lundqvist/Widen 2015A: 
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64, 65). Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Poland represent the coastal states separat-
ing the Schengen Area from Russia. Further-
more, Russiaǯs ongoing remilitarisation of the 
Kaliningrad oblast, sandwiched between Po-
land and Lithuania, raises particular security 
policy concerns. This development contrasts 
sharply with the special economic status 
which Russia assigned Kaliningrad in 1996. 
Notably, this resulted in increased trade with 
the EU and improved economic growth, 
which peaked in 2007 (BBC News 2015). Ap-
parently, the hopes for a Russia that would 
move closer to Europe, at least in terms of 
tourism and trade, were well justified at this 
time. 
Although Russiaǯs Northern and Pacific Fleets 
have priority over its Baltic Fleet, which is 
based in Russiaǯs only ice-free European port 
(Baltiysk) and in Kronstadt, it will be rein-
forced with new vessels and weapon upgrades 
through the ongoing 2011-2020 State Arma-
ment Programme (Carlsson 2012: 7, 8). Alt-
hough Russian naval shipbuilding plans have 
been plagued by delays and cost over-runs, 
partly as a result of EU sanctions, three addi-
tional Steregushchy-class multipurpose 
stealth corvettes have been commissioned 
into the Baltic Fleet since 2011 (ONI 2015; 
Gorenburg 2015). 
Uninterrupted commercial sea transport is 
vital to the coastal states of the region. The 
sea lanes of the Baltic Sea are trafficked daily 
by 2000 large vessels5 carrying some 40 per 
cent of Swedish goods (Havsmiljöinstitutet 
͚͙͘͞Ȍ and some ͙͝ per cent of the worldǯs 
container traffic. Notably, this shipping also 
carries almost ͘͟ per cent of Russiaǯs contain-
er throughput, including that transiting via 
Finland and the Baltic states, giving the Baltic 
                                                          
5 i.e. vessels equipped with Automatic Identifica-
tion System (AIS). 
Sea basin a dominant role in Russian contain-
er traffic6 (Lorentzon 2014: 14). 
The shallow Baltic Sea – one of the largest 
bodies of brackish water on earth – is over-
stretched. Its marine ecosystem consists of 
unique flora and fauna which are vulnerable to 
overuse and pollution (EEA 2015). Shipping, 
fishing, energy cables and pipelines, tourism 
and recreation; the Baltic Sea has many uses 
today and the competition for marine areas 
continues to become more intense (WWF 
2010). Offshore wind farms and oil rigs, gas 
pipelines, power and communication cables 
are being laid at many places on the sea floor, 
while shipping routes, boat traffic, fishing and 
other human activities already affect the 
same areas.  
This phenomenon is well illustrated by the 48 
turbines of the densely configured Lillgrund 
offshore wind farm opened in 2008, which 
produces some 330 Gigawatt Hours of elec-
tricity per year resulting from the strong, con-
stant winds in the area (Vattenfall 2015). No-
tably, the Drogden and Flintrännan naviga-
tional fairways border the wind farm to the 
West and Northwest, while the navigational 
fairway Lillgrundsrännan borders it to the 
East. To complicate the picture, one of the 
Baltic Seaǯs ͙͟͜ Marine Protected Areas 
(MPAs), under the Helsinki Convention (HEL-
COM), borders the area to the south (HEL-
COM 2013). This area – the Bredgrund – also 
constitutes a so-called Natura 2000 area, sen-
sitive to pollution resulting from accidents at 
sea. In addition, the area is considered to be 
of marine archaeological importance (Car-
neiro and Nilsson: 72, 73). 
Interest in offshore oil exploration is growing 
in the Baltic Sea region, and exploratory drill-
ing has shown there is more oil to extract. 
                                                          
6 In comparison, the share of the Far Eastern Basin 
was approximately 20 per cent in 2013, while the 
Black Sea Basin accounted for 10. The twin termi-
nal container port in St Petersburg is the largest in 
the Baltic Sea Basin.  
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Currently, there are four oil platforms in the 
Baltic Sea, all of them located in the south-
eastern part of the region in the oilfields of 
Kravtsovskoye and B-3 (WWF 2010). Three of 
the platforms are Polish and one is Russian. 
The reserves in these fields are estimated to 
last until 2030 or longer. Here, we must also 
bear in mind that large sea areas off the 
coasts of Poland and Lithuania are MPAs and 
Natura 2000 areas (HELCOM 2013). 
Nord Stream is the worldǯs longest ȋ͙,͚͚͜ 
kilometres) sub-sea gas pipeline and has been 
controversial from political, environmental 
and strategic perspectives since the outset. 
Inaugurated in 2011, its capacity is equivalent 
to about ten per cent of the consumption of 
natural gas in the EU (Reuters 2015). In June 
2015, Gazprom, Shell Oil, the German com-
pany E.ON and the Austrian company OMV 
signed a preliminary agreement to build an-
other twin gas pipeline – Nord Stream 2 – in 
the Baltic Sea, placed parallel to the existing 
Nord Stream pipeline (Zhdannikov and 
Pinchuk 2015). Thus, Russia aims to double its 
gas deliveries through the Baltic Sea, thereby 
reducing its exports via Ukraine and Poland. 
This project is significant for European energy 
security and has security policy implications 
because it will increase some of its member 
states dependence on Russian gas. In No-
vember 2015, Gazprom sought to mitigate 
these concerns by announcing that its stake in 
the new project will be reduced from 51 to 50 
per cent, thus equalising EU-Russian owner-
ship (Nord Stream 2 2015). 
The seabed of the Baltic Sea is also being in-
creasingly used for placing cables for high-
voltage power transmission. On 6 February 
2014, EstLink-2 was handed over to its owners 
and made available for commercial opera-
tions, boosting the existing power transmis-
sion capacity between Finland and Estonia 
(Fingrid 2015). Consequently, a bottleneck in 
the Baltic regionǯs power connectivity with 
the rest of the EU was removed.  
These kinds of exploration activities also face 
risks from previous and current military activi-
ties. In the Baltic Sea, the remains of an esti-
mated 170,000 mines and unexploded ord-
nance (UXO), laid since 1855, need to be tak-
en into consideration when planning activities 
on the seabed. There are also large amounts 
of chemical warfare munitions dumped in 
certain areas of the Baltic Sea. Accordingly, 
the Nord Stream project faced risks posed by 
the remains of both conventional and chemi-
cal munitions in dumpsites east of Bornholm 
and south-east of Gotland (Nord Stream 
2009).  
Urgent calls for maritime governance and 
management in Sweden since the millennium 
must be seen against this backdrop, a tenden-
cy also evident in the U.S. and the EU. As in 
the U.S. (Lundqvist 2015a: 24), the Swedish 
demands emerged from the gradual incorpo-
ration of broader views in its national security 
policy, and its increased economic depend-
ence on international sea-borne trade.7 In this 
conceptualisation of maritime security, navies 
only take supporting roles, while law en-
forcement agencies assume the lead. 
 
The Role of Russia: Inducing Multi-sectoral 
Maritime Insecurity  
The Russian quest for a new security order, 
announced by Vladimir Putin in his infamous 
speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Se-
curity Policy in 2007 (The Washington Post 
2007), has a territorial dimension. As in-
creased geopolitical tensions lead to intensi-
fied naval exercise activity in the Baltic Sea, 
we can expect continuing conflicts and fric-
tions between Russiaǯs military interests and 
neighbouring states civilian interests. If Russia 
persists in pursuing the hybrid warfare strate-
gy salient in its seizure of Crimea and other 
                                                          
7 For a summative portrayal of Swedenǯs develop-
ment into a competitive export-oriented state in 
the wake of the recession of the early 1990s, see 
Sutherland (2015).  
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parts of Ukraine, states in the Baltic Sea re-
gion will be forced to manage coercion or 
threats of violence – or the exercise of gradu-
ated violence – in a context of strategic peace. 
The perpetrator might be hidden or use proxy 
elements to influence various security sectors 
of other states.8 As a result, Baltic Sea coastal 
states must prepare for action within a 
framework of continuous crisis, the character 
and intensity of which are set by Russia. 
)n light of Russiaǯs current behaviour, the need 
for capable navies returns. It does not, how-
ever, entail a return to the Cold War concept. 
To manage a maritime security environment 
facing a broad spectrum of threats, where the 
military security sector has primacy but with 
complex links to other security sectors, con-
sideration must be given to a co-operative 
and comprehensive approach where the mili-
tary is allowed to lead. Managing threats to 
todayǯs intense shipping will be a demanding 
task. 
Finland and Sweden perceive the Russian 
conduct as Ǯchallengingǯ and Ǯaggressiveǯ. )n 
fact, Russia is seen as the main – and highly 
capable – source of maritime insecurity in the 
Baltic Sea region because of the way it wields 
its sea power (Lundqvist and Widen 2015a: 63, 
64). Therefore, maritime security is given a 
more traditional interpretation by the regionǯs 
coastal states than that presented in the 
March 2015 U.S. maritime strategy (Lundqvist 
and Widen 2015b: 44). Here, essential func-
tions such as All Domain Access, Deterrence, 
Sea Control and Power Projection are inter-
linked with bilateral efforts to provide mari-
time security. 
Finnish and Swedish media frequently report 
border infringements and ǯharassmentsǯ. Fin-
land and Sweden have noted an increase in 
Russian9 airspace violations since 2014. The 
                                                          
8 For a post-structural approach to studying the 
concept of multi-sectoral security, see Buzan et al. 
(1998). 
9 N.b. as well as aircraft of other origin. 
Swedish Supreme Commander has highlight-
ed the risk of collisions with Russian aircraft, 
following incidents in 2015, when they oper-
ated with transponders turned off, and the 
2014 incident in which a Russian fighter jet 
manoeuvred Ǯprovocatively closeǯ to a Swe-
dish signal intelligence plane. (Yle 2015, 
Holmström 2015). In January 2016, two Swe-
dish fighter jets intervened to break off the 
hot pursuit of a Swedish Airborne Surveillance 
Control (ASC-890) aircraft by a Russian SU-27 
off Bornholm (Gummesson 2016). In August 
and September 2014 and April 2015, the 
scheduled activities of the Finnish research 
vessel M/V Aranda in Gotlandsdjupet were 
prevented by Russian warships and helicop-
ters, because of alleged interference with 
unannounced Russian submarine activities 
(Nygårds 2015). The second of these incidents 
prompted a response by two Swedish fighter 
jets.  
In October 2014 the Swedish Armed Forces 
launched a week-long search operation for 
what was widely assumed to be a Russian 
submarine in the archipelago off Stockholm 
(Gummesson 2015a). The final analysis con-
cluded that Swedish internal waters were, 
Ǯbeyond all reasonable doubtǯ, violated by a 
foreign submarine. This incident drew atten-
tion to the apparent lack of anti-submarine 
warfare (ASW) helicopters in the Swedish 
Armed Forces. On 27 January 2016 this capa-
bility shortcoming was set to be remedied, as 
the first of nine navy version NH 90 helicop-
ters was delivered to the Swedish Armed 
Forces (DI 2016).10 
Energy security is increasingly important in 
the Baltic Sea region, which is why Sweden 
assigned high priority to completion of the 
NordBalt sub-sea connection between Swe-
den and Lithuania as planned (Swedish Grid 
2015: 5). The transmission capacity of this 
                                                          
10 The Swedish Armed Forces has ordered a total 
of 18 NH 90 helicopters, which are to be delivered 
until 2020. 
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energy link – amounting to 700 Megawatts – 
enhances the Baltic countriesǯ supply security 
and contributes to connecting Nordic and 
European electricity markets. A Swedish 
Member of the European Parliament (MEP) 
dared to describe the December 2015 inaugu-
ration of two high-voltage power cables and a 
fibre-optic telecommunications cable as a 
Ǯvictoryǯ for Swedish security policy, depriving 
Russia of an instrument of power (Eriksson 
2015). 
Russian naval vessels interfered with NordBalt 
cable laying work in spring 2014 and on four 
occasions in March and April 2015 
(Gummesson 2015a). The cable laying vessel 
M/V Topaz Installer and the surveillance ship 
M/V Alcedo were either ordered to alter 
course, or to leave the area for periods up to 
10 hours due to alleged Russian naval exercis-
es in the area. The President of the Swedish 
National Grid, Mikael Odenberg, pointedly 
commented on the August 2015 NordBalt 
incidents in the Lithuanian EEZ, stating that: Ǯ) 
see this as a demonstration of the Russians 
behaving in a manner someone might, if they 
mentally considered it to be their own eco-
nomic zone, and not Lithuaniaǯs. )n identical 
formal written notes to Russia in April 2015, 
Sweden and Lithuania expressed their Ǯdeep 
concernǯ about the repeated interference, 
disrupting peaceful shipping and economic 
activity in violation of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.  
The written protests illustrate the harsh dip-
lomatic tone that currently prevails between 
Sweden and Russia. In August 2015, Russia 
expelled a Swedish diplomat from Moscow. 
Swedish defence attachés in Moscow have 
reportedly had problems performing their 
duties, being denied opportunities to visit 
military units and attend normally open brief-
ings by Russian authorities.  
The general need to protect submarine com-
munication cables – such as the one laid by 
the NordBalt project – was highlighted in Oc-
tober 2015. The New York Times then reported 
on American and Norwegian concerns over 
the ongoing Russian survey of transatlantic 
communication cables by submarines and the 
ocean survey vessel M/V Yantar (Sanger and 
Schmitt 2015). Admiral Mark Ferguson, 
Commander U.S. Naval Forces Europe, re-
portedly considered these operations as part 
of Russiaǯs emergent hybrid warfare strategy. 
Moreover, analysts (c.f. Braw 2015) have high-
lighted the risk of Russian A2/AD capabilities 
being imminently established in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. Such capability development 
is also discernible in the Baltic Sea Region, 
through Russiaǯs investment in improved air 
defence capabilities, and its deployment of 
Iskander missiles to the Kaliningrad exclave 
since 2013. 
 
Responses by the U.S., NATO, Finland and 
Sweden 
Current maritime security challenges are be-
ing addressed through various regional co-
operation initiatives (Lundqvist and Widen 
2015b: 43-45). To a large extent, they centre 
on the security of Estonia, Latvia and Lithua-
nia. The U.S. launch of Operation Atlantic Re-
solve in June 2014 –part of its European Reas-
surance Initiative, resulting in a series of rota-
tional deployments – is particularly important, 
augmented by the co-ordinated initiatives of 
NATO. The fact that NATO territory is poten-
tially threatened in the Baltics is also taken 
into careful consideration by Finland and 
Sweden. The 2015 U.S.-led BALTOPS exercise 
– aimed at demonstrating U.S., NATOǯs and 
partnersǯ resolve to defend Poland and the 
Baltic states through training in amphibious 
landings, airlifts and assaults in Poland, Swe-
den and Germany – has reinforced the co-
operative dimension. The use of U.S. B-52s 
has also forged a link between the U.S. Stra-
tegic Command and regional exercises with 
NATO. 
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However, shared maritime domain awareness 
(MDA) constitutes the baseline for providing 
maritime security. Accordingly, Sweden and 
Finland operate the bilateral Sea Surveillance 
Co-operation Finland-Sweden (SUCFIS) inter-
face for exchanging target information in the 
Northern Baltic Sea between their autono-
mous maritime surveillance systems 
(Lundqvist and Widen 2015a: 66, 67). SUCFIS, 
established in 2006, enables exchange of se-
cret target data. They have also taken on lead 
roles in the wider, unclassified, Sea Surveil-
lance Co-operation Baltic States (SUCBAS)11 
and the EU Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR) 
co-operation. Quite tellingly, Russia was in-
vited to join the SUCBAS co-operation, but 
has consistently refused to participate. Never-
theless, the geographical scope of the 
SUCBAS co-operation has grown to include 
the Baltic Seaǯs approaches by the UK becom-
ing a fully-fledged member in March 2015 
(SUCBAS 2015). 
To cope with the current challenges, Finland 
and Sweden seek to merge their capabilities 
to create synergies and to send resolute dip-
lomatic signals. Notably, their navies also 
strive to ensure interoperability at the higher 
level of the conflict spectrum by operating in 
full accordance with NATO standards. The 
Ǯflagship projectǯ of their co-operation – es-
tablished within the Nordic Defence Coopera-
tion (NORDEFCO) framework – is the Swe-
dish-Finnish Naval Task Group (SFNTG), 
composed of task units for surface warfare, 
mine countermeasures, amphibious opera-
tions and logistics (Lundqvist and Widen 
2015b: 44). It will be led by a Task Group 
Commander supported by a bi-national staff.  
Finland and Sweden are currently implement-
ing their vision document for the SFNTG 
2023, outlining a two-tiered objective, to: i) 
reach Initial Operational Capability to conduct 
                                                          
11 Member states co-operate at any of the three 
levels of ambition offered  
(see: http://sucbas.org/levels/). 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance Operations in 
2017; and ii) form a standing Task Group with 
Full Operational Capability to conduct opera-
tions including Protection of Shipping Opera-
tions in 2023 (Lundqvist and Widen, 2015a: 
70). The higher level of ambition will require a 
high degree of interoperability in their com-
mand and communications systems. Mutual 
trust and cultural understanding is being built 
through exchanges of officers and non-
commissioned officers at all levels of com-
mand. So far, the project has been successful 
and the 2017 objective is well within reach. 
The parties, however, face legal challenges in 
achieving the far more complex 2023 objec-
tive, centring on the need to use force in each 
otherǯs territorial waters under peace condi-
tions to counter the Russian threat. 
To achieve these capabilities on time, an am-
bitious bi- and multilateral exercise pro-
gramme is scheduled. The multilateral dimen-
sion is mainly – although not exclusively – 
being pursued within a NATO framework (Fin 
MoD ͚͙͘͝: ͝͠Ȍ, reflecting the two statesǯ ever 
closer defence ties with NATO ȋOǯDwyer 
2015a). Sweden has assigned air force and 
naval units to the NATO Response Forces 
Pool (RFP) since 2014, while Finland12 and 
Sweden jointly assigned their bilateral Am-
phibious Task Unit in 2015 (Holmström 2013). 
Of particular interest to the establishment of 
the SFNTG is Swedenǯs assignment of two 
Visby-class multi-purpose corvettes and Fin-
landǯs assignment of a supply ship to the 
NATO RFP in 2017 (Larsson and Selling 2015: 
147; Fin MoD 2015: 60). The main drivers for 
the Swedish and Finnish assignments are the 
opportunity to participate in NATOǯs exercise 
programme – in which the Trident Juncture 
exercise series stands out – as well as its sys-
tematic evaluation and feedback programme 
aiming at certification of military units.  
                                                          
12 As early as 2013, Finland assigned the Utti Jaeger 
Regimentǯs Special Operations Unit to the NATO 
RFP (MoF to NATO 2013). 
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Notably, Finland and Sweden will be involved 
in planning certain NATO Response Force 
(NRF) Very High Readiness Joint Task Force 
(VJTF) exercises and will gain access to NATO 
communication systems during their execu-
tion (Larsson and Selling 2015: 147). In es-
sence, participation in the NRF is expected to 
bolster development of areas of operational 
effectiveness and interoperability with NATO, 
which cannot be obtained on a national basis 
(Fin MoD 2015: 60). The quid pro quo is that 
the littoral expertise of the Swedish and Finn-
ish navies is envisaged as Ǯenhancing the ca-
pabilities of the [NRF] to respond to [the] 
emerging security challenges posed by [inter 
alia] Russiaǯ ȋLarsson and Selling ͚͙͘͝: ͙͜͟; 
SHAPE 2015). 
Sweden is seeking bilateral co-operation be-
yond that with Finland. Accordingly, in Octo-
ber 2015 the Swedish Government mandated 
its Armed Forces to negotiate bilateral 
agreements with the relevant authorities in 
Finland and Denmark to allow for the use of 
each other's ports for alternative basing of 
naval units in peacetime (Government Offices 
of Sweden 2015). Notwithstanding the bilat-
eral dimensions in Swedish security policy 
initiatives, the ability to act with NATO re-
mains a recurring theme. In October 2015, 
when summoned by the Swedish Parliamentǯs 
Defence Committee following the disclosure 
of a classified memorandum, Defence Minis-
ter Peter Hultqvist clarified that he did not 
rule out Swedish participation in the UK-led 
NATO Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) 
(Gummesson 2015b).  
Reportedly, talks with ǮNorthern Groupǯ – i.e. 
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK – gov-
ernment representatives had taken place, but 
no formal process was established. In 2017, 
the JEF will constitute NATOǯs VJTF, with 
readiness to intervene in the Baltic States 
within 48 hours. As highlighted by the 
BALTOPS ͚͙͘͝ exercise, Swedenǯs participa-
tion in such an enterprise might prove deci-
sive, given its key geostrategic position. 
 
Discussion 
Maritime Security is increasingly important to 
the coastal states in the Baltic Sea region, 
which is why Sweden and Finland have taken 
leading roles in multinational co-operation on 
a range of issues, including sea surveillance. 
Here, considerations such as navigational 
safety, marine environmental protection and 
maritime spatial planning are complicated by 
Russiaǯs challenging and aggressive military 
conduct. Notwithstanding the real threat that 
Russia poses to the three Baltic States – vul-
nerable to the kind of hybrid warfare that 
Russia is using in Ukraine – incidents involving 
Russian air or naval craft could well escalate 
into military violence. This concern was raised 
by NATO Secretary General, Jens Stolten-
berg, during the Nordic Defence Ministers’ 
Meeting in Stockholm 10-11 November 2015 
(SvD 2015). 
Although they are non-aligned, Finland and 
Sweden could preferably act in concert with 
NATO to protect the Baltic States and Poland. 
Needless to say, this would require their ex-
tended involvement in joint capability build-
ing, training and exercises. NATOǯs regional 
exercise programme, including the Northern 
Coast series, the 2018 Trident Juncture High 
Visibility Exercise hosted by Norway, and the 
U.S. BALTOPS series are already in place.  
The Finnish-Swedish defence co-operation – 
spearheaded by their navies and founded on 
NATO standards and procedures – should not 
be seen as a political process isolated from 
the EU and NATO. Instead, their regionally 
focussed capability development is being 
pursued in tandem with those of the EU, 
NATO. James J. Townsend, U.S Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary of Defense for European and 
NATO Policy, stressed in February 2016 that 
the US Department of Defense refers to Swe-
den as a Ǯbuilding block in the wallǯ to deter 
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Russia (Holmström 2016). Furthermore, Ben-
jamin Hodges, Commander of the U.S. Army 
in Europe, declared that the U.S. wants to 
practice the deployment of key military 
equipment – such as Patriot missiles – from its 
bases in Europe to Sweden by air and sea 
(Stenquist 2016). 
 
Conclusion 
Fostering maritime security in the Baltic Sea 
region, with Russiaǯs emerging hybrid warfare 
strategy, will require co-operative and com-
prehensive efforts, in which navies are as-
signed leading roles. Therefore, besides their 
multinational regional security engagement, 
Finland and Sweden have launched domestic 
programmes to improve the co-ordination of 
civilian and military agencies with responsibil-
ities in the maritime domain. This involves 
legal challenges and the need for flexibility 
among their organisations. In order to reach a 
common and comprehensive end-state for 
the Baltic Sea region founded on the rule of 
law, states in the region must deepen their 
co-operation not only between navies but also 
between maritime law enforcement agencies. 
Stimulating challenges in terms of creating a 
dialogue to align disparate – and occasionally 
conflicting – civilian and military interests 
surely await military decision-makers, if poli-
cymakers task them with leading a compre-
hensive planning process aimed at securing 
the maritime domain.13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 For an argument on the educational and practi-
cal challenges inherent in implementing a truly 
comprehensive approach, using the NATO Com-
prehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD), 
see Lundqvist (2015B). 
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6. Concluding discussion 
– What is maritime security? I posed this research question when I first 
approached the concept by authoring a literature review for the Swedish Armed 
Forces (Lundqvist 2011). It proved to be the start of a complex and stimulating 
research project. The significance of the maritime domain to national prosperity, 
international politics and trade as well as environmental sustainability soon 
became clear. I noted that the deficit of maritime security in key regions resulted 
from multifaceted non-traditional threats, while the concept of maritime 
security was in transformation towards a more comprehensive definition – 
drawing on concepts of cooperative and common security. 
It spurred me to author Article 1 of this thesis, exploring key factors candidate 
to explain this change through the study of official documents, statistics and 
scholarly works. Comments on this article provided by a senior US naval 
strategist made me realise the need for considering also the influence of 
traditional maritime strategy objectives given priority by the US Navy and the US 
Marine Corps, materialising in the US Navy force structure. His key point was 
that certain objectives stated in US maritime security strategy documents would 
remain nothing but words – or peacetime activities for its expensive navy 
awaiting kinetic missions – if adequate resources did not support them. Clearly, 
the US Navy has maintained a focus on carrier strike groups through the entire 
period of study. These type of platforms are not optimal for operations at the 
lower level of the conflict spectrum, such as maritime security operations. These 
insights made me orient this thesis towards the study of continuity and change 
in the post-Cold War maritime security strategies employed by rational state 
actors, and examine them through the main lens of structural realism. 
The works of Buzan (1991a), Buzan et al. (1998) and Buzan and Wæver 
(2003) – expounding on and employing the analytical concepts of regional 
security complex theory and multi-sectoral security – convinced me to heed the 
regional dimensions of maritime security. This implied a focus on the 
interactions of weak and strong states in regions where traditional and non-
traditional security concerns interact in shaping their maritime security 
strategies. The five articles have presented the empirical, but also certain 
theoretical, results of this endeavour. Based on these findings, this concluding 
chapter discusses the answers to the four research questions through the 
theoretical lenses and frameworks set forth in Chapter 1 and draws aggregated 
conclusions:  
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 What explains continuity and change in the post-Cold War maritime 
security strategy of the US? 
 What lessons can we learn from the post-Cold War employment of 
maritime security strategies in the East and South China Seas? 
 What explains continuity and change in the post-Cold War maritime 
security strategy of Sweden and Finland? 
 What lessons can we learn from the post-Cold War employment of 
maritime security strategies in the Baltic Sea region? 
6.1. The continuity and change in the maritime security 
strategies of the US, Finland and Sweden 
This concluding section combines the findings of the empirical studies to 
provide a theory-driven explanation of the continuity and change in the maritime 
security strategies of the US, Finland and Sweden, while reflecting on factors 
relevant to explain the differences. Some key events characterised the initial 
period of study, including the break-up of the USSR in 1991 and the entry into 
force of the UNCLOS in 1994. In the mid-period, the 11 September attacks had a 
pivotal effect on their conceptual maritime security developments. As stated in 
Chapter 1, this thesis departed from the key assumption that the US post-Cold 
War conceptual maritime security developments of the US had influenced states 
worldwide. This assumption gained some empirical support in the findings of 
Article 1 and more solid backing in Article 2. We will discuss the results below. 
6.1.1. The US 
The results outlined in Article 2 show that throughout the period of study, the 
maritime security concept expressed in US national strategies sometimes 
differed from those expressed in its service strategies. At the outset of the period 
studied, the US maritime security concept was consistently cast in terms of 
ensuring deterrence and secure access by sea for power projection purposes, 
facilitated by naval missions together with its NATO allies. The strategies of the 
US Navy and the US Marine Corps maintained this traditional conceptual 
understanding until it eventually changed by the 2007 A Cooperative Strategy 
for 21st Century Seapower, representing the first joint service strategy including 
the US Coast Guard. 
This traditional concept, firmly embedded in US balance of power 
considerations relative the USSR, is well explained by structural realism and its 
expectations that states perceiving high security pressure will favour military 
240
  
 
power to economic power. The robust network of global maritime trade – 
sustained by US sea power and linking the world’s richest states – was seen as 
instrumental in winning the Cold War by making them end up on its side. Here, 
the subsidy Maritime Security Program for US flag oceangoing ship owners and 
operators, making their ships and crews available to the US Department of 
Defense for sealift operations in times of war or national emergencies, is 
instructive on the continuity of traditional security considerations in the US post-
Cold War maritime security concept. 
This concept was integral also to the US aim to consolidate its position as the 
sole superpower in the 1990s, seeking to preclude any hostile power from 
dominating any region critical to US interests while preventing the re-emergence 
of a global threat to its interests or those of its allies. It correlates with structural 
realism’s predictions on the behaviour of a state having achieved the level of 
security that comes with the systemic position of a hegemon. In this period, it is 
clear that the US maritime security concept centred on the role of the maritime 
domain as a medium of dominion and transportation. 
Accordingly, the US duly considered the need for maritime access to project 
power ashore in the UNCLOS negotiations. They catered for this by enforcing 
what would be its provisions on the principles of freedom of the seas, the right 
to innocent passage of states’ territorial waters and the right to passage through 
international straits. Thereto, the US relaunched its Freedom of Navigation 
Program in 1990, aimed at protecting US navigation, overflight and interests 
over, under and on the seas. The 1994 entry into force of UNCLOS did not alter 
the US traditional maritime security conception. However, it raised the stakes for 
states’ maritime resource extraction and increased the tension between the US 
Freedom of Navigation (FON) requirements and other coastal states’ desire to 
exercise their national jurisdiction. It also increased the tendency among states 
on a global scale to regard the sea as a resource, a factor explaining much of the 
conceptual maritime security developments of the 1990s. 
In accordance with structural realism predictions, the military needs for 
including also littoral areas among the areas that must be dominated to establish 
sea control well explain the geographical widening in the altered maritime 
security concept of the US. The change was due to the military area denial 
capabilities of potential adversaries’ in Asia and the Middle East, required to 
allow for US hedging or containment strategies. It also explains the US 
continuous capability needs for establishing sea control to reassure US allies 
such as Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan. Here, China and an 
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increasingly threatening North Korea – engaged in acquiring ballistic nuclear 
weapons capabilities – represented their common concerns. Structural realism 
accounts for the reaction of the sole superpower to the 11 September 2001 
attacks – launched in a context of low international security pressure – by 
engaging in a “war on terrorism” to fend off the sudden and harsh attack on its 
cultural, political and economic identity. Notably, most of the US post-
millennium legal, commercial and diplomatic initiatives taken to secure the 
maritime domain have been directly linked to this war. One could thus rightly 
argue that the US benefitted more than other states from a successful, 
coordinated, effort to fight transnational terrorism. 
As shown in Article 2, it is clear that the US throughout the period of study 
used its power and economic leverage to influence its allies and trading partners 
– bilaterally as well as by influencing international institutions – to accept, 
implement and even bear most of the costs for those measures identified by US 
authorities as required to prevent any unauthorised entry of people66 or 
prohibited goods67 into the US via shipping. This empirical finding supports the 
structural realist prediction that a great power will seek to influence: i) 
international trade patterns and alter them in their favour; ii) international 
institutions in order to reduce their transaction costs and improve the protection 
of their property rights. It is also clear that the domestic Homeland Security 
measures introduced in the US were the ones that the US with apparent success 
exported to its allies and trading partners. Structural realism’s idea of 
“bandwagoning for profit” is instructive to why they volunteered to implement 
costly US arrangements such as the Container Security Initiative, the Megaports 
Initiative and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism. 
The perceived threat of maritime terrorism – framed by the US as common to 
all states in a globalised world centred on itself as the leading trader – serves to 
explain the partial success of the US efforts to create and sustain the navy 
contributions to the “war on terrorism”, e.g. by the multilateral Global Maritime 
Partnership68 initiative. Given that the maritime transport sector’s share of 
world trade had consistently amounted to 90 percent, providing an adequate 
level of maritime security was indispensable to the US. Although the number of 
maritime terrorist attacks was low, the effects of those carried out had proven 
                                                          
66 I.e. illegal migrants and terrorists. 
67 I.e. WMD-related items/substances, weapons and drugs. 
68 Introduced by USN Admiral Mullen in 2005 as “the 1,000-ship Navy” initiative to foster 
global maritime security. 
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their adverse influence on regional and global trade. The progressive emphasis 
in US national and maritime strategies on providing systemic stability is striking. 
Since 2005, an emphasis on the US role as the guarantor of the international 
system – called upon to lead its allies and partners in a cooperative effort to this 
end – pervaded its national and service strategies. This, in turn, required a 
systemic and collective understanding of US security – and thus its maritime 
security. The 2007 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower was the 
pivotal maritime strategy, clearly influenced by a broader concept of security. 
N.B. the priority assigned by the US to its long-term economic gains was 
premised on limited international security pressure. At this time, both China and 
the US recognised the need for maritime security in the East and South China 
Seas to promote their maritime-related economies, while they played out their 
competition mainly in the political-economic domain. 
One could argue that neoliberalism is best suited to explain the assignment of 
the international system as a referent object to US security by drawing on the 
role of interdependence, international free trade and state prosperity to peace. 
Structural realism, however, offers convincing explanations. Notably, security 
pressure was low in the first two decades of the period of study. As shown in 
Articles 1 and 2, the post-Cold War era was marked by intense global economic 
competition, and it is striking that the US placed emphasis on protecting 
international maritime security in order to protect the international trade 
system and the liberal order while actively competing with inter alia China to 
secure preferential trade agreements. Based on these findings, we can conclude 
that the US made intertemporal trade-offs between its short- (i.e. economic 
power) and long-term (i.e. military power) requirements while continuously 
seeking relative gains. Accordingly, the low international security pressure gave 
way to a focus on economic power in a globalised world, which sea-borne trade 
faced increasing threats from the activities of certain non-state actors. This 
explains why the US chose to engage in multi-sectoral international maritime 
security cooperation, i.e. assigning priority to non-military dimensions of 
maritime security and promoting collective security. 
We can also conclude that – in accordance with structural realism predictions 
– the US assigned key roles to international organisations such as the IMO, the 
World Customs Organization (WCO), the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to 
foster international maritime security in the wake of the 11 September 2001 
events. The reason for influencing these institutions was their utility as tools for 
promoting US national interests, and the global support was served by the 
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principle that by implementing security measures all states obtained absolute 
gains. The US, however, also obtained relative gains. In respect of being the 
world’s top trading nation until 2012, when China took over this position, the US 
gained more than the rest of improved global maritime security. 
We can draw two conclusions from the implications on the type of activities 
performed under the maritime security banner by the transformation of the US 
maritime security concept, visualised below in Figure 7. First, the US Coast Guard 
played a decisive role in the successful transfer of US Homeland Security 
initiatives to US allies and trade partners through internal staff work in key 
international organisations. It also played a decisive role in convincing small 
Southeast Asian states that resuming security cooperation with the US would 
bring mutual benefits. Given that China in 2007 was increasingly cast as a peer 
competitor to the US by its economic and military rise, fuelled by its deepening 
economic and political interactions with the ASEAN as a body and its member 
states, the widespread regional scepticism towards its Global Maritime 
Partnership initiative posed a US concern. 
Eventually, the US Coast Guard bilateral cooperation initiatives with ASEAN 
members and China’s increasing diplomatic assertiveness, including China’s use 
of the fleets of its Maritime Law Enforcement agencies to promote its marine 
resource extraction, paved the way for an increased US maritime security 
engagement in Southeast Asia including naval cooperation. In 2008, the focus of 
US maritime security activities had hence shifted towards the low end of the 
conflict spectrum, i.e. maritime security operations where the US Navy provided 
support to its law enforcement agencies. The US Coast Guard concept for 
Southeast Asia was not new. Instead, it was a concept proven through years of 
engagements to counter drugs- and people smuggling in the Caribbean. 
Gradually, the US managed to include the military dimension of maritime 
security cooperation with most Southeast Asian states through a range of 
exercise series. Politically, the US declared its “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific region, 
emphasising its maritime character and recognising its role to global economy 
and politics. 
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Figure 7: The altered focus of US activities on the maritime security spectrum 
1991–2015. Source: Adapted from NRC (2008: 129). 
Second, we can conclude that the US maritime security activities in Southeast 
Asia have had a dual character. On the one hand, throughout the period of study 
China and the US have been dependent on an uninterrupted global 
transportation system to prosper, while their relations have been – and still are 
– marked by a significant level of economic interdependence. Accordingly, 
various maritime strategic documents from 2005 to 2008 conceptualised 
maritime security as a requirement for sustained globalisation and the 
establishment of collective ends that went beyond states’ selfish pursuit of their 
national interests. Here, maritime security operations addressing common 
threats at the lower end of the conflict spectrum served to build trust and 
cultural understanding, especially when performed by law enforcement 
agencies. This mechanism – readily explained by structural realism as the 
strategy of a responsible superpower that is consolidating a world order in 
accordance with its political ideology and national preferences – is duly 
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considered also in the 2015 document A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready. 
On the other hand, structural realism’s predictions that great powers will seek 
to maximise its power and adjust the amount of power politics in its foreign 
policy accordingly – e.g. through influencing the creation or change of 
international norms in line with its interest – are confirmed by the US 
appreciation of and response to China since 2007. This has profound 
implications for the US maritime security concept, involving a renewed emphasis 
on traditional security concerns (see Figure 7 above). It is not a return to its 
1991 concept. Instead, US maritime security has become a comprehensive 
concept in which the military sector takes a dominant position while permeating 
the management of other sectors of security.  
As shown in Article 2, the 2015 Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy 
fleshes out the US appreciation of the growing maritime security complexity of 
the Asia-Pacific. This document also illustrates the dual character of the concept. 
As opposed to the collective ends expressed in the 2015 A Cooperative Strategy 
for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready, the traditional maritime 
security objectives set by this Department of Defense strategy focus on 
safeguarding the freedom of the seas, deterrence and promoting adherence to 
international law – while explaining why they represent US national interests. It 
designates China as the actor inducing regional maritime insecurity through 
incremental steps aimed at gaining control over disputed islands; i.e. engaging in 
land reclamation, constructing advanced military installations, coercing its rivals 
and performing unsafe manoeuvres by ships and aircraft. 
In tandem with the increasing security pressure in the East and South China 
Seas, the US has moved upwards on the realist ladder of strategies. It is clear 
though, that the US still pursues an engagement strategy combing hedging by 
deterrence with elements of reassurance (see Figure 8 below). 
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Figure 8: The US current position vis-à-vis China on structural realism’s ladder 
of strategies. Source: Adapted from Tang (2010: 104). 
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The US altered maritime strategy versus China conforms to structural 
realism’s expectations of a state experiencing a heightened level of security 
pressure (see Figure 3). This involves a tendency towards perceiving a situation 
of strategic rivalry vis-à-vis its peer competitor inducing possibility rather than 
probability calculations of conflict, and assigning priority to military readiness 
although in this case it may compromise its trade with China. N.B. this important 
change in the US 2015 maritime strategy document – adopted at military service 
level – is clearly reflected in the US subsequent 2015 Asia-Pacific Maritime 
Security Strategy, a component of its grand strategy. 
6.1.2. Finland and Sweden 
In 1991, Finland and Sweden did not embrace the concept of maritime 
security in their national or service strategies. Notwithstanding, typical maritime 
security tasks were included in the still highly valid operations type “protection 
of shipping” in tactical doctrines. The maritime security concept was introduced 
by the measures they were bound to implement due to IMO’s adoption of the 
ISPS Code. Their gradual implementation of the concept has followed the path of 
the EU rather than national ones. Seen through a structural realism lens, it 
follows from their limited power to influence neither the maritime strategies of 
the EU, in which they are members since 1995, nor those of the US. Until 2013, 
there was no need for them to develop national strategies on this issue-area 
marked by global credentials. This was simply because the Baltic Sea was a sea 
of peace and cooperation, which maritime challenges centred on issues of sea 
safety and environmental sustainability. Accordingly, Finland and Sweden have 
willingly contributed navy and coast guard resources to promote maritime 
security in the EU-led military crisis management operation European Union 
Naval Force Operation (EUNAVFOR) Atalanta in the waters off Somalia. 
In respect of possessing the longest coastlines Finland and Sweden have, as 
shown in Articles 3 through 5, shouldered much responsibility for establishing 
bi- and multilaterally shared maritime domain awareness in the Baltic Sea. 
Thereto, their leading roles in the Baltic Marine Environment Protection 
Commission (the Helsinki Commission [HELCOM]) and the EU Natura 2000 
network, establishing vast nature protection areas, illustrate their efforts to 
contribute to the environmental management of the Baltic Sea.69 Here, the EU’s 
                                                          
69 I.e. the governing body of the 1974 Convention on the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (the Helsinki Convention). The right of EU member 
states to assign protected maritime Natura 2000 areas is founded on the EU Council’s 
1992 Habitats Directive and the 1979 Birds Directive. 
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comprehensive 2014 Maritime Security Strategy represents a capstone 
document outlining the maritime dimension of EU’s maritime policy, in turn 
being the partial result of a process aimed at turning the EU into a strategic 
foreign policy actor. 
In conclusion, Finland and Sweden have refrained from developing national 
concepts of maritime security but incorporated that of the EU, in turn influenced 
by that of the US. These two EU member states have placed emphasis on 
maritime governance, blue growth opportunities and marine environmental 
protection. Since 2014, however, traditional military concerns superimpose 
their maritime security calculus, with an emphasis on defence and deterrence. 
Accordingly, changing circumstances related to a more assertive Russia – the 
regional power that has dimensioned their defence capabilities in much of 
modern history – have forced them to react. As shown in Articles 3 through 5, 
they have responded by deepening their bilateral naval cooperation, including 
far from insignificant elements of maritime security strategy in their vision 
document for the Swedish-Finnish Naval Task Group (SFNTG). Notably, the 2023 
objective for the SFNTG represents a joint re-establishment of their national Cold 
War protection of shipping capabilities, but spanning a wider range of civilian 
maritime activities. Finland and Sweden have identified the need for a regional 
maritime security strategy that, as shown in Article 3, centres on managing the 
effects of great power competition and interaction. 
6.2. Lessons learned from recent employments of maritime 
security strategies in regions where traditional and non-
traditional security threats converge 
Despite the differing geopolitical70 characteristics of the two regions subject 
to study in this thesis, certain aspects of the maritime security problems 
addressed by their coastal states and those of the external great power US are 
common. Such a common denominator is the fact that traditional and non-
traditional security threats converge in shaping the character of their maritime 
security challenges. Another is that the traditional threats stem from the rise of 
regional powers challenging the current hegemon – external to both regions, but 
allied with several coastal states in each of the regions that perceive themselves 
increasingly threatened by the regional challenger – potentially capable of 
                                                          
70 Following Cohen (2003: 12), this thesis understands geopolitics as “the analysis of the 
interaction between, on the one hand, geographical settings and perspectives and, on the 
other, political processes”. 
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inducing a change in the order of the international anarchic system. In order to 
suggest viable strategies for preserving peace and stability in the Baltic Sea 
region, we can learn certain lessons from the developments in the East and South 
China Sea region. 
6.2.1. The East and South China Seas 
Arguably, the maritime security of the East and South China Sea region are 
subsets of that of the larger Asia-Pacific region. Here, maritime powers Australia, 
China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan interact with each other and the US, but 
so do also the rising power India, which maritime security interests – as part of 
a more vigorous Indian foreign policy – now extends beyond the Indian Ocean 
and the South China Sea into the Western Pacific (see Collin 2016).  
As shown in Article 2 of this thesis, the coastal states of the East and South 
China Sea region have been particularly active in promoting national interests 
and economic growth through bi- and multilateral cooperation initiatives and 
trade agreements, but also of linking them to security. While the level of distrust 
and rivalry between many of them has thwarted bi- and multilateral defence-
industrial cooperation, the ASEAN has taken on lead roles in fostering dialogues 
on trade and managing threats at the low end of the conflict spectrum, such as 
the region’s widespread piracy and the smuggling of drugs and arms. The high 
level of irregular migration in the region – which links to security have been 
thoroughly addressed in the constructivist literature (see Chapter 2) – stands 
out as a major challenge. The activities of Islamic groups have been troubling 
phenomena in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines throughout the period of 
study. In addition to criminal groups, there are numerous examples on their 
engagement in armed robbery at sea, maritime piracy, ship hijacking, as well as 
terrorist plots and attacks on cruise ships and military vessels in the period of 
study. 
As shown in Article 2, the main and intractable traditional security problems 
of the East and South China Seas that include a maritime security dimension and 
directly involve the US through its security guarantees are: i) the military 
(nuclear) threat posed by North Korea, directed primarily towards South Korea 
and Japan; ii) the China-Taiwan conflict; iii) the Chinese build-up of its Maritime 
Law Enforcement agency capacity, anti-access area denial, submarine and blue 
water naval capabilities, territorial assertiveness and appetite for marine 
resources in the South China Sea and its biased interpretation of international 
maritime law; and iv) the build-up of naval capabilities among the other coastal 
states of the region. We can add to this list the uncertainty of the India-China and 
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India-US relations, which may prove stabilising or destabilising for the security 
of this maritime region. 
In conclusion, patterns of economic and maritime security cooperation on 
managing non-traditional threats superimpose patterns of national rivalry over 
resources, territory and influence as well as naval power in the East and South 
China Sea region. Thereto, as shown in Article 2, it is apparent that – in line with 
structural realism predictions – the amount of power politics in the foreign 
policy of China increases in tandem with the increase in its military power. As a 
result, the notable – although not always successful – role of the 
intergovernmental ASEAN in issues of low politics such as economics, trade, 
social affairs and the management of non-traditional security issues in the last 
decades. However, its role in managing issues of high politics – i.e. issues of 
traditional military security – has been marginal, a fact apparent in the territorial 
disputes and the increasing security pressure affecting its member states. 
In reflection on Till’s conceptualisation of the sea (see Section 2.1), the roles 
of the East and South China Seas have consistently served as a resource and a 
medium: i) of transportation and exchange; ii) for information and the spread of 
ideas; and iv) of dominion. 
In accordance with structural realism’s prediction that states will assign low 
priority to non-security objectives in times of high security pressure, small and 
medium powers in this region have sought to maintain their economic 
relationships with China while deepening their security relationships with the 
US, regardless of ideology. Among them, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam – 
signing a US strategic partnership in 2013 – stands out. So do the ongoing process 
of changing the Japanese post-WW2 pacifist constitution (McCurry 2016) and 
the US-Philippines 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, leading up 
to the Philippines’ March 2016 decision to once again allow for permanent US 
military presence by rotational deployments. To the south, as shown in Article 2, 
Australia’s post-2012 enhanced security ties with the US including US military 
deployments – which stands in bright contrast to its close economic ties with 
China – are due to fears of the latter becoming a regional hegemon.  
Given this trend, it is likely that states in this region will continue to conform 
to structural realism predictions and give priority to autonomy seeking over 
influence seeking policies if the level of security pressure increases further. 
Accordingly, many will disregard ideology and national sentiments that may 
disfavour the presence of US military personnel on their territories in their 
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subordination of other requirements to military power. As a result, we can 
expect that the role of ASEAN will be further diminished and that the states of 
the wider Asia-Pacific region will more or less continue the process of aligning 
with either the US or China. The lack of reference to the recent ruling of the 
international tribunal on the China-Philippines territorial dispute in the final 
statement of the 28th and 29th ASEAN Summits of September 2016, following 
intense Chinese diplomacy, is indicative on this (Crowe 2016). 
Here, the conceptual framework for structuring the analysing the relations 
between small states and a nearby great power engaged in power rivalry with a 
more distant great power (see Section 3.2.4) is useful. As shown in Article 2, 
structural realism’s prediction that a regional power will put pressure on weaker 
states in the region and minimise their options when security pressure is high is 
confirmed by China’s use of its economic leverage through a divide and rule 
strategy to break up ASEAN’s unity on the territorial disputes in the South China 
Sea. The case of the Philippines’ loss of control over disputed territory to China 
following the Scarborough Shoal standoff is illustrative on the way China uses 
the capabilities of its maritime law enforcement agencies in combination with 
those of its navy. The Philippines – openly promoted by the US and Vietnam – did 
not redraw its submission the territorial disputes with China from the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, which ruled in its favour in July 2016.  
As shown in Article 2, the case of Vietnam is indicative on the effect of the 
Chinese pressure and perhaps an attempt to performance a balancing act 
between China and the US, since it has not followed suit with the Philippines and 
submitted its territorial disputes with China to this court. Its careful official 
comments to the ruling, contrasting those of geographically more distant 
Indonesia and Singapore, are instructive on its efforts to manage the Chinese 
pressure and avoid confrontation. This points to the influence of the geographic 
location of the small state relative the regional great power, as set forth by the 
framework, and the influence of their historical record of bilateral relations. The 
China-Vietnam relations have been turbulent throughout history, well-
illustrated by their 1974 naval engagement resulting in China gaining control 
over the Paracel Islands (Fravel 2011: 298). However, China was a strategic ally 
of North Vietnam in the US-Vietnam War while the former US colony Philippines 
is a long-standing US ally. We must also bear in mind that China shares a 1,450 
km border with Vietnam (VBN 2016). Accordingly, we can expect that China is 
considering the possibility that the US would use Vietnam’s territory for its 
purposes unacceptable, while it finds the US use of that of the Philippines 
undesired. 
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A key lesson learned from the East and South China Seas is that to overcome 
“the stopping power of water” emphasised by Mearsheimer (2001: 114), the US 
has sought to employ a well-crafted comprehensive maritime strategy 
embracing civilian as well as military agencies. As noted in Article 2, the 2007 A 
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower served to reassure China by the 
emphasis placed on the cooperative dimensions of maritime security. This 
concept provided not so obvious benefits to an external great power in the 
backyard of a rival regional great power. Through its increasingly ambitious 
maritime security activities the US became capable not only to assist its allies and 
partners in policing the seas, but also gained a military foothold in a region in 
which China was establishing the capability to prevent regional access by the US 
Navy and the US Marine Corps. Here, the employment of US Coast Guard 
capabilities in the South China Sea as a part of the US “pivot” paved the way for 
military deployments, initially providing support to its law enforcement agencies 
but gradually expanding their scope to include also naval dimensions.  
Another lesson learned is that to manage the complex maritime security 
challenges of the East and South China Seas, US allies and partners agreed to 
contribute to establish shared maritime domain awareness, each to a level of 
information sharing which satisfied their needs and their command, control, 
computers, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
(C4ISR) systems capabilities.71 As noted in Article 2, close allies share secret 
information of the entire spectrum through the implemented multilevel 
information architecture, while less trusted partners only have access to an 
unclassified “shared information space” and a “user-defined operational picture” 
suitable for law enforcement agencies. By implementing such differing 
information security regimes across the maritime security spectrum, the US has 
managed to obtain all information while it controls that of each participant. 
Since superior maritime domain awareness is a prerequisite for the US 
establishment of “command of the seas” and the projection of naval and air 
power ashore, the layered information management concept implemented in the 
region under the banner of “maritime security partnership” serves well its 
maritime strategy. The concept leverages the US information superiority, why it 
has become a prescription for obtaining success in other maritime regions of 
importance, serving its quest for continued global leadership. 
  
                                                          
71 Arguably, these military capabilities shape the modern battlefield. 
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6.2.2. The Baltic Sea 
As noted in Articles 3 through 5, the Baltic Sea is a distinct region in which the 
interaction of its coastal states – Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Russia and Sweden – shape its maritime security. All of them, 
except Russia, are members of the EU while the Baltic States, Denmark, Germany 
and Poland are members of NATO. The Baltic States, Finland and Poland forms 
the Eastern boundary of the Schengen Area in which internal border controls has 
been eliminated since 1995, but of which Sweden has temporary reintroduced 
them since November 2015 to manage the migration crisis (EC 2016b). In 
contrast to the East and South China Seas, access to the Baltic Sea is limited to 
the single shallow gateway made up of the narrow Øresund and the Great and 
Little Belt straits.  
As shown in Articles 3 through 5, Finland and Sweden have been particularly 
active in promoting bi- and multilateral cooperation on sea surveillance. Until 
2014, regional maritime security management centred on navigational safety, 
resource exploitation and protecting the vulnerable eco-system of the Baltic Sea, 
i.e. maritime governance. Since 2005, it is designated a “particularly sensitive sea 
area” by the International Maritime Organization and thus subject to particular 
measures, i.e. routing and traffic monitoring of shipping and pollution control 
(IMO 2016). The Baltic Sea is distinguished for the absence of piracy, armed 
robbery and maritime terrorist attacks. However, Sweden has had to deal with 
cases of illegal migration by sea since 2015, while Finnish and Swedish police 
have suspected that representatives of human trafficking networks of the 
Mediterranean operate in their countries (Ekstrand 2015; TT 2016a). In 
conclusion, these non-traditional security concerns have been the focus areas of 
their maritime security policies throughout the period of study. 
Given the multinational – and partly transnational – characters of these 
threats to sustainable maritime governance and exploitation of marine 
resources, it is apparent that Finland and Sweden have considered their national 
interests best promoted by engagement in wider Baltic Sea and EU frameworks. 
One could rightly argue that this provides support to typical neoliberalism 
predictions that international institutions and regimes to constrain state 
behaviour and manage state interaction, that ideological preferences prevail in 
states’ foreign policy, and that states seek absolute gains while focussing on 
economics and other non-military issues. It also points to the importance 
assigned by them to the rule of law. Notwithstanding, also structural realism 
predicts that weaker states will seek to mitigate or prevent domination by 
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stronger powers by negotiating collaborative arrangements in inter- or 
supranational institutions. In this quest, the EU was the given arena for Finland 
and Sweden.  
As shown in Article 3, neofunctionalism explains the motives and interests 
that led to the 2013 launch of a process by the two chiefs of their navies aimed 
at integrating the navies of Finland and Sweden within the framework of the 
Swedish-Finnish Naval Task Group. This need for bilateral military cooperation 
within the NORDEFCO framework was not due to external threats. Instead, the 
need to become more cost-efficient and maintain critical capabilities in response 
to aggregated and foreseen defence cuts was the main motive. 
Neofunctionalism’s idea of functional and technical spillover effects between 
different issue-areas explains the dynamics at the time they launched the 
cooperation. Notably, the wider framework of the EU and its Common Foreign 
and Security Policy was a prerequisite for this process. Both this policy – 
adopted in 1991 and thus coinciding with the Cold War termination – and the 
subsequent 2003 European Security Strategy – focussing on cooperative security 
on a global scale – were premised on a benign security environment in Europe 
and the continued global military dominance of the US. 
The post-2013 developments contrast these collaborative views on maritime 
security in the Baltic Sea region. They suggest that while its role as a resource 
and a medium of transport and trade persist, the Baltic Sea is increasingly seen 
as a medium that must be controlled and dominated. 
As shown in Articles 3 through 5, the US pivot to the Asia-Pacific was being 
effectuated in 2014 and its military presence in Europe was already reduced. 
Within NATO, member states spent much effort on discussing who would pay for 
the defence capabilities of Europe. In this context, Russia’s March 2014 
annexation of Crimea was a “game-changer” altering the security calculus of the 
EU and NATO, while restoring US interest in European security. Russia’s 
demonstrated capability to effectuate its will by force made earlier statements 
by President Putin on a new security order – e.g. that of the 43rd Munich 
Conference on Security Policy in 2007 – credible and the European security 
landscape swiftly embraced geopolitical dimensions. Russia’s build-up of anti-
access area denial capabilities and modernised nuclear weapons, e.g. in the 
Kaliningrad exclave, now posed a tangible threat to NATO-members on its 
Eastern flank. Russia’s much noted deployment of Iskander-M missile systems 
from the Saint Petersburg region to Kaliningrad on 7–8 October 2016 illustrates 
the role of the maritime domain to the security of the Baltic Sea region. Russia 
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used the M/V Ambal to deploy the missile systems, escorting it by SU-27 fighter 
aircraft of which some repeatedly violated Estonian and Finnish airspace 
(Holmström 2016c). 
As shown in Articles 4 and 5, Russia’s military modernisation and renewed 
assertiveness in the Baltic Sea region has become a regional, as well as a global, 
security problem. The weak national defence capabilities of the Baltic States and 
their: i) limited territorial size; ii) common borders with Russia; and iii) Russian 
minorities; render them particularly vulnerable to Russian conventional and 
hybrid warfare. Withal, given the security guarantees NATO and the US have 
granted them, their survival is crucial to the credibility of the former. We must 
also consider the vulnerability of Poland, a NATO-member bordering the 
Kaliningrad exclave that has taken a series of measures to improve its defence 
capabilities. NATO and the US have launched multiple initiatives to improve 
deterrence, e.g. the 2014 US Operation Atlantic Resolve (part of its European 
Reassurance Initiative), the setup of the NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task 
Force and the raised ambitions of various exercise series. 
The defence of these NATO-members has obvious maritime implications. 
While a maritime logistics chain has the advantages that come with the load 
capacity of ships, amphibious landings may be required in a scenario at the high-
end of the conflict spectrum to deploy reinforcements or to retake occupied 
territory. Depending on the level of threat, command of the sea in the region may 
be required to provide adequate force protection and reach acceptable levels of 
risk to own forces when executing any such operation. Accordingly, Russia’s 
emerging anti-access area denial capacity poses a risk to allied naval forces, 
while an opposed entry through the narrow and shallow gateway to the Baltic 
Sea would be particularly risky. 
Notwithstanding the obvious challenges associated with crisis scenarios at 
the high-end of the conflict spectrum, Russia has induced multi-sectoral 
peacetime maritime insecurity in the Baltic Sea since 2013. As shown in Articles 
3 through 5, it has involved harassments of civilian shipping, intrusions of 
Finnish and Swedish territorial waters and airspace, as well as deliberate close 
encounters by military aircraft and naval vessels. Developments in 2016 include 
Russia being accused of distributed denial-of-service attacks on Swedish media 
(Kudo 2016), Swedish civilian air traffic control systems and the Finnish 
Parliament (Fagerström 2016), the spread of disinformation (Holmström 
2016a) as well as espionage (TT 2016b). In response, NATO has raised the stakes 
regarding military deployments and by engaging in increasingly advanced 
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exercises in the Baltic Sea region (as in the rest of Northern Europe), aimed at 
deterring Russia. While Finland and Sweden have actively participated in these 
exercises, Finland joined the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of 
Excellence in Latvia in June 2016 and Sweden decided to follow suit in 
September 2016 (NATO 2016d; TT 2016c). 
The conceptual framework for structuring the analysis of relations between a 
small state and a nearby great power engaged in power rivalry with a more 
distant great power (see section 3.2.4) is useful also to explain the security 
dynamics of the Baltic Sea region. Concerning the first independent variable, 
Russia’s growing power corresponds with its increasingly assertive foreign 
policy – as predicted by structural realism. This has induced geopolitical tensions 
with its rival external great power (the US), which influence it would like to 
reduce in the regional “sphere of interest” in which Russia apparently seeks to 
acquire a level of economic, military, political and to some extent even cultural 
exclusivity. Recently, analysts (see Ma 2016) have pointed to the gap between 
Russia’s military and economic power, of which the latter is far from impressive. 
Notwithstanding, a recent US Office of Naval Intelligence (2015) report 
concludes that although being plagued by production problems, Russia’s build-
up of a multi-purpose naval force continues at a steady pace. 
Concerning the second independent variable, it is clear that Russia uses its 
economic and military power as a lever to influence the foreign policies of its 
neighbours. Here, as shown in Article 3, Finland’s 1,340 km common land border 
with Russia means higher risks and sensitivities than for Sweden. Given recent 
developments, we can conclude that if stakes get higher this factor will be more 
pronounced, which contributes to explain why Finland are more keen on seeking 
a formalised alliance with Sweden than vice versa. 
As concerns the third independent variable, Articles 3 through 5 show that 
both Finland and Sweden have transformed their foreign and security policies in 
the time period of study, from one of non-alignment aiming at neutrality in times 
of war to one of non-aligned EU-members engaged in deep partnerships with 
NATO. An explicit aim of their bilateral naval cooperation has been to send 
diplomatic signals on their resolve to protect their sovereignty and their national 
interests. This is evident by the facts that both states: i) have ensured that their 
navies fully operate according to NATO standards within the framework of the 
SFNTG; ii) host and deeply engage in high-profile NATO exercises, which 
objectives are associated with deterrence and the high-end of the conflict 
spectrum; and iii) carefully cultivate their bilateral relations with the US. 
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Notably, as shown in Article 5, Swedish Defence and Foreign Ministers have 
refrained from opposing statements by US military officials such as that Sweden 
represents a “building block in the wall” to deter Russia.  
To Russia, the impending probability that an external rivalling great power 
may use Finnish and Swedish territories must be apparent. In turn, this 
probability entails an underlying motive for Russia to influence their foreign 
policies and convince them to heed the risks associated with deepening their 
relations – not to mention aligning – with the US. This contributes to explain why 
Russia has engaged itself in multi-sectoral, peacetime, assertiveness and 
psychological operations in the Baltic Sea region since 2013. 
Concerning the fourth independent variable, it is clear that throughout 
modern history, the location of the Baltic Sea between Russia and the Atlantic 
Ocean have conditioned the geopolitics of the region. The conflicting views have 
centred on whether it should be a “mare liberum” open to external powers or a 
“mare clausum” strategically controlled by its littoral powers, i.e. Russia and until 
1991 the USSR (Miljan 1974). As shown in Articles 4 and 5, the Baltic Sea is vital 
for Russia’s oil and gas exports, its export of naval vessels including submarines 
and the use of container ships in its trade. A complicating factor for its maritime 
resource extraction is its very limited EEZ rights in the Baltic Sea, why its needs 
for influencing or controlling the policies of smaller coastal states are apparent. 
Withal, control over its sea lines of communication and military exercise areas 
are core Russian interests. 
As noted in a recent study on the effects of Finland’s possible NATO 
membership, “Finland and Sweden constitute a common strategic space” (MFA 
FI 2016: 6). From a geopolitical perspective, both states hold important strategic 
spaces in the Baltic Sea region, including the demilitarised Åland archipelago in 
the Northern Baltic Sea. As noted in Articles 3 and 4, the southern coast of 
Sweden is particularly useful for staging a military intervention in support of the 
Baltic States. The placement of modern air defence systems on the island of 
Gotland would effectively contribute to the military control of the Baltic Sea. 
From a Russian perspective, control of this territory would impede such a NATO 
intervention. These facts help explain the Swedish Armed Forces September 
2016 deployment of a mechanised infantry company to the island, reportedly 
motivated by a “significant deterioration” of the international security situation 
(SvD 2016). Here, the conditioner for the level of trust between Russia vis-à-vis 
Finland and Sweden, made up of their historical record relations, work against 
Russia. The relationship between these Western democracies and Russia have 
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been nothing but adversarial throughout modern history. During the Cold War, 
Finland was compelled to pursue a cautious policy towards the West since Russia 
“never truly accepted Finnish neutrality” (MFA FI 2016: 9–10). 
As noted in Articles 4 and 5, non-aligned Sweden and Finland have become 
deeply integrated with NATO and bilaterally linked to the US. From a Russian 
perspective, NATO membership applications by these states would therefore 
simply confirm the negative implications of their aggregated foreign and security 
policy choices. Finland’s and Sweden’s joint signing and implementation of Host 
Nation Support agreements with NATO have clearly fuelled the Russian concern 
that they would allow NATO – and thus the US – to use their territories in a crisis. 
Prior to Sweden’s May 2016 parliamentary decision on its implementation, 
Russian agents were particularly active in spreading systematic disinformation 
aimed at postponing the decision (Holmström 2016b). In July 2016, the Russian 
President hinted on how Russia’s would react if Finland joined NATO, i.e. that it 
would “move its troops closer to the Finnish-Russian border” to balance “NATO’s 
military infrastructure, which overnight would be at the borders of the Russian 
Federation” (Dyomkin and Forsell 2016).  
We noted in Articles 4 and 5 that access to Swedish and Finnish territory is 
critical to NATO and the US for establishing staging areas in case of a military 
intervention in the Baltic States. If so, NATO and the US highly desire access to 
information from their interconnected sea surveillance systems for establishing 
an adequate level of MDA in the Baltic Sea. Thereto, we must not disregard the 
value to NATO and the US of being able to make use of the naval niche capabilities 
of Finland and Sweden – interoperable with NATO forces – for their operations 
in these confined and shallow waters. Their far-reaching partnership 
arrangements with NATO and their deepened bilateral security cooperation with 
the US confirm the expectation set out in the introduction of this thesis that these 
small states – for the reasons above – are able to punch beyond their weight as 
regional security providers. The implications of this fact are particularly 
prominent in the maritime domain due to the importance of the Baltic Sea to 
transport and communication within the region. In conclusion, the security 
policy choices of Finland and Sweden centre on whether they will choose to 
openly challenge Russia by entering processes of accession to NATO, which risk 
creating an atmosphere of tense antagonism, or continue their “middle way” of 
close cooperation with NATO while putting their hope in a lowering of the 
regional security pressure.  
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Regardless of choice they must, as argued in Articles 3 through 5, protect their 
lawful maritime interest on a daily basis in peace-time scenarios. To mitigate the 
risk of being accused by Russia for escalating various types of incidents where 
civilian and military interests collide, Finland and Sweden need to implement a 
comprehensive approach. If existing maritime law enforcement units – ships and 
maritime patrol aircraft cross-manned by liaison officers – would be equipped 
with military command and control systems and weapons as appropriate, they 
would be well suited to act as first responders on incidents at the low end of the 
conflict spectrum. Of, course this would involve widening the scope of their 
maritime patrols as well as an increase in their intensity. Seamlessly, as done by 
China, naval vessels and aircraft could then be called upon to support if situations 
escalate. Here, active strategic communication – preferably coordinated 
bilaterally and with NATO as feasible – could counteract any attempts to spread 
misinformation. 
To establish a comprehensive and collaborative maritime security effort in 
the Baltic Sea, aimed at managing the lower end of the conflict spectrum, further 
legal amendments are required in Finland and Sweden but also on a regional 
scale among members of the EU and NATO. The ability of maritime law 
enforcement and military personnel of the region’s coastal states to use of force 
on each other’s territorial waters would significantly leverage the effectiveness 
of existing capabilities. However, as suggested in Article 5, implementing a 
comprehensive approach among civilian and military agencies on a national 
and/or multinational scale is a daunting legal and cultural challenge. In the view 
of this author, as concluded in Article 5, it may require transformational learning 
processes among the personnel of all services. 
6.3. Aggregated conclusions 
This section serves to present the aggregated conclusions drawn from 
answering the research questions, divided into empirical and theoretical 
conclusions respectively. 
6.3.1. Aggregated empirical conclusions 
In this thesis, we have noted close relation between the US 1991 concept of 
maritime security and that of sea power. Arguably, it was as a naval approach to 
manage national security problems. It draws back to the idea that “he who 
commandeth the sea is at great liberty and may take as much or as little of the 
war as he will”, coined in 1625 by the English philosopher and statesman Francis 
Bacon (cited in Friedman 2001: 4). N.B. it implies the utility of naval forces to 
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project power in distant regions of the world or use it as a defensive barrier off 
its own shores. As commonly known, the prominent maritime strategists USN 
Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan and British historian Sir Julian S. Corbett 
elaborated further on this thinking in their works. The fundamental role 
traditionally assigned to naval power in US strategic thought explains much of 
the continuity, but also much of the change, in its maritime security concept. Its 
employment may involve direct and/or indirect approaches with different 
strategic implications. While the direct approach centres on various types of 
kinetic action, the indirect approach involves more subtle dimensions such as 
naval presence, reassurance of allies as well as counter-piracy, embargo and FON 
operations. These types of activities shape the maritime domain, most often in 
peacetime. 
We can conclude that the use of sea power is at heart of the US maritime 
security concept, representing a thread of continuity. Change is due to shifts in 
focus regarding the domains for the US peacetime strategic competition with 
other major powers, in turn conditioned by the influence of altering economic 
and transforming security contexts. The absence of peer US military rivals in the 
1990s gave way for strategies aimed at reaping the benefits of the global trade 
system – dominated by merchant shipping while being increasingly threatened 
by various non-state actors perpetrating maritime crimes or terrorism for 
reasons of economic gain or political influence – by shaping it in its favour. 
Following the plots and attacks on USN vessels and the 11 September 2001 
attacks, the US used terrorism as a lever to implement Homeland Security 
initiatives among its allies and trading partners on a global scale through 
bilateral agreements (often linked to preferential trade agreements) and by 
influencing relevant international institutions. The rise of China and Russia in the 
2000s made them peer US competitors (and Russia a named adversary), whose 
shore and sea-based anti-access area denial capabilities posed increasingly 
severe threats to US naval access to the East and South China Seas and the Baltic 
Sea. Advanced shore-based coastal defence capabilities and non-traditional 
security threats necessitated the geographical widening of the sea areas in which 
maritime security were required. We can thus conclude that the return of 
geopolitics and military threats to world politics explains both the continuity and 
the most recent change in the US post-Cold War maritime security strategy. 
To promote its interests from the array of traditional and non-traditional 
maritime security threats in these regions, the US was dependent on cooperation 
with its regional allies and partners, large and small. Those who possessed 
geographic areas critical to promoting US national interests, while being willing 
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to offer basing areas, share information contributing to maritime domain 
awareness, engage in training and exercises while preferably also being subject 
to US free trade agreements were the ones who could punch beyond their weight 
in the regional security calculus. Their non-proportional influence on US 
employment of regional maritime strategies was clearly conditioned by an 
increase in the level of great power rivalry and their fear of the regional great 
power – resulting in willingness to side with the external great power by 
facilitating US peace-time access and intelligence information, and for partners 
to deepen their US/NATO partnership. Concerning partner countries Finland 
and Sweden, they also offered niche capabilities – of great value to the US – to 
respond by submarine and anti-submarine warfare in confined and shallow 
brackish waters. Finally, it is worth reflecting on the fact that the Swedish-
Finnish naval cooperation has rendered them a stronger partner in their often 
joint dialogues with the US and NATO. Article 2 of this thesis noted the power of 
joint small states action, as small states’ dominance of UN General Assembly 
influenced the US decision not to ratify the UNCLOS. 
6.3.2. Aggregated theoretical conclusions 
Given that structural realism is the main theoretical framework of this thesis, 
it is reasonable to pose the question: How can we know that its explanations are 
convincing? Article 3 showed that neofunctionalism provides credible 
explanations of the motives and processes underpinning the launch of the 
Finnish-Swedish naval cooperation. However, the distinction between high and 
low politics given primacy in neofunctionalism is outright dismissed by Waltz 
(2010[1979]: 94), since states “use military and political means for the 
achievement of economic interests” and vice versa. The causal direction of this 
mechanism is thus reversible, making it “misplaced” to explain state behaviour. 
To structural realism, states’ priorities are determined by the level of 
international security pressure, which was low in the Baltic Sea region in 1991–
2013. 
Neofunctionalism is an IR-theory designed to explain – and even instruct on – 
EU-integration. Hence, neoliberalism represents a more adequate competing 
theoretical framework for examining the US developments. Although this IR-
theory has not been employed in this thesis, we can expect that neoliberalism 
would offer complementary or competing explanations on the role of 
international bodies such as the IMO, the UN and the ASEAN, especially 
concerning the priority given to the political and economic sectors of security in 
the first two decades of the study. In particular, it would explain the 
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conceptualisation of maritime security as a requirement for sustained 
globalisation and the establishment of collective ends beyond states’ selfish 
pursuit of their national interests expressed in various maritime strategic 
documents from 2005 to 2008. N.B. security pressure was low also in the Asia-
Pacific region at this time. Although this perspective remains an important part 
of the US current maritime security concept, the most recent strategy documents 
place emphasis on traditional security considerations. 
It is equally clear that structural realism fares better than neofunctionalism 
in explaining the deepening of the Swedish-Finnish bilateral naval cooperation, 
resulting from a common external threat and influenced by Russia-US rivalry. 
The gradual emphasis of the naval dimension in their maritime security 
strategies, entailing revisions of legal frameworks including constitutional laws 
and intensified rapprochement to the US and NATO, have not been due to 
concerns of cost-efficiency but of sovereignty and to deter Russia. Structural 
realism readily explains the continuity in Finnish post-Cold War maritime 
security strategy as compared to Sweden by its common border with Russia and 
their historical record of conflict and submission. 
Concerning the South China Sea, we noted the weak response of 
intergovernmental ASEAN in dealing with individual member states’ territorial 
disputes with China in Article 2. The apparent limits of this regional organisation 
– characterised by socialisation processes and the norm of non-interference – to 
promote the interests of its members in face of a rising and increasingly assertive 
China is well illustrated by its vague response to the ruling of the International 
Tribunal in Hague on the China-Philippines case.72  
Regional organisations premised on liberal principles appear to be frail in 
times of high security pressure, weakening the explanations of liberalism 
theories and strengthening those of structural realism. Given the congruence 
between the predictions of structural realism and the empirical findings of this 
study, we can conclude that this framework provides convincing explanations to 
the most important aspects of continuity and change in the maritime security 
strategies of the US and EU member states Finland and Sweden. This despite the 
fact that its explanations are somewhat “indeterminate” on the role of domestic 
and systemic factors (see Waltz 1986: 343). 
                                                          
72 Although the ruling favoured the Philippines, its September 2016 Summit only gave a 
vague statement of on the concerns expressed by some member states on the Chinese 
assertion of its territorial claims (Crowe 2016). 
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6.4. Limitations and future studies 
In this qualitative study, as in all research, we have chosen and applied a 
methodology. Certain limitations in its results are thus unavoidable. This thesis 
employed the broad structural realism school of thought in its study of the sole 
superpower and two small states in two distinct regions subject to 
comprehensive maritime security challenges. It aimed at providing explanations 
not only to continuity and change in the post-Cold War maritime security 
strategies employed in the Baltic Sea region with a focus on non-aligned Finland 
and Sweden, but also to that of the US post-Cold War maritime security concept 
by examining its maritime security strategy developments. The degree of 
transferability of the empirical results depends on the nature and character of 
the maritime security problems in the two regions at hand. Given that much of 
the detailed findings are context dependent, we can expect them to differ widely. 
It is however clear that the influence of global trade has resulted in significant 
interdependence, which serves to explain why the US conceptual understanding 
of maritime security has influenced most states of the world. Thereto, the 
influence of a varying level of security pressure on the explanatory power of 
structural realism and neoliberalism has a certain level of generalisability. It is 
likely that the structural realism claim that when states face military threats to 
their sovereignty and survival, they will subordinate their economic and 
ideological interests has merit. In this regard, the agony shown by the current 
Swedish government when forced to deal with traditional security threats in its 
own region, centring on the role of NATO and collective defence, instead of 
focussing on contributing to EU-led global crisis management and state 
reconstruction activities is illustrative. As shown in Article 3, cross-case 
comparisons of neofunctionalism explanations on defence cooperation are 
possible within the EU. Since the origin of this theory coincides with European 
integration, comparisons are likely to be limited to this regional context. 
The comparison of the findings in the two distinct regions highlights the 
similarities of the constraints on the foreign policy of Finland and Vietnam in 
their relations to a regional great power. Moreover, certain aspects of the 
Philippines more daring behaviour in the face of the same regional power – 
which can be traced backed to its lack of common border with China and its 
alliance with the US – to some extent resembles the wider leeway Sweden enjoys 
in comparison to its Eastern neighbour Finland. In both cases, the states 
concerned are members of regional international bodies – i.e. ASEAN and the EU 
respectively. Here, further study on the interactions of Vietnam and the 
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Philippines and the continued role of ASEAN and their respective bilateral 
relations with the US seems like a promising project. 
For the Baltic Sea region, a longitudinal case study on the Swedish-Finnish 
naval cooperation, employing the theoretical framework used in Article 3, would 
provide answers to the prospects and challenges inherent in European defence 
cooperation. Concerning the far-flung plans on marine exploitation of the Baltic 
Sea including sea-based wind power parks, fish farming, offshore oil and gas 
extraction – well captured by the concept of Maritime Spatial Planning – a study 
on how the region’s coastal state approach the entanglement of civilian interests 
and military activities seems like a worthwhile endeavour. Here, one might pose 
the following research question: - what are the viable national strategies that 
enable blue growth in contested marine environments subject to the forces and 
interactions that follow from global interdependence? 
Finally, the foreign and security policy of the EU – an economic and political 
union subject to what some have described as an existential crisis (see Menéndez 
2013) – represents a fascinating object of study in its own respect. Here, we could 
employ a variety of theoretical perspectives to explain the current challenges 
and expound on its future prospects. As an extension of this study, a case study 
on the US conceptual influence on the 2014 European Union Maritime Security 
Strategy – and the shaping efforts made by individual member states including 
Finland and Sweden in the drafting process – would be most relevant. 
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